Re: [openstack-dev] [Barbican] Providing service user read access to all tenant's certificates

2015-09-18 Thread Kant, Arun
>From description of use case, looks like you want 'service user' to access any >tenant resource regardless of that user has a tenant role or not and without >explicit read assignment on that resource. This can be done via a customized >policy where related 'get' calls are allowed access for a

Re: [openstack-dev] FW: [Keystone][Folsom] Token re-use

2013-06-21 Thread Kant, Arun
ts failed. It beats the whole logic of being available. About the keyrings, How do we tackle if a service is using JSON API calls and not python clients? Thanks, -Ravi. On Tue, Jun 18, 2013 at 6:37 PM, Adam Young mailto:ayo...@redhat.com>> wrote: On 06/18/2013 09:13 PM, Kant, Arun wrote: T

Re: [openstack-dev] FW: [Keystone][Folsom] Token re-use

2013-06-19 Thread Kant, Arun
ON API calls and not python clients? Thanks, -Ravi. On Tue, Jun 18, 2013 at 6:37 PM, Adam Young mailto:ayo...@redhat.com>> wrote: On 06/18/2013 09:13 PM, Kant, Arun wrote: The issue with having un-managed number of tokens for same credential is that it can be easily exploited. Getting

[openstack-dev] FW: [Keystone][Folsom] Token re-use

2013-06-18 Thread Kant, Arun
The issue with having un-managed number of tokens for same credential is that it can be easily exploited. Getting a token is one of initial step (gateway) to get access to services. A rogue client can keep creating unlimited number of tokens and possibly create denial of service attack on services.