Hrm, I didn’t realize it had been restricted. The gist is that bug is closed as
incomplete as of three months ago and there is a new bug that I don’t have
access to: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409786
> On Jan 29, 2018, at 20:02, James Burton wrote:
>
> Hi Jonathan,
>
> I h
Hi Jonathan,
I haven't got the required permission to access bug 1376996.
Thank you,
James
On Tue, Jan 30, 2018 at 12:57 AM, Jonathan Rudenberg
wrote:
>
> > On Jan 29, 2018, at 19:48, James Burton via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> >
> > I was doing
> On Jan 29, 2018, at 19:48, James Burton via dev-security-policy
> wrote:
>
> I was doing research on the ccadb.org site and was surprised to find that
> the site is running only in HTTP and is not using HTTPS.
There is already a bug about this:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1
I was doing research on the ccadb.org site and was surprised to find that
the site is running only in HTTP and is not using HTTPS. Now, I understand
that GitHub pages don't support HTTPS for custom domains but you could
always use CloudFlare for HTTPS support in the meantime until GitHub
enables HT
The email has been sent, and we've published a blog post:
https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2018/01/29/january-2018-ca-communication/
On Monday, January 29, 2018 at 1:15:51 PM UTC-7, Wayne Thayer wrote:
> You can find a link to the final version of the survey at
> https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Comm
You can find a link to the final version of the survey at
https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Communications#January_2018_CA_Communication
We're planning to send this out to all CAs in the Mozilla program later
today. The deadline for responses has been set to 9-February.
Thanks to everyone who contribut
Thanks for pointing this out Ryan and Dimitris. You are both correct: we
should direct Taiwan GRCA to change their request from including the root
to including only the subordinate CAs that comply with the Mozilla policy.
The option of adding the non-compliant subordinate CAs to OneCRL does not
mee
Yair,
Will you please provide a detailed response to each of Ryan's points? Also,
please provide the specific version of the RSA Certificate Manager in use
by ComSign.
Thanks,
Wayne
On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 8:43 AM, YairE via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
Hi Ryan,
I noticed that your notes refer to a previous version of the CPS and not the
current one
here is a link to the current version which is 4.1.
https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/comsign/CPS/CPS_4.1_eng.pdf
About the CA software – we are now under auditing for our new Microsoft CA and
it
Le jeudi 27 avril 2017 15:22:27 UTC+2, Aaron Wu a écrit :
> This request from the Dhimyotis/Certigna is to include the SHA-256 ‘Certigna
> Root CA’ certificate and turn on the Websites and Email trust bits. This root
> certificate will eventually replace the SHA-1 ‘Certigna’ root certificate
> t
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