Right, the author of the book and Terry Gross used the naked emperor analogy as well. They did point out, though, that the "little" boy" first made bets on the emperor being proved to be naked, *then* told people he was.
----- Original Message ----- From: "Kelwyn" <ravena...@yahoo.com> To: scifinoir2@yahoogroups.com Sent: Saturday, March 20, 2010 1:28:31 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: [scifinoir2] Re: OT: Author Details How Some Profited from Financial Meltdown I read about it in Vanity Fair, too, but I didn't want to sound elitist ;> Once again, the information these handful of men used to get fabulously rich was hidden in plain sight. It was there for anybody to see. It reminds me of the fable about the Emperor with No Clothes. The Wall Street Emperors had been walking around bucket-ass naked for a long time but everybody - especially the alleged regulators - refused to see it. This Asperger guy is like the little kid in the fable who had not only the eyes to see but the courage to voice his conviction. ~rave! --- In scifinoir2@yahoogroups.com , Martin Baxter <martinbaxt...@...> wrote: > > Read that as well, rave, in Vanity Fair. In a sense, you want to applaud it > as True American Ingenuity, even as you want to rail at the thought of such > blood money being made. > > On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 9:15 AM, Kelwyn <ravena...@...> wrote: > > > > > > > I saw this on 60 minutes. I was fascinated by the guy who suffered from > > Asperger's syndrome who figured out what was going on by doing something > > really simple - he read the prospectuses he requested from the brokerage > > houses. He made $750 million. Reading is fundamental. > > > > ~rave! > > > > > > --- In scifinoir2@yahoogroups.com <scifinoir2%40yahoogroups.com>, Keith > > Johnson <KeithBJohnson@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > Here's the link to the NPR "Fresh Air" interview with the "The Blind > > Side" author, whose newest book "The Big Short" tells how some people > > anticipated and profited from the financial meltdown. I'm amazed at this > > guy's writing diversity, but the story here is shocking, for all that we've > > been in this mess for a couple of years now. To hear how some relative > > amateurs figured out how badly the system was going to fail is bad enough. > > To understand that institutions were actually buying and selling insurance > > against that failure--for as cheaply as 1/10 of one percent on the > > dollar--is amazing. To hear how these crap bond packages were falsely rated > > as AAA loans is maddening. And to try to understand again, how none of the > > people leading these deals anticipated or cared about the absolutely > > inevitable catastrophe is...impossible. > > > I highly recommend taking the 45 minutes to listen to this interview just > > to be amazed and disgusted all over again.... > > > > > > ********************************************************************* > > > > > > > > http://www.npr.org/templates/rundowns/rundown.php?prgId=13&prgDate=03-16-2010 > > > > > > > > and here's a written excerpt from the interview: > > > > > > http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124690424 > > > > > > > > > > > > Writer Michael Lewis is the author of Moneyball, Liar's Poker, and The > > Blind Side, books with vastly different subjects but a common theme: > > outsiders with innovative ideas who find astonishing success. Lewis' newest > > book continues that narrative. The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine > > chronicles the 2008 financial collapse through stories of the people who > > realized what was happening to the U.S. economy while it was happening â€" > > and then made vast fortunes by betting against the markets. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > "Everybody [on Wall Street] was working with the same set of facts about > > subprime mortgage lending â€" about how subprime mortgage loans were turned > > into bonds and repackaged and turned into CDOs and so on and so forth," > > Lewis tells Terry Gross. "[And] the vast majority of the people in the > > markets took those facts and painted one kind of picture with it; it was a > > very pleasant picture. And a very small handful of people took the same > > facts and painted a completely different kind of picture with it. [I wanted > > to find out] 'What is it that enables [the people who bet against the > > market] to paint that picture?' and 'Why do these people look at the world > > differently?' " > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Dr. Michael Burry > > > > > > One of the most compelling stories Lewis tells in The Big Short follows a > > doctor, Michael Burry, who decided to leave his neurology residency after > > his investment blog attracted attention from money managers across the > > country. Burry started a hedge fund named Scion Capital, which, Lewis > > writes, was "madly, almost comically successful" â€" even when the Standard > > & Poors index fell. > > > > > > While investigating stocks to invest for his customers, Burry discovered > > that the bond market was absorbing subprime mortgage loans in incredible > > volumes. Soon he realized that the millions of dollars of credit swirling > > around the market were artificially inflated and almost worthless. > > > > > > Burry figured that he could bet against pools of these subprime mortgage > > loans using an instrument called a "credit default swap," essentially > > insurance on a corporate loan. Burry persuaded the investment banks to > > create credit default swaps for the subprime mortgage market. > > > > > > "As the pools of loans that are underneath these bonds start to default," > > Lewis says, the investment banks that gambled on the subprime mortgage > > loans > > were forced to send Burry money daily as the bonds went bad. "Wall Street > > firms, they were on the other side of the bets." > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Charles Ledley and Jaime Mai > > > > > > Ledley and Mai were two guys in their early 30s who decided to start > > their own hedge fund with just over $100,000. They quickly made more than > > $15 million by betting on financial events that are extremely unlikely to > > occur â€" and therefore didn't cost much to bet against. > > > > > > "They thought that Wall Street underestimated the likelihood of really > > unlikely events," Lewis says. "So they would buy options to buy stocks at > > prices far, far away from where the stocks were currently trading. They did > > this with currencies, they did it with commodities. They scoured the world, > > essentially looking to make bets on extreme things happening." > > > > > > > > > > > > Soon, Ledley and Mai stumbled into the subprime mortgage market and > > realized that they could bet against not only the loans but also the > > financial institutions themselves. > > > > > > "They're able to piece together a clear picture of what's going on in a > > matter of months," Lewis says. "They become less interested in the bet than > > the social implications of what they're learning. They go to the SEC. They > > go to The Wall Street Journal. They're screaming at the top of their lungs, > > 'My God, there's fraud in the system.' " > > > > > > By betting against subprime mortgages, Ledley and Mai's $15 million > > investment ballooned to $120 million. Soon, Ledley began to experience > > migraines and anxiety attacks. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > "They were stressed about being right," Lewis says. "I think they were so > > stressed that they realized that this wasn't a bet against a company, this > > was a bet against an entire system. And it was a bet that arose from their > > insight that the system had become rigged â€" that, essentially, Wall > > Street > > had become a giant Ponzi scheme." > > > > > > Lewis says the two men â€" like Dr. Burry â€" were able to see the > > failures of the market before the rest of the world did because they viewed > > the world differently. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > "This is the story of human perception as much as it is anything else. > > And their attitude toward the financial markets was peculiar," Lewis says. > > "It was peculiar to be running around the world looking for unlikely things > > that might happen. ... And it told you something about Wall Street and ... > > the way the markets were functioning when they were dysfunctional. There > > weren't enough people thinking this way. There weren't enough people taking > > into account the real likelihood of extreme change in the world." > > > > > > > > > >
