It has become
established conventional wisdom that �no stockpiles of WMD
have been discovered in Iraq.� But this reading of the
evidence uncovered to date is premature at best, and highly
questionable. A closer look at the data, and at the uses
made of it, is essential for those who wish to understand the
genuine state of Iraq�s WMD threat at the time of Operation
Iraqi Freedom.
Another Congressional
committee hearing has come and gone for the head of the
hapless Iraqi Survey Group (ISG). Charles Duelfer has
testified that he did not know how much longer the weapons
hunt might take, but that the "picture is much more
complicated than I anticipated going in." In addition,
he also figured out that pinning hopes on getting information
from frightened Iraqi scientists was probably not the best way
to find the locations of all those WMD stockpiles. (see my
previous article Cased Not Closed: Iraq�s
WMDs).
Despite contracting out
for assistance in document exploitation last October, only a
small fraction of the seized documents have been analyzed.
Keep in mind that the ISG is largely composed of personnel
from the CIA, State Department, such as Duelfer, and the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), such as the deputy, Maj.
Gen. Keith Dayton. These are the same organizations that
are currently getting raked over the coals for bureaucratic
bungling of intelligence prior to 9-11.
In turn, the
beleaguered agencies are deflecting this criticism to the
President and his national security advisors, by essentially
complaining the �devil made me do it.� In other words,
their technical and tactical incompetence and/or their
motivation to embarrass the administration has allowed the ISG
to make proclamations about WMD stockpiles that minimize the
significance of their findings, or deliberately downplay and
contradict the findings of Coalition forces in the
field. Such is the case with chemical weapons (CW)
precursors.
The anti-war left and
the media continuously shift the goal posts about WMD
stockpiles. But what does the term �stockpile� mean for
WMDs? One nuclear bomb is not really a �stockpile,� but
it would only take one, set off in an American city or dropped
on US forces in the field, to make everybody wake up and smell
the coffee.
What did we expect to
find in Iraq, the equivalent of the Pantex Plant? In fact, we did find
hundreds of metric tons of yellowcake and low-enriched
uranium. But I digress.
�Stockpiles� of
biological weapons? A stockpile of bio-weapons can be
kept in a fridge in a scientist�s house. Ricin and
botulinum toxin have already been found in sufficient
quantities to regenerate a biological weapon (BW) capability
in short order. No, the standard established by the left
and their allies in the media is that we must find chemical
weapons (CW). That is, if the US has not found pallets
of CW projectiles in ammo dumps or munitions factories or at
Iraqi Army unit areas, well then that George Bush flat-out
lied to us. In a fashion, the critics are correct
concerning CW stockpiles. Here�s why.
Chemical weapons are
very potent in small amounts in a sterile setting. Hence, the
bit in movies where the leading man dips a pen into a glass of
water and says something to the effect that �these few drops
of nerve agent are enough to wipe out hundreds of thousands of
people� is correct, but only if those people are crammed into
the Silverdome. Chemical weapons have very important
weaknesses: They can be destroyed by light, heat, water, and
wind -- that is, the weather -- not to mention the heat from
the explosive charge designed to disperse the agent. It
is for this reason that CWs are employed en masse with strict
targeting protocols, when attacking an army in the
field.
Even if done properly,
depending upon the equipment and training of your adversary,
the killing and incapacitating effects may not be tactically
significant. For these reasons, Saddam initially
�tested� his CW on unsuspecting Kurd civilians to gain an
accurate medical picture of chemical agent effects.
Simply put, anyone contemplating use of CW needs a lot of it,
and it must be delivered at the right time and
place.
UNSCOM inspectors
understood these factors when they concluded in 1995 that, at
the time of Operation Desert Storm in January of 1991, Iraq
had largely solved key technical issues. The problem of
precursor storage and stabilization for VX, a powerful and
persistent nerve agent was solved by Saddam�s
scientists. In addition, UNSCOM noted the development of
prototypes for binary sarin (non-persistent nerve agent)
artillery shells and 122mm rockets. Binary rounds
consist of two non-lethal substances that combine upon
detonation to form a lethal agent.
The technically
advanced binary nature of these projectiles was amazing
enough, but they also had developed �quantities well beyond
the prototype levels.� The DIA concurred with UNSCOM
that Iraq had retained production equipment and chemical
precursors to reconstitute a CW program absent an inspection
regime.
Specifically, the DIA
noted that Baghdad had rebuilt segments of its industrial
chemical infrastructure under the �guise of a civilian need
for pesticides, chlorine, and other legitimate chemical
products.� Pesticides are the key elements in the
chemical agent arena. In fact, the general pesticide
chemical formula (organophosphate) is the �grandfather� of
modern day nerve agents. Pesticides are also precursors
of many other chemical weapons including Mustard-Lewisite
(HL), Phosgene (CG) a choking agent, and Hydrogen Cyanide (AC)
a blood agent.
It was not surprising
then, as Coalition forces attacked into Iraq, that huge
warehouses and caches of �commercial and agricultural�
chemicals were seized and painstakingly tested by Army and
Marine chemical specialists. What was surprising was how
quickly the ISG refuted the findings of our ground forces, and
how silent they have been on the significance of these
caches.
US forces participating
in Operation Iraqi Freedom had the latest chemical detection
gear, including chemical detection paper, chemical agent
detector kits, improved chemical agent monitors, and
sophisticated Fox Chemical Recon Vehicles. Some American
GIs remembered well the shortfalls of this equipment in Gulf
War I. Now all of these older devices had been improved,
and new and more accurate devices had been issued. In
fact, some mobile Army labs had highly sensitive mass
spectrometers to test for suspicious substances. Who
could argue the results of repeated tests using these devices
without explaining how DoD had apparently been ripped off by
contractors for faulty products? Apparently, the ISG
could and did.
One of the reported
incidents occurred near Karbala where there appeared to be a
very large �agricultural supply� area of 55-gallon drums of
pesticide. In addition, there was also a camouflaged
bunker complex full of these drums that some people entered
with unpleasant results. More than a dozen soldiers, a
Knight-Ridder reporter, a CNN cameraman, and two Iraqi POWs
came down with symptoms consistent with exposure to nerve
agent. A full day of tests on the drums resulted in one
positive for nerve agent, and then one resulted in a
negative. Later, an Army Fox NBC [nuclear, biological,
chemical] Recon Vehicle confirmed the existence of
Sarin. An officer from the 63d Chemical Company thought
there might well be chemical weapons at the site.
But later ISG tests
resulted in a proclamation of negative, end of story, nothing
to see here, etc., and the earlier findings and injuries
dissolved into non-existence. Left unexplained is the small
matter of the obvious pains taken to disguise the cache of
ostensibly legitimate pesticides. One wonders about the
advantage an agricultural commodities business gains by
securing drums of pesticide in camouflaged bunkers
six feet
underground. The �agricultural site� was also co-located
with a military ammunition dump, evidently nothing more than a
coincidence in the eyes of the ISG.
Another find occurred
around the northern Iraqi town of Bai�ji, where elements of
the 4th Infantry Division (Mech) discovered 55-gallon drums of
a substance that mass spectrometer testing confirmed was
cyclosarin and an unspecified blister agent. A mobile
laboratory was also found nearby that could have been used to
mix chemicals at the site. And only yards away,
surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, as well as gas
masks were found. Of course, later tests by the experts
revealed that these were only the ubiquitous pesticides that
everybody was turning up. It seems that Iraqi soldiers were
obsessed with keeping their ammo dumps insect-free, according
to the reading of the evidence now enshrined by the
conventional wisdom that �no WMD stockpiles have been
discovered.�
Coalition forces
continued to find evidence of CW after major combat operations
had concluded. The US unit around Taji, just north of
Baghdad discovered pesticides in one of the largest ammo dumps
in Iraq. The unit wanted to use the ammo dump for their own
operations, when they discovered the pesticides in
�non-standard� drums that were smaller in diameter but much
longer than the standard 55-gallon drums.
Then in January of this
year, Danish forces discovered 120mm mortar shells with a
mysterious liquid inside that initially tested positive for
blister agents. Further tests in Southern Iraq and in
the US were, of course, negative. The Danish Army said,
�It is unclear why the initial field tests were wrong.�
This is the understatement of the year, and also points to a
most basic question: If it wasn�t a chemical agent, what was
it? More pesticides? Dishwashing detergent?
From this old soldier�s perspective, I gain nothing from
putting a liquid in my mortar rounds unless that stuff will do
bad things to the enemy.
Virtually all agencies
concerned with Iraq�s WMD programs have reached the conclusion
that Saddam was an expert at delay, dispersion, and
deception. His nuclear program had restarted as reported
earlier this year by Dr. Kay, the previous head of the
ISG. Also, �seed agents� and other bio-toxins had been
dispersed throughout Baghdad and Iraq to form the basis for
the regeneration of a full-fledged BW program. This
modus operandi was no different for the regeneration of
Saddam�s chemical weapons program. Operating under the
guise of legitimate industrial and agricultural chemical
production and storage, Iraq would have gone into full-scale
conversion of its stockpile of chemical precursors into
weaponized agents, had the Coalition not attacked and seized
Iraq.
What is stunning is
that the ISG seems incapable of connecting the dots to present
to the American people the clear evidence of Saddam�s flouting
of 12 years of UN resolutions, and the grave consequences if
we had failed to act. The ISG also owes a detailed
explanation to DoD as to how 12 years of research,
development, and money has apparently gone down the drain in
the effort to upgrade the military�s chemical detection
capability and NBC training regimen. That the ISG can
consistently contradict other technical specialists, while
ignoring years of UNSCOM and US intelligence assessments,
without accountability is unconscionable, and must be
rectified as soon as possible.
Douglas
Hanson was a US Army cavalry reconnaissance officer for 20
years, and is a Gulf War I combat veteran. He was an
Atomic Demolitions Munitions (ADM) Security Officer, and a
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Officer. As a
civilian analyst, he has worked on stability and support
operations in Bosnia, and was initially an operations officer
in the operations/intelligence cell of the Requirements
Coordination Office of the CPA in Baghdad. He was later
assigned as the Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Science and
Technology.
