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I will add that a phrack paper, which im pretty sure introduced the
concept to the public called 'overwriting the frame pointer', or something
similar to that effect explains in all its gruesome detail.
Basically if my memory serves me correctly, what happened was because it
was a stack based off by one, it allowed you to overwrite the LSB
(depending on arch, this was done on a little endian machine) of the frame
pointer that is restored into {e}bp when the leave instruction is called,
thus the idea was the ability to control where the ret address would
actually be called from (look up the leave and ret instructions on intel
if you dont understand that), and the idea was to manipulate it in a way
that you could alter the base pointer in such a way as for it to point to
an address that you could legally store on the stack which pointed to your
code, and then the following ret instruction was 'misguided', the phrack
article describes it better than i could, and it was called something like
'overwriting the frame pointer', im not sure if it covered off-by-five
errors though, and thats an error i never fully understood [how do you
miscount the index by five?]
so in a short recap,
in a normal off by one error (that is exploitable), you can overwrite the
LSB of an address on the stack that is restored to ebp when leave is
called by a routine, then you would have an address that pointed to your
code on the stack that ebp (now affected with one byte overwritten)
pointed to thus confusing the ret instruction when its called by the
procedure epilogue. If you dont understand the procedure prolog/epilogue,
review aleph1's smashing the stack, or run a simple c program through your
favorite debugger.
anyway hope that helped some.
j
- --
It is only the great men who are truly obscene. If they had not dared to
be obscene, they could never have dared to be great.
-- Havelock Ellis
On Wed, 5 May 2004, Steven M. Christey wrote:
>
> Mads Rasmussen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> said:
>
> >I for one have difficulties understanding the "off-by-one"
> >vulnerability. Maybe a kind soul would step in?
>
> I'll try to tackle this. Corrections or additions are most welcome :)
>
> In general, off-by-one bugs involve small errors in which an array of
> size "N" is accessed using an index of N - but since an index is
> 0-based in C, the maximum index for the array is N-1. So, N is
> actually one byte outside the range of the array. I haven't dug
> deeply into the details, but there are probably a couple variants.
>
> When manipulating strings using functions like strcpy, this means that
> the terminating null byte is written outside of the buffer, in some
> other memory location that might have security implications if that
> null is interpreted as a 0. Or, that memory location is overwritten
> after the null was inserted (say, by a string copy to another
> variable), so the null character is removed. Then, a function that
> processes that string will keep accessing memory until it hits a 0
> byte.
>
> Functions like strncpy can also be vulnerable to off-by-ones. If the
> input is exactly size N, then strncpy doesn't add a terminating null
> byte.
>
> Any kind of C array can be susceptible to off-by-ones, not just
> strings. And the use of terminators isn't necessarily required. For
> example, if a programmer has an array of data structures, its length
> might be stored in a separate variable, rather than relying on a
> terminator value to signify the last element of the array.
>
> The bug isn't always exploitable for code execution. For example,
> sensitive data could be leaked from "nearby" memory locations due to a
> missing null terminator.
>
> Some documents that touch on off-by-ones include:
>
> Halvar Flake's presentation at Black Hat Europe 2001 on "Third
> Generation Exploits on NT/Win2k Platforms," which includes buffer
> overflows, heap/free() and off-by-one errors:
>
>
> http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe-01/halvar-flake/bh-europe-01-halvarflake.ppt
>
> This includes a nice graphic representation of the problem at the
> stack level, touching on how portions of return addresses can be
> overwritten.
>
> The following Bugtraq post by Vade 79 gives an alternate description
> of off-by-ones, along with an example that causes potentially
> sensitive memory to be read and copied into a string because of the
> missing terminator.
>
> BUGTRAQ:20030727 [PAPER]: Address relay fingerprinting.
> URL:http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=105941103709264&w=2
>
> The following Bugtraq post by Jedi/Sector One gives something of a
> good demonstration if you read between the lines in the code:
>
> BUGTRAQ:20020624 Apache mod_ssl off-by-one vulnerability
> URL:http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=102513970919836&w=2
>
> In this example, a buffer is allocated 1024 bytes, and there is a
> conditional in a loop which tests if i < 1024. However, after
> that loop exits, index "i" in the array is modified.
>
> Olaf Kirch's Bugtraq post "The poisoned NUL byte" seems to be an
> early report of the security implications of an off-by-one error:
>
> BUGTRAQ:19981014 The poisoned NUL byte
> URL:http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/10884
>
> Here are some more source code examples, from Bugtraq posts by
> Janusz Niewiadomski:
>
> BUGTRAQ:20030714 Linux nfs-utils xlog() off-by-one bug
> URL:http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=105820223707191&w=2
>
> BUGTRAQ:20030731 wu-ftpd fb_realpath() off-by-one bug
> URL:http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=105967516807664&w=2
>
>
> - Steve
>
>
>
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