New York Post GLASS HALF FULL By RICHARD SPERTZEL October 6, 2003 -- AGAIN we hear the cries of "no smoking gun." David Kay's report to Congress is decried variously as a full glass or an empty glass. It seem no one can accept that this is an interim report, and indeed the glass is half full.
Kay says his group has found considerable evidence that Iraq had ongoing, prohibited biological and missile programs, although to date no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been found. He further reports of innumerable items and sites that should have been declared by Iraq to U.N. Monitoring and Verification Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and probably earlier to U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM). Not declaring directly violated Security Council Resolution1441. Those of us experienced in dealing with Iraq over its weapons are not surprised that no "smoking gun" - e.g., munitions filled with chemical or biological agents - has been found. I've stated many times that if Iraq didn't use these weapons, they'd be difficult to find. Iraq didn't use them. Rolf Ekeus, former UNSCOM executive chairman, explained why in an oped earlier this summer: Iraq had told him and others in UNSCOM that it realized chemical and biological weapons could do little against a rapidly advancing enemy. FINDING WMD-loaded munitions would require Iraqi individuals with knowledge of their storage sites to give that information to the Coalition forces. To date, this has not occurred. Yes, several scientists have talked to the press - but they've related less than what Iraq had already declared or acknowledged to UNSCOM. Many of the accounts seemed to be more akin to those of 1995 and early '96, rather than those of 1997 and '98. Indeed, Kay says the scientists have been reluctant to talk. Several reasons come to mind: They may have been unaware of the later admissions by Iraq, and afraid of revealing that which was not permitted. This also indicates that there is still a fear of retaliation for telling too much. The scientists may distrust both western reporters and Coalition personnel. I certainly saw this lack of trust in speaking with an Iraqi scientist this spring. And trust was not generated by the actions of some early "inspectors" from April through June, when the scientists were offered "less jail time" if they cooperated. The U.S. personnel were seemingly unaware that jail means one thing to us, but something far more horrific to Iraqis who lived under the Saddam regime. IN considering how full the glass is, don't that it takes relatively little biological-agent material to create large-scale havoc, misery and death. Rather than casually dismissing any link between al Queda and Iraq, more effort should be exerted to fully establish that there was or was not a connection. Certainly, the official Czech position is still - despite all the leaks and innuendos to the contrary - that a meeting did take place in the Spring of 2001. We know from the anthrax letters that anthrax spores can survive the rigors of the mail service and produce evil results. These could be easily transported to and used in America. Nor are Anthrax spores the only biological agents that could be so usedm, or letters the only delivery means. Iraq supplying terrorists with biological material to be used in the United Sates has always been my concern with an ongoing Iraqi bioweapon program. It was most unlikely that Iraq would develop missiles that could threaten North America. Indeed, UNSCOM was told that Iraq saw biological weapons as a way to get its neighbors to "see things Iraq's way." But Iraq could extend its reach by supplying terrorists with suitable material. YET to be accounted for is some significant WMD-production material that we know Iraq had. It is not apparent that current investigative units are even aware of these - i.e., a spray-dryer ideally suitable for making a powdered agent; 25 metric tons of Aerosil imported by Iraq in 2002, a product important to both the chemical and biological programs; and the missing 1,000-liter fermenters. These should have been among UNMOVIC's highest priorities, but the sites where they were located were not inspected. Where are these items now? The glass is now clearly half full. With time, which David Kay has requested, it may be fuller than many would like to see. Richard Spertzel was head of the biological-weapons section of Unscom from 1994-99.E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
