On 27 Aug 2009, at 15:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> 2009/8/27 Bruno Marchal :
>
>> You are right. A simpler example is a dreamer and a rock, and the
>> whole universe. They have locally the same input and output: none!
>> So
>> they are functionally identical, yet very different from the
2009/8/27 Flammarion :
>
>
>
> On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> 2009/8/26 David Nyman :
>
>> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
>> independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I
>> perfom the computation on an abacus or within my h
On Aug 28, 6:58 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> So how are you going to get around Cox's
> theorem?http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cox%27s_theorem
>
Cox's theorem is referring to laws of probability for making
predictions. I agree Bayesian inference is best for this. But it
fails to capture the t
On 27 Aug, 20:11, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/27 Flammarion :
>
> >> and hence that it can't
> >> in and of itself tell us anything fundamental about ontology.
>
> > I don't think it revelas it sown ontology. OTOH, it must somehow
> > be taken accounto fi in any succesful ontology because every
On Aug 27, 7:35 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Zermelo Fraenkel theory has full transfinite induction power, but is
> still limited by Gödel's incompleteness. What Gentzen showed is that
> you can prove the consistency of ARITHMETIC by a transfinite induction
> up to epsilon_0. This shows
On 28 Aug, 02:20, Brent Meeker wrote:
> > the door is opened to some grander metaphysical speculation
> > concerning the nature of the world. For example, it is often noted
> > that physics characterizes its basic entities only extrinsically, in
> > terms of their relations to other entities,
On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are religious in
>> the way they try to explain, or explain away the mind body problem. I
>> can
On 28 Aug, 08:42, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> >> But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are religious in
> >> the way they try to exp
On 28 Aug, 02:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Flammarion wrote:
>
> > On 21 Aug, 21:01, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >> Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> Do you think that if you scanned my brain right down to the atomic
> >>> level,
> >>> you still wouldn't have captured all the information?
> >> That's an intere
On 28 Aug, 09:50, Flammarion wrote:
> On 28 Aug, 07:27, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> > 2009/8/27 Flammarion :
>
> > > On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > >> 2009/8/26 David Nyman :
>
> > >> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
> > >> independant of
On 28 Aug, 07:27, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/8/27 Flammarion :
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >> 2009/8/26 David Nyman :
>
> >> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
> >> independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation.
On 21 Aug, 20:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 21 Aug 2009, at 09:33, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 20 Aug, 00:28, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:21, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> Where he says computation can happen without any physicial process
> >>> at
> >>> all. I don't see
On 28 Aug, 12:53, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 28 Aug 2009, at 10:52, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 28 Aug, 08:42, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> >>
On 22 Aug, 00:38, David Nyman wrote:
> On 21 Aug, 19:04, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > > > Explaining away qua reduction is nto the same as
> > > > explaining away qua elimination.
>
> > > Well, either way he's explaining away, as you yourself point out
> > > below. But it's a false distinction
On 28 Aug 2009, at 10:52, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 28 Aug, 08:42, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
But you see Brent, here you confirm tha
2009/8/28 David Nyman :
> Well, I don't think that it is just words, but it can be difficult to
> see this because of the heavy freight of association carried by the
> standard vocabulary. At root, if one doesn't intuit the 'personal'
> (in the most general sense - e.g. Bruno's sense of the 0-pe
On 25 Aug, 08:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:38, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> >>> That is false. You are tacitly assuming that PM has to be argued
> >>> with the full force of necessity --
>
> >> I don't remember. I don't find trace of what makes you think so.
> >> Where?
>
> > W
On 28 Aug, 13:51, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Is functionalism monism, property dualism, or might it even be a form
> of substance dualism?
Monism
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
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"Everything Lis
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker :
>>> Is your experience the same? Do you experience "frabjous"? If you
>>> put "melody" for "frabjous", you've got synsathesia. I'd say that
>>> functional equivalence is relative to the level. At *some* level
>>> equal-input-output=>equal-experience, but not at higher
On 22 Aug, 08:21, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 21 Aug 2009, at 10:28, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > 1. Something that ontologically exists can only be caused or generated
> > by something else that does
> > 2. I ontologically exist
> > 3. According to you, I am generated by the UD
> > 4. Therefore the U
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/8/27 Flammarion :
>>
>>
>> On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>> 2009/8/26 David Nyman :
>>> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
>>> independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I
>>> perfom the computation
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>> But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are religious in
>>> the way they try to explain, or explain away the
On 28 Aug 2009, at 14:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 22 Aug, 08:21, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 21 Aug 2009, at 10:28, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>> 1. Something that ontologically exists can only be caused or
>>> generated
>>> by something else that does
>>> 2. I ontologically exist
>>> 3. Accor
Flammarion wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Aug, 02:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>> On 21 Aug, 21:01, Brent Meeker wrote:
Flammarion wrote:
> Do you think that if you scanned my brain right down to the atomic
> level,
> you still wouldn't have captured all the informatio
On 28 Aug 2009, at 10:47, marc.geddes wrote:
>
>
>
> On Aug 27, 7:35 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> Zermelo Fraenkel theory has full transfinite induction power, but is
>> still limited by Gödel's incompleteness. What Gentzen showed is that
>> you can prove the consistency of ARITHMETIC by a
On 28 Aug 2009, at 13:47, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 21 Aug, 20:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 21 Aug 2009, at 09:33, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>> I can only hope you will work on the UDA+MGA, and understand that
>> "non-theoretical" truth have to be redefined as theoretical
>> possibilities (cons
marc.geddes wrote:
>
>
> On Aug 28, 6:58 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> So how are you going to get around Cox's
>> theorem?http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cox%27s_theorem
>>
>
> Cox's theorem is referring to laws of probability for making
> predictions. I agree Bayesian inference is best for th
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker :
>
Is your experience the same? Do you experience "frabjous"? If you
put "melody" for "frabjous", you've got synsathesia. I'd say that
functional equivalence is relative to the level. At *some* level
equal-input-output=>
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker :
>
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> 2009/8/27 Flammarion :
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/26 David Nyman :
This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementat
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker :
>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>> 2009/8/27 Flammarion :
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/8/26 David Nyman :
> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
> independant of the (physical o
On 28 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are
marc.geddes wrote:
>
>
> On Aug 27, 7:35 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Zermelo Fraenkel theory has full transfinite induction power, but is
>> still limited by Gödel's incompleteness. What Gentzen showed is that
>> you can prove the consistency of ARITHMETIC by a transfinite induction
>>
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker :
>
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker :
>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/27 Flammarion :
>
> On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> 2009/8/26 David Nyman :
>> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker :
>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/8/27 Flammarion :
>> On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>> 2009/8/26 David Nyman :
>>> This is because if consciousness is a computati
2009/8/29 Brent Meeker :
>
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker :
>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker :
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> 2009/8/27 Flammarion :
>>> On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/26 David Nyman :
This is be
David,
your logic is very hard to attack, it is impressive and perfect - ALMOST.
(That "almost" comes to me like my "somehow" in such discussions)
To save copying, please accept my "nested reflections" in Italics inserted
into your text below. Thnx.
John
--
On Aug 29, 2:36 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Obviously (?, by Gödel) Arithmetic (arithmetical truth) is infinitely
> larger that what you can prove in ZF theory.
Godel’s theorem doesn’t mean that anything is *absolutely*
undecidable; it just means that not all truths can captured by
*axioma
On Aug 29, 5:21 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Look at Winbugs or R. They compute with some pretty complex priors -
> that's what Markov chain Monte Carlo methods were invented for.
> Complex =/= uncomputable.
Techniques such the Monte Carlo method don’t scale well.
>
>
> Actually Bayesian in
On Aug 29, 5:30 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
> marc.geddes wrote:
>
> > See for example ‘Theory and Reality’ (Peter Godfrey Smith) and
> > debates in philosophy about prediction versus integration. True
> > explanation is more than just prediction, and involves *integration*
> > of different mode
marc.geddes wrote:
>
> On Aug 29, 5:21 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>> Look at Winbugs or R. They compute with some pretty complex priors -
>> that's what Markov chain Monte Carlo methods were invented for.
>> Complex =/= uncomputable.
>>
>
> Techniques such the Monte Carlo method don’t
marc.geddes wrote:
>
> On Aug 29, 5:30 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> marc.geddes wrote:
>>
>
>
>>> See for example ‘Theory and Reality’ (Peter Godfrey Smith) and
>>> debates in philosophy about prediction versus integration. True
>>> explanation is more than just prediction, and invol
marc.geddes wrote:
>
> On Aug 29, 6:16 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
>>> Stathis once pointed on this list that crazy people can actually still
>>> perform axiomatic reasoning very well, and invent all sorts of
>>> elaborate justifications, the problem is their priors, not their
>>> reasoning;
On Aug 29, 6:41 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
> marc.geddes wrote:
>
> > On Aug 29, 5:30 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> >> marc.geddes wrote:
>
>
> > *Before* you can even begin to assign probabilities to anything, you
> > first need to form symbolic representations of the things you are
> > talking ab
On Aug 29, 6:16 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> > Stathis once pointed on this list that crazy people can actually still
> > perform axiomatic reasoning very well, and invent all sorts of
> > elaborate justifications, the problem is their priors, not their
> > reasoning; so if you try to use Baye
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