>> - 2 are technically constrained sub-CAs (
https://crt.sh/?id=147626411 / https://crt.sh/?id=47081615 )
Those two are actually the same certificate; it's not clear to me why
they appear twice on crt.sh
Il 29/08/2017 18:50, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy ha scritto:
On Tue, Aug 29, 2
Please stop to misleading the audience, the first news has link that refer to
second news.
We have provided best service for our customer more than 10 years that we are
continue as always, to provide high quality pre-sale and after-sales service
for our customers.
Best Regards,
Richard
-
This CA is technically constrained:
DN: C=CH, L=Zurich, O=ABB, CN=ABB Issuing CA 6
From: Paul Kehrer [mailto:paul.l.keh...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, August 29, 2017 6:48 AM
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10
I've rec
On Sunday, August 27, 2017 at 10:59:48 PM UTC-7, Richard Wang wrote:
> We released replacement notice in Chinese in our website:
> https://www.wosign.com/news/announcement-about-Microsoft-Action-20170809.htm
> https://www.wosign.com/news/announcement-about-Google-Action-20170710.htm
> https://www.w
> Government of The Netherlands, PKIoverheid (Logius)
>
> DN: C=NL, O=KPN Corporate Market BV, CN=KPN Corporate Market CSP
> Organisatie CA - G2
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=f821a600af00d2fa23f569e00fdf2379bc182920205a6b9b0276733cb2857c15
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp2.managedpki.com
Hi Paul,
T
On Tuesday, August 29, 2017 at 12:51:05 PM UTC-4, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 29, 2017 at 8:47 AM, Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> >
> > Symantec / GeoTrust
> >
> > CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.
> >
> > DN: C=IT, O=UniCr
On Tue, Aug 29, 2017 at 8:47 AM, Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
> Symantec / GeoTrust
>
> CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.
>
> DN: C=IT, O=UniCredit S.p.A., CN=UniCredit Subordinate External
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=04
This CA only issues client certificates:
DN: CN=Cartão de Cidadão 001, OU=ECEstado, O=SCEE - Sistema de Certificação
Electrónica do Estado, C=PT
Ben Wilson, JD, CISA, CISSP
VP Compliance
+1 801 701 9678
From: Paul Kehrer [mailto:paul.l.keh...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, August 29
Hello:
Many thanks. The CA listed for Government of The Netherlands, PKIoverheid
(Logius) is operated by KPN Corporate Market not QuoVadis. We will pass on the
information to PKIoverheid.
Government of The Netherlands, PKIoverheid (Logius)
Email sent to supp...@quovadisglobal.com
DN: C=NL, O=
I've recently completed a scan of OCSP responders with a focus on checking
whether they are compliant with BR section 4.9.10's requirement: "Effective
1 August 2013, OCSP responders for CAs which are not Technically
Constrained in line with Section 7.1.5 MUST NOT respond with a "GOOD"
status for su
Hi Harshal,
Yes, we took the option of pre-generating some OCSP signing certificates in
2016 for use in 2017 and 2018 vs. creating long validity OCSP signing
certificates or moving to SHA-256. Since the not-before dates are in 2017 when
this would have been prohibited, so we posted them to CT
Hello,
The following certificates are using the SHA-1 signature algorithm. They will
all be valid for approximately three months in 2018, as none have been revoked
thus far.
https://crt.sh/?id=62407589&opt=cablint
https://crt.sh/?id=62416636&opt=cablint
https://crt.sh/?id=62423790&opt=cablint
On 28/08/2017 10:15, Nick Lamb wrote:
I think that instead Ryan H is suggesting that (some) CAs are taking advantage
of multiple geographically distinct nodes to run the tests from one of the
Blessed Methods against an applicant's systems from several places on the
Internet at once. This mitig
13 matches
Mail list logo