Fucking nuts.
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/22/politics/22TRAC.html?pagewanted=print&position=bottom
Agency Weighed, but Discarded, Plan Reconfiguring the Internet
By JOHN MARKOFF
The Pentagon research agency that is exploring how to create a vast
database of electronic transactions and analyz
In case someone missed this, the content of tim may's file is:
0617 13 010 1 1 RODRIGUEZ DUARTE IRENE
EJIDO SAN CARLOS .
0873 02 010 1 1 GONZALEZ MONTOYA RAYMUNDO1 DE MAYO
CALLE 3 # 195 .
8047 13 0
Marc Branchaud wrote:
> Having read the article I can't help but consider more benign reasons
> for its removal...
> 1. It's not funny.
> 2. It's jokes are in pretty poor taste.
> 3. Michael Bay got his lawyers to send a letter to the Onion.
Color me dumb, but when I read the article, I assume
Markoff writes in the NY Times about a proposal called eDNA which would
"reconfigure" the Internet to forbid anonymous usage of certain parts.
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/22/politics/22TRAC.html
The scheme was explored by DARPA a few months ago, which gave a contract
to SRI to look into it. S
On Thu, Nov 21, 2002 at 02:47:24PM -0600, tcmay wrote:
> Content-Type: application/octet-stream;
> name=RPOUDOMI.TXT
> Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
> Content-ID:
>
Who are all these people with Hispanic names anyway ?
Doesn't look like a list of arab terrorists to me.
--
> On Thu, Nov 21, 2002 at 09:33:39AM -0800, Greg Broiles wrote:
> > To flesh this out a little more - the judge was Stephen
> > Trott, speaking on September 18 2002 at the Commonwealth
> > Club. Trott credits the torture warrant idea to Alan
> > Dershowitz, whom he describes as a good fri
On Thu, 21 Nov 2002, James A. Donald wrote:
> Mojo was intended to do this but it failed, I think it failed
> because they failed to monetize mojo before it was introduced
> as service management mechanism.
Mojo ultimatively failed because MojoNation failed. MNet is very alive,
though, and it wil
"identifying network miscreants and revoking their network privileges"
If one has any doubt, this sentence says it all. In fact,
"revoking their network privileges"
does it. No, wait,
"network privileges" is enough.
From: Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
CC: <[EMAI
On Thursday, November 21, 2002, at 09:46 PM, Dave Emery wrote:
On Thu, Nov 21, 2002 at 02:47:24PM -0600, tcmay wrote:
Content-Type: application/octet-stream;
name=RPOUDOMI.TXT
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-ID:
Who are all these people with Hispanic names anyway ?
Doesn't loo
At 04:59 PM 11/21/02 -0800, James A. Donald wrote:
>--
>According to Microsoft,
>
>http://crypto.stanford.edu/DRM2002/darknet5.doc
>
>Darknet is being undermined by free riders.
They attribute this to 2 things: most are on 56Kbps, and legal
harassment of
large sharers is possible.
I suspect i
At 08:20 AM 11/22/2002 +0100, Nomen Nescio wrote:
Markoff writes in the NY Times about a proposal called eDNA which would
"reconfigure" the Internet to forbid anonymous usage of certain parts.
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/22/politics/22TRAC.html
The scheme was explored by DARPA a few months ag
On Fri, 22 Nov 2002, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
> >Darknet is being undermined by free riders.
>
> They attribute this to 2 things: most are on 56Kbps, and legal
> harassment of large sharers is possible.
I attribute this to lack of agoric load levelling, and prestige
accounting. Legal harassmen
Question: if you control the traffic layer you can easily disrupt
opportunistic encryption (STARTTLS & Co) by killing public key exchange,
or even do a MITM.
Is there any infrastructure in MTAs for public key caching, and admin
notification if things look fishy? (Fishy: a host which used to do PKI
Geek 'Vigilantes' Monitor Border
By Michelle Delio | Also by this reporter Page 1 of 1
02:00 AM Nov. 22, 2002 PT
A group of tech-savvy ranchers in Arizona is using military technology
to monitor and apprehend illegal immigrants crossing the border from
Mexico
into the United States.
Member
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 09:23:57PM +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote:
| Question: if you control the traffic layer you can easily disrupt
| opportunistic encryption (STARTTLS & Co) by killing public key exchange,
| or even do a MITM.
|
| Is there any infrastructure in MTAs for public key caching, and admin
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