[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: What is Part III about?
Creath says: Joe, list, I do want to belatedly comment on this provocative post. The dependency of the symbol on the interpretant is, it seems to me, rather strictly limited. While symbols are arbitrary in some sense, Peirce does not contemplate a free play of semiotic exchange, limited only by, as Rorty might say, what is rhetorically convincing. Rather, every symbol "refers more or less directly to an icon" and every symbol "refers. . . to a real object through an index." Every symbol. Further, as interpretants, we are able to meaningfully use symbols in communicating with one another because we are embedded in a ground of shared "reactional experiences." Interpretation is, therefore, sharply constrained by such referentiality and by the additional constraints of shared reactional experiences. Further, symbols are ultimately more dependent on iconicity and indexicality than upon any whims or vagaries of interpretants. REPLY: I agree with all this, Creath. I said nothing that implies that interpretation is unnconstrained, or at least did not intend to. . But although determined, it is not strictly determined, and there is always vagueness: enough room for plenty of spontaneity and creativity. Joe Ransdell Joseph Ransdell writes: > > Considered as an introduction to a book on mathematical reasoning, the New > Elements is probably best regarded as incomplete because Peirce does not > in > fact get around to saying anything specifically about that sort of > reasoning > except for the definition in Part II of "diagram", which is important but > is > not followed up in Part III although some groundwork is laid for doing do. > If the introduction were complete I would expect Peirce to have gone ahead > to a Part IV in which the distinction between corollarial and theorematic > deduction is drawn, and the differing role of the diagram in the two kinds > of deduction is explained, and if not there then in still another new part > there would be other things to be explained, too, at least briefly, as, > for > example, the peculiarly hypothetical status of distinctively mathematical > reasoning. But since, as it stands, there is actually very little in the > New Elements which seems to be designed specifically to explain or provide > the logical basis for understanding the nature of mathematical reasoning > in > particular, I conclude that it is simply incomplete and therefore best > understood in respect to what Peirce actually does accomplish, or at least > attempt to accomplish as far as he got with it. > > Looking at it that way, it seems to me, then, that the question is, what > is > Part III about? What is it mainly attempting designed to accomplish? And > I > would say that Peirce is mainly attempting there to make clear to the > reader > what is implicit in understanding a symbol as essentially dependent on its > interpretant for its identity as the particular symbol it is. The > peculiarity of the symbol is that no conclusion can be drawn as to what it > is, as a symbol, on the basis either of an intrinsic characteristic of it, > or on the basis of it as something in existential relationship with other > entities. It is essentially dependent on its interpretant for its > identity > as a symbol, which supplies what is missing in the symbol itself > considered > as replicated in something which has no properties of its own, qualitative > or existential, that account for its meaning. > > This is what makes semiosis essentially dialogical: the actually occurring > sign is "hostage to the future" in the sense that, apart from what its > interpretant can do for it, it is meaningless and is not really a symbol > at > all. (See Thomas Riese's recent message on this in the interchange with > Gary Richmond.) Contrary to what some interpreters of Peirce think, there > is no implication in this that it is hostage to some infinitely remote > interpretant: any authentic interpretant of it will do, provided it is an > interpretation of it as significant in the sense of being connotative or > having sense or logical intension (i.e.. signifying a quality or > character). > If it is an interpretation of it as denotative or referential (having > logical extension) it must, as a matter of logical priority, already be > significative connotationally. And this is true of it a fortiori if it is > an interpretation of it as propositional since that presupposes > referential > interpretation. So if we suppose that a given symbol actually has been > replicated in a sinsign occurrence, we are supposing that an authentic > interpretant of it either has occurred or will occur. > > Nevertheless, Peirce also wants to make clear, before going into the > special > considerations involved in understanding mathematical representation and > the > way symbolism works in that respect, that the critically reflective symbol > user should understand that there is indeed the promise of an infinitude >
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Jim, list,
Jim Piat wrote:
>>[Joe Ransdell] Good point, Gary. Still another way of thinking about it
>>might be to suppose that the emphasis is supposed to fall on "thing" rather
>>than "sign": "no sign is a real THING" rather than "no sign is a REAL
>>thing"; but that doesn't sound very plausible to me. I like your solution
>>better.
>> Joe Ransdell
>[Jim] While we're raising questions about the distinctions among such notions
>as the real, the existent and the true (their relationships to the categories
>etc)
Are you disagreeing with Peirce here? It's okay to disagree with him, I do too,
but I'm wondering whether that's what you're doing. Here's Peirce's view:
1. The possible
|> 3. The (conditionally) necessary ("would have to" approx. = "should"), the
real
2. The actual, the reactive, the existent
"Truth" in Peirce's use of the word is the property of a true proposition, its
property of corresponding to fact, though it could also correspond to a law
regarded as a fact.
I'll give this a try. Keeping in mind that these are correlations, not
equations:
1. Term (seme, etc.) - (univocality?) -- (case in the sense of question,
issue, matter, _res_?) --- possibility.
|> 3. Argument -- validity -- law --- (conditional) necessity.
2. Proposition - truth -- fact --- actuality.
>[Jim] -- I'd like to throw in a related question: Does existence as a mode of
>being ever occur outside of representation or thirdness (as a mode of being).
>Or is existence (and objects conceived of as merely existing -- ie something
>less than signs) something that always swims in the contiuum of
>representation.
My take has been that existent objects are always also embodied signs, but that
embodied interpretants aren't so common. I'd have to dig. I seem to remember
Peirce talking about genuine phenomenal thirdness as not being everywhere --
but I also remember thinking that he was talking in terms of the interpretant,
and not of "just any" signs -- i.e., it was the thing about embodied
interpretants again. Peirce doesn't use the phrase "embodied interpretant," as
I recall. Gary used it & I picked it up from him.
Now, Peirce says that an index doesn't necessarily resemble its object at all,
and that it indicates its object whether we notice or not -- the relationship
with its object is one of actual resistance or reaction (when the index a
sinsign; otherwise, the relationship of its replica with the object). If I
think of such reactions, I think vaguely of forces, variational principles,
etc. And I think of effects which quantitatively and qualitatively differ a lot
from their causes.
In the case of icons, Peirce is more likely to think in terms of mathematical
diagrams. He thinks that mathematical structures and patterns are real, and are
real thirdness (I think).
However, I don't know what Peirce thinks about iconicity in statistical
patterns and processes in material nature -- I don't mean in the sense of
statistical patterns making pictures of physical objects, if that ever happens.
I mean in the sense that there are statistical processes whereby random
fluctuations and differences cancel out to a common middle or average, and a
stage of a process can be predictably similar to a current stage depending on
how recent or soon-to-arrive it is at the time of the given curren stage. There
are other kinds of widespread similarities -- typical percentages of various
substances in widely dispersed material, & so on. Now insofar as we're talking
about embodied iconicity, it's not just about resemblances, but about
resemblances arising among things reactively or resistantially related -- in
other words, a lot of things with family kinships, things made of the same
kinds of stuff often from common sources and maybe ultimately all from a common
source way way back, anyway, such that these things informatively resemble one
another.
Peirce does not seem to have regarded biological phenomena as involving genuine
thirdness. He includes biology in the physical wing of cenoscopy. He says that
if a sunflower's turning sunward could reproduce another sunflower's turning
sunward without the second sunflower's having directly reacted with the
sunlight, then the first sunflower's turning sunward would be a genuine a
representamen (to the second sunflower) -- in the sense that a sign entails a
mind, while a representamen does not, a distinction which he later dropped. And
of course the second sunflower's turning sunward would be an interpretant
representamen. If we look inside vegetable organisms, rather than among them,
we might have better chances of finding genuine semiosis. However, although
there is a lot of what we now call decoding, there doesn't appear to be the
kind of learning & retention that allows chains of interpretants onward
indefinitely, which is an essential part of what Peirce means by "interpretant"
and semiosis.
My view has been that retention in s
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: What is Part III about?
Joe, list, I do want to belatedly comment on this provocative post. The dependency of the symbol on the interpretant is, it seems to me, rather strictly limited. While symbols are arbitrary in some sense, Peirce does not contemplate a free play of semiotic exchange, limited only by, as Rorty might say, what is rhetorically convincing. Rather, every symbol refers more or less directly to an icon and every symbol refers. . . to a real object through an index. Every symbol. Further, as interpretants, we are able to meaningfully use symbols in communicating with one another because we are embedded in a ground of shared reactional experiences. Interpretation is, therefore, sharply constrained by such referentiality and by the additional constraints of shared reactional experiences. Further, symbols are ultimately more dependent on iconicity and indexicality than upon any whims or vagaries of interpretants. Creath Thorne Joseph Ransdell writes: Considered as an introduction to a book on mathematical reasoning, the New Elements is probably best regarded as incomplete because Peirce does not in fact get around to saying anything specifically about that sort of reasoning except for the definition in Part II of "diagram", which is important but is not followed up in Part III although some groundwork is laid for doing do. If the introduction were complete I would expect Peirce to have gone ahead to a Part IV in which the distinction between corollarial and theorematic deduction is drawn, and the differing role of the diagram in the two kinds of deduction is explained, and if not there then in still another new part there would be other things to be explained, too, at least briefly, as, for example, the peculiarly hypothetical status of distinctively mathematical reasoning. But since, as it stands, there is actually very little in the New Elements which seems to be designed specifically to explain or provide the logical basis for understanding the nature of mathematical reasoning in particular, I conclude that it is simply incomplete and therefore best understood in respect to what Peirce actually does accomplish, or at least attempt to accomplish as far as he got with it. Looking at it that way, it seems to me, then, that the question is, what is Part III about? What is it mainly attempting designed to accomplish? And I would say that Peirce is mainly attempting there to make clear to the reader what is implicit in understanding a symbol as essentially dependent on its interpretant for its identity as the particular symbol it is. The peculiarity of the symbol is that no conclusion can be drawn as to what it is, as a symbol, on the basis either of an intrinsic characteristic of it, or on the basis of it as something in existential relationship with other entities. It is essentially dependent on its interpretant for its identity as a symbol, which supplies what is missing in the symbol itself considered as replicated in something which has no properties of its own, qualitative or existential, that account for its meaning. This is what makes semiosis essentially dialogical: the actually occurring sign is "hostage to the future" in the sense that, apart from what its interpretant can do for it, it is meaningless and is not really a symbol at all. (See Thomas Riese's recent message on this in the interchange with Gary Richmond.) Contrary to what some interpreters of Peirce think, there is no implication in this that it is hostage to some infinitely remote interpretant: any authentic interpretant of it will do, provided it is an interpretation of it as significant in the sense of being connotative or having sense or logical intension (i.e.. signifying a quality or character). If it is an interpretation of it as denotative or referential (having logical extension) it must, as a matter of logical priority, already be significative connotationally. And this is true of it a fortiori if it is an interpretation of it as propositional since that presupposes referential interpretation. So if we suppose that a given symbol actually has been replicated in a sinsign occurrence, we are supposing that an authentic interpretant of it either has occurred or will occur. Nevertheless, Peirce also wants to make clear, before going into the special considerations involved in understanding mathematical representation and the way symbolism works in that respect, that the critically reflective symbol user should understand that there is indeed the promise of an infinitude of prospective future interpretation to be taken duly into account, the practical import of which is that the critical interpreter will understand that there is indeed a potentially infinitely interpretational future implicit in the symbol which precludes the possibility of absolute certainty that interpretation of it at any given time is not mistaken. And he seems especially c
[peirce-l] Re: Introduction
Ben, list, Thanks for the links to the Queens visuals. We Manhattanites always like to see what's happening in the boonies. But, have you heard? Queens is one of the Boroughs of New York City?!!!. And I understand some of the most intelligent "streetwise" folk live there? Best, Gary Benjamin Udell wrote: Gary, list, Thanks for the unintentionally pubic compliment. But what's this about my living in the City? You know I'm out in Queens. :-) --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Introduction
Gary, list,
Thanks for the unintentionally pubic compliment. But what's this about my
living in the City? You know I'm out in Queens. :-)
http://www.pulp.tc/manholecover1-7-05.pdf (& enlarge the view) How well I
remember that day! A humongous THUMP! & soft like rustling sound of shattering
glass
http://images.google.com/images?q=Woodside%2CQueens&hl=en
http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&hl=en&q=40.74669,-73.89945&ll=40.746737,-73.899536&spn=0.119907,0.431213&t=k
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-01/18/content_4064807.htm Gas tanker
crash, just blocks away from me. Bam! & a lot of smoke.
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: "Gary Richmond" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum"
Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2006 4:27 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Introduction
List,
Sorry, that was to have gone directly to Ben's mailbox. Still, those of you
who know that Ben and I live in New York may have gotten my "inside" joke.
Gary
Gary Richmond wrote:
> offlist--
> Joe wrote:
>
>> the superior intelligence of the street-wise New Yorker in comparison with
>> the well-protected genteel intelligence of the Cambridge academicians.
>
> "Hey, who are you talkin' about? Are you talking about me???!"
>
> Ben, all of your posts of late have been of the greatest interest.
> Keep up the good work!
>
> Gary
>
> Joseph Ransdell wrote:
>> Ben:
>>I was in grad school at Columbia while Sidney Morgenbesser was there and the
>>anecdote about his refutation of J. L. Austin's claim ("Yeah, yeah) is wholly
>>believable. He published very little and what he published was not
>>especially important, but he was the greatest asset that department had and
>>that story captures him to perfection. He was the most combative and
>>abrasive philosopher I've ever met but also the liveliest, and had an
>>extraordinary knack for deflating anything pretentious but empty. Peirce
>>somewhere characterized Chauncey Wright as "the boxing master" for the
>>members of the Metaphysical Club, and I immediately think of Morgenbesser
>>whenever I read that passage and also when I encounter one of Peirce's
>>remarks about the superior intelligence of the street-wise New Yorker in
>>comparison with the well-protected genteel intelligence of the Cambridge
>>academicians. The idea (in the article you mention) that Morgenbesser's
>>retort either did or could "hurt the first philosopher's reputation and
>>career" is ridiculous, by the way.
>>
>> Joe Ransdell
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Introduction
Dear Ben, Theresa, Folks-- I'm trying to follow this attempt to understand what we mean by "nothing". And I am having a hard time. Seems to me Kant is attempting some sort of classification of our notions of nothing based upon some sort of tripart distinction of possible/impossible, empty/occupied and finally whether or not whatever concept we are talking about occured to him when he dreamed up his categories which apparently he takes to be from god's lips to his ears. So looking at Peirce's categories since they are fewer I'd say we have nothing as quality, reaction and representation. Qualtitatively nothin is the absense of form. Try to conceive matter without form. I can not. Even chaos is a form. The nothing of secondness is akin to form without matter. Again something I can not conceive except from the vantage point of some third dimension against which present or absent can be viewed as relative to. IOWs it is only from the standpoint of a third that a comparison between two things (including the concept of present vs absent) can be judged. The nothing of thirdness is that which is not present (proximate) in time or space. IOWs one of three objects is absent a property common to the other two. . We tend (it seems to me) to think of Peirce's categories as qualitatively distinct (despite the fact that he gave them quantitative designations). But I think that nothing may be a concept that arises only as a matter of quantity and with the pythaogreans maybe all the universe is a matter of number rather than substance or qualities. Nothing can not be a property of either a monad or a dyad. The basic indivisable building block of reality is the triad. It is only within the concept of a triad that nothing can have any meaning.; To attempt some extrapolation of nothing outside of this basic building block of all conceptions is nonsensical. Of course we can scrap these categories and suppose that there is another sort of nothing which constitutes the inconceivable -- but then where are we. Either talking nonsense or in need of a good case for the the alternative catagories. So, in summary nothing is that which is either absent possiblity (form) , absent existence (substance) or absent representation (meaning). To be absent more or other than the above is inconceivable because these are the categories of conception. "Nothing" is a property of reality that arises out of the fact that our universe is built on a quantity of three. Nothing is that which is either inconceivable, absent or impossible. The same can be said for something.Those are the categories of being and those are the categories of the categories. Well, I don't know how much sense I've just made myself, but I could not follow Kant. I appreciate your attempt to find a common example, Ben though unfortunately I couldn't follow you either. Obviously the shortcoming is mine and I mention it merely to try to explain the offering of my own half ass account. Now I will try Kant again. When I first encountered the use of a what I thought was a double negative in spanish I was a bit taken aback -- but then I realized I was mistranslating. After all how can there exist none of something as the English suppose. Wouldn't it be better to go with the Spanish speakers who know they can not have what does not exist. Question: What do we know when we know that the emperor has no clothes? Best answer gets a bowl of ice cream. Best wishes, Jim Piat - Original Message - From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2006 12:07 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Introduction Theresa, Darrel, Gary Richmond, Gary F., Bernard, Claudio, Victoria, Joe, Jim, list, Thanks, Theresa, for passing the Kant excerpt along, it's interesting. I thought I'd try to do Kant's four categories of nothing(ness) in terms of the same examples for all four. For me, it's proven to be not the easiest exercise. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object: ~ ~ ~ ~ The quantified, in its "zero state" as ~ ~ ~ ~ "underlying" any greater-than-zero quantity and ~ ~ ~ ~ as apart from any intuitions and instead ~ ~ ~ ~ as it is in itself, noumenal. 2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium empty object of a concept: ~ ~ ~ empty intuition without object: Actual zero quantity. ~ ~ ~ ~ The quantified, intuited in its "zero state" as ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ "underlying" any greater-than-zero quantity. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. as nihil negativum ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Empty object without concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ Quantity both zero and non-zero ~ ~ ~ ~ in the same time, place, & way. = ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Space "in itself," noumenal. 2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium empty object
[peirce-l] Re: Introduction
List,
Sorry, that was to have gone directly to Ben's mailbox. Still, those of
you who know that Ben and I live in New York may have gotten my "inside"
joke.
Gary
Gary Richmond wrote:
offlist--
Joe wrote:
the superior intelligence of the street-wise New Yorker in comparison
with the well-protected genteel intelligence of the Cambridge
academicians.
"Hey, who are you talkin' about? Are you talking about me???!"
Ben, all of your posts of late have been of the greatest interest.
Keep up the good work!
Gary
Joseph Ransdell wrote:
Ben:
I was in grad school at Columbia while Sidney Morgenbesser was there
and the anecdote about his refutation of J. L. Austin's claim ("Yeah,
yeah) is wholly believable. He published very little and what he
published was not especially important, but he was the greatest asset
that department had and that story captures him to perfection. He
was the most combative and abrasive philosopher I've ever met but
also the liveliest, and had an extraordinary knack for deflating
anything pretentious but empty. Peirce somewhere characterized
Chauncey Wright as "the boxing master" for the members of the
Metaphysical Club, and I immediately think of Morgenbesser whenever I
read that passage and also when I encounter one of Peirce's remarks
about the superior intelligence of the street-wise New Yorker in
comparison with the well-protected genteel intelligence of the
Cambridge academicians. The idea (in the article you mention) that
Morgenbesser's retort either did or could "hurt the first
philosopher's reputation and career" is ridiculous, by the way.
Joe Ransdell
- Original Message - From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum"
Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2006 11:07 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Introduction
Theresa, Darrel, Gary Richmond, Gary F., Bernard, Claudio, Victoria,
Joe, Jim, list,
Thanks, Theresa, for passing the Kant excerpt along, it's interesting.
I thought I'd try to do Kant's four categories of nothing(ness) in
terms of the same examples for all four. For me, it's proven to be
not the easiest exercise.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis,
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object:
~ ~ ~ ~ The quantified, in its "zero state" as
~ ~ ~ ~ "underlying" any greater-than-zero quantity and
~ ~ ~ ~ as apart from any intuitions and instead
~ ~ ~ ~ as it is in itself, noumenal.
2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium
empty object of a concept: ~ ~ ~ empty intuition without object:
Actual zero quantity. ~ ~ ~ ~ The quantified, intuited in its "zero
state" as
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ "underlying" any greater-than-zero quantity.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. as nihil negativum
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Empty object without concept:
~ ~ ~ ~ Quantity both zero and non-zero
~ ~ ~ ~ in the same time, place, & way.
=
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis,
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object:
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Space "in itself," noumenal.
2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium
empty object of a concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ empty intuition without object:
Actually empty space, ~ ~ ~ ~ The pure empty form of space,
a vacuum. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ intuited apart from whether it is actually
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty or actually occupied.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. as nihil negativum
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Empty object without concept:
~ ~ ~ ~ Space both empty & occupied
~ ~ ~ ~ at the same time & in the same way.
=
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis,
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object:
~ ~ ~ ~ A system apart from all its (not particle-bound) internal
kinetic energy, and
~ ~ ~ ~ considered in itself, noumenal, apart from one's intuitions.
2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium
empty object of a concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ empty intuition without object:
Actual cold, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A system intuited apart from all its
(not particle-bound)
actual shortage ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ internal kinetic energy, intuited as
"underlying" .
or absence of heat. ~ ~ ~ ~ any heat apart from whether the
temperature is
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ actually low or high.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. as nihil negativum
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Empty object without concept:
~ ~ ~ ~ Temperature both low & high.
~ ~ ~ ~ at the same time & in the same way.
=
More nothing humor:
He who asks for nothing, will be rewarded.
(I don't know where that comes from, and an Internet search on it
found -- nothing.)
Q: Why there is something rather than nothing?
Sidney Morgenbesser: "Even if there were nothing, you'd still be
complaining!"
I remember, some decades ago, a New York Times article saying that
philosophers were arguing about whether there was too much emphasis
in the discipline on that which we now call "gotcha!" moments and
about whether such moments had started to have excessive effects on
philosophers' careers. An example given was that of a well known
philosopher, not named i
[peirce-l] Re: Introduction
offlist--
Joe wrote:
the superior intelligence of the street-wise New Yorker in
comparison with the well-protected genteel intelligence of the Cambridge
academicians.
"Hey, who are you talkin' about? Are you talking about me???!"
Ben, all of your posts of late have been of the greatest interest. Keep
up the good work!
Gary
Joseph Ransdell wrote:
Ben:
I was in grad school at Columbia while Sidney Morgenbesser was there and the
anecdote about his refutation of J. L. Austin's claim ("Yeah, yeah) is
wholly believable. He published very little and what he published was not
especially important, but he was the greatest asset that department had and
that story captures him to perfection. He was the most combative and
abrasive philosopher I've ever met but also the liveliest, and had an
extraordinary knack for deflating anything pretentious but empty. Peirce
somewhere characterized Chauncey Wright as "the boxing master" for the
members of the Metaphysical Club, and I immediately think of Morgenbesser
whenever I read that passage and also when I encounter one of Peirce's
remarks about the superior intelligence of the street-wise New Yorker in
comparison with the well-protected genteel intelligence of the Cambridge
academicians. The idea (in the article you mention) that Morgenbesser's
retort either did or could "hurt the first philosopher's reputation and
career" is ridiculous, by the way.
Joe Ransdell
- Original Message -
From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum"
Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2006 11:07 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Introduction
Theresa, Darrel, Gary Richmond, Gary F., Bernard, Claudio, Victoria, Joe,
Jim, list,
Thanks, Theresa, for passing the Kant excerpt along, it's interesting.
I thought I'd try to do Kant's four categories of nothing(ness) in terms of
the same examples for all four. For me, it's proven to be not the easiest
exercise.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis,
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object:
~ ~ ~ ~ The quantified, in its "zero state" as
~ ~ ~ ~ "underlying" any greater-than-zero quantity and
~ ~ ~ ~ as apart from any intuitions and instead
~ ~ ~ ~ as it is in itself, noumenal.
2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium
empty object of a concept: ~ ~ ~ empty intuition without object:
Actual zero quantity. ~ ~ ~ ~ The quantified, intuited in its "zero state"
as
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ "underlying" any greater-than-zero quantity.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. as nihil negativum
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Empty object without concept:
~ ~ ~ ~ Quantity both zero and non-zero
~ ~ ~ ~ in the same time, place, & way.
=
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis,
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object:
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Space "in itself," noumenal.
2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium
empty object of a concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ empty intuition without object:
Actually empty space, ~ ~ ~ ~ The pure empty form of space,
a vacuum. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ intuited apart from whether it is actually
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty or actually occupied.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. as nihil negativum
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Empty object without concept:
~ ~ ~ ~ Space both empty & occupied
~ ~ ~ ~ at the same time & in the same way.
=
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis,
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object:
~ ~ ~ ~ A system apart from all its (not particle-bound) internal kinetic
energy, and
~ ~ ~ ~ considered in itself, noumenal, apart from one's intuitions.
2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium
empty object of a concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ empty intuition without object:
Actual cold, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A system intuited apart from all its (not
particle-bound)
actual shortage ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ internal kinetic energy, intuited as
"underlying" .
or absence of heat. ~ ~ ~ ~ any heat apart from whether the temperature is
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ actually low or high.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. as nihil negativum
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Empty object without concept:
~ ~ ~ ~ Temperature both low & high.
~ ~ ~ ~ at the same time & in the same way.
=
More nothing humor:
He who asks for nothing, will be rewarded.
(I don't know where that comes from, and an Internet search on it found --
nothing.)
Q: Why there is something rather than nothing?
Sidney Morgenbesser: "Even if there were nothing, you'd still be
complaining!"
I remember, some decades ago, a New York Times article saying that
philosophers were arguing about whether there was too much emphasis in the
discipline on that which we now call "gotcha!" moments and about whether
such moments had started to have excessive effects on philosophers' careers.
An example given was that of a well known philosopher, not named in the
article, who was giving a talk on negation, nothingness, etc. At some point
he said that, while in some languages a double negative makes a positive and
in others a double negative ma
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Bernard, List Bernard, I apologize for not replying more promptly. A lot of things, including reconsidering what I have posted after reviewing what Peirce says in "New Elements" and other sources, are draining my time these days. I am responding to your comments on replicatability and the questions you raise at the conclusion of you post. In regard to your saying, "could we not go as far as to say that the 'essential nature of signs' is also of being replicatable?" I would say that the essential nature of a sign as Peirce sets it out in "New Elements" at least turns on its being replicatable as a consequence of the connection between replicatability and the existence of signs. Peirce does not say that signs do not exist but that, contrary to the nature of a real thing, a sign "is of such a nature as to exist in replicas." "A real thing," Peirce says, "does not so exist in replicas." The non-replicatability of a real thing is a consequence of its being a singular event that is strictly here and now. As Peirce puts further on in a different context, "But, it may be objected, an index has for its object a thing hic et nunc, while a sign is not such a thing. This is true, if under 'thing' we include singular events, which are the only things that are strictly hic et nunc." What I has in mind in agreeing with Martin that pure icons to not exist and by intimating that pure indices don't either was that pure icons and indices could not exist in the only mode in which signs do exist because they would not be replicatable. While we seem to generally agree on replicatability as it pertains to the nature of signs, I do not see anything in the text of "New Elements" that points either to a connection between Peirce's scholium and his Speculative Rhetoric or to the relevance of replicatability to such a connection. This is not to say that it isn't there, but that so far I fail to see it. QUOTE BM: Now, I have questions about your idea that "the interpretant represents the sign as the same sign that it replicates". In fact, the replica is the sign itself, and the interpretant will become a replica of another signperhaps, sooner or later. My reading of Peirce led me to think that the interpretant is such that it is in the same relation to the object as the sign itself is. Nothing makes necessary that the interpretant be some kind of clone of the sign it interprets, no? Furthermore I don't understand what you are calling a "rule" in this context nor the reasons you have to say that "for anything to be a sign it must be a symbol". END QUOTE Although not convinced, I am tempted to say that Peirce's preface is an exercise in "meta-semiotic" the subject of which is the sign, and more particularly, the proposition, as such irrespective of how signs in general and propositions in particular may be classified, parsed, and so forth. In any case, having said that a sign is not a real thing and is of such a nature as to exist in replicas, Peirce's going on to say, "The being of a sign is merely being represented." I take to mean that what a sign is, the essential nature of a sign from which it derives its capacity for representing an object distinguishable from the sign by which it is represented, consists in a sign's capacity for representing itself as a sign, and as the sign it is, whatever its object may be. I am assuming that a replica being, as you say, "the sign itself," does not merely resemble, but is identical to the sign of which it is a replica--that there is no loss of "fidelity" in a signs replication. Hence, it appears to me that the conditions under which a sign is replicatable must be logically antecedent to a sign's being replicated with the result that, replicated or not, the possibility of its being replicated with the necessary "fidelity" must inhere in the sign. At the most rudimentary level, if a sign exists the possibility of its existence consists in its being replicatable, and its actual existence consists in its being a replica of itself. At more developed levels, the actual existence of a particular sign distinguishable from other particular signs consists in its being a replica of itself which, in conjunction with other signs, participates in a more completed sign wherein what is signified by the particular signs in themselves is amplified, so to speak, through their joint participation in a more completed sign. So, I would say that a replica of a particular sign is in a sense a "clone" (and in a sense not a "clone" inasmuch as a replica is not a "reproduction") the signification of which, through its participation in more completed signs, is not restricted to its "clonedness." If, for instance, every "the" on a printed page is one and the same sign, the signification of the word in itself is identical in every instance in which we are prompted to think it and is "amplified" by its participation in
[peirce-l] Re: Introduction
Joe, list,
Thank you for your recollections of Morgenbesser.
He sounds so New York Jewish!
To B.F. Skinner, "Let me see if I understand your thesis. You think we
shouldn't anthropomorphize people?"
Yes, I've come to think that the NYT claim sounds ridiculous (I didn't know
what to think back when I first read it all those years ago). The worst that
Morgenbesser may have done was crystallize some people's feelings about Austin.
More Morgenbesser stories, "Remembering Sidney Morgenbesser":
http://daily.nysun.com/Repository/getmailfiles.asp?Style=OliveXLib:ArticleToMail&Type=text/html&Path=NYS/2004/08/03&ID=Ar01400
Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sidney_Morgenbesser
>From Leon Wieselier in TNR: "And now Sidney Morgenbesser, whom I loved. And
>not, I hasten to declare, chiefly for his jokes. They are properly famous, but
>their fame was burdensome to Sidney. He wanted to be remembered for more, this
>hilarious man consecrated to things much higher than hilarity."
Full article available only to paid TNR subscribers:
https://ssl.tnr.com/p/docsub.mhtml?i=20040816&s=diarist081604
More from the Wieselier article at:
http://64.233.179.104/search?q=cache:qUwwWkaF1F4J:scott3362.blogspot.com/2005/07/mind-of-mensch-don-quixotic-bliss-was.html+%22They+are+properly+famous,+but+their+fame+was+burdensome+to+Sidney%22&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=3
Correction to common (not only the NYT) story about "unfair" & "unjust" from
commenter at _Crooked Timber_,
http://crookedtimber.org/2004/08/03/sidney-morgenbesser
"The New York times repeats a misquotation from Sydney Morgenbesser: He was
once asked if it was unfair that the police hit him on the head during the
riot. "It was unfair but not unjust," he pronounced. Why? "It's unfair to be
hit over the head, but it was not unjust since they hit everybody else over the
head." He actually said the opposite: "It was unjust but not unfair. It was
unjust for them to hit me over the head, but it was not unfair since they hit
everybody else over the head." The Times version doesn't make sense. Sydney had
been thinking about Rawls' development of the idea that "Justice is Fairness"
and this was one of the ways in which he saw a clear difference.
"Posted by Gilbert Harman · August 5th, 2004 at 3:32 pm"
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: "Joseph Ransdell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum"
Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2006 1:50 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Introduction
Ben:
I was in grad school at Columbia while Sidney Morgenbesser was there and the
anecdote about his refutation of J. L. Austin's claim ("Yeah, yeah) is wholly
believable. He published very little and what he published was not especially
important, but he was the greatest asset that department had and that story
captures him to perfection. He was the most combative and abrasive philosopher
I've ever met but also the liveliest, and had an extraordinary knack for
deflating anything pretentious but empty. Peirce somewhere characterized
Chauncey Wright as "the boxing master" for the members of the Metaphysical
Club, and I immediately think of Morgenbesser whenever I read that passage and
also when I encounter one of Peirce's remarks about the superior intelligence
of the street-wise New Yorker in comparison with the well-protected genteel
intelligence of the Cambridge academicians. The idea (in the article you
mention) that Morgenbesser's retort either did or could "hurt the first
philosopher's reputation and career" is ridiculous, by the way.
Joe Ransdell
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Introduction
Ben:
I was in grad school at Columbia while Sidney Morgenbesser was there and the
anecdote about his refutation of J. L. Austin's claim ("Yeah, yeah) is
wholly believable. He published very little and what he published was not
especially important, but he was the greatest asset that department had and
that story captures him to perfection. He was the most combative and
abrasive philosopher I've ever met but also the liveliest, and had an
extraordinary knack for deflating anything pretentious but empty. Peirce
somewhere characterized Chauncey Wright as "the boxing master" for the
members of the Metaphysical Club, and I immediately think of Morgenbesser
whenever I read that passage and also when I encounter one of Peirce's
remarks about the superior intelligence of the street-wise New Yorker in
comparison with the well-protected genteel intelligence of the Cambridge
academicians. The idea (in the article you mention) that Morgenbesser's
retort either did or could "hurt the first philosopher's reputation and
career" is ridiculous, by the way.
Joe Ransdell
- Original Message -
From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum"
Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2006 11:07 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Introduction
Theresa, Darrel, Gary Richmond, Gary F., Bernard, Claudio, Victoria, Joe,
Jim, list,
Thanks, Theresa, for passing the Kant excerpt along, it's interesting.
I thought I'd try to do Kant's four categories of nothing(ness) in terms of
the same examples for all four. For me, it's proven to be not the easiest
exercise.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis,
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object:
~ ~ ~ ~ The quantified, in its "zero state" as
~ ~ ~ ~ "underlying" any greater-than-zero quantity and
~ ~ ~ ~ as apart from any intuitions and instead
~ ~ ~ ~ as it is in itself, noumenal.
2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium
empty object of a concept: ~ ~ ~ empty intuition without object:
Actual zero quantity. ~ ~ ~ ~ The quantified, intuited in its "zero state"
as
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ "underlying" any greater-than-zero quantity.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. as nihil negativum
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Empty object without concept:
~ ~ ~ ~ Quantity both zero and non-zero
~ ~ ~ ~ in the same time, place, & way.
=
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis,
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object:
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Space "in itself," noumenal.
2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium
empty object of a concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ empty intuition without object:
Actually empty space, ~ ~ ~ ~ The pure empty form of space,
a vacuum. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ intuited apart from whether it is actually
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty or actually occupied.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. as nihil negativum
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Empty object without concept:
~ ~ ~ ~ Space both empty & occupied
~ ~ ~ ~ at the same time & in the same way.
=
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis,
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object:
~ ~ ~ ~ A system apart from all its (not particle-bound) internal kinetic
energy, and
~ ~ ~ ~ considered in itself, noumenal, apart from one's intuitions.
2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium
empty object of a concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ empty intuition without object:
Actual cold, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A system intuited apart from all its (not
particle-bound)
actual shortage ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ internal kinetic energy, intuited as
"underlying" .
or absence of heat. ~ ~ ~ ~ any heat apart from whether the temperature is
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ actually low or high.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. as nihil negativum
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Empty object without concept:
~ ~ ~ ~ Temperature both low & high.
~ ~ ~ ~ at the same time & in the same way.
=
More nothing humor:
He who asks for nothing, will be rewarded.
(I don't know where that comes from, and an Internet search on it found --
nothing.)
Q: Why there is something rather than nothing?
Sidney Morgenbesser: "Even if there were nothing, you'd still be
complaining!"
I remember, some decades ago, a New York Times article saying that
philosophers were arguing about whether there was too much emphasis in the
discipline on that which we now call "gotcha!" moments and about whether
such moments had started to have excessive effects on philosophers' careers.
An example given was that of a well known philosopher, not named in the
article, who was giving a talk on negation, nothingness, etc. At some point
he said that, while in some languages a double negative makes a positive and
in others a double negative makes a negative, in no known language does a
double positive make a negative. A philosopher in the audience said, "Yeah,
yeah."
The article claimed that this hurt the first philosopher's reputation and
career. Subsequent letters to the editor said that the article was
exaggerating ridiculously, and that it was sound and fury about nothing.
I searched the Internet in hopes of f
[peirce-l] Re: Introduction
Hello, I just want to mention to the people being on this list that I opened some new forum on the internet. The website concerned is www.nanomanagement.info. Aim for this site is to get people with high knowledge on social sciences and/or relevant people from practice (managers/CEO's) together to share their knowledge. The site is online just now and there is not much info on yet. But I would like to ask intellectuals and university teachers here on the list to review the site and maybe enlist. Regarding enlisting, I have to mention that I want to apply some registration policy ensuring that only people with lots of knowledge enlist. Which is why I will decide myself who will get enlisted and who not. Some policy that might sound strange, but like I said I want to improve quality. Quality in management and knowledge. On the site sciences like philosophy, sociology, and several issues and intellectuals and books and the like can be discussed. As long as it is relevant for management and social science. Again, just take a look. And maybe return at the site in some weeks also. I will try to get more intellectuals on the site as from tomorrow and create some forums to start with there this week. Regards, Wilfred -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.371 / Virus Database: 267.15.6/257 - Release Date: 10-2-2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Introduction
Theresa, Darrel, Gary Richmond, Gary F., Bernard, Claudio, Victoria, Joe, Jim, list, Thanks, Theresa, for passing the Kant excerpt along, it's interesting. I thought I'd try to do Kant's four categories of nothing(ness) in terms of the same examples for all four. For me, it's proven to be not the easiest exercise. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object: ~ ~ ~ ~ The quantified, in its "zero state" as ~ ~ ~ ~ "underlying" any greater-than-zero quantity and ~ ~ ~ ~ as apart from any intuitions and instead ~ ~ ~ ~ as it is in itself, noumenal. 2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium empty object of a concept: ~ ~ ~ empty intuition without object: Actual zero quantity. ~ ~ ~ ~ The quantified, intuited in its "zero state" as ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ "underlying" any greater-than-zero quantity. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. as nihil negativum ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Empty object without concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ Quantity both zero and non-zero ~ ~ ~ ~ in the same time, place, & way. = ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Space "in itself," noumenal. 2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium empty object of a concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ empty intuition without object: Actually empty space, ~ ~ ~ ~ The pure empty form of space, a vacuum. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ intuited apart from whether it is actually ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty or actually occupied. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. as nihil negativum ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Empty object without concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ Space both empty & occupied ~ ~ ~ ~ at the same time & in the same way. = ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1. as ens rationis, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ empty concept without an object: ~ ~ ~ ~ A system apart from all its (not particle-bound) internal kinetic energy, and ~ ~ ~ ~ considered in itself, noumenal, apart from one's intuitions. 2. as nihil privativum, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. as ens imaginarium empty object of a concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ empty intuition without object: Actual cold, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A system intuited apart from all its (not particle-bound) actual shortage ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ internal kinetic energy, intuited as "underlying" . or absence of heat. ~ ~ ~ ~ any heat apart from whether the temperature is ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ actually low or high. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. as nihil negativum ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Empty object without concept: ~ ~ ~ ~ Temperature both low & high. ~ ~ ~ ~ at the same time & in the same way. = More nothing humor: He who asks for nothing, will be rewarded. (I don't know where that comes from, and an Internet search on it found -- nothing.) Q: Why there is something rather than nothing? Sidney Morgenbesser: "Even if there were nothing, you'd still be complaining!" I remember, some decades ago, a New York Times article saying that philosophers were arguing about whether there was too much emphasis in the discipline on that which we now call "gotcha!" moments and about whether such moments had started to have excessive effects on philosophers' careers. An example given was that of a well known philosopher, not named in the article, who was giving a talk on negation, nothingness, etc. At some point he said that, while in some languages a double negative makes a positive and in others a double negative makes a negative, in no known language does a double positive make a negative. A philosopher in the audience said, "Yeah, yeah." The article claimed that this hurt the first philosopher's reputation and career. Subsequent letters to the editor said that the article was exaggerating ridiculously, and that it was sound and fury about nothing. I searched the Internet in hopes of finding some quotations from that very pre-Internet article, found none, but found other accounts of the incident, and found that the philosophers involved have been named. (The following versions of what the first philosopher was saying differ a bit from what I remember the article saying). >From the blog _Nothing Is Perfect_ at >http://www.dolben.org/nothingisperfect/archives/2004/08/yeah_yeah.html 66 2004 August 6 Yeah, Yeah Another Sidney Morgenbesser http://www.columbia.edu/cu/philosophy/Faculty/_facultypages/sidneymorgenbess.html story: During a conference of linguistic philosophers at Columbia University, he interrupted the pompous J. L. Austin, who was saying that while many double negatives express a positive - as in "not unattractive" - there is no example in English of a double positive expressing a negative. Morgenbesser's interjection took the form of the two words "Yeah, yeah." Posted by Hank at 11:49 AM 99 >From the New York Times obituary Dec. 26, 2004, for Sidney Morgenbesser: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/26/magazine/26MORGENBESSER.html?ex=1261803600&en=8a2b4fae8706e36f&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland (At the NYT link, one may have to click refresh in order to get the article to appear) 66~
