Richard Spertzel, a former member of UNSCOM and a member of the Iraq Survey Group, writes in today's WSJ, "It is asserted that Iraq was not supporting terrorists. Really? Documentation indicates that Iraq was training non-Iraqis at Salman Pak in terrorist techniques, including assassination and suicide bombing. In addition to Iraqis, trainees included Palestinians, Yemenis, Saudis, Lebanese, Egyptians and Sudanese."
Where are the President and the National Security Council on this? Iraq and the legitimacy of this war is, arguably, the key issue of the presidential race. Why don't they say the ISG found documents that show Iraq was training terrorists? The same thing happened with Iraqi documents recently detailed by Scott Wheeler for Cybercast News Service. Without the backing of the administration, the information falls into a black hole and disappears. That is so, even as this issue is relevant to understanding the ongoing war in Iraq. Who is the enemy? Do the foreign terrorists operate independently of the Baathists; in conjunction with them; or somewhere in between? We can't fight this war properly, unless we have the best possible answers to those questions, while the result of not having those answers is unnecessary casualties, both American and Iraqi. The Wall Street Journal Have War Critics Even Read the Duelfer Report? By RICHARD SPERTZEL October 14, 2004 After the release of the Iraq Survey Group's Duelfer report, the headlines blazed "No WMD Found." Most stories continued by saying that Iraq did not constitute an imminent threat to the U.S. and thus the U.S. was wrong to eliminate that threat. This reflects the notion that Iraq was only a threat if it had military munitions filled with WMD. The claim "Iraq was not an imminent threat" was also expounded by pundits that seemingly crawled out of the woodwork as well as those opposed to President Bush. But have these individuals read carefully the report before engaging in such anti-Bush rhetoric? While no facilities were found producing chemical or biological agents on a large scale, many clandestine laboratories operating under the Iraqi Intelligence Services were found to be engaged in small-scale production of chemical nerve agents, sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, ricin, aflatoxin, and other unspecified biological agents. These laboratories were also evaluating whether various poisons would change the texture, smell or appearance of foodstuffs. These aspects of the ISG report have been ignored by the pundits and press. Did these constitute an imminent threat? Perhaps it depends how you define "threat." The chemical section reports that the M16 Directorate "had a plan to produce and weaponize nitrogen mustard in rifle grenades and a plan to bottle sarin and sulfur mustard in perfume sprayers and medicine bottles which they would ship to the United States and Europe." Are we to believe this plan existed because they liked us? Or did they wish to do us harm? The major threat posed by Iraq, in my opinion, was the support it gave to terrorists in general, and its own terrorist activity. The ISG was also told that "ricin was being developed into stable liquid to deliver as an aerosol" in various munitions. Such development was not just for assassination. If Iraq was successful in developing an aerosolizable ricin, it made a significant step forward. The development had to be for terrorist delivery. Even on a small scale this must be considered as a WMD. Biological agents, delivered on a small scale (terrorist delivery) can maim or kill a large number of people. The Iraqi Intelligence organizations had a history of conducting tests on humans with chemical and biological substances that went beyond assassination studies. While many of these were in the 1970s and 1980s, multiple documents and testimony indicate that such testing continued through the 1990s and into the next millennium, perhaps as late as 2002. Do we wait until such weapons are used against our domestic population before we act? Is that the way that some people wish to have the U.S. protected from terrorist activity? It is asserted that Iraq was not supporting terrorists. Really? Documentation indicates that Iraq was training non-Iraqis at Salman Pak in terrorist techniques, including assassination and suicide bombing. In addition to Iraqis, trainees included Palestinians, Yemenis, Saudis, Lebanese, Egyptians and Sudanese. As for the U.N. inspection system preventing such R&D, why did Iraq not declare these clandestine laboratories to Unscom and Unmovic and why did these inspection agencies not discover these laboratories? Might it have been that there were multiple informants working inside Unscom and Unmovic that kept the Iraqi Intelligence Service informed as to what sites were to be inspected? Information collected by ISG indicates that this was the case. In late 2002 and early 2003, equipment and materials were removed from several sites 24 hours before U.N. inspections. Such informants were said to be active since 1993. Ergo, no surprise inspections. Furthermore, sanctions were rapidly eroding. Unscom was aware of this erosion but not to the degree that apparently developed post 1998. The accounts of bribery of officials from several countries that were pushing for lifting or weakening sanctions are legend and have been extensively reported this past week. Inspections can not be effective without the full support of the U.N. Security Council. Such full support did not exist from late 1996 onward. Perhaps, now we know why. Iraq exploited the power of wealth in the form of oil to buy influence in the Security Council and within governments throughout the World. This has now been well documented. Was Iraq an imminent threat? With the regime's intention and the activity of its intelligence organizations, and with the proven futility of uncovering its clandestine laboratory operations by the U.N. inspectors, it is hard to draw any other conclusion. Regretfully, terrorism is the wave of the future. The report by Charles Duelfer is unclassified and makes very interesting reading for those who really want to know. For those with a closed mind, it will be a waste of time. Mr. Spertzel, head of the biological-weapons section of Unscom from 1994-99, just returned from Iraq, where he has been a member of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG).
