The branch, v4-4-test has been updated
       via  374fb91 VERSION: Bump version up to 4.4.17...
       via  09fa5f7 Merge tag 'samba-4.4.16' into v4-4-test
       via  89edb76 VERSION: Disable GIT_SNAPSHOTS for the 4.4.16 release.
       via  2ef4251 WHATSNEW: Add release notes for Samba 4.4.16.
       via  bf85c3d CVE-2017-12163: s3:smbd: Prevent client short SMB1 write 
from writing server memory to file.
       via  50f649e CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: make use of 
cli_state_is_encryption_on()
       via  17019aa CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: add cli_state_is_encryption_on() 
helper function
       via  81f1804 CVE-2017-12150: s3:libsmb: only fallback to anonymous if 
authentication was not requested
       via  4a91f4a CVE-2017-12150: libcli/smb: add 
smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory()
       via  b063223 CVE-2017-12150: auth/credentials: 
cli_credentials_authentication_requested() should check for 
NTLM_CCACHE/SIGN/SEAL
       via  95f6e5b CVE-2017-12150: libgpo: make use of SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED in 
gpo_connect_server()
       via  26b87d0 CVE-2017-12150: s3:pylibsmb: make use of 
SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT for 'samba.samba3.libsmb_samba_internal'
       via  428ede3 CVE-2017-12150: s3:lib: get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state 
smb_encrypt SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED
       via  084bf98 VERSION: Bump version up to 4.5.16...
      from  189a717 s3: smbd: Fix a read after free if a chained SMB1 call goes 
async.

https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=shortlog;h=v4-4-test


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 374fb910aaebdd0c209236cc3776479ab0e83768
Author: Karolin Seeger <[email protected]>
Date:   Wed Sep 20 13:05:49 2017 +0200

    VERSION: Bump version up to 4.4.17...
    
    and re-enable GIT_SNAPSHOTS.
    
    Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <[email protected]>

commit 09fa5f7dbb9828a9cb9f4df4b3150c884db42861
Merge: 189a717 89edb76
Author: Karolin Seeger <[email protected]>
Date:   Wed Sep 20 13:05:23 2017 +0200

    Merge tag 'samba-4.4.16' into v4-4-test
    
    samba: tag release samba-4.4.16

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 VERSION                         |  4 +-
 WHATSNEW.txt                    | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 auth/credentials/credentials.c  | 16 ++++++++
 libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c       |  5 +++
 libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h       |  1 +
 libgpo/gpo_fetch.c              |  2 +-
 source3/lib/util_cmdline.c      |  3 ++
 source3/libsmb/clidfs.c         |  6 ++-
 source3/libsmb/clientgen.c      | 13 +++++++
 source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c |  2 +-
 source3/libsmb/proto.h          |  1 +
 source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c       |  2 +-
 source3/smbd/reply.c            | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 13 files changed, 180 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)


Changeset truncated at 500 lines:

diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION
index 1a67456..602ba75 100644
--- a/VERSION
+++ b/VERSION
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 ########################################################
 SAMBA_VERSION_MAJOR=4
 SAMBA_VERSION_MINOR=4
-SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=15
+SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=17
 
 ########################################################
 # If a official release has a serious bug              #
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ SAMBA_VERSION_RC_RELEASE=
 # e.g. SAMBA_VERSION_IS_SVN_SNAPSHOT=yes               #
 #  ->  "3.0.0-SVN-build-199"                           #
 ########################################################
-SAMBA_VERSION_IS_GIT_SNAPSHOT=no
+SAMBA_VERSION_IS_GIT_SNAPSHOT=yes
 
 ########################################################
 # This is for specifying a release nickname            #
diff --git a/WHATSNEW.txt b/WHATSNEW.txt
index 476ea80..f97f799 100644
--- a/WHATSNEW.txt
+++ b/WHATSNEW.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,84 @@
                    ==============================
+                   Release Notes for Samba 4.4.16
+                          September 20, 2017
+                   ==============================
+
+
+This is a security release in order to address the following defects:
+
+o  CVE-2017-12150 (SMB1/2/3 connections may not require signing where they
+   should)
+o  CVE-2017-12151 (SMB3 connections don't keep encryption across DFS redirects)
+o  CVE-2017-12163 (Server memory information leak over SMB1)
+
+
+=======
+Details
+=======
+
+o  CVE-2017-12150:
+   A man in the middle attack may hijack client connections.
+
+o  CVE-2017-12151:
+   A man in the middle attack can read and may alter confidential
+   documents transferred via a client connection, which are reached
+   via DFS redirect when the original connection used SMB3.
+
+o  CVE-2017-12163:
+   Client with write access to a share can cause server memory contents to be
+   written into a file or printer.
+
+For more details and workarounds, please see the security advisories:
+
+   o https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2017-12150.html
+   o https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2017-12151.html
+   o https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2017-12163.html
+
+
+Changes since 4.4.15:
+---------------------
+
+o  Jeremy Allison <[email protected]>
+   * BUG 12836: s3: smbd: Fix a read after free if a chained SMB1 call goes
+     async.
+   * BUG 13020: CVE-2017-12163: s3:smbd: Prevent client short SMB1 write from
+     writing server memory to file.
+
+o  Ralph Boehme <[email protected]>
+   * BUG 12885: s3/smbd: Let non_widelink_open() chdir() to directories
+     directly.
+
+o  Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
+   * BUG 12996: CVE-2017-12151: Keep required encryption across SMB3 dfs
+     redirects.
+   * BUG 12997: CVE-2017-12150: Some code path don't enforce smb signing
+     when they should.
+
+
+#######################################
+Reporting bugs & Development Discussion
+#######################################
+
+Please discuss this release on the samba-technical mailing list or by
+joining the #samba-technical IRC channel on irc.freenode.net.
+
+If you do report problems then please try to send high quality
+feedback. If you don't provide vital information to help us track down
+the problem then you will probably be ignored.  All bug reports should
+be filed under the "Samba 4.1 and newer" product in the project's Bugzilla
+database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
+
+
+======================================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+======================================================================
+
+
+Release notes for older releases follow:
+----------------------------------------
+
+                   ==============================
                    Release Notes for Samba 4.4.15
                             July 12, 2017
                    ==============================
@@ -48,8 +128,8 @@ database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
 ======================================================================
 
 
-Release notes for older releases follow:
-----------------------------------------
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
 
                    ==============================
                    Release Notes for Samba 4.4.14
diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials.c b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
index 3b7d42a..43e587a 100644
--- a/auth/credentials/credentials.c
+++ b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h" /* for struct samrPassword */
 #include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
 #include "auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
 #include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
 #include "tevent.h"
 #include "param/param.h"
@@ -362,6 +363,8 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_principal_callback(struct 
cli_credentials *cre
 
 _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials 
*cred) 
 {
+       uint32_t gensec_features = 0;
+
        if (cred->bind_dn) {
                return true;
        }
@@ -389,6 +392,19 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool 
cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials *c
                return true;
        }
 
+       gensec_features = cli_credentials_get_gensec_features(cred);
+       if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_NTLM_CCACHE) {
+               return true;
+       }
+
+       if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN) {
+               return true;
+       }
+
+       if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL) {
+               return true;
+       }
+
        return false;
 }
 
diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
index 691b8ff..3c41127 100644
--- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
+++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
@@ -468,6 +468,11 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
        return false;
 }
 
+bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
+{
+       return conn->mandatory_signing;
+}
+
 void smbXcli_conn_set_sockopt(struct smbXcli_conn *conn, const char *options)
 {
        set_socket_options(conn->sock_fd, options);
diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
index 16c8848..6809807 100644
--- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
+++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_dfs_supported(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
 
 enum protocol_types smbXcli_conn_protocol(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
 bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
+bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
 
 void smbXcli_conn_set_sockopt(struct smbXcli_conn *conn, const char *options);
 const struct sockaddr_storage *smbXcli_conn_local_sockaddr(struct smbXcli_conn 
*conn);
diff --git a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
index 6b01544..cb969ff 100644
--- a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
+++ b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static NTSTATUS gpo_connect_server(ADS_STRUCT *ads,
                        ads->auth.password,
                        CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_KERBEROS |
                        CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_FALLBACK_AFTER_KERBEROS,
-                       Undefined);
+                       SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED);
        if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
                DEBUG(10,("check_refresh_gpo: "
                                "failed to connect: %s\n",
diff --git a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
index 80c3ecd..539fa55 100644
--- a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
+++ b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
@@ -123,6 +123,9 @@ bool set_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(struct 
user_auth_info *auth_info,
 
 int get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(const struct user_auth_info *auth_info)
 {
+       if (auth_info->smb_encrypt) {
+               return SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
+       }
        return auth_info->signing_state;
 }
 
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
index d2a4c19..074f8ed 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
@@ -203,7 +203,9 @@ static NTSTATUS do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
                /* If a password was not supplied then
                 * try again with a null username. */
                if (password[0] || !username[0] ||
+                       force_encrypt || 
smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(c->conn) ||
                        get_cmdline_auth_info_use_kerberos(auth_info) ||
+                       get_cmdline_auth_info_use_ccache(auth_info) ||
                        !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status = cli_session_setup(c, "",
                                                "", 0,
                                                "", 0,
@@ -952,7 +954,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
                             "IPC$",
                             dfs_auth_info,
                             false,
-                            smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn),
+                            cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli),
                             smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn),
                             0,
                             0x20,
@@ -1010,7 +1012,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
                                dfs_refs[count].share,
                                dfs_auth_info,
                                false,
-                               smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn),
+                               cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli),
                                smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn),
                                0,
                                0x20,
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
index cfb3b16..868ee59 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
@@ -339,6 +339,19 @@ uint16_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli)
        return cli->smb1.pid;
 }
 
+bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli)
+{
+       if (smbXcli_conn_protocol(cli->conn) < PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
+               return smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(cli->conn);
+       }
+
+       if (cli->smb2.tcon == NULL) {
+               return false;
+       }
+
+       return smb2cli_tcon_is_encryption_on(cli->smb2.tcon);
+}
+
 bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli)
 {
        uint16_t tid = cli_state_get_tid(cli);
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
index 5e31dfb..0513374 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ smbc_option_get(SMBCCTX *context,
 
                 for (s = context->internal->servers; s; s = s->next) {
                         num_servers++;
-                        if (!smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(s->cli->conn)) {
+                        if (!cli_state_is_encryption_on(s->cli)) {
                                 return (void *)false;
                         }
                 }
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/proto.h b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
index dc9aa17..e872e31 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/proto.h
+++ b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ const char *cli_state_remote_realm(struct cli_state *cli);
 uint16_t cli_state_get_vc_num(struct cli_state *cli);
 uint16_t cli_setpid(struct cli_state *cli, uint16_t pid);
 uint16_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli);
+bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli);
 bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli);
 uint16_t cli_state_get_tid(struct cli_state *cli);
 uint16_t cli_state_set_tid(struct cli_state *cli, uint16_t tid);
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
index 0c5d7e9..97aa39e 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ static int py_cli_state_init(struct py_cli_state *self, 
PyObject *args,
                cli_credentials_get_username(cli_creds),
                cli_credentials_get_domain(cli_creds),
                cli_credentials_get_password(cli_creds),
-               0, 0);
+               0, SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT);
        if (!py_tevent_req_wait_exc(self->ev, req)) {
                return -1;
        }
diff --git a/source3/smbd/reply.c b/source3/smbd/reply.c
index 3ba61a3..9896ff8 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/reply.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/reply.c
@@ -4463,6 +4463,9 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req)
        }
 
        /* Ensure we don't write bytes past the end of this packet. */
+       /*
+        * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
+        */
        if (data + numtowrite > smb_base(req->inbuf) + smb_len(req->inbuf)) {
                reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
                error_to_writebrawerr(req);
@@ -4563,6 +4566,11 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req)
                        exit_server_cleanly("secondary writebraw failed");
                }
 
+               /*
+                * We are not vulnerable to CVE-2017-12163
+                * here as we are guarenteed to have numtowrite
+                * bytes available - we just read from the client.
+                */
                nwritten = 
write_file(req,fsp,buf+4,startpos+nwritten,numtowrite);
                if (nwritten == -1) {
                        TALLOC_FREE(buf);
@@ -4644,6 +4652,7 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req)
        connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
        ssize_t nwritten = -1;
        size_t numtowrite;
+       size_t remaining;
        off_t startpos;
        const char *data;
        NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
@@ -4676,6 +4685,17 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req)
        startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0);
        data = (const char *)req->buf + 3;
 
+       /*
+        * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
+        * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
+        */
+       remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
+       if (numtowrite > remaining) {
+               reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+               END_PROFILE(SMBwriteunlock);
+               return;
+       }
+
        if (!fsp->print_file && numtowrite > 0) {
                init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
                    (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
@@ -4757,6 +4777,7 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req)
 {
        connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
        size_t numtowrite;
+       size_t remaining;
        ssize_t nwritten = -1;
        off_t startpos;
        const char *data;
@@ -4797,6 +4818,17 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req)
        startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0);
        data = (const char *)req->buf + 3;
 
+       /*
+        * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
+        * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
+        */
+       remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
+       if (numtowrite > remaining) {
+               reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+               END_PROFILE(SMBwrite);
+               return;
+       }
+
        if (!fsp->print_file) {
                init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
                        (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
@@ -5023,6 +5055,9 @@ void reply_write_and_X(struct smb_request *req)
                        goto out;
                }
        } else {
+               /*
+                * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
+                */
                if (smb_doff > smblen || smb_doff + numtowrite < numtowrite ||
                                smb_doff + numtowrite > smblen) {
                        reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
@@ -5451,6 +5486,7 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req)
 {
        connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
        size_t numtowrite;
+       size_t remaining;
        ssize_t nwritten = -1;
        NTSTATUS close_status = NT_STATUS_OK;
        off_t startpos;
@@ -5484,6 +5520,17 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req)
        mtime = convert_time_t_to_timespec(srv_make_unix_date3(req->vwv+4));
        data = (const char *)req->buf + 1;
 
+       /*
+        * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
+        * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
+        */
+       remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
+       if (numtowrite > remaining) {
+               reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+               END_PROFILE(SMBwriteclose);
+               return;
+       }
+
        if (fsp->print_file == NULL) {
                init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
                    (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
@@ -6079,6 +6126,9 @@ void reply_printwrite(struct smb_request *req)
 
        numtowrite = SVAL(req->buf, 1);
 
+       /*
+        * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
+        */
        if (req->buflen < numtowrite + 3) {
                reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
                END_PROFILE(SMBsplwr);


-- 
Samba Shared Repository

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