Re: QM, Bell's Inequality and Quantum Cryptosystems

2003-01-02 Thread Morlock Elloi
> But in the end, as strange and unreasonable as this action-at-a-distance may > be, it's now regularly seen in the laboratory. (Even wierder are the 'quantum > eraser' and other bizarre behaviors). Is there any practical way to translate this into doll-and-needles method of punishing modelled ta

Re: QM, Bell's Inequality and Quantum Cryptosystems

2003-01-02 Thread Mike Rosing
On Thu, 2 Jan 2003, Anonymous wrote: > No. Bell's inequality tells us that there are no "hidden variables". >It's not that we don't know the value of the measureable prior to >wavefunction collapse...the specific measureable doesn't exist prior to >wavefunction collapse. When Bell formulated the t

Re: biological systems and cryptography

2003-01-02 Thread John Kelsey
At 08:55 PM 1/1/03 -0800, Michael Cardenas wrote: On Tue, Dec 31, 2002 at 12:23:51PM -0800, Tim May wrote: ... > Strong crypto is, ipso facto, resistant to all of the above. For the > obvious reason that the specific solution to a cipher is like a Dirac > delta function (a spike) rising above a

QM, Bell's Inequality and Quantum Cryptosystems

2003-01-02 Thread Anonymous
"Easy, the particles are correlated at birth. *they* know what their orientation is, it is fixed at birth. The math says *we* don't know." No. Bell's inequality tells us that there are no "hidden variables". It's not that we don't know the value of the measureable prior to wavefunction collapse

Re: Nevada Supreme Court rules suspect must give police ID

2003-01-02 Thread Anonymous
On Thu, 2 Jan 2003 10:26:40 -0500, you wrote: > > http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2002/Dec-21-Sat-2002/news/20327620.html > > > Las Vegas Review Journal > > Saturday, December 21, 2002 > Hiibel refused to identify himself during a May 2000 stop just outside of > Winnemucca because he did not

Re: QM, EPR, A/B

2003-01-02 Thread Mike Rosing
On Tue, 31 Dec 2002, Tyler Durden wrote: > Actually, Tyler Durden (ie, me) wrote what is attributed to the generic > anonymous name of Norman Nescio. Anyway,... Yeah, the TD gave that away :-) > With all due respect, Pooey Dr Mike. Take a nice, straightforward EPR using > two correlated photons

Re: Dossiers and Customer Courtesy Cards

2003-01-02 Thread Todd Boyle
At 07:12 PM 1/1/2003, Mike Rosing wrote: On Tue, 31 Dec 2002, Tim May wrote: > * I expect most uses of "customer courtesy cards" are to try to get > some kind of brand loyalty going. People thinking "Well, I have a card > at Albertson's, but not at Safeway, so I'll go to Albertson's." They'd lov

Re: biological systems and cryptography

2003-01-02 Thread Mike Rosing
On Wed, 1 Jan 2003, Michael Cardenas wrote: > People do break cyphers, by finding weaknesses in them. Are you saying > that you think that current cyphers are unbreakable? > > Also, what about using biological systems to create strong cyphers, > not to break them? We do pretty good already don't

Re: Dossiers and Customer Courtesy Cards

2003-01-02 Thread Mike Rosing
On Wed, 1 Jan 2003, Todd Boyle wrote: > Its not enough to put the chips next to the beer. They want > to examining the layout of all their shelf space. > The cash register data alone, is enough to do this, but > it doesn't work very well for shoppers who come and > buy chips on tuesday and beer o

Re: Dossiers and Customer Courtesy Card

2003-01-02 Thread Anonymous
Michael Cardenas wrote: > But what if this data is used as part of a larger picture, such as in > TIA. It definitely can be used, along with gas purchases, to track > where a suspect, aka a citizen, is living. Also, many possible > weapons such as perscription drugs, box cutters, and kitchen knive

Re: QM, EPR, A/B

2003-01-02 Thread Tyler Durden
Actually, Tyler Durden (ie, me) wrote what is attributed to the generic anonymous name of Norman Nescio. Anyway,... Part of the problem is that the detection equipment is many fermions looking at single particles. I think QM is easier to understand when looking at an ion trap. There are lots o

Re: Dossiers and Customer Courtesy Cards

2003-01-02 Thread Mike Rosing
On Tue, 31 Dec 2002, Tim May wrote: > * I expect most uses of "customer courtesy cards" are to try to get > some kind of brand loyalty going. People thinking "Well, I have a card > at Albertson's, but not at Safeway, so I'll go to Albertson's." They'd love that, but know better. > * Dossier-comp

Re: Dossiers and Customer Courtesy Cards

2003-01-02 Thread John Kelsey
At 01:46 PM 12/31/02 -0800, Bill Stewart wrote: ... The scalability of the problem is much different depending on your goals. If you want to sort through the transcriptions of people who bought drugs and knives and airline tickets but no luggage in an effort to find potential terrorists, that's us

Re: I Crypto U and your files

2003-01-02 Thread Steve Schear
At 01:40 PM 12/27/2002 +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote: On Thu, 26 Dec 2002, Anonymous wrote: > to have an encrypted tunnel materialize through blacknet, but I > strongly doubt this will scale to millions of users very well. Instead of doubting, try creating a model that might work, and test drive it i

Re: The Culpability of the Conformist Criminal Choate.

2003-01-02 Thread Steve Furlong
On Wednesday 01 January 2003 09:28, Jim Choate wrote: > ... If I as an individual can not > decide to take anothers life at my whim (ie 'convicted' by individual > ethics) how than can a group of men do it? Can a group of men have a > right that as individuals they do not? No. Ergo, the state has

Re: biological systems and cryptography

2003-01-02 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Wed, 1 Jan 2003, Michael Cardenas wrote: > People do break cyphers, by finding weaknesses in them. Are you saying > that you think that current cyphers are unbreakable? People break cyphers by 1) cryptoanalysis (mostly brain, a bit of muscle) 2) brute force (no brain at all, pure muscle) So

Re: biological systems and cryptography

2003-01-02 Thread Michael Cardenas
On Tue, Dec 31, 2002 at 12:23:51PM -0800, Tim May wrote: > On Tuesday, December 31, 2002, at 11:41 AM, Michael Cardenas wrote: > > >How do you all see the future use of biologically based systems > >affecting cryptography in general? > > > >By biologically based systems I mean machine learning, ge

Re: Specifismo.

2003-01-02 Thread Chuck0
I'm failing to understand what it so new about "specifismo." I've been arguing for a strategy like this for many years, as have many anarchists. It sounds like something related to "practical anarchism" and "ecumenical anarchism" which have been focuses of my work for many years. I think the an

List of documents from ILETS 97 seminar on lawful interception

2003-01-02 Thread Bo Elkjaer
The following is a documentlist obtained from the danish ministry of information technology and science concerning the international law enforcement telecommunications seminar ILETS 97 held january 1997 in Dublin. I haven't been able to locate the documents listed and all FOIA-requests concerning

Re: Many Worlds Version of Fermi Paradox

2003-01-02 Thread Sarad AV
hi, --- Jim Choate <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On Tue, 31 Dec 2002, Sarad AV wrote: > > > Does a paradox ever help in understanding any > thing? > > Yes, it can demonstrate that you aren't asking the > right questions within > the correct context. okay. > > 2.Gödel asks for the program a

re:constant encryped stream

2003-01-02 Thread Mike Rosing
On Wed, 1 Jan 2003, Eugen Leitl wrote: > I have a related question. I have a little server sitting in a wall > closet. Does anyone have an easy solution (preferably low tech) for > figuring out that the closet door has been opened? from a kids cartoon a couple weeks ago: put a bowl of marbles nex

Specifismo.

2003-01-02 Thread Matthew X
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [anarchy_africa] Anarcho-socialism? I'm pretty new to the list, so I don't know how much of this has been said before, but I have a couple things to add on the issue of sectarianism. First, I think some Latin American anarchists, under the banner of specifis