Re: [PATCH 1/2] kernel: Add noaudit variant of ns_capable()

[Serge Hallyn]

Quoting Tyler Hicks (tyhi...@canonical.com):
> When checking the current cred for a capability in a specific user
> namespace, it isn't always desirable to have the LSMs audit the check.
> This patch adds a noaudit variant of ns_capable() for when those
> situations arise.
> 
> The common logic between ns_capable() and the new ns_capable_noaudit()
> is moved into a single, shared function to keep duplicated code to a
> minimum and ease maintainability.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks 

Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn 

> ---
>  include/linux/capability.h |  5 +
>  kernel/capability.c| 46 
> --
>  2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index 00690ff..5f3c63d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct 
> *t,
> struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
>  extern bool capable(int cap);
>  extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
> +extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
>  #else
>  static inline bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
>  {
> @@ -233,6 +234,10 @@ static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, 
> int cap)
>  {
>   return true;
>  }
> +static inline bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> +{
> + return true;
> +}
>  #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
>  extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
>  extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace 
> *ns, int cap);
> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
> index 45432b5..00411c8 100644
> --- a/kernel/capability.c
> +++ b/kernel/capability.c
> @@ -361,6 +361,24 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int 
> cap)
>   return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, _user_ns, cap);
>  }
>  
> +static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit)
> +{
> + int capable;
> +
> + if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
> + pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
> + BUG();
> + }
> +
> + capable = audit ? security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) :
> +   security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), ns, cap);
> + if (capable == 0) {
> + current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
> + return true;
> + }
> + return false;
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in 
> effect
>   * @ns:  The usernamespace we want the capability in
> @@ -374,19 +392,27 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int 
> cap)
>   */
>  bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
>  {
> - if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
> - pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
> - BUG();
> - }
> -
> - if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) {
> - current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
> - return true;
> - }
> - return false;
> + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, true);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
>  
> +/**
> + * ns_capable_noaudit - Determine if the current task has a superior 
> capability
> + * (unaudited) in effect
> + * @ns:  The usernamespace we want the capability in
> + * @cap: The capability to be tested for
> + *
> + * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability 
> currently
> + * available for use, false if not.
> + *
> + * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
> + * assumption that it's about to be used.
> + */
> +bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> +{
> + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, false);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit);
>  
>  /**
>   * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in 
> effect
> -- 
> 2.7.4
> 

Re: [PATCH 1/2] kernel: Add noaudit variant of ns_capable()

[Serge Hallyn]

Quoting Tyler Hicks (tyhi...@canonical.com):
> When checking the current cred for a capability in a specific user
> namespace, it isn't always desirable to have the LSMs audit the check.
> This patch adds a noaudit variant of ns_capable() for when those
> situations arise.
> 
> The common logic between ns_capable() and the new ns_capable_noaudit()
> is moved into a single, shared function to keep duplicated code to a
> minimum and ease maintainability.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks 

Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn 

> ---
>  include/linux/capability.h |  5 +
>  kernel/capability.c| 46 
> --
>  2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index 00690ff..5f3c63d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct 
> *t,
> struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
>  extern bool capable(int cap);
>  extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
> +extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
>  #else
>  static inline bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
>  {
> @@ -233,6 +234,10 @@ static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, 
> int cap)
>  {
>   return true;
>  }
> +static inline bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> +{
> + return true;
> +}
>  #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
>  extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
>  extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace 
> *ns, int cap);
> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
> index 45432b5..00411c8 100644
> --- a/kernel/capability.c
> +++ b/kernel/capability.c
> @@ -361,6 +361,24 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int 
> cap)
>   return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, _user_ns, cap);
>  }
>  
> +static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit)
> +{
> + int capable;
> +
> + if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
> + pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
> + BUG();
> + }
> +
> + capable = audit ? security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) :
> +   security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), ns, cap);
> + if (capable == 0) {
> + current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
> + return true;
> + }
> + return false;
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in 
> effect
>   * @ns:  The usernamespace we want the capability in
> @@ -374,19 +392,27 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int 
> cap)
>   */
>  bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
>  {
> - if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
> - pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
> - BUG();
> - }
> -
> - if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) {
> - current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
> - return true;
> - }
> - return false;
> + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, true);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
>  
> +/**
> + * ns_capable_noaudit - Determine if the current task has a superior 
> capability
> + * (unaudited) in effect
> + * @ns:  The usernamespace we want the capability in
> + * @cap: The capability to be tested for
> + *
> + * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability 
> currently
> + * available for use, false if not.
> + *
> + * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
> + * assumption that it's about to be used.
> + */
> +bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> +{
> + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, false);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit);
>  
>  /**
>   * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in 
> effect
> -- 
> 2.7.4
> 

[PATCH 1/2] kernel: Add noaudit variant of ns_capable()

[Tyler Hicks]

When checking the current cred for a capability in a specific user
namespace, it isn't always desirable to have the LSMs audit the check.
This patch adds a noaudit variant of ns_capable() for when those
situations arise.

The common logic between ns_capable() and the new ns_capable_noaudit()
is moved into a single, shared function to keep duplicated code to a
minimum and ease maintainability.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks 
---
 include/linux/capability.h |  5 +
 kernel/capability.c| 46 --
 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 00690ff..5f3c63d 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
  struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 extern bool capable(int cap);
 extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 #else
 static inline bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
 {
@@ -233,6 +234,10 @@ static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, 
int cap)
 {
return true;
 }
+static inline bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+{
+   return true;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
 extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
 extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace 
*ns, int cap);
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 45432b5..00411c8 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -361,6 +361,24 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, _user_ns, cap);
 }
 
+static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit)
+{
+   int capable;
+
+   if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
+   pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
+   BUG();
+   }
+
+   capable = audit ? security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) :
+ security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), ns, cap);
+   if (capable == 0) {
+   current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
+   return true;
+   }
+   return false;
+}
+
 /**
  * ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in 
effect
  * @ns:  The usernamespace we want the capability in
@@ -374,19 +392,27 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int 
cap)
  */
 bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 {
-   if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
-   pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
-   BUG();
-   }
-
-   if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) {
-   current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
-   return true;
-   }
-   return false;
+   return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, true);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
 
+/**
+ * ns_capable_noaudit - Determine if the current task has a superior capability
+ * (unaudited) in effect
+ * @ns:  The usernamespace we want the capability in
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
+ * available for use, false if not.
+ *
+ * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
+ * assumption that it's about to be used.
+ */
+bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+{
+   return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, false);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit);
 
 /**
  * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH 1/2] kernel: Add noaudit variant of ns_capable()

[Tyler Hicks]

When checking the current cred for a capability in a specific user
namespace, it isn't always desirable to have the LSMs audit the check.
This patch adds a noaudit variant of ns_capable() for when those
situations arise.

The common logic between ns_capable() and the new ns_capable_noaudit()
is moved into a single, shared function to keep duplicated code to a
minimum and ease maintainability.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks 
---
 include/linux/capability.h |  5 +
 kernel/capability.c| 46 --
 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 00690ff..5f3c63d 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
  struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 extern bool capable(int cap);
 extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 #else
 static inline bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
 {
@@ -233,6 +234,10 @@ static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, 
int cap)
 {
return true;
 }
+static inline bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+{
+   return true;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
 extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
 extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace 
*ns, int cap);
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 45432b5..00411c8 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -361,6 +361,24 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, _user_ns, cap);
 }
 
+static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit)
+{
+   int capable;
+
+   if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
+   pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
+   BUG();
+   }
+
+   capable = audit ? security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) :
+ security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), ns, cap);
+   if (capable == 0) {
+   current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
+   return true;
+   }
+   return false;
+}
+
 /**
  * ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in 
effect
  * @ns:  The usernamespace we want the capability in
@@ -374,19 +392,27 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int 
cap)
  */
 bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 {
-   if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
-   pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
-   BUG();
-   }
-
-   if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) {
-   current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
-   return true;
-   }
-   return false;
+   return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, true);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
 
+/**
+ * ns_capable_noaudit - Determine if the current task has a superior capability
+ * (unaudited) in effect
+ * @ns:  The usernamespace we want the capability in
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
+ * available for use, false if not.
+ *
+ * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
+ * assumption that it's about to be used.
+ */
+bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+{
+   return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, false);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit);
 
 /**
  * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
-- 
2.7.4