[agi] masterpiece on an iPad
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/culturevideo/artvideo/7865736/Artist-creates-masterpiece-on-an-iPad.html McLuhan argues that touch is the central sense - the one that binds the others. He may be right. The i-devices integrate touch into intelligence. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=8660244-6e7fb59c Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Open Sets vs Closed Sets
narrow AI is a term that describes the solution to a problem, not the problem. It is a solution with a narrow scope. General AI on the other hand should have a much larger scope than narrow ai and be able to handle unforseen circumstances. What I don't think you realize is that open sets can be described by closed sets. Here is an example from my own research. The set of objects I'm allowing in the simplest case studies so far are black squares. This is a closed set. But, the number, movement and relative positions of these squares is an open set. I can define an infinite number of ways in which a 0 to infinite number of black squares can move. If I define a general AI algorithm, it should be able to handle the infinite subset of the open set that is representative of some aspect of the real world. We could also study case studies that are not representative of the environment though. The example I just gave is a completely open set, yet an algorithm could handle such an open set, and I am designing for it. So, your claim that no one is studying or handling such things is not right. Dave On Wed, Jun 30, 2010 at 8:58 AM, Mike Tintner tint...@blueyonder.co.ukwrote: I'd like opinions on terminology here. IMO the opposition of closed sets vs open sets is fundamental to the difference between narrow AI and AGI. However I notice that these terms have different meanings to mine in maths. What I mean is: closed set: contains a definable number and *kinds/species* of objects open set: contains an undefinable number and *kinds/species* of objects (what we in casual, careless conversation describe as containing all kinds of things); the rules of an open set allow adding new kinds of things ad infinitum Narrow AI's operate in artificial environments containing closed sets of objects - all of wh. are definable. AGI's operate in real world environments containing open sets of objects - some of wh. will be definable, and some definitely not To engage in any real world activity, like walking down a street or searching/tidying a room or reading a science book/text is to operate with open sets of objects, because the next field of operations - the next street or room or text - may and almost certainly will have unpredictably different kinds of objects from the last. Any objections to my use of these terms, or suggestions that I should use others? *agi* | Archives https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ | Modifyhttps://www.listbox.com/member/?;Your Subscription http://www.listbox.com/ --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=8660244-6e7fb59c Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad
It could be done a lot faster if the iPad had a camera. -- Matt Mahoney, matmaho...@yahoo.com From: Mike Tintner tint...@blueyonder.co.uk To: agi agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Fri, July 2, 2010 6:28:58 AM Subject: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/culturevideo/artvideo/7865736/Artist-creates-masterpiece-on-an-iPad.html McLuhan argues that touch is the central sense - the one that binds the others. He may be right. The i-devices integrate touch into intelligence. agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=8660244-6e7fb59c Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Open Sets vs Closed Sets
Well, first, you're not dealing with open sets in my broad sense - containing a potentially unlimited number of different SPECIES of things. [N.B. Extension to my definitions here - I should have added that all members of a set have fundamental SIMILARITIES or RELATIONSHIPS - and the set is constrained. An open set does not incl. everything under the sun (unless that is the title of the set). So a set may be everything in that room or that street or text but will not incl. everything under the sun] With respect to your example, a relevant broadly open-species set then might be regular shapes or geometric shapes incl. most shapes in geometry, (or if you prefer, more limited sections of geometry) - where species = different kinds of shapes - squares, triangles,fractals etc. I can't see how your work with squares will prepare you to deal with a broad range of geometric shapes - please explain. AFAICT you have take a very closed geometric space/set. More narrowly, you raise a v. interesting question. Let us take a set of just one or a v. few objects, as you seem to be doing - say one or two black squares. The relevant set then is something like all the positionings [or movements] of two black squares within a given area [like a screen]. The set is principally one of square positions. You make the bold claim:I can define an infinite number of ways in which a 0 to infinite number of black squares can move. - Are you then saying your program can deal with every positioning/configuration of two squares on a screen? [I'm making this simple as pos]. I would say;no way. That is an open set of positions. And one can talk of different species of positions [tho I must say I haven't thought much about this] And this is a subject IMO of central AGI importance - the predictability of object positions and movements. If you could solve this, your program would in fairly shortly order become a great inventor - for finding new ways to position and apply objects is central to a vast amount of invention. But it is absolutely,impossible to do what you're claiming - there are an infinity of non-formulaic, non-predictable - and therefore always new - ways to position objects - and that's why invention (and coming up with the idea of Chicken Kiev - putting the gravy inside instead of outside the food] is so hard. We're talking here about the fundamental nature of objects and space. From: David Jones Sent: Friday, July 02, 2010 1:53 PM To: agi Subject: Re: [agi] Open Sets vs Closed Sets narrow AI is a term that describes the solution to a problem, not the problem. It is a solution with a narrow scope. General AI on the other hand should have a much larger scope than narrow ai and be able to handle unforseen circumstances. What I don't think you realize is that open sets can be described by closed sets. Here is an example from my own research. The set of objects I'm allowing in the simplest case studies so far are black squares. This is a closed set. But, the number, movement and relative positions of these squares is an open set. I can define an infinite number of ways in which a 0 to infinite number of black squares can move. If I define a general AI algorithm, it should be able to handle the infinite subset of the open set that is representative of some aspect of the real world. We could also study case studies that are not representative of the environment though. The example I just gave is a completely open set, yet an algorithm could handle such an open set, and I am designing for it. So, your claim that no one is studying or handling such things is not right. Dave On Wed, Jun 30, 2010 at 8:58 AM, Mike Tintner tint...@blueyonder.co.uk wrote: I'd like opinions on terminology here. IMO the opposition of closed sets vs open sets is fundamental to the difference between narrow AI and AGI. However I notice that these terms have different meanings to mine in maths. What I mean is: closed set: contains a definable number and *kinds/species* of objects open set: contains an undefinable number and *kinds/species* of objects (what we in casual, careless conversation describe as containing all kinds of things); the rules of an open set allow adding new kinds of things ad infinitum Narrow AI's operate in artificial environments containing closed sets of objects - all of wh. are definable. AGI's operate in real world environments containing open sets of objects - some of wh. will be definable, and some definitely not To engage in any real world activity, like walking down a street or searching/tidying a room or reading a science book/text is to operate with open sets of objects, because the next field of operations - the next street or room or text - may and almost certainly will have unpredictably different kinds of objects from the last. Any objections to my use of these terms, or suggestions that I should use others?
Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad
that's like saying cartography or cartoons could be done a lot faster if they just used cameras - ask Michael to explain what the hand can draw that the camera can't From: Matt Mahoney Sent: Friday, July 02, 2010 2:21 PM To: agi Subject: Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad It could be done a lot faster if the iPad had a camera. -- Matt Mahoney, matmaho...@yahoo.com From: Mike Tintner tint...@blueyonder.co.uk To: agi agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Fri, July 2, 2010 6:28:58 AM Subject: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/culturevideo/artvideo/7865736/Artist-creates-masterpiece-on-an-iPad.html McLuhan argues that touch is the central sense - the one that binds the others. He may be right. The i-devices integrate touch into intelligence. agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=8660244-6e7fb59c Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad
AGI is all about building machines that think, so you don't have to. -- Matt Mahoney, matmaho...@yahoo.com From: Mike Tintner tint...@blueyonder.co.uk To: agi agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Fri, July 2, 2010 9:37:51 AM Subject: Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad that's like saying cartography or cartoons could be done a lot faster if they just used cameras - ask Michael to explain what the hand can draw that the camera can't From: Matt Mahoney Sent: Friday, July 02, 2010 2:21 PM To: agi Subject: Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad It could be done a lot faster if the iPad had a camera. -- Matt Mahoney, matmaho...@yahoo.com From: Mike Tintner tint...@blueyonder.co.uk To: agi agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Fri, July 2, 2010 6:28:58 AM Subject: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/culturevideo/artvideo/7865736/Artist-creates-masterpiece-on-an-iPad.html McLuhan argues that touch is the central sense - the one that binds the others. He may be right. The i-devices integrate touch into intelligence. agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=8660244-6e7fb59c Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad
Matt:
AGI is all about building machines that think, so you don't have to.
Matt,
I'm afraid that's equally silly and also shows a similar lack of understanding
of sensors and semiotics.
An AGI robot won't know what it's like to live inside a human skin, and will
have limited understanding of our life problems -different body, different
sensors, different body metaphors, and ergo different connotations for signs it
may use.
So, sorry, you're just going to have to keep thinking.
Funny this, because I just posted the following elsewhere:
What's The Difference between Dawkins The Pope?
We are survival machines-robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the
selfish molecules known as genes
The Pope
Why did God make you? God made me to know him, love him and serve him in this
world, and be with him forever in the next
Richard Dawkins
God, genes, what's the diff, ? Same basic urge to subordinate the human to a
higher purpose, to be worshipped and adored. Is there any real difference
between so many scientists and religious here?
{And one might add, AGI-ers with their omnipotent SuperAGI - in nomine
Turing, et Neumann, et Minsky].
From: Matt Mahoney
Sent: Friday, July 02, 2010 3:20 PM
To: agi
Subject: Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad
AGI is all about building machines that think, so you don't have to.
-- Matt Mahoney, matmaho...@yahoo.com
From: Mike Tintner tint...@blueyonder.co.uk
To: agi agi@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Fri, July 2, 2010 9:37:51 AM
Subject: Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad
that's like saying cartography or cartoons could be done a lot faster if they
just used cameras - ask Michael to explain what the hand can draw that the
camera can't
From: Matt Mahoney
Sent: Friday, July 02, 2010 2:21 PM
To: agi
Subject: Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad
It could be done a lot faster if the iPad had a camera.
-- Matt Mahoney, matmaho...@yahoo.com
From: Mike Tintner tint...@blueyonder.co.uk
To: agi agi@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Fri, July 2, 2010 6:28:58 AM
Subject: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/culturevideo/artvideo/7865736/Artist-creates-masterpiece-on-an-iPad.html
McLuhan argues that touch is the central sense - the one that binds the others.
He may be right. The i-devices integrate touch into intelligence.
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RE: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad
An AGI may not really think like we do, it may just execute code. Though I suppose you could program a lot of fuzzy loops and idle speculation, entertaining possibilities, having human think envy.. John From: Matt Mahoney [mailto:matmaho...@yahoo.com] Sent: Friday, July 02, 2010 8:21 AM To: agi Subject: Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad AGI is all about building machines that think, so you don't have to. -- Matt Mahoney, matmaho...@yahoo.com _ From: Mike Tintner tint...@blueyonder.co.uk To: agi agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Fri, July 2, 2010 9:37:51 AM Subject: Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad that's like saying cartography or cartoons could be done a lot faster if they just used cameras - ask Michael to explain what the hand can draw that the camera can't From: Matt Mahoney mailto:matmaho...@yahoo.com Sent: Friday, July 02, 2010 2:21 PM To: agi mailto:agi@v2.listbox.com Subject: Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad It could be done a lot faster if the iPad had a camera. -- Matt Mahoney, matmaho...@yahoo.com _ From: Mike Tintner tint...@blueyonder.co.uk To: agi agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Fri, July 2, 2010 6:28:58 AM Subject: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/culturevideo/artvideo/7865736/Artist-crea tes-masterpiece-on-an-iPad.html McLuhan argues that touch is the central sense - the one that binds the others. He may be right. The i-devices integrate touch into intelligence. agi | https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now Archives https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ | Modify Your Subscription https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=8660244-6e7fb59c Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Reward function vs utility
I found the answer as given by Legg, *Machine Superintelligence*, p. 72, copied below. A reward function is used to bypass potential difficulty in communicating a utility function to the agent. Joshua The existence of a goal raises the problem of how the agent knows what the goal is. One possibility would be for the goal to be known in advance and for this knowledge to be built into the agent. The problem with this is that it limits each agent to just one goal. We need to allow agents that are more flexible, specifically, we need to be able to inform the agent of what the goal is. For humans this is easily done using language. In general however, the possession of a suffciently high level of language is too strong an assumption to make about the agent. Indeed, even for something as intelligent as a dog or a cat, direct explanation is not very effective. Fortunately there is another possibility which is, in some sense, a blend of the above two. We define an additional communication channel with the sim- plest possible semantics: a signal that indicates how good the agent’s current situation is. We will call this signal the reward. The agent simply has to maximise the amount of reward it receives, which is a function of the goal. In a complex setting the agent might be rewarded for winning a game or solving a puzzle. If the agent is to succeed in its environment, that is, receive a lot of reward, it must learn about the structure of the environment and in particular what it needs to do in order to get reward. On Mon, Jun 28, 2010 at 1:32 AM, Ben Goertzel b...@goertzel.org wrote: You can always build the utility function into the assumed universal Turing machine underlying the definition of algorithmic information... I guess this will improve learning rate by some additive constant, in the long run ;) ben On Sun, Jun 27, 2010 at 4:22 PM, Joshua Fox joshuat...@gmail.com wrote: This has probably been discussed at length, so I will appreciate a reference on this: Why does Legg's definition of intelligence (following on Hutters' AIXI and related work) involve a reward function rather than a utility function? For this purpose, reward is a function of the word state/history which is unknown to the agent while a utility function is known to the agent. Even if we replace the former with the latter, we can still have a definition of intelligence that integrates optimization capacity over possible all utility functions. What is the real significance of the difference between the two types of functions here? Joshua *agi* | Archives https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ | Modifyhttps://www.listbox.com/member/?;Your Subscription http://www.listbox.com -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC CTO, Genescient Corp Vice Chairman, Humanity+ Advisor, Singularity University and Singularity Institute External Research Professor, Xiamen University, China b...@goertzel.org “When nothing seems to help, I go look at a stonecutter hammering away at his rock, perhaps a hundred times without as much as a crack showing in it. Yet at the hundred and first blow it will split in two, and I know it was not that blow that did it, but all that had gone before.” *agi* | Archives https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ | Modifyhttps://www.listbox.com/member/?;Your Subscription http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=8660244-6e7fb59c Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Re: Huge Progress on the Core of AGI
On Wed, Jun 30, 2010 at 5:13 PM, Matt Mahoney matmaho...@yahoo.com wrote: Jim, what evidence do you have that Occam's Razor ... is wrong, besides your own opinions? It is well established that elegant (short) theories are preferred in all branches of science because they have greater predictive power. -- Matt Mahoney, matmaho...@yahoo.com When a heuristic is used as if it were an axiom of truth, it will interfere in the development of reasonable insight just because an heuristic is not an axiom. Now to apply this heuristic (which does have value) as an unquestionable axiom of mind, you are making a more egregious claim because you are multiplying the force of the error. Occam's razor has greater predictive power within the boundaries of the isolation experiments which have the greatest potential to enhance its power. If simplest theories are preferred because they have the greater predictive power, then it would follow that isolation experiments would be the preferred vehicles of science just because they can produce theories that had the most predictive power. Whether this is the case or not (the popular opinion), it does not answer the question of whether narrow AI (for example) should be the preferred child of computer science just because the theorems of narrow AI are so much better at predicting their (narrow) events than the theorems of AGI are at comprehending their (more complicated) events. Jim Bromer --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=8660244-6e7fb59c Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Re: Huge Progress on the Core of AGI
On Wed, Jun 30, 2010 at 5:13 PM, Matt Mahoney matmaho...@yahoo.com wrote: Jim, what evidence do you have that Occam's Razor or algorithmic information theory is wrong, Also, what does this have to do with Cantor's diagonalization argument? AIT considers only the countably infinite set of hypotheses. -- Matt Mahoney, matmaho...@yahoo.com There cannot be a one to one correspondence to the representation of the shortest program to produce a string and the strings that they produce. This means that if the consideration of the hypotheses were to be put into general mathematical form it must include the potential of many to one relations between candidate programs (or subprograms) and output strings. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=8660244-6e7fb59c Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Re: Huge Progress on the Core of AGI
On Fri, Jul 2, 2010 at 2:09 PM, Jim Bromer jimbro...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Jun 30, 2010 at 5:13 PM, Matt Mahoney matmaho...@yahoo.comwrote: Jim, what evidence do you have that Occam's Razor or algorithmic information theory is wrong, Also, what does this have to do with Cantor's diagonalization argument? AIT considers only the countably infinite set of hypotheses. -- Matt Mahoney, matmaho...@yahoo.com There cannot be a one to one correspondence to the representation of the shortest program to produce a string and the strings that they produce. This means that if the consideration of the hypotheses were to be put into general mathematical form it must include the potential of many to one relations between candidate programs (or subprograms) and output strings. But, there is also no way to determine what the shortest program is, since there may be different programs that are the same length. That means that there is a many to one relation between programs and program length. So the claim that you could just iterate through programs *by length* is false. This is the goal of algorithmic information theory not a premise of a methodology that can be used. So you have the diagonalization problem. --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=8660244-6e7fb59c Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Reward function vs utility
To all, There may be a fundamental misdirection here on this thread, for your consideration... There have been some very rare cases where people have lost the use of one hemisphere of their brains, and then subsequently recovered, usually with the help of recently-developed clot-removal surgery. What they report seems to be completely at odds with the present discussion. I will summarize and probably overgeneralize, because there aren't many such survivors. One was a brain researcher who subsequently wrote a book, about which I heard a review on the radio, but I don't remember the details like title or name. Hopefully, one of you has found and read this book. It appears that one hemisphere is a *completely* passive observer, that does *not* even bother to distinguish you and not-you, other than noting a probable boundary. The other hemisphere concerns itself with manipulating the world, regardless of whether particular pieces of it are you or not-you. It seems unlikely that reward could have any effect at all on the passive observer hemisphere. In the case of the author of the book, apparently the manipulating hemisphere was knocked out of commission for a while, and then slowly recovered. This allowed her to see the passively observed world, without the overlay of the manipulating hemisphere. Obviously, this involved severe physical impairment until she recovered. Note that AFAIK all of the AGI efforts are egocentric, while half of our brains are concerned with passively filtering/understanding the world enough to apply egocentric logic. Note further that since the two hemispheres are built from the same types of neurons, that the computations needed to do these two very different tasks are performed by the same wet-stuff. There is apparently some sort of advanced Turing machine sort of concept going on in wetware. This sounds to me like a must-read for any AGIer, and I certainly would have read it, had I been one. Hence, I see goal direction, reward, etc., as potentially useful only in some tiny part of our brains. Any thoughts? Steve --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=8660244-6e7fb59c Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad
An AGI only has to predict your behavior so that it can serve you better by giving you what you want without you asking for it. It is not a copy of your mind. It is a program that can call a function that simulates your mind for some arbitrary purpose determined by its programmer. -- Matt Mahoney, matmaho...@yahoo.com From: John G. Rose johnr...@polyplexic.com To: agi agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Fri, July 2, 2010 11:39:23 AM Subject: RE: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad An AGI may not really think like we do, it may just execute code. Though I suppose you could program a lot of fuzzy loops and idle speculation, entertaining possibilities, having human think envy.. John From:Matt Mahoney [mailto:matmaho...@yahoo.com] Sent: Friday, July 02, 2010 8:21 AM To: agi Subject: Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad AGI is all about building machines that think, so you don't have to. -- Matt Mahoney, matmaho...@yahoo.com From:Mike Tintner tint...@blueyonder.co.uk To: agi agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Fri, July 2, 2010 9:37:51 AM Subject: Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad that's like saying cartography or cartoons could be done a lot faster if they just used cameras - ask Michael to explain what the hand can draw that the camera can't From:Matt Mahoney Sent:Friday, July 02, 2010 2:21 PM To:agi Subject:Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad It could be done a lot faster if the iPad had a camera. -- Matt Mahoney, matmaho...@yahoo.com From:Mike Tintner tint...@blueyonder.co.uk To: agi agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Fri, July 2, 2010 6:28:58 AM Subject: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/culturevideo/artvideo/7865736/Artist-creates-masterpiece-on-an-iPad.html McLuhan argues that touch is the central sense - the one that binds the others. He may be right. The i-devices integrate touch into intelligence. agi| Archives | Modify Your Subscription agi| Archives| Modify Your Subscription agi| Archives| Modify Your Subscription agi| Archives| ModifyYour Subscription agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=8660244-6e7fb59c Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
RE: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad
Sounds like everyone would want one, or, one AGI could service us all. And that AGI could do all of the heavy thinking for us. We could become pleasure seeking, fibrillating blobs of flesh and bone suckling on the electronic brains of one big giant AGI. John From: Matt Mahoney [mailto:matmaho...@yahoo.com] Sent: Friday, July 02, 2010 1:16 PM To: agi Subject: Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad An AGI only has to predict your behavior so that it can serve you better by giving you what you want without you asking for it. It is not a copy of your mind. It is a program that can call a function that simulates your mind for some arbitrary purpose determined by its programmer. -- Matt Mahoney, matmaho...@yahoo.com _ From: John G. Rose johnr...@polyplexic.com To: agi agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Fri, July 2, 2010 11:39:23 AM Subject: RE: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad An AGI may not really think like we do, it may just execute code. Though I suppose you could program a lot of fuzzy loops and idle speculation, entertaining possibilities, having human think envy.. John From: Matt Mahoney [mailto:matmaho...@yahoo.com] Sent: Friday, July 02, 2010 8:21 AM To: agi Subject: Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad AGI is all about building machines that think, so you don't have to. -- Matt Mahoney, matmaho...@yahoo.com _ From: Mike Tintner tint...@blueyonder.co.uk To: agi agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Fri, July 2, 2010 9:37:51 AM Subject: Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad that's like saying cartography or cartoons could be done a lot faster if they just used cameras - ask Michael to explain what the hand can draw that the camera can't From: Matt Mahoney mailto:matmaho...@yahoo.com Sent: Friday, July 02, 2010 2:21 PM To: agi mailto:agi@v2.listbox.com Subject: Re: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad It could be done a lot faster if the iPad had a camera. -- Matt Mahoney, matmaho...@yahoo.com _ From: Mike Tintner tint...@blueyonder.co.uk To: agi agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Fri, July 2, 2010 6:28:58 AM Subject: [agi] masterpiece on an iPad http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/culturevideo/artvideo/7865736/Artist-crea tes-masterpiece-on-an-iPad.html McLuhan argues that touch is the central sense - the one that binds the others. He may be right. The i-devices integrate touch into intelligence. agi | https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now Archives https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ | Modify Your Subscription https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=8660244-6e7fb59c Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Re: Huge Progress on the Core of AGI
On Fri, Jul 2, 2010 at 2:25 PM, Jim Bromer jimbro...@gmail.com wrote: There cannot be a one to one correspondence to the representation of the shortest program to produce a string and the strings that they produce. This means that if the consideration of the hypotheses were to be put into general mathematical form it must include the potential of many to one relations between candidate programs (or subprograms) and output strings. But, there is also no way to determine what the shortest program is, since there may be different programs that are the same length. That means that there is a many to one relation between programs and program length. So the claim that you could just iterate through programs *by length* is false. This is the goal of algorithmic information theory not a premise of a methodology that can be used. So you have the diagonalization problem. A counter argument is that there are only a finite number of Turing Machine programs of a given length. However, since you guys have specifically designated that this theorem applies to any construction of a Turing Machine it is not clear that this counter argument can be used. And there is still the specific problem that you might want to try a program that writes a longer program to output a string (or many strings). Or you might want to write a program that can be called to write longer programs on a dynamic basis. I think these cases, where you might consider a program that outputs a longer program, (or another instruction string for another Turing Machine) constitutes a serious problem, that at the least, deserves to be answered with sound analysis. Part of my original intuitive argument, that I formed some years ago, was that without a heavy constraint on the instructions for the program, it will be practically impossible to test or declare that some program is indeed the shortest program. However, I can't quite get to the point now that I can say that there is definitely a diagonalization problem. Jim Bromer --- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=8660244-6e7fb59c Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Re: Huge Progress on the Core of AGI
Jim, to address all of your points,
Solomonoff induction claims that the probability of a string is proportional to
the number of programs that output the string, where each program M is weighted
by 2^-|M|. The probability is dominated by the shortest program (Kolmogorov
complexity), but it is not exactly the same. The difference is small enough
that we may neglect it, just as we neglect differences that depend on choice of
language.
Here is the proof that Kolmogorov complexity is not computable. Suppose it
were. Then I could test the Kolmogorov complexity of strings in increasing
order of length (breaking ties lexicographically) and describe the first
string that cannot be described in less than a million bits, contradicting the
fact that I just did. (Formally, I could write a program that outputs the first
string whose Kolmogorov complexity is at least n bits, choosing n to be larger
than my program).
Here is the argument that Occam's Razor and Solomonoff distribution must be
true. Consider all possible probability distributions p(x) over any infinite
set X of possible finite strings x, i.e. any X = {x: p(x) 0} that is
infinite. All such distributions must favor shorter strings over longer ones.
Consider any x in X. Then p(x) 0. There can be at most a finite number (less
than 1/p(x)) of strings that are more likely than x, and therefore an infinite
number of strings which are less likely than x. Of this infinite set, only a
finite number (less than 2^|x|) can be shorter than x, and therefore there must
be an infinite number that are longer than x. So for each x we can partition X
into 4 subsets as follows:
- shorter and more likely than x: finite
- shorter and less likely than x: finite
- longer and more likely than x: finite
- longer and less likely than x: infinite.
So in this sense, any distribution over the set of strings must favor shorter
strings over longer ones.
-- Matt Mahoney, matmaho...@yahoo.com
From: Jim Bromer jimbro...@gmail.com
To: agi agi@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Fri, July 2, 2010 4:09:38 PM
Subject: Re: [agi] Re: Huge Progress on the Core of AGI
On Fri, Jul 2, 2010 at 2:25 PM, Jim Bromer jimbro...@gmail.com wrote:
There cannot be a one to one correspondence to the representation of the
shortest program to produce a string and the strings that they produce. This
means that if the consideration of the hypotheses were to be put into general
mathematical form it must include the potential of many to one relations
between candidate programs (or subprograms) and output strings.
But, there is also no way to determine what the shortest program is, since
there may be different programs that are the same length. That means that
there is a many to one relation between programs and program length. So the
claim that you could just iterate through programs by length is false. This is
the goal of algorithmic information theory not a premise of a methodology that
can be used. So you have the diagonalization problem.
A counter argument is that there are only a finite number of Turing Machine
programs of a given length. However, since you guys have specifically
designated that this theorem applies to any construction of a Turing Machine it
is not clear that this counter argument can be used. And there is still the
specific problem that you might want to try a program that writes a longer
program to output a string (or many strings). Or you might want to write a
program that can be called to write longer programs on a dynamic basis. I
think these cases, where you might consider a program that outputs a longer
program, (or another instruction string for another Turing Machine) constitutes
a serious problem, that at the least, deserves to be answered with sound
analysis.
Part of my original intuitive argument, that I formed some years ago, was that
without a heavy constraint on the instructions for the program, it will be
practically impossible to test or declare that some program is indeed the
shortest program. However, I can't quite get to the point now that I can say
that there is definitely a diagonalization problem.
Jim Bromer
agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription
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Re: [agi] Re: Huge Progress on the Core of AGI
Nice Occam's Razor argument. I understood it simply because I knew there are
always an infinite number of possible explanations for every observation
that are more complicated than the simplest explanation. So, without a
reason to choose one of those other interpretations, then why choose it? You
could look for reasons in complex environments, but it would likely be more
efficient to wait for a reason to need a better explanation. It's more
efficient to wait for an inconsistency than to search an infinite set
without a reason to do so.
Dave
On Fri, Jul 2, 2010 at 6:08 PM, Matt Mahoney matmaho...@yahoo.com wrote:
Jim, to address all of your points,
Solomonoff induction claims that the probability of a string is
proportional to the number of programs that output the string, where each
program M is weighted by 2^-|M|. The probability is dominated by the
shortest program (Kolmogorov complexity), but it is not exactly the same.
The difference is small enough that we may neglect it, just as we neglect
differences that depend on choice of language.
Here is the proof that Kolmogorov complexity is not computable. Suppose it
were. Then I could test the Kolmogorov complexity of strings in increasing
order of length (breaking ties lexicographically) and describe the first
string that cannot be described in less than a million bits, contradicting
the fact that I just did. (Formally, I could write a program that outputs
the first string whose Kolmogorov complexity is at least n bits, choosing n
to be larger than my program).
Here is the argument that Occam's Razor and Solomonoff distribution must be
true. Consider all possible probability distributions p(x) over any infinite
set X of possible finite strings x, i.e. any X = {x: p(x) 0} that is
infinite. All such distributions must favor shorter strings over longer
ones. Consider any x in X. Then p(x) 0. There can be at most a finite
number (less than 1/p(x)) of strings that are more likely than x, and
therefore an infinite number of strings which are less likely than x. Of
this infinite set, only a finite number (less than 2^|x|) can be shorter
than x, and therefore there must be an infinite number that are longer than
x. So for each x we can partition X into 4 subsets as follows:
- shorter and more likely than x: finite
- shorter and less likely than x: finite
- longer and more likely than x: finite
- longer and less likely than x: infinite.
So in this sense, any distribution over the set of strings must favor
shorter strings over longer ones.
-- Matt Mahoney, matmaho...@yahoo.com
--
*From:* Jim Bromer jimbro...@gmail.com
*To:* agi agi@v2.listbox.com
*Sent:* Fri, July 2, 2010 4:09:38 PM
*Subject:* Re: [agi] Re: Huge Progress on the Core of AGI
On Fri, Jul 2, 2010 at 2:25 PM, Jim Bromer jimbro...@gmail.com wrote:
There cannot be a one to one correspondence to the representation of
the shortest program to produce a string and the strings that they produce.
This means that if the consideration of the hypotheses were to be put into
general mathematical form it must include the potential of many to one
relations between candidate programs (or subprograms) and output strings.
But, there is also no way to determine what the shortest program is,
since there may be different programs that are the same length. That means
that there is a many to one relation between programs and program length.
So the claim that you could just iterate through programs *by length* is
false. This is the goal of algorithmic information theory not a premise
of a methodology that can be used. So you have the diagonalization problem.
A counter argument is that there are only a finite number of Turing Machine
programs of a given length. However, since you guys have specifically
designated that this theorem applies to any construction of a Turing Machine
it is not clear that this counter argument can be used. And there is still
the specific problem that you might want to try a program that writes a
longer program to output a string (or many strings). Or you might want to
write a program that can be called to write longer programs on a dynamic
basis. I think these cases, where you might consider a program that outputs
a longer program, (or another instruction string for another Turing
Machine) constitutes a serious problem, that at the least, deserves to be
answered with sound analysis.
Part of my original intuitive argument, that I formed some years ago, was
that without a heavy constraint on the instructions for the program, it will
be practically impossible to test or declare that some program is indeed the
shortest program. However, I can't quite get to the point now that I can
say that there is definitely a diagonalization problem.
Jim Bromer
*agi* | Archives https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now
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