On Tuesday, December 17, 2019 12:03:49 PM EST Marek Haicman wrote:
> > > And now the question - should the reference be part of all the rules?
> > > Or just the ones that really increases the security of the system?
> > 
> > In my opinion, all of them as a group meet the requirement since they
> > form the policy. But there is also firewire, bluetooth, external SCSI,
> > RS-232, or printer connectors.  You can really go far down the rabbit
> > hole.  :-)
> > 
> > And that's what I am asking - are they together forming a policy? Or are
> they all related to the policy, but only the core rules are forming it?

They all are required to meet a guess at the deployment environment. Based on 
specific site knowledge, you could make a different interpretation. But that is 
beyond general guidance. For example, based on knowledge of your local 
network, you might decide that you have to allow ICMP redirects for network 
provider failover. There are always deployment unknowns. But what you can say 
is this policy is secure for specific assumptions about a deployment.

> What if user wants the machine to disallow any USB device - removal of the
> rule (that is part of the policy) will make the machine hardening stricter,
> and to follow requirement in even stricter sense.

Well, then they would probably just blacklist the device driver and not use 
usbguard.

> It is an unusual situation, as usually more rules -> stricter config.

But is that really a problem? People can always tailor content to fit their 
site policy. Maybe they want passwords that are 20 characters long? Maybe 
they always want to enter via a jump box and want a pam rule enforcing that. 
Maybe they want 2 factor authentication with an RSA token?

There is a point where you just stop and say, this meets the needs of a 
typical deployment based on a specific threat model and a guess at the 
deployment environment. This is why common criteria lists its addressed 
threats accompanied by assumptions. If the assumptions are wrong, the 
mitigations may not address all of the threats. In this case, we are assuming 
that a keyboard and mouse may be a USB device.

-Steve

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