The branch, v4-7-test has been updated
via 19df09e CVE-2017-12163: s3:smbd: Prevent client short SMB1 write
from writing server memory to file.
via ecb3cfd CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: make use of
cli_state_is_encryption_on()
via c38e3a7 CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: add cli_state_is_encryption_on()
helper function
via e0fe5d0 CVE-2017-12150: s3:libsmb: only fallback to anonymous if
authentication was not requested
via acd9dcb CVE-2017-12150: libcli/smb: add
smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory()
via dfd1156 CVE-2017-12150: auth/credentials:
cli_credentials_authentication_requested() should check for
NTLM_CCACHE/SIGN/SEAL
via d148d6d CVE-2017-12150: libgpo: make use of SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED in
gpo_connect_server()
via f737447 CVE-2017-12150: s3:pylibsmb: make use of
SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT for 'samba.samba3.libsmb_samba_internal'
via 1b6684e CVE-2017-12150: s3:lib: get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state
smb_encrypt SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED
via 1217df5 CVE-2017-12150: s3:popt_common: don't turn a guessed
username into a specified one
from f2f5ab6 VERSION: Bump version up to 4.7.0rc7...
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=shortlog;h=v4-7-test
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 19df09e29a3c1daace945dfa9e5f7ba7c574a888
Author: Jeremy Allison <j...@samba.org>
Date: Fri Sep 8 10:13:14 2017 -0700
CVE-2017-12163: s3:smbd: Prevent client short SMB1 write from writing
server memory to file.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13020
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <j...@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(v4-7-test): Karolin Seeger <ksee...@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-7-test): Wed Sep 20 16:20:07 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
commit ecb3cfd8982a6d6b610f98ca80362d3db4178b50
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Date: Sat Dec 17 10:36:49 2016 +0100
CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: make use of cli_state_is_encryption_on()
This will keep enforced encryption across dfs referrals.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12996
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
commit c38e3a7086164b1c58e003dd627b207ffcbe856e
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Date: Mon Aug 14 12:13:18 2017 +0200
CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: add cli_state_is_encryption_on() helper function
This allows to check if the current cli_state uses encryption
(either via unix extentions or via SMB3).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12996
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
commit e0fe5d09082509c8a11720f683264ffac21e7a75
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 12 06:07:56 2016 +0100
CVE-2017-12150: s3:libsmb: only fallback to anonymous if authentication was
not requested
With forced encryption or required signing we should also don't fallback.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
commit acd9dcb671fdc4cd543ddf76918e70599cb09259
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Date: Tue Aug 29 15:35:49 2017 +0200
CVE-2017-12150: libcli/smb: add smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory()
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
commit dfd11569de24064bcf8a4348b4b5271807dd501b
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Date: Tue Aug 29 15:24:14 2017 +0200
CVE-2017-12150: auth/credentials:
cli_credentials_authentication_requested() should check for
NTLM_CCACHE/SIGN/SEAL
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
commit d148d6df0b39e0c2c31ba8fc1d31207a4c852af0
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 12 05:49:46 2016 +0100
CVE-2017-12150: libgpo: make use of SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED in
gpo_connect_server()
It's important that we use a signed connection to get the GPOs!
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
commit f7374475c867cb8a71fe4cf07a6bfec9f148af0b
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Date: Fri Dec 9 09:26:32 2016 +0100
CVE-2017-12150: s3:pylibsmb: make use of SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT for
'samba.samba3.libsmb_samba_internal'
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
commit 1b6684ea4e9c77229c5b9ef6399eb639ec39e50f
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Date: Thu Nov 3 17:16:43 2016 +0100
CVE-2017-12150: s3:lib: get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state smb_encrypt
SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED
This is an addition to the fixes for CVE-2015-5296.
It applies to smb2mount -e, smbcacls -e and smbcquotas -e.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
commit 1217df5f9c507dfa08b584ecd39ce982a8d69ddc
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Date: Tue Aug 29 17:06:21 2017 +0200
CVE-2017-12150: s3:popt_common: don't turn a guessed username into a
specified one
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
auth/credentials/credentials.c | 16 +++++++++++++
libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c | 5 +++++
libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h | 1 +
libgpo/gpo_fetch.c | 2 +-
source3/include/auth_info.h | 1 +
source3/lib/popt_common.c | 7 +-----
source3/lib/util_cmdline.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
source3/libsmb/clidfs.c | 20 +++++------------
source3/libsmb/clientgen.c | 13 +++++++++++
source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c | 2 +-
source3/libsmb/proto.h | 1 +
source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c | 2 +-
source3/smbd/reply.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
13 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
Changeset truncated at 500 lines:
diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials.c b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
index 2342d72..0dbdf88 100644
--- a/auth/credentials/credentials.c
+++ b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h" /* for struct samrPassword */
#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
#include "auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
#include "tevent.h"
#include "param/param.h"
@@ -300,6 +301,8 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_principal_callback(struct
cli_credentials *cre
_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials
*cred)
{
+ uint32_t gensec_features = 0;
+
if (cred->bind_dn) {
return true;
}
@@ -327,6 +330,19 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool
cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials *c
return true;
}
+ gensec_features = cli_credentials_get_gensec_features(cred);
+ if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_NTLM_CCACHE) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
return false;
}
diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
index 5493954..7322380 100644
--- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
+++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
@@ -468,6 +468,11 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
return false;
}
+bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
+{
+ return conn->mandatory_signing;
+}
+
/*
* [MS-SMB] 2.2.2.3.5 - SMB1 support for passing through
* query/set commands to the file system
diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
index 52fec9a..6d9198a 100644
--- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
+++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_dfs_supported(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
enum protocol_types smbXcli_conn_protocol(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
+bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
bool smbXcli_conn_support_passthrough(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
void smbXcli_conn_set_sockopt(struct smbXcli_conn *conn, const char *options);
diff --git a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
index 836bc23..3740d4e 100644
--- a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
+++ b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static NTSTATUS gpo_connect_server(ADS_STRUCT *ads,
ads->auth.password,
CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_KERBEROS |
CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_FALLBACK_AFTER_KERBEROS,
- Undefined);
+ SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(10,("check_refresh_gpo: "
"failed to connect: %s\n",
diff --git a/source3/include/auth_info.h b/source3/include/auth_info.h
index c6f71ad..8212c27 100644
--- a/source3/include/auth_info.h
+++ b/source3/include/auth_info.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ void set_cmdline_auth_info_from_file(struct user_auth_info
*auth_info,
const char *get_cmdline_auth_info_username(const struct user_auth_info
*auth_info);
void set_cmdline_auth_info_username(struct user_auth_info *auth_info,
const char *username);
+void reset_cmdline_auth_info_username(struct user_auth_info *auth_info);
const char *get_cmdline_auth_info_domain(const struct user_auth_info
*auth_info);
void set_cmdline_auth_info_domain(struct user_auth_info *auth_info,
const char *domain);
diff --git a/source3/lib/popt_common.c b/source3/lib/popt_common.c
index 65b6efe..cc93a75 100644
--- a/source3/lib/popt_common.c
+++ b/source3/lib/popt_common.c
@@ -247,8 +247,6 @@ void popt_common_credentials_set_delay_post(void)
void popt_common_credentials_post(void)
{
- const char *username = NULL;
-
if (get_cmdline_auth_info_use_machine_account(cmdline_auth_info) &&
!set_cmdline_auth_info_machine_account_creds(cmdline_auth_info))
{
@@ -268,10 +266,7 @@ void popt_common_credentials_post(void)
* correctly parsed yet. If we have a username we need to set it again
* to run the string parser for the username correctly.
*/
- username = get_cmdline_auth_info_username(cmdline_auth_info);
- if (username != NULL && username[0] != '\0') {
- set_cmdline_auth_info_username(cmdline_auth_info, username);
- }
+ reset_cmdline_auth_info_username(cmdline_auth_info);
}
static void popt_common_credentials_callback(poptContext con,
diff --git a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
index ad51a4f..90ee67c 100644
--- a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
+++ b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
struct user_auth_info {
struct cli_credentials *creds;
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx;
+ bool got_username;
bool got_pass;
int signing_state;
bool smb_encrypt;
@@ -93,6 +94,7 @@ void set_cmdline_auth_info_from_file(struct user_auth_info
*auth_info,
if (!ok) {
exit(EIO);
}
+ auth_info->got_username = true;
}
const char *get_cmdline_auth_info_username(const struct user_auth_info
*auth_info)
@@ -123,11 +125,38 @@ void set_cmdline_auth_info_username(struct user_auth_info
*auth_info,
exit(ENOMEM);
}
+ auth_info->got_username = true;
if (strchr_m(username, '%') != NULL) {
auth_info->got_pass = true;
}
}
+void reset_cmdline_auth_info_username(struct user_auth_info *auth_info)
+{
+ const char *username = NULL;
+ const char *new_val = NULL;
+
+ if (!auth_info->got_username) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ username = cli_credentials_get_username(auth_info->creds);
+ if (username == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+ if (username[0] == '\0') {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ cli_credentials_parse_string(auth_info->creds,
+ username,
+ CRED_SPECIFIED);
+ new_val = cli_credentials_get_username(auth_info->creds);
+ if (new_val == NULL) {
+ exit(ENOMEM);
+ }
+}
+
const char *get_cmdline_auth_info_domain(const struct user_auth_info
*auth_info)
{
const char *domain = NULL;
@@ -236,6 +265,9 @@ void set_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state_raw(struct
user_auth_info *auth_info,
int get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(const struct user_auth_info *auth_info)
{
+ if (auth_info->smb_encrypt) {
+ return SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
+ }
return auth_info->signing_state;
}
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
index 1feeca9..0d851d2 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include "trans2.h"
#include "libsmb/nmblib.h"
#include "../libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
/********************************************************************
Important point.
@@ -144,9 +145,6 @@ static NTSTATUS do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
char *servicename;
char *sharename;
char *newserver, *newshare;
- const char *username;
- const char *password;
- const char *domain;
NTSTATUS status;
int flags = 0;
enum protocol_types protocol = PROTOCOL_NONE;
@@ -229,21 +227,15 @@ static NTSTATUS do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
smb2cli_conn_set_max_credits(c->conn, DEFAULT_SMB2_MAX_CREDITS);
}
- username = get_cmdline_auth_info_username(auth_info);
- password = get_cmdline_auth_info_password(auth_info);
- domain = get_cmdline_auth_info_domain(auth_info);
- if ((domain == NULL) || (domain[0] == '\0')) {
- domain = lp_workgroup();
- }
-
creds = get_cmdline_auth_info_creds(auth_info);
status = cli_session_setup_creds(c, creds);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
/* If a password was not supplied then
* try again with a null username. */
- if (password[0] || !username[0] ||
- get_cmdline_auth_info_use_kerberos(auth_info) ||
+ if (force_encrypt || smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(c->conn) ||
+ cli_credentials_authentication_requested(creds) ||
+ cli_credentials_is_anonymous(creds) ||
!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status = cli_session_setup_anon(c)))
{
d_printf("session setup failed: %s\n",
@@ -978,7 +970,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
smbXcli_conn_remote_name(rootcli->conn),
"IPC$",
dfs_auth_info,
- smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn),
+ cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli),
smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn),
0,
0x20,
@@ -1035,7 +1027,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
dfs_refs[count].server,
dfs_refs[count].share,
dfs_auth_info,
- smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn),
+ cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli),
smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn),
0,
0x20,
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
index 039176e..44afee1 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
@@ -321,6 +321,19 @@ uint32_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli)
return cli->smb1.pid;
}
+bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli)
+{
+ if (smbXcli_conn_protocol(cli->conn) < PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
+ return smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(cli->conn);
+ }
+
+ if (cli->smb2.tcon == NULL) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return smb2cli_tcon_is_encryption_on(cli->smb2.tcon);
+}
+
bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli)
{
uint32_t tid;
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
index ed6ca2b..b55cf1e 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ smbc_option_get(SMBCCTX *context,
for (s = context->internal->servers; s; s = s->next) {
num_servers++;
- if (!smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(s->cli->conn)) {
+ if (!cli_state_is_encryption_on(s->cli)) {
return (void *)false;
}
}
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/proto.h b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
index d032625..11fa409 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/proto.h
+++ b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
@@ -193,6 +193,7 @@ void cli_shutdown(struct cli_state *cli);
uint16_t cli_state_get_vc_num(struct cli_state *cli);
uint32_t cli_setpid(struct cli_state *cli, uint32_t pid);
uint32_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli);
+bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli);
bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli);
uint32_t cli_state_get_tid(struct cli_state *cli);
uint32_t cli_state_set_tid(struct cli_state *cli, uint32_t tid);
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
index 39afdc8..d2167e9 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static int py_cli_state_init(struct py_cli_state *self,
PyObject *args,
req = cli_full_connection_creds_send(
NULL, self->ev, "myname", host, NULL, 0, share, "?????",
- cli_creds, flags, 0);
+ cli_creds, flags, SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT);
if (!py_tevent_req_wait_exc(self->ev, req)) {
return -1;
}
diff --git a/source3/smbd/reply.c b/source3/smbd/reply.c
index 317143f..7b07078 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/reply.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/reply.c
@@ -4474,6 +4474,9 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req)
}
/* Ensure we don't write bytes past the end of this packet. */
+ /*
+ * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
+ */
if (data + numtowrite > smb_base(req->inbuf) + smb_len(req->inbuf)) {
reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
error_to_writebrawerr(req);
@@ -4574,6 +4577,11 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req)
exit_server_cleanly("secondary writebraw failed");
}
+ /*
+ * We are not vulnerable to CVE-2017-12163
+ * here as we are guarenteed to have numtowrite
+ * bytes available - we just read from the client.
+ */
nwritten =
write_file(req,fsp,buf+4,startpos+nwritten,numtowrite);
if (nwritten == -1) {
TALLOC_FREE(buf);
@@ -4647,6 +4655,7 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req)
connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
ssize_t nwritten = -1;
size_t numtowrite;
+ size_t remaining;
off_t startpos;
const char *data;
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
@@ -4679,6 +4688,17 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req)
startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0);
data = (const char *)req->buf + 3;
+ /*
+ * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
+ * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
+ */
+ remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
+ if (numtowrite > remaining) {
+ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ END_PROFILE(SMBwriteunlock);
+ return;
+ }
+
if (!fsp->print_file && numtowrite > 0) {
init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
(uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
@@ -4756,6 +4776,7 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req)
{
connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
size_t numtowrite;
+ size_t remaining;
ssize_t nwritten = -1;
off_t startpos;
const char *data;
@@ -4796,6 +4817,17 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req)
startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0);
data = (const char *)req->buf + 3;
+ /*
+ * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
+ * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
+ */
+ remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
+ if (numtowrite > remaining) {
+ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ END_PROFILE(SMBwrite);
+ return;
+ }
+
if (!fsp->print_file) {
init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
(uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
@@ -5018,6 +5050,9 @@ void reply_write_and_X(struct smb_request *req)
goto out;
}
} else {
+ /*
+ * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
+ */
if (smb_doff > smblen || smb_doff + numtowrite < numtowrite ||
smb_doff + numtowrite > smblen) {
reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
@@ -5444,6 +5479,7 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req)
{
connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
size_t numtowrite;
+ size_t remaining;
ssize_t nwritten = -1;
NTSTATUS close_status = NT_STATUS_OK;
off_t startpos;
@@ -5477,6 +5513,17 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req)
mtime = convert_time_t_to_timespec(srv_make_unix_date3(req->vwv+4));
data = (const char *)req->buf + 1;
+ /*
+ * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
+ * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
+ */
+ remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
+ if (numtowrite > remaining) {
+ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ END_PROFILE(SMBwriteclose);
+ return;
+ }
+
if (fsp->print_file == NULL) {
init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
(uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
@@ -6069,6 +6116,9 @@ void reply_printwrite(struct smb_request *req)
numtowrite = SVAL(req->buf, 1);
+ /*
+ * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
+ */
if (req->buflen < numtowrite + 3) {
reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
END_PROFILE(SMBsplwr);
--
Samba Shared Repository
