Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 05:57 AM 4/8/2010, Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Apr 7, 2010 at 11:25 PM, Dave Ketchum
wrote:
> Write-ins permitted (if few write-ins expected,
> counters may lump all such as if a single candidate - if assumption
correct
> the count verifies it; if incorrect, must
MMPO minimizes the maximum pairwise opposition, so in some sense tries to
minimize the total
disappointment that results from the MMPO winner being elected instead of some
other candidate.
If strict rankings are not required (so that favorite and compromise can be
ranked equal first), then
M
On Apr 9, 2010, at 3:03 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho a écrit :
I more or less despise the election of A in this
scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 C>B
I believe the possibility of this outcome is a
disincentive for a candidate
like C to run.
The story behind
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Ven 9.4.10, Juho a écrit :
> >>> I more or less despise the election of A in
> this
> >> scenario:
> >>>
> >>> 49 A
> >>> 24 B
> >>> 27 C>B
> >>>
> >>> I believe the possibility of this outcome is
> a
> >> disincentive for a candidate
> >>> like C to run.
> >>
> >> Th
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
MMPO minimizes the maximum pairwise opposition, so in some sense tries to minimize the total
disappointment that results from the MMPO winner being elected instead of some other candidate.
(...)
In general no matter who wins, there will be disappointed voters. Why not m
On Apr 9, 2010, at 2:37 PM, Juho wrote:
On Apr 9, 2010, at 3:03 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho a écrit :
I more or less despise the election of A in this
scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 C>B
I believe the possibility of this outcome is a
disincentive for a candi
At 03:55 AM 4/9/2010, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I'll note here that Bucklin is not cloneproof, and in some cases it
can reward cloning. See
http://www.mail-archive.com/election-methods-electorama@electorama.com/msg02705.html
. Thus it might pay for voters of some opinion to add lots of
