At 10:52 AM -0700 on 10/13/02, Bill Stewart wrote:
> (You may not remember, but there was a program from fortify.net
> that "fixed" 40-bit implementations of Netscape,
> and there was even a one-liner Javascript signature-line program
> that let you set Netscape to use 128 bits...
Not to mentio
At 01:06 PM 10/13/2002 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote:
>Oh yeah. Interesting. Of course, this would be done only.
>if the sender knew or supected how mass-scanning might be done.
>And so the existence of another level of heavier encryption ...
>might be a tip off that this is not simply a financial tr
On Sun, 13 Oct 2002, Tyler Durden wrote:
> "And of course you can package 'strong' encryption into a 'weak' encryption
> envelope, so you will only know that 'strong' encryption has been used after
> you've broken the 'weak' envelope."
>
> Oh yeah. Interesting. Of course, this would be done on
den <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>CC: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: Re: Echelon-like resources...
>Date: Sun, 13 Oct 2002 13:32:45 +0200 (CEST)
>
>On Fri, 11 Oct 2002, Tyler Durden wrote:
>
> > And indeed, in a world where most messages are fairl
On Fri, 11 Oct 2002, Tyler Durden wrote:
> And indeed, in a world where most messages are fairly weakly encrypted,
> bursts of strongly-encrypted messages will stand out all the more and
> possibly flag the need for other methods of investigation.
Doesn't figure: while it's easy to screen for
At 10:54 AM 10/11/2002 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote:
Which returns to my original point: the "easy" availability of strong
crypto products does not mean it is unprofitable for an agency to continue
to push populations towards lighter forms of encryption.
Assuming that the agency's goal is to maxi
OK, let's assume for the same of argument that it takes about 1 minute for
Echelon/NSA-like resources to break a weakly encypted lotus notes message.
And then let's assume that there's a whole LOT of these machines sitting
somewhere.
And as the grumpy Tim May has suggested, perhaps only a smal
Why the hell would anyone use lotus notes encryption for anything whatsoever?
On Fri, Oct 11, 2002 at 09:37:52AM -0400, Tyler Durden wrote:
> OK, let's assume for the same of argument that it takes about 1 minute for
> Echelon/NSA-like resources to break a weakly encypted lotus notes message
urden <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Subject: Re: Echelon-like resources...
>Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2002 09:39:01 -0500
>
>On Fri, Oct 11, 2002 at 10:29:53AM -0400, Tyler Durden wrote:
> > Harmon Seaver wrote...
> >
> > > Why the hell would anyone
Harmon Seaver wrote...
>Why the hell would anyone use lotus notes encryption for anything
>whatsoever?
Lotus Notes or whatever, of course. The point here is that larger
organizations with decryption capabilities probably do not think on the
message-by-message level very often, just like c
On Fri, Oct 11, 2002 at 10:29:53AM -0400, Tyler Durden wrote:
> Harmon Seaver wrote...
>
> > Why the hell would anyone use lotus notes encryption for anything
> >whatsoever?
>
> Lotus Notes or whatever, of course. The point here is that larger
Or whatever? What makes you think that anyon
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