The branch, v4-14-stable has been updated
via ae3229e76d0 VERSION: Disable GIT_SNAPSHOT for the 4.14.11 release.
via 808afc79cc9 WHATSNEW: Add release notes for Samba 4.14.11.
via 08eb470b9c5 smb2_server: don't let SMB2_OP_IOCTL force FILE_CLOSED
for invalid file ids
via 25c97fc3a0f smb2_ioctl: return BUFFER_TOO_SMALL in
smbd_smb2_request_ioctl_done()
via 016d9c40bca smb2_server: skip tcon check and
chdir_current_service() for FSCTL_VALIDATE_NEGOTIATE_INFO
via fd82e1e4bad smb2_server: decouple IOCTL check from
signing/encryption states
via ea6db15c314 smb2_server: make sure in_ctl_code = IVAL(body, 0x04);
reads valid bytes
via 8eb06f10a12 s4:torture/smb2: add
smb2.ioctl.bug14788.VALIDATE_NEGOTIATE
via fd8864ef4fe libcli/smb: split out smb2cli_raw_tcon* from
smb2cli_tcon*
via 4d2d5a3c66a s3:smbd: remove dead code from
smbd_smb2_request_dispatch()
via 3d35397e103 smbd: s3-dsgetdcname: handle num_ips == 0
via ce1186e06ed dsdb: Use DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN when searching
for the local replicated object
via b0d67dc3d42 CVE-2020-25717: s3-auth: fix MIT Realm regression
via aef700ad3c8 s3: docs-xml: Clarify the "delete veto files" paramter.
via b61fb49a7a9 s3: smbd: Fix logic in can_delete_directory_fsp() to
cope with dangling symlinks.
via 7034f9b765d s3: smbd: Fix logic in rmdir_internals() to cope with
dangling symlinks.
via 66d688cea2b s3: smbd: Fix rmdir_internals() to do an early return
if lp_delete_veto_files() is not set.
via 3d4761cf04d s3: VFS: xattr_tdb. Allow unlinkat to cope with
dangling symlinks.
via 37804062ea7 s3: VFS: streams_depot. Allow unlinkat to cope with
dangling symlinks.
via 67c85f0ce8e s3: smbd: Add two tests showing the ability to delete a
directory containing a dangling symlink over SMB2 depends on "delete veto
files" setting.
via db8eb865b53 s3: smbd: Add two tests showing recursive directory
delete of a directory containing veto file and msdfs links over SMB2.
via 3e8d6e681f8 CVE-2021-3670 ldap_server: Clearly log LDAP queries and
timeouts
via 3a4eb50cf74 CVE-2021-3670 dsdb/anr: Do a copy of the potentially
anr query before starting to modify it
via d92dfb0dabf CVE-2021-3670 ldap_server: Remove duplicate print of
LDAP search details
via 08c9016cb9f CVE-2021-3670 ldb: Confirm the request has not yet
timed out in ldb filter processing
via f9b2267c6eb CVE-2021-3670 ldap_server: Ensure value of
MaxQueryDuration is greater than zero
via f72090064bd CVE-2021-3670 ldap_server: Set timeout on requests
based on MaxQueryDuration
via dc71ae17782 CVE-2021-3670 tests/krb5/test_ldap.py: Add test for
LDAP timeouts
via 8ccb26c679b CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: Fallback to a SID/UID based
mapping if the named based lookup fails
via ff3798418e8 CVE-2020-25717: tests/krb5: Add a test for idmap_nss
mapping users to SIDs
via 9bef6bc6cf0 CVE-2020-25717: selftest: turn ad_member_no_nss_wb into
ad_member_idmap_nss
via f00c993f0c7 CVE-2020-25717: nsswitch/nsstest.c: Lower 'non existent
uid' to make room for new accounts
via 8bed2c3f7a9 CVE-2020-25717: tests/krb5: Add method to automatically
obtain server credentials
via 1bd06f8cb35 CVE-2020-25727: idmap_nss: verify that the name of the
sid belongs to the configured domain
via 75ab0a306fc IPA DC: add missing checks
via 5b1d789632f s3:winbindd: fix "allow trusted domains = no" regression
via 4a106c2322c lib: handle NTTIME_THAW in nt_time_to_full_timespec()
via 4e2c7c66c96 torture: add a test for NTTIME_FREEZE and NTTIME_THAW
via 7e1a65ed980 lib: add a test for null_nttime(NTTIME_THAW)
via 38ac4c09474 lib: update null_nttime() of -1: -1 is NTTIME_FREEZE
via f8fec80020e lib: use NTTIME_FREEZE in a null_nttime() test
via 43f873d52ab lib: fix null_nttime() tests
via ac6f4c093b8 lib: add NTTIME_THAW
via a1dae6a208a VERSION: Bump version up to Samba 4.14.11...
from 9312b1832e5 VERSION: Disable GIT_SNAPSHOT for the 4.14.10 release.
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=shortlog;h=v4-14-stable
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
VERSION | 2 +-
WHATSNEW.txt | 90 +++++-
auth/gensec/schannel.c | 1 +
docs-xml/smbdotconf/filename/deletevetofiles.xml | 9 +-
lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv.c | 2 +
lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv.h | 10 +
lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv_index.c | 41 +++
lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv_search.c | 33 +-
lib/util/tests/time.c | 5 +-
lib/util/time.c | 8 +-
lib/util/time.h | 1 +
libcli/smb/smb2cli_tcon.c | 183 ++++++++---
libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h | 20 ++
nsswitch/nsstest.c | 2 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/kdc_base_test.py | 42 +++
python/samba/tests/krb5/test_idmap_nss.py | 232 ++++++++++++++
python/samba/tests/usage.py | 1 +
selftest/target/Samba.pm | 2 +-
selftest/target/Samba3.pm | 44 ++-
source3/auth/auth_util.c | 34 ++-
source3/auth/user_krb5.c | 9 +
source3/libsmb/dsgetdcname.c | 4 +
source3/modules/vfs_streams_depot.c | 10 +
source3/modules/vfs_xattr_tdb.c | 10 +
source3/rpc_server/lsa/srv_lsa_nt.c | 1 +
.../tests/test_delete_veto_files_only_rmdir.sh | 183 +++++++++++
source3/script/tests/test_veto_rmdir.sh | 217 +++++++++++++
source3/selftest/tests.py | 6 +
source3/smbd/close.c | 334 ++++++++++++++-------
source3/smbd/dir.c | 97 ++++++
source3/smbd/smb2_ioctl.c | 19 ++
source3/smbd/smb2_server.c | 39 +--
source3/winbindd/idmap_nss.c | 26 +-
source3/winbindd/winbindd_util.c | 2 +-
source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/anr.c | 73 ++++-
source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/operational.c | 2 +-
source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/repl_meta_data.c | 13 +-
source4/dsdb/tests/python/large_ldap.py | 63 ++++
source4/ldap_server/ldap_backend.c | 136 +++++++--
source4/ldap_server/ldap_server.c | 4 +-
source4/selftest/tests.py | 18 +-
source4/torture/smb2/ioctl.c | 111 +++++++
source4/torture/smb2/timestamps.c | 208 +++++++++++++
43 files changed, 2109 insertions(+), 238 deletions(-)
create mode 100755 python/samba/tests/krb5/test_idmap_nss.py
create mode 100755 source3/script/tests/test_delete_veto_files_only_rmdir.sh
create mode 100755 source3/script/tests/test_veto_rmdir.sh
Changeset truncated at 500 lines:
diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION
index b487cba796e..b86cd446d7a 100644
--- a/VERSION
+++ b/VERSION
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
########################################################
SAMBA_VERSION_MAJOR=4
SAMBA_VERSION_MINOR=14
-SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=10
+SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=11
########################################################
# If a official release has a serious bug #
diff --git a/WHATSNEW.txt b/WHATSNEW.txt
index f81a31d49b0..ea20a3ea952 100644
--- a/WHATSNEW.txt
+++ b/WHATSNEW.txt
@@ -1,3 +1,90 @@
+ ===============================
+ Release Notes for Samba 4.14.11
+ December 15, 2021
+ ===============================
+
+
+This is the latest stable release of the Samba 4.14 release series.
+
+Important Notes
+===============
+
+There have been a few regressions in the security release 4.14.10:
+
+o CVE-2020-25717: A user on the domain can become root on domain members.
+ https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2020-25717.html
+ PLEASE [RE-]READ!
+ The instructions have been updated and some workarounds
+ initially adviced for 4.14.10 are no longer required and
+ should be reverted in most cases.
+
+o BUG-14902: User with multiple spaces (eg Fred<space><space>Nurk) become
+ un-deletable. While this release should fix this bug, it is
+ adviced to have a look at the bug report for more detailed
+ information, see https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14902.
+
+Changes since 4.14.10
+---------------------
+
+o Jeremy Allison <j...@samba.org>
+ * BUG 14878: Recursive directory delete with veto files is broken.
+ * BUG 14879: A directory containing dangling symlinks cannot be deleted by
+ SMB2 alone when they are the only entry in the directory.
+
+o Andrew Bartlett <abart...@samba.org>
+ * BUG 14656: Spaces incorrectly collapsed in ldb attributes.
+ * BUG 14694: Ensure that the LDB request has not timed out during filter
+ processing as the LDAP server MaxQueryDuration is otherwise not honoured.
+ * BUG 14901: The CVE-2020-25717 username map [script] advice has undesired
+ side effects for the local nt token.
+ * BUG 14902: User with multiple spaces (eg Fred<space><space>Nurk) become
un-
+ deletable.
+
+o Ralph Boehme <s...@samba.org>
+ * BUG 14127: Avoid storing NTTIME_THAW (-2) as value on disk
+ * BUG 14922: Kerberos authentication on standalone server in MIT realm
+ broken.
+ * BUG 14923: Segmentation fault when joining the domain.
+
+o Alexander Bokovoy <a...@samba.org>
+ * BUG 14903: Support for ROLE_IPA_DC is incomplete.
+
+o Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
+ * BUG 14788: Memory leak if ioctl(FSCTL_VALIDATE_NEGOTIATE_INFO) fails
before
+ smbd_smb2_ioctl_send.
+ * BUG 14899: winbindd doesn't start when "allow trusted domains" is off.
+ * BUG 14901: The CVE-2020-25717 username map [script] advice has undesired
+ side effects for the local nt token.
+
+o Joseph Sutton <josephsut...@catalyst.net.nz>
+ * BUG 14694: Ensure that the LDB request has not timed out during filter
+ processing as the LDAP server MaxQueryDuration is otherwise not honoured.
+ * BUG 14901: The CVE-2020-25717 username map [script] advice has undesired
+ side effects for the local nt token.
+
+
+#######################################
+Reporting bugs & Development Discussion
+#######################################
+
+Please discuss this release on the samba-technical mailing list or by
+joining the #samba-technical IRC channel on irc.freenode.net.
+
+If you do report problems then please try to send high quality
+feedback. If you don't provide vital information to help us track down
+the problem then you will probably be ignored. All bug reports should
+be filed under the Samba 4.1 and newer product in the project's Bugzilla
+database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
+
+
+======================================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+======================================================================
+
+
+Release notes for older releases follow:
+----------------------------------------
===============================
Release Notes for Samba 4.14.10
November 9, 2021
@@ -103,8 +190,7 @@ database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
======================================================================
-Release notes for older releases follow:
-----------------------------------------
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
==============================
diff --git a/auth/gensec/schannel.c b/auth/gensec/schannel.c
index 0cdae141ead..6ebbe8f3179 100644
--- a/auth/gensec/schannel.c
+++ b/auth/gensec/schannel.c
@@ -1080,6 +1080,7 @@ static NTSTATUS schannel_server_start(struct
gensec_security *gensec_security)
case ROLE_DOMAIN_BDC:
case ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC:
case ROLE_ACTIVE_DIRECTORY_DC:
+ case ROLE_IPA_DC:
return NT_STATUS_OK;
default:
return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
diff --git a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/filename/deletevetofiles.xml
b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/filename/deletevetofiles.xml
index 581dc05396d..570d4ac60a0 100644
--- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/filename/deletevetofiles.xml
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/filename/deletevetofiles.xml
@@ -4,9 +4,12 @@
xmlns:samba="http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc";>
<description>
<para>This option is used when Samba is attempting to
- delete a directory that contains one or more vetoed directories
- (see the <smbconfoption name="veto files"/>
- option). If this option is set to <constant>no</constant> (the
default) then if a vetoed
+ delete a directory that contains one or more vetoed files
+ or directories or non-visible files or directories (such
+ as dangling symlinks that point nowhere).
+ (see the <smbconfoption name="veto files"/>, <smbconfoption name="hide
special files"/>,
+ <smbconfoption name="hide unreadable"/>, <smbconfoption name="hide
unwriteable files"/>
+ options). If this option is set to <constant>no</constant> (the
default) then if a vetoed
directory contains any non-vetoed files or directories then the
directory delete will fail. This is usually what you want.</para>
diff --git a/lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv.c b/lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv.c
index ed0f760b5a2..aea6f0c1be0 100644
--- a/lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv.c
+++ b/lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv.c
@@ -2078,6 +2078,8 @@ static int ldb_kv_handle_request(struct ldb_module
*module,
}
}
+ ac->timeout_timeval = tv;
+
/* set a spy so that we do not try to use the request context
* if it is freed before ltdb_callback fires */
ac->spy = talloc(req, struct ldb_kv_req_spy);
diff --git a/lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv.h b/lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv.h
index f9dffae2dcf..ac474b04b4c 100644
--- a/lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv.h
+++ b/lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv.h
@@ -152,6 +152,16 @@ struct ldb_kv_context {
struct ldb_module *module;
struct ldb_request *req;
+ /*
+ * Required as we might not get to the event loop before the
+ * timeout, so we need some old-style cooperative multitasking
+ * here.
+ */
+ struct timeval timeout_timeval;
+
+ /* Used to throttle calls to gettimeofday() */
+ size_t timeout_counter;
+
bool request_terminated;
struct ldb_kv_req_spy *spy;
diff --git a/lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv_index.c
b/lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv_index.c
index 1cc042aa84f..d70e5f619ef 100644
--- a/lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv_index.c
+++ b/lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv_index.c
@@ -2352,6 +2352,47 @@ static int ldb_kv_index_filter(struct ldb_kv_private
*ldb_kv,
for (i = 0; i < num_keys; i++) {
int ret;
bool matched;
+
+ /*
+ * Check the time every 64 records, to reduce calls to
+ * gettimeofday(). This is a compromise, not all
+ * calls to ldb_match_message() will take the same
+ * time, most will run quickly but by luck it might be
+ * possible to have 64 records that are slow, doing a
+ * recursive search via LDAP_MATCHING_RULE_IN_CHAIN.
+ *
+ * Thankfully this is after index processing so only
+ * on the subset that matches some index (but still
+ * possibly a big one like objectclass=user)
+ */
+ if (i % 64 == 0) {
+ struct timeval now = tevent_timeval_current();
+ int timeval_cmp =
tevent_timeval_compare(&ac->timeout_timeval,
+ &now);
+
+ /*
+ * The search has taken too long. This is the
+ * most likely place for our time to expire,
+ * as we are checking the records after the
+ * index set intersection. This is now the
+ * slow process of checking if the records
+ * actually match.
+ *
+ * The tevent based timeout is not likely to
+ * be hit, sadly, as we don't run an event
+ * loop.
+ *
+ * While we are indexed and most of the work
+ * should have been done already, the
+ * ldb_match_* calls can be quite expensive if
+ * the caller uses LDAP_MATCHING_RULE_IN_CHAIN
+ */
+ if (timeval_cmp <= 0) {
+ talloc_free(keys);
+ return LDB_ERR_TIME_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
+ }
+ }
+
msg = ldb_msg_new(ac);
if (!msg) {
talloc_free(keys);
diff --git a/lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv_search.c
b/lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv_search.c
index a0e1762bc90..46031b99c16 100644
--- a/lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv_search.c
+++ b/lib/ldb/ldb_key_value/ldb_kv_search.c
@@ -314,7 +314,8 @@ static int search_func(_UNUSED_ struct ldb_kv_private
*ldb_kv,
struct ldb_context *ldb;
struct ldb_kv_context *ac;
struct ldb_message *msg, *filtered_msg;
- int ret;
+ struct timeval now;
+ int ret, timeval_cmp;
bool matched;
ac = talloc_get_type(state, struct ldb_kv_context);
@@ -341,6 +342,36 @@ static int search_func(_UNUSED_ struct ldb_kv_private
*ldb_kv,
return 0;
}
+ /*
+ * Check the time every 64 records, to reduce calls to
+ * gettimeofday(). This is a compromise, not all calls to
+ * ldb_match_message() will take the same time, most will fail
+ * quickly but by luck it might be possible to have 64 records
+ * that are slow, doing a recursive search via
+ * LDAP_MATCHING_RULE_IN_CHAIN.
+ */
+ if (ac->timeout_counter++ % 64 == 0) {
+ now = tevent_timeval_current();
+ timeval_cmp = tevent_timeval_compare(&ac->timeout_timeval,
+ &now);
+
+ /*
+ * The search has taken too long. This is the most
+ * likely place for our time to expire, as we are in
+ * an un-indexed search and we return the data from
+ * within this loop. The tevent based timeout is not
+ * likely to be hit, sadly.
+ *
+ * ldb_match_msg_error() can be quite expensive if a
+ * LDAP_MATCHING_RULE_IN_CHAIN extended match was
+ * specified.
+ */
+ if (timeval_cmp <= 0) {
+ ac->error = LDB_ERR_TIME_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
msg = ldb_msg_new(ac);
if (!msg) {
ac->error = LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
diff --git a/lib/util/tests/time.c b/lib/util/tests/time.c
index fce0eef5e2e..d94f50355d0 100644
--- a/lib/util/tests/time.c
+++ b/lib/util/tests/time.c
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ static bool test_null_time(struct torture_context *tctx)
static bool test_null_nttime(struct torture_context *tctx)
{
- torture_assert(tctx, null_nttime(-1), "-1");
- torture_assert(tctx, null_nttime(-1), "-1");
+ torture_assert(tctx, null_nttime(0), "0");
+ torture_assert(tctx, !null_nttime(NTTIME_FREEZE), "-1");
+ torture_assert(tctx, !null_nttime(NTTIME_THAW), "-2");
torture_assert(tctx, !null_nttime(42), "42");
return true;
}
diff --git a/lib/util/time.c b/lib/util/time.c
index e8b58e87268..680bfe7c282 100644
--- a/lib/util/time.c
+++ b/lib/util/time.c
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ check if it's a null NTTIME
**/
_PUBLIC_ bool null_nttime(NTTIME t)
{
- return t == 0 || t == (NTTIME)-1;
+ return t == 0;
}
/*******************************************************************
@@ -1133,10 +1133,10 @@ struct timespec nt_time_to_full_timespec(NTTIME nt)
if (nt == NTTIME_OMIT) {
return make_omit_timespec();
}
- if (nt == NTTIME_FREEZE) {
+ if (nt == NTTIME_FREEZE || nt == NTTIME_THAW) {
/*
- * This should be returned as SAMBA_UTIME_FREEZE in the
- * future.
+ * This should be returned as SAMBA_UTIME_FREEZE or
+ * SAMBA_UTIME_THAW in the future.
*/
return make_omit_timespec();
}
diff --git a/lib/util/time.h b/lib/util/time.h
index 04945b5f25f..d3dfde77e2b 100644
--- a/lib/util/time.h
+++ b/lib/util/time.h
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
* implement this yet.
*/
#define NTTIME_FREEZE UINT64_MAX
+#define NTTIME_THAW (UINT64_MAX - 1)
#define SAMBA_UTIME_NOW UTIME_NOW
#define SAMBA_UTIME_OMIT UTIME_OMIT
diff --git a/libcli/smb/smb2cli_tcon.c b/libcli/smb/smb2cli_tcon.c
index 8863bae0764..7bbae8ea3b3 100644
--- a/libcli/smb/smb2cli_tcon.c
+++ b/libcli/smb/smb2cli_tcon.c
@@ -23,42 +23,38 @@
#include "../libcli/smb/smb_common.h"
#include "../libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h"
-struct smb2cli_tcon_state {
- struct tevent_context *ev;
- struct smbXcli_conn *conn;
- uint32_t timeout_msec;
+struct smb2cli_raw_tcon_state {
struct smbXcli_session *session;
struct smbXcli_tcon *tcon;
uint8_t fixed[8];
uint8_t dyn_pad[1];
};
-static void smb2cli_tcon_done(struct tevent_req *subreq);
-
-struct tevent_req *smb2cli_tcon_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct tevent_context *ev,
- struct smbXcli_conn *conn,
- uint32_t timeout_msec,
- struct smbXcli_session *session,
- struct smbXcli_tcon *tcon,
- uint16_t flags,
- const char *unc)
+static void smb2cli_raw_tcon_done(struct tevent_req *subreq);
+
+struct tevent_req *smb2cli_raw_tcon_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct tevent_context *ev,
+ struct smbXcli_conn *conn,
+ uint32_t additional_flags,
+ uint32_t clear_flags,
+ uint32_t timeout_msec,
+ struct smbXcli_session *session,
+ struct smbXcli_tcon *tcon,
+ uint16_t tcon_flags,
+ const char *unc)
{
- struct tevent_req *req, *subreq;
- struct smb2cli_tcon_state *state;
- uint8_t *fixed;
- uint8_t *dyn;
+ struct tevent_req *req = NULL;
+ struct smb2cli_raw_tcon_state *state = NULL;
+ struct tevent_req *subreq = NULL;
+ uint8_t *fixed = NULL;
+ uint8_t *dyn = NULL;
size_t dyn_len;
- uint32_t additional_flags = 0;
- uint32_t clear_flags = 0;
- req = tevent_req_create(mem_ctx, &state, struct smb2cli_tcon_state);
+ req = tevent_req_create(mem_ctx, &state,
+ struct smb2cli_raw_tcon_state);
if (req == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
- state->ev = ev;
- state->conn = conn;
- state->timeout_msec = timeout_msec;
state->session = session;
state->tcon = tcon;
@@ -77,7 +73,7 @@ struct tevent_req *smb2cli_tcon_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
fixed = state->fixed;
SSVAL(fixed, 0, 9);
if (smbXcli_conn_protocol(conn) >= PROTOCOL_SMB3_10) {
- SSVAL(fixed, 2, flags);
+ SSVAL(fixed, 2, tcon_flags);
} else {
SSVAL(fixed, 2, 0); /* Reserved */
}
@@ -89,10 +85,6 @@ struct tevent_req *smb2cli_tcon_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
dyn_len = sizeof(state->dyn_pad);
}
- if (smbXcli_session_is_authenticated(state->session)) {
- additional_flags |= SMB2_HDR_FLAG_SIGNED;
- }
-
subreq = smb2cli_req_send(state, ev, conn, SMB2_OP_TCON,
additional_flags, clear_flags,
timeout_msec,
@@ -104,19 +96,17 @@ struct tevent_req *smb2cli_tcon_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) {
return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
}
- tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, smb2cli_tcon_done, req);
+ tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, smb2cli_raw_tcon_done, req);
return req;
}
-static void smb2cli_tcon_validate(struct tevent_req *subreq);
-
-static void smb2cli_tcon_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+static void smb2cli_raw_tcon_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
{
struct tevent_req *req = tevent_req_callback_data(
subreq, struct tevent_req);
- struct smb2cli_tcon_state *state = tevent_req_data(
- req, struct smb2cli_tcon_state);
+ struct smb2cli_raw_tcon_state *state = tevent_req_data(
+ req, struct smb2cli_raw_tcon_state);
NTSTATUS status;
struct iovec *iov;
uint8_t *body;
@@ -156,6 +146,129 @@ static void smb2cli_tcon_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
share_capabilities,
maximal_access);
+ tevent_req_done(req);
+}
+
+NTSTATUS smb2cli_raw_tcon_recv(struct tevent_req *req)
+{
+ return tevent_req_simple_recv_ntstatus(req);
+}
+
+NTSTATUS smb2cli_raw_tcon(struct smbXcli_conn *conn,
+ uint32_t additional_flags,
+ uint32_t clear_flags,
+ uint32_t timeout_msec,
+ struct smbXcli_session *session,
+ struct smbXcli_tcon *tcon,
+ uint16_t tcon_flags,
+ const char *unc)
+{
+ TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
+ struct tevent_context *ev;
+ struct tevent_req *req;
+ NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+
+ if (smbXcli_conn_has_async_calls(conn)) {
+ /*
+ * Can't use sync call while an async call is in flight
+ */
+ status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ ev = samba_tevent_context_init(frame);
+ if (ev == NULL) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ req = smb2cli_raw_tcon_send(frame, ev, conn,
+ additional_flags, clear_flags,
+ timeout_msec, session, tcon,
+ tcon_flags, unc);
+ if (req == NULL) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (!tevent_req_poll_ntstatus(req, ev, &status)) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
--
Samba Shared Repository
