Warren Marik is a retired CIA case
officer who is currently in Iraq observing the formation of the new government
and sent these observations to the list.
LOW AND IN THE DIRT
The Robb-Silberman report on U.S. intelligence coverage of Iraqi WMD programs before Saddam's fall received very little play in Baghdad. The focus here in Baghdad is on forming a new government. However, one portion of the report, the portion concerning the completely discredited former WMD intelligence source, Curve Ball, resonated throughout the Iraqi National Congress and among its supporters.
"We've received justice!" was a cry heard from one INC worker after he read the report's conclusion that the infamous Curve Ball was "not influenced by, controlled by, or connected to, the INC," as had been charged throughout the news media for months. Well, maybe they will receive justice.
News people at the INC have watched half in amusement and half in consternation as they read journalists' responses to the Robb-Silberman Curve Ball/INC conclusions that belied their previous reporting. One senior journalist took the tack that, although the INC was not connected to Curve Ball, the INC had provided a defector who confirmed Curve Ball's false information. No further details were provided. Another response called the report's conclusion a "strange exoneration" of the INC--which was a very strange reply. And, the among the best: After an INC media adviser requested an apology from a journalist for his misreporting on the INC, the journalist replied, "Apology, my ass!"
Strange indeed. Why don't these respected and experienced newspaper and newsweekly journalists and editors respond in good form and move on? Intelligence case officers, those intelligence officers who recruit and handle agents (clandestine human sources), might offer one possible answer. In intelligence jargon, these journalists have "fallen in love" with their sources. No matter what the evidence, they won't believe that their sources deceived them, and the journalists will deny and deflect the evidence, at least initially, in any way they can.
To a case officer this is understandable. Case officers befriend and cultivate their agents before recruitment, often in a dangerous environment, and sometimes a considerable bond is established. No case officer wants to admit that his or her agent is "bad" or has "gone sour." But for the integrity of the system and the case officer to be maintained, the admission must be made.
In the world of intelligence, when this admission is made, a damage report is written and disseminated. Disinterested parties look at the case and determine what went wrong, why it went wrong, and what the consequences were. For journalists to claim that they are accountable to the public in more ways than vaguely worded retractions on back pages, they might well conduct a similar effort concerning an issue that is of significant importance to U.S. foreign and intelligence policy.
Unfortunately, on April Fool's Day, one respected newspaper attempted to make this issue political. Fortunately, many of the Americans who have followed Iraqi affairs over the years believe that U.S. policy toward Iraq has been, at best, confused for the past 25 years and over several administrations. A media damage report might be a small step toward reversing that trend.
Warren Marik
Information for Democracy
Baghdad
The Robb-Silberman report on U.S. intelligence coverage of Iraqi WMD programs before Saddam's fall received very little play in Baghdad. The focus here in Baghdad is on forming a new government. However, one portion of the report, the portion concerning the completely discredited former WMD intelligence source, Curve Ball, resonated throughout the Iraqi National Congress and among its supporters.
"We've received justice!" was a cry heard from one INC worker after he read the report's conclusion that the infamous Curve Ball was "not influenced by, controlled by, or connected to, the INC," as had been charged throughout the news media for months. Well, maybe they will receive justice.
News people at the INC have watched half in amusement and half in consternation as they read journalists' responses to the Robb-Silberman Curve Ball/INC conclusions that belied their previous reporting. One senior journalist took the tack that, although the INC was not connected to Curve Ball, the INC had provided a defector who confirmed Curve Ball's false information. No further details were provided. Another response called the report's conclusion a "strange exoneration" of the INC--which was a very strange reply. And, the among the best: After an INC media adviser requested an apology from a journalist for his misreporting on the INC, the journalist replied, "Apology, my ass!"
Strange indeed. Why don't these respected and experienced newspaper and newsweekly journalists and editors respond in good form and move on? Intelligence case officers, those intelligence officers who recruit and handle agents (clandestine human sources), might offer one possible answer. In intelligence jargon, these journalists have "fallen in love" with their sources. No matter what the evidence, they won't believe that their sources deceived them, and the journalists will deny and deflect the evidence, at least initially, in any way they can.
To a case officer this is understandable. Case officers befriend and cultivate their agents before recruitment, often in a dangerous environment, and sometimes a considerable bond is established. No case officer wants to admit that his or her agent is "bad" or has "gone sour." But for the integrity of the system and the case officer to be maintained, the admission must be made.
In the world of intelligence, when this admission is made, a damage report is written and disseminated. Disinterested parties look at the case and determine what went wrong, why it went wrong, and what the consequences were. For journalists to claim that they are accountable to the public in more ways than vaguely worded retractions on back pages, they might well conduct a similar effort concerning an issue that is of significant importance to U.S. foreign and intelligence policy.
Unfortunately, on April Fool's Day, one respected newspaper attempted to make this issue political. Fortunately, many of the Americans who have followed Iraqi affairs over the years believe that U.S. policy toward Iraq has been, at best, confused for the past 25 years and over several administrations. A media damage report might be a small step toward reversing that trend.
Warren Marik
Information for Democracy
Baghdad
