IRAQ NEWS, SUNDAY, JULY 25, 2004
I. UNWILLING VICTIMS, ABC NEWS, JUL 23
II. THE FIGHTING IN RAMADI, LAT, JUL 25
As ABC News, Jul 23, reported, regarding the violence in Iraq, the director
of intelligence for Central Command, Brig. Gen. John Custer, explained, "The
big myth is that the foreign fighters are everywhere, that there are
thousands," Custer said. "My feeling is that that's largely that Arab street
[spreading the myth]. That's the story everybody wants to hear, and Iraqis
don't want to admit that some of [the bombers] might be Iraqis."
Custer also said that "there was evidence some bombers were physically
chained inside the vehicles used in the attacks."
"'What we've found in a number of places are hands chained to a steering
wheel,' he said. 'Up in Irbil, we found a foot roped into the car, unable to
escape. Their children were kidnapped and held - they were forced.'"
The LA Times today carries a similar story about fighting in the Sunni city
of Ramadi, capital of Anbar province.
As the LAT explains, "The ferocity of the fighting in Ramadi and the
tenacity of the mujahedin - as the insurgents are widely known, though one
commander favors the snappier 'Johnny Jihad" - have produced a very specific
view of who the enemy is here: A mostly home-grown mix of anti-U.S.
nationalists, loyalists of Saddam Hussein's former regime and a seemingly
endless supply of part-time fighters - many former members of the Iraqi
army - willing to pick up a rifle or grenade launcher to fire at U.S. forces
and their Iraqi allies.
"Most insurgents here, the Marines say, are natives of the Ramadi area,
where the insular tribal culture and tradition of cross-border smuggling
have fostered an undercurrent of violence and suspicion of outsiders. . . .
"Neither foreign fighters nor religious militants drive the insurgency here,
commanders say, though both strains are present. 'It's one big overlapping
mishmash,' said Maj. Michael P. Wylie, battalion executive officer."
It is, indeed, "one big overlapping mishmash" ("Iraq News" would suggest
that Syrian intelligence is also involved.)
Yet one would never know this from most of what America's chattering class
has to say. On both the left and the right, there is a fixation on and
fascination with "Islamic Militants," as if the many problems of that vast,
dysfunctional region could be accurately summarized in a five second
soundbite.
Yet where life is clearly and directly on the line, people are far more
accurate and precise in their observations and analysis. Much more
attention should be paid to what America's military commanders in Iraq are
saying. It is relevant not only to Iraq, but the Middle East more broadly.
I. UNWILLING VICTIMS
Unwilling Victims?
U.S. Official: Some Iraqi Suicide Bombers May Have Been Forced
BAGHDAD, Iraq, July 23, 2004
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/World/iraq_suicide_bombers_040723.html
- It is one of the most frightening forms of violence in Iraq today - dozens
of human bombers willing to die for their cause. But Brig. Gen. John Custer,
the director of intelligence for Central Command, told ABC News he believes
many of the bombers are forced to carry out the attacks.
Custer said there was evidence some bombers were physically chained inside
the vehicles used in the attacks.
"What we've found in a number of places are hands chained to a steering
wheel," he said. "Up in Irbil, we found a foot roped into the car, unable to
escape. Their children were kidnapped and held - they were forced. We've
seen faces blown off and been able to identify the perpetrator."
Officials are not certain who is forcing people to do this, but he says the
idea that Iraq is being badly infiltrated by outsiders is wrong.
"The big myth is that the foreign fighters are everywhere, that there are
thousands," Custer said. "My feeling is that that's largely that Arab street
[spreading the myth]. That's the story everybody wants to hear, and Iraqis
don't want to admit that some of [the bombers] might be Iraqis."
There are serious concerns that violence will increase in the next few
months with the approach of the Iraq elections. They primary concern:
Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
Zarqawi has been blamed for much of the violence in Iraq. Today U.S.
warplanes attacked what the military said was a gathering site for his
followers in Fallujah.
"Zarqawi has certainly become the rock star terrorist in the past two
months," Custer said. "Not to the degree most people can claim and not to
the degree they want to be seen."
Custer said he sees possible links between Zarqawi and al Qaeda, but beyond
that, he said, "I don't see a lot of evidence in Iraq of al Qaeda."
Custer insisted progress has been made in going after the insurgents in
Iraq, but he acknowledged the extremist networks are proving very difficult
to crack.
ABC News' Martha Raddatz filed this report for World News Tonight.
II. THE FIGHTING IN RAMADI
July 25, 2004
THE CONFLICT IN IRAQ
No Shortage of Fighters in Iraq's Wild West
Marines in the key city of Ramadi dig in and wait anxiously for the battle
to come to them. The goal isn't victory; it's to stave off chaos.
By Patrick J. McDonnell, Times Staff Writer
RAMADI, Iraq - Hunkered down in the turquoise-domed Islamic Law Center, a
dozen Marines wait for the enemy to make its inevitable move. Insurgents
equipped with Soviet-made sniper rifles keep the building in their cross
hairs. Assailants with AK-47s and grenade launchers regularly peer from
nearby alleys and roofs. Attacks can come from any direction.
The wait is unnerving, but it's better than being in the streets of this
turbulent western city. A Marine convoy was attacked here Wednesday with a
roadside bomb and as many as 100 insurgents unleashed a barrage of
small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades in rolling firefights that
lasted for much of the day. Thirteen Marines and one soldier were injured,
and the U.S. military reported killing 25 fighters.
"When you walk on the streets, they can hide in every nook and cranny and
you can never find them until they start shooting," said Marine Cpl. Glenn
Hamby, 26, who heads Squad 3 of Golf Company. "Here, they have to come right
to us."
This is what the war has come down to in Iraq's Sunni Muslim heartland,
where providing tenuous security harks back to America's 19th century Indian
Wars - a time when the cavalry set up outposts and forts in decidedly
hostile territory. Ramadi is Indian Country - "the wild, wild West," as the
region is called.
Half a dozen or so Marine observation posts dot Ramadi's main drag, linking
heavily fortified bases and helping to keep the inhospitable city from
turning into a Fallouja-like sanctuary for insurgents.
U.S. troops have walked away from Fallouja, 30 miles to the east. But here
in the capital of strategic Al Anbar province, the fight goes on day after
day.
The aggressive patrols that marked the Marines' arrival this spring were met
with frenzied and bloody insurgent attacks, leading to some of the heaviest
U.S. losses of the Iraq conflict. Since the patrols gave way to the more
modulated "outposting" strategy, however, American deaths have declined
dramatically.
Marines say the scaled-back blueprint has worked in other ways: Unlike
Fallouja, Ramadi still has a U.S. military presence designed to keep open
the city's main artery, back up Iraqi police who protect the heavily
fortified Iraqi government center and prevent the city from falling into
complete chaos or insurgent control.
The reduced U.S. visibility here also coincides with the return of
sovereignty to Iraq and a nationwide push to keep American troops in the
background as much as possible. Still, no one doubts that Iraqi security
forces would be outmatched here if not for the U.S. military presence.
"We've had some success - Highway 10 is open, and we're seeing the Iraqis
take more and more charge of their own security," said Capt. Christopher
Bronzi, who heads Golf Company from the frequently attacked Marine base
known as the Combat Outpost, a former Iraqi army facility along Highway 10,
the city's main drag. "People in Ramadi are ready for us to be less a part
of their country."
Even beyond the evolving strategy, the story of Ramadi is in sharp contrast
to that of Fallouja.
Although it has acquired great symbolic potency as a symbol of armed
resistance, Fallouja is basically a backwater with no strategic
significance. Ramadi, on the other hand, with 450,000 residents, is the
economic and political hub of the Sunni Muslim heartland.
Ramadi also is the gateway to Syria and Jordan, brimming with potential
recruits for the jihad against "infidel" invaders. Marines in Ramadi did not
have the luxury of walking away.
Since arriving in March, the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Marine Regiment based
in Ramadi has lost 31 troops and suffered almost 200 injuries, most during a
series of fierce but largely unheralded urban fights in early April.
Before the Marines' arrival, the commander of the Army's 82nd Airborne
Division, Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr., declared that Al Anbar was "on
a glide path toward success" and pronounced the insurgency here in
"disarray" - far from the situation faced here today by the Marines who took
over from Swannack's soldiers.
The Marines' initial strategy of high-profile patrols was far more
aggressive than the Army's limited-engagement efforts. The violent backlash
demonstrated that the insurgents in Ramadi had never been vanquished,
Marines say, and probably had been consolidating forces during the Army
occupation.
The fierce house-to-house combat of April taught the Marines a hard lesson:
The kind of "hearts and minds" campaign that many had envisioned while
preparing at Camp Pendleton was not going to fly in the core of the Sunni
Triangle, where resentment against the U.S. presence is pervasive and
unlikely to diminish, many Marines acknowledge.
The thin-skinned Humvees that made up much of the Marine fleet this spring
have been largely replaced by the tank-like "up-armored" version - but only
after many casualties resulted from the lack of armor, Marines say. "We ask
ourselves all the time why they didn't come earlier," one officer said.
Still, little here is completely safe, no matter how much armor is used.
Venturing outside a base in Ramadi is a gut-clenching experience, even
though the fortified outposts have helped reduce the prevalence of roadside
bombs, which the military calls improvised explosive devices.
"We heard about IEDs before we got here, but nobody realized that Ramadi was
just saturated with IEDs," said Capt. Rob Weiler, who heads the battalion
mobile assault company.
One of the main tasks of the observation posts is to spot and kill
bomb-emplacement teams, while also being alert to mortar men, car bombers,
ambush squads and other attackers.
The insurgents know exactly where the Marines are and regard the posts as
prime targets: Four Marines were killed last month in Ramadi when their post
was overrun in the early morning darkness; stunning images of the sniper
team's dead and bloodied bodies sprawled on a rooftop were captured on
videotape and broadcast worldwide. Marine commanders decline to provide
details on how the post could have been taken - apparently by surprise, with
no time for backup to arrive.
The ferocity of the fighting in Ramadi and the tenacity of the mujahedin -
as the insurgents are widely known, though one commander favors the snappier
"Johnny Jihad" - have produced a very specific view of who the enemy is
here: A mostly home-grown mix of anti-U.S. nationalists, loyalists of Saddam
Hussein's former regime and a seemingly endless supply of part-time
fighters - many former members of the Iraqi army - willing to pick up a
rifle or grenade launcher to fire at U.S. forces and their Iraqi allies.
Most insurgents here, the Marines say, are natives of the Ramadi area, where
the insular tribal culture and tradition of cross-border smuggling have
fostered an undercurrent of violence and suspicion of outsiders. Even
Hussein's regime had difficulty exerting full control.
Neither foreign fighters nor religious militants drive the insurgency here,
commanders say, though both strains are present. "It's one big overlapping
mishmash," said Maj. Michael P. Wylie, battalion executive officer.
The cell networks can be virtually impenetrable, and seem to regenerate
quickly after leaders are arrested during Marine raids.
"It's not as if we have foolproof intel - we're dealing with a different
language, a different culture," said Capt. Kelly Royer of Echo Company,
which has lost 18 Marines - by far the most of any company.
Marines speak of a classic urban guerrilla force - a transient, elusive
enemy that quickly melts into the population, spiriting away all evidence of
its presence.
"It's like ghost fighters," Cpl. Hamby said. "You can get into a firefight,
and afterward when you go to the exact spot you were firing at, you won't
find any shell cases, bodies, nothing. They grab everything and they're
gone."
The insurgents are believed to have used captured U.S. materiel against the
Marines, including a lone Humvee seen wandering about like a phantom ship -
though the latter accounts have acquired the feel of an urban legend.
There are few illusions among U.S. troops here about being liked in a city
where ubiquitous graffiti extol the exploits of the "brave" mujahedin and
declares, "Down With the U.S.A."
"They pretty much hate us here," said one Marine commander as his Humvee
maneuvered through the dangerous side streets of Ramadi's explosive south
side, where fighting was intense in April. Slim youths approached with
smiles on a recent morning - and then let loose with a barrage of stones.
Arriving at the Islamic Law Center, where the Marines of Squad 3 were
pulling a 12-hour shift the other day, is an unequivocal war zone exercise:
Several Humvees block all traffic along Highway 10 and form a safety cordon
with machine guns at the ready, while other Marines dismount and train their
weapons on buildings, passersby and vehicles. Relieving troops sprint the
final 10 yards or so to the metal front door, which is quickly opened and
shut.
The four-story brick and concrete structure offers a strategic perch near
downtown. Claymore mines are laid within the walls of the now heavily
damaged center, where junked computers still sit in a classroom and
bookshelves brim with law books in Arabic, English and French.
Marines say their task here is mostly about waiting, watching for insurgents
planting bombs or laying ambushes, and then repelling the assault.
That morning, men with AK-47s were seen mingling among civilians at a taxi
stand across the street to the north. A pickup truck disgorged more fighters
from the east. At least three attackers were killed in the ensuing,
adrenaline-charged 10-minute fight, the Marines say; no Marines were hurt.
Marines fired half a dozen rockets, destroying the taxi kiosk, which lay in
a ruin of bricks and mortar.
The months of fighting have made it clear to these Marines that they are in
an inhospitable place where much of the population would like to see them
gone - and many want them dead. A decisive military victory here is widely
viewed as unlikely, Marines say.
The recent hand-over of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government was
generally welcomed as the first step in an exit strategy that eventually
will remove the incendiary presence of U.S. troops - and put Iraqis in the
front lines of their own fight.
"Personally, I see this as a stalemate: We could keep fighting in this same
manner forever," said Lance Cpl. David Goward, 26, who had a copy of "The
Great Gatsby" to read in his spare moments. "They have no shortage of
weapons. And neither do we. As long as Americans are here, they're going to
keep on fighting."
