September 23, 2003 New York Times Troops in Iraq: More Isn't Better By DANIELLE PLETKA
BAGHDAD, Iraq - It has become almost an article of faith among Bush administration critics on both the left and right: more troops are needed to straighten out the "mess" in Iraq. Even President Bush is expected to repeat his call for other countries to contribute forces when he appears before the United Nations today. Few proponents, though, have stopped to explain just how flooding the country with more soldiers will fix the problems on the ground, accelerate the transfer of power to an elected Iraqi government, or pave the way for American troops to return home sooner. The answer is, it won't. Those arguing for more troops come from three schools of thought: the "share the burden" school of officials inside the Bush administration who want more troops, so long as they come from other countries; the conservative school of skeptics who are convinced that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's stinginess with manpower is harming the Iraq mission; and the school of fervent internationalists, who want to "legitimize" the Iraq occupation by sending in foreign troops to de-Americanize it. None have made the case that more occupying forces will be better. The two groups calling for deploying more foreign troops in Iraq ignore the obvious risks of an international force, even one under United States command. Muslim peacekeepers from Turkey or Pakistan will be viewed with hostility or contempt in Iraq. The Turks are despised by Kurds and Shiites alike; Pakistanis are identified, with some truth, as Wahhabi Islamist hardliners who will do more harm than good. Other nationalities present logistical nightmares that could nullify any burden-sharing benefit. Communications among Americans, Poles, Bulgarians and Fijians have already become a nightmare - different languages and rules of engagement and general confusion about responsibilities are par for the course. Worse yet, the United Nations' demand to internationalize the governance of Iraq will only delay the empowerment of Iraqis desperate to arrive at their moment of liberation. Those who advocate sending more American troops - mostly serious Iraq hawks like Senator John McCain and midlevel military commanders in Iraq - argue that is the only way the United States will be able to stabilize the country enough to move forward with democratization and genuine liberation. That demand rests on a false premise - that the additional troops would be used to battle resurgent Baathists and patch over the gaps in security that exist throughout Iraq. Rather, more Americans will end up doing jobs they ought to hand off, like guarding electrical lines and schools, policing neighborhoods and directing traffic in downtown Baghdad. It is true that commanders should be able, if they deem it necessary, to maximize the number of men and women hunting down Saddam Hussein and foreign terrorists. But that job is not growing in size: the number of engagements in Iraq have declined from roughly 25 a day in July to about 15 a day today - and each lasts for an average of two or three minutes. The problem American commanders in the field face is not too few troops, but too little intelligence to act upon. And that problem is getting better as well. In the months since the deaths of Uday and Qusay Hussein, more Iraqis have been stepping forward with information - leading United States forces to Baathist fugitives and arms caches. This is the kind of work United States forces need to be doing. The time has come to get American troops back to this core mission, and take them out of the night watchman game. But even if we weren't winning on the ground, the answer would not be to call up more reservists, but to train more Iraqis to do this kind of work. Indeed, virtually every task that could be done by additional American forces would be better assigned to Iraqis. Iraqis are directly plugged into intelligence. They speak the language, know the local population and are more sensitive to anomalies in behavior, dress and speech that give away bad actors. They are also perfectly capable of painting schools and directing traffic. Most important, a better Iraq will come about only if Iraqis themselves feel a sense of ownership. This is precisely what Pentagon officials and senior civilians are trying to achieve. Already, some 55,000 Iraqis have been trained and are under arms. According to the Pentagon and commanders in the field, the number should be close to 200,000 by the middle of next year. Five forces are being formed: the police, a border guard, a protection service for facilities (security guards), a national army and a civil defense corps. Recruiting goals for these forces are being exceeded. Members of Iraq's Governing Council have argued strenuously against an infusion of additional troops - American or otherwise. Already chafing at the cloying stewardship of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq's interim government is eager to take more responsibility for security and governance of the country. Unlike United States commanders - who some of Mr. Rumsfeld's skeptics in Washington say have been stifled by the secretary's lean transformation dream - the interim government has no vested interest in keeping United States troop levels down. Making the transition to an Iraqi security force is an imperative for the liberation of the country. But it should not be done cavalierly. Washington's willingness to grab former Baathists and Saddam Hussein's security thugs and press them back into service is an enormous mistake, as is the selection of a new "interior minister," Nouri Badran, whose background consists of defending Saddam Hussein's military. (The Iraqi National Accord, the minister's original political home, is made up of former Baathists and military nostalgists.) Clearly, the job in Iraq is not done. But sending in more troops is not the answer. With the number of ground engagements down and the recruitment of Iraqi players up, the solution lies in thinking about the transition from postwar triumph over Saddam Hussein to the empowerment of Iraqis. Danielle Pletka is vice president of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterpise Institute.
