> Software-based attacks are redistributable. Once I write a program
> that hacks a computer, I can give that program to anyone to use. I
> can even give it to everyone, and then anyone could use it. The
> expertise necessary can be abstracted away into a program even my
> mother could use.
>
>
On Tue, 22 Oct 2002, Rick Wash wrote:
> Hardware-based attacks cannot be redistributed. If I figure out how
> to hack my system, I can post instructions on the web but it still
> requires techinical competence on your end if you want to hack your
> system too.
>
> While this doesn't help a whole
On Tue, Oct 22, 2002 at 04:52:16PM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
> So they disclaim in the talk announce that Palladium is not intended
> to be secure against hardware attacks:
>
> | "Palladium" is not designed to provide defenses against
> | hardware-based attacks that originate from someone in control
At 4:52 PM +0100 10/22/02, Adam Back wrote:
Remote attestation does indeed require Palladium to be secure against
the local user.
However my point is while they seem to have done a good job of
providing software security for the remote attestation function, it
seems at this point that hardware s
Remote attestation does indeed require Palladium to be secure against
the local user.
However my point is while they seem to have done a good job of
providing software security for the remote attestation function, it
seems at this point that hardware security is laughable.
So they disclaim in t
On Tuesday 22 October 2002 10:22, Shawn K. Quinn wrote:
> If one has set up a new anonymous remailer, where is the best place
> to get the word out? Here or somewhere else?
The cpunks list is good.
There's a list of remailers, with meatspace locations, at
http://riot.eu.org/anon/remap.html . You
If one has set up a new anonymous remailer, where is the best place to
get the word out? Here or somewhere else?
--
Shawn K. Quinn
At 10:52 PM +0100 10/21/02, Adam Back wrote:
On Sun, Oct 20, 2002 at 10:38:35PM -0400, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
There may be a hole somewhere, but Microsoft is trying hard to get
it right and Brian seemed quite competent.
It doesn't sound breakable in pure software for the user, so this
forces
On Sun, Oct 20, 2002 at 10:38:35PM -0400, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
> There may be a hole somewhere, but Microsoft is trying hard to get
> it right and Brian seemed quite competent.
It doesn't sound breakable in pure software for the user, so this
forces the user to use some hardware hacking.
The
At 05:13 PM 10/21/02 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote:
>
>So I guess the follow on question is: Even if you can look at the code
of a
>RNG...how easy is it to determine if its output is "usefully random",
or are
>there certain "Diffie-approved" RNGs that should always be there, and
if not
>something's up?
On Wed, 31 Dec 1969, Bill Frantz wrote:
> I have been asked to audit some source code to see if the programmer
> inserted a backdoor. (The code processes input from general users, and has
> access to the bits that control the privilege levels of those users, so
> backdoors are quite possible.) T
So two illegals are going back because they were in a white van near a
pay phone.
They're fortunate, they only got the 12gauge in the face and the asphalt
facial;
in a month it'll be a cruise missile first, forensics later.
"Mr. Godsniper, call us back. We couldn't trace^H^H^H^H^H hear you. "
Th
today...
DEFENSE
The Discovery Channel
Science exhibition with the nation's top 40 middle school scientists
as finalists in the 4th annual Discovery Channel Young Scientist Challenge
(DCYSC), October 22-23. Highlights: 9:30 a.m. - CIA Challenge, Langley,
VA 10 a.m. - Cyber-crime Challenge, ACCES
I have been asked to audit some source code to see if the programmer
inserted a backdoor. (The code processes input from general users, and has
access to the bits that control the privilege levels of those users, so
backdoors are quite possible.) The question I have is what obscure
techniques sho
> surrounding a white van near a Richmond gas station.
Toyota, GM and Ford all reported huge drop in white van sales, to a virtual
zero. Ford also asked dealers to remove white vans from "highly visible"
locations.
Unrelated, several body shops are advertising discounts on "white van
conversion"
I've been trying to figure out whether the following attack will be
feasible in a Pd system, and what would have to be incorporated to prevent
against it.
Alice runs "trusted" application T on her computer. This is some sort of
media application, which acts on encoded data streamed over the
intern
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