Re: Prince Jones v US
> Can you cite the case #. All I could find is an old "local appeals court in > Washington, D.C." ruling. I found nothing under the US Supreme Court. It was a DC Court of Appeals decision, not SCOTUS. It appears unlikely to hit SCOTUS. https://www.dccourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-09/15-CF-322.pdf ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Prince Jones v US
On 09/22/2017 11:55 AM, Jerry wrote: > Can you cite the case #. All I could find is an old "local appeals court in > Washington, D.C." ruling. I found nothing under the US Supreme Court. See https://www.dccourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-09/15-CF-322.pdf DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS No. 15-CF-322 09/21/2017 P RINCE J ONES , A PPELLANT , V . U NITED S TATES , A PPELLEE . Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (CF1-18140-13) -- Kristian Fiskerstrand Blog: https://blog.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk Public OpenPGP keyblock at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3 "Great things are not accomplished by those who yield to trends and fads and popular opinion." (Jack Kerouac) signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Prince Jones v US
On Fri, 22 Sep 2017 01:22:13 -0400, Robert J. Hansen stated: >Good news for US citizens: _Prince Jones v US_ was decided Thursday. >The important text from the opinion is recreated here, and the >implications for encrypted email follow. > >* * * * * > >But in addition to the fact that people reasonably value and hope to >protect the privacy of their location information, what necessitates our >conclusion is the _method_ by which the government obtained the location >information in this case. Unlike in a situation in which the government >determines a person's location through visual surveillance or by >employing the older generation of tracking devices, it cannot be argued >that "the information obtained by [the government] in this case was ... >readily available and in the public view". The cell-site simulator >employed in this case gave the government a powerful person-locating >capability that private actors do not have and that, as explained above, >the government itself had previously lacked -- a capability only >superficially analogous to the visual tracking of a suspect. And the >simulator's operation involved exploitation of a security flaw in a >device that most people now feel obligated to carry with them at all >times. Allowing the government to deploy such a powerful tool without >judicial oversight would surely "shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy" >far below that which "existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted". It >would also place an individual in the difficult position either of >accepting the risk that at any moment his or her cellphone could be >converted into tracking device or of forgoing "necessary use of" the >cellphone. We thus conclude that under ordinary circumstances, the use >of a cell-site simulator to locate a person through his or her cellphone >invades the person's actual, legitimate, and reasonable expectation of >privacy in his or her location information and is a search. > >* * * * * > >The above is taken from the opinion -- citations omitted. But it >appears to me this logic is immediately applicable to many different >kinds of surveillance: namely, if it involves security flaws in common >everyday technologies which millions of Americans entrust with their >secrets and who really cannot reasonably avoid using... then it needs a >warrant. > >The implications for electronic privacy in the United States should be >clear. This is a really good development. :) Can you cite the case #. All I could find is an old "local appeals court in Washington, D.C." ruling. I found nothing under the US Supreme Court. -- Jerry ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Prince Jones v US
Good news for US citizens: _Prince Jones v US_ was decided Thursday. The important text from the opinion is recreated here, and the implications for encrypted email follow. * * * * * But in addition to the fact that people reasonably value and hope to protect the privacy of their location information, what necessitates our conclusion is the _method_ by which the government obtained the location information in this case. Unlike in a situation in which the government determines a person's location through visual surveillance or by employing the older generation of tracking devices, it cannot be argued that "the information obtained by [the government] in this case was ... readily available and in the public view". The cell-site simulator employed in this case gave the government a powerful person-locating capability that private actors do not have and that, as explained above, the government itself had previously lacked -- a capability only superficially analogous to the visual tracking of a suspect. And the simulator's operation involved exploitation of a security flaw in a device that most people now feel obligated to carry with them at all times. Allowing the government to deploy such a powerful tool without judicial oversight would surely "shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy" far below that which "existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted". It would also place an individual in the difficult position either of accepting the risk that at any moment his or her cellphone could be converted into tracking device or of forgoing "necessary use of" the cellphone. We thus conclude that under ordinary circumstances, the use of a cell-site simulator to locate a person through his or her cellphone invades the person's actual, legitimate, and reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her location information and is a search. * * * * * The above is taken from the opinion -- citations omitted. But it appears to me this logic is immediately applicable to many different kinds of surveillance: namely, if it involves security flaws in common everyday technologies which millions of Americans entrust with their secrets and who really cannot reasonably avoid using... then it needs a warrant. The implications for electronic privacy in the United States should be clear. This is a really good development. :) ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users