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Today's Topics:
1. Update: New Active Exploit: memcached on port 11211 UDP & TCP
being exploited for reflection attacks (Barry Greene)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message: 1
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2018 22:28:56 -0500
From: Barry Greene <[email protected]>
To: [email protected], "Afnog@Afnog. Org" <[email protected]>,
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected], AP
Organizations <[email protected]>, [email protected],
[email protected]
Subject: [SANOG] Update: New Active Exploit: memcached on port 11211
UDP & TCP being exploited for reflection attacks
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
[The posting is sent to APOPS, AfNOG, SANOG, PacNOG, SAFNOG, CaribNOG, TZNOG,
MENOG, SDNOG, LACNOG, IRNOG, MYNOG, SGOPS, and the RIPE Routing WG.]
UPDATE: As of 2018-02-28, more attacks using the memcached reflection vector
have been unleashed on the Internet. Operators are asked to port filter
(Exploitable Port Filters), rate limits the port 11211 UDP traffic (ingress and
egress), and clean up any memcached exposed to the Internet (iptables on UNIX
works). These mitigations should be on IPv4 and IPv6! There is not excuse for
ISPs, Telcos, and other operators for not acting. NTT is an example of action.
As stated by Job Snijders <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> on the NANOG
List:
?NTT too has deployed rate limiters on all external facing interfaces on the
GIN backbone ? for UDP/11211 traffic ? to dampen the negative impact of open
memcached instances on peers and customers.
The toxic combination of ?one spoofed packet can yield multiple reponse
packets? and ?one small packet can yield a very big response? makes the
memcached UDP protocol a fine example of double trouble with potential for
severe operational impact.?
This post has been updated with recommendations. Check with your network
vendors for deployment/configuration details.
http://www.senki.org/memcached-on-port-11211-udp-tcp-being-exploited/
<http://www.senki.org/memcached-on-port-11211-udp-tcp-being-exploited/>
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