AW: [agi] New Scientist: Why nature can't be reduced to mathematical laws

2008-10-07 Thread Dr. Matthias Heger

Mike Tintner wrote,

You don't seem to understand creative/emergent problems (and I find this 
certainly not universal, but v. common here).

If your chess-playing AGI is to tackle a creative/emergent  problem (at a 
fairly minor level) re chess - it would have to be something like: find a 
new way for chess pieces to move - and therefore develop a new form of 
chess   (without any preparation other than some knowledge about different 
rules and how different pieces in different games move).  Or something like 
get your opponent to take back his move before he removes his hand from the

piece  - where some use of psychology, say, might be appropriate rather 
than anything to do directly with chess itself.


In your example you leave the domain of chess rules.
There *are* already emergent problems just within the domain of chess.
For example I could see, that my chess program tends to move the queen too
early.
Or it tends to attack the other side too late and so on. The programmer will
then have the difficult
task to change heuristics and parameters of the program to get the right
emergent behavior.
But this is possible.


I think you suppose that creativity is something very strange and mythical
and cannot be done by machines.
I don't think so. Creativity is mainly the ability to use and combine *all*
the pieces of knowledge you have.
The creativity of humans seems to be so mythical just because the knowledge
data base is so huge. Remember how many bits your brain receives every
second for many years!
A chess program has only knowledge of chess. And that's the main reason it
just can do chess. But within chess, it can be creative.

You see an inherent algorithmic problem to obtain creativity but it is in
fact just mainly a problem of knowledge.

So has the chess program the same creativity as a human if you are fair and
restrict just to the domain and knowledge of chess?
The answer is yes! Very good experts of chess often say that a certain move
of a chess program is creative, spirited, clever and so on.

- Matthias



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[agi] New Scientist: Why nature can't be reduced to mathematical laws

2008-10-06 Thread Richard Loosemore




Perhaps now that there are other physicists (besides myself) making 
these claims, people in the AGI community will start to take more 
seriously the implications for their own field 


http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20026764.100

For those who do not have a New Scientist subscription, the full article 
refers to a paper at http://www.arxiv.org/abs/0809.0151.


Mile Gu et al looked at the possibility of explaining emergent 
properties of Ising glasses and managed to prove that those properties 
are not reducible.


Myself, I do not need the full force of Gu's proof, since I only claim 
that emergent properties can be *practically* impossible to work with.


It is worth noting that his chosen target systems (Ising glasses) are 
very closely linked to some approaches to AGI, since these have been 
proposed by some neural net people as the fundamental core of their 
approach.


I am sure that I can quote a short extract from the full NS article 
without treading on the New Scientist copyright.  It is illuminating 
because what Gu et al refer to is the problem of calculating the lowest 
energy state of the system, which approximately corresponds to the state 
of maximum understanding in the class of systems that I am most 
interested in:


BEGIN QUOTE:

Using the model, the team focused on whether the pattern that the atoms 
adopt under various scenarios, such as a state of lowest energy, could 
be calculated from knowledge of those forces. They found that in some 
scenarios, the pattern of atoms could not be calculated from knowledge 
of the forces - even given unlimited computing power. In mathematical 
terms, the system is considered formally undecidable.


We were able to find a number of properties that were simply decoupled 
from the fundamental interactions, says Gu. Even some really simple 
properties of the model, such as the fraction of atoms oriented in one 
direction, cannot be computed.


This result, says Gu, shows that some of the models scientists use to 
simulate physical systems may actually have properties that cannot be 
linked to the behaviour of their parts (www.arxiv.org/abs/0809.0151). 
This, in turn, may help explain why our description of nature operates 
at many levels, rather than working from just one. A 'theory of 
everything' might not explain all natural phenomena, says Gu. Real 
understanding may require further experiments and intuition at every level.


Some physicists think the work offers a promising scientific boost for 
the delicate issue of emergence, which tends to get swamped with 
philosophical arguments. John Barrow at the University of Cambridge 
calls the results really interesting, but thinks one element of the 
proof needs further study. He points out that Gu and colleagues derived 
their result by studying an infinite system, rather than one of large 
but finite size, like most natural systems. So it's not entirely clear 
what their results mean for actual finite systems, says Barrow.


Gu agrees, but points out that this was not the team's goal. He also 
argues that the idealised mathematical laws that scientists routinely 
use to describe the world often refer to infinite systems. Our results 
suggest that some of these laws probably cannot be derived from first 
principles, he says.


END QUOTE.


I particularly liked his choice of words when he said: We were able to 
find a number of properties that were simply decoupled from the 
fundamental interactions...


Now where have I heard that before, I wonder?



Richard Loosemore







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Re: [agi] New Scientist: Why nature can't be reduced to mathematical laws

2008-10-06 Thread Ben Goertzel
But Richard,

1)
none of us are **trying** to predict highly specific properties of the state
of an AGI at a certain point in time, based on the AGIs micro-level
configuration

2)
we are not trying to understand some natural system, we are trying to
**engineer** systems ... arguing that certain natural systems are hard to
predict in some senses is one thing, whereas arguing that some specific kind
of hard-to-predictness is **intrinsic** to intelligence (natural or
engineered) is another


-- Ben G

On Mon, Oct 6, 2008 at 12:16 PM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED]wrote:




 Perhaps now that there are other physicists (besides myself) making these
 claims, people in the AGI community will start to take more seriously the
 implications for their own field 

 http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20026764.100

 For those who do not have a New Scientist subscription, the full article
 refers to a paper at http://www.arxiv.org/abs/0809.0151.

 Mile Gu et al looked at the possibility of explaining emergent properties
 of Ising glasses and managed to prove that those properties are not
 reducible.

 Myself, I do not need the full force of Gu's proof, since I only claim that
 emergent properties can be *practically* impossible to work with.

 It is worth noting that his chosen target systems (Ising glasses) are very
 closely linked to some approaches to AGI, since these have been proposed by
 some neural net people as the fundamental core of their approach.

 I am sure that I can quote a short extract from the full NS article without
 treading on the New Scientist copyright.  It is illuminating because what Gu
 et al refer to is the problem of calculating the lowest energy state of the
 system, which approximately corresponds to the state of maximum
 understanding in the class of systems that I am most interested in:

 BEGIN QUOTE:

 Using the model, the team focused on whether the pattern that the atoms
 adopt under various scenarios, such as a state of lowest energy, could be
 calculated from knowledge of those forces. They found that in some
 scenarios, the pattern of atoms could not be calculated from knowledge of
 the forces - even given unlimited computing power. In mathematical terms,
 the system is considered formally undecidable.

 We were able to find a number of properties that were simply decoupled
 from the fundamental interactions, says Gu. Even some really simple
 properties of the model, such as the fraction of atoms oriented in one
 direction, cannot be computed.

 This result, says Gu, shows that some of the models scientists use to
 simulate physical systems may actually have properties that cannot be linked
 to the behaviour of their parts (www.arxiv.org/abs/0809.0151). This, in
 turn, may help explain why our description of nature operates at many
 levels, rather than working from just one. A 'theory of everything' might
 not explain all natural phenomena, says Gu. Real understanding may require
 further experiments and intuition at every level.

 Some physicists think the work offers a promising scientific boost for the
 delicate issue of emergence, which tends to get swamped with philosophical
 arguments. John Barrow at the University of Cambridge calls the results
 really interesting, but thinks one element of the proof needs further
 study. He points out that Gu and colleagues derived their result by studying
 an infinite system, rather than one of large but finite size, like most
 natural systems. So it's not entirely clear what their results mean for
 actual finite systems, says Barrow.

 Gu agrees, but points out that this was not the team's goal. He also argues
 that the idealised mathematical laws that scientists routinely use to
 describe the world often refer to infinite systems. Our results suggest
 that some of these laws probably cannot be derived from first principles,
 he says.

 END QUOTE.


 I particularly liked his choice of words when he said: We were able to
 find a number of properties that were simply decoupled from the fundamental
 interactions...

 Now where have I heard that before, I wonder?



 Richard Loosemore







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-- 
Ben Goertzel, PhD
CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC
Director of Research, SIAI
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first
overcome   - Dr Samuel Johnson



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Re: [agi] New Scientist: Why nature can't be reduced to mathematical laws

2008-10-06 Thread Mike Tintner
This is fine and interesting, but hasn't anybody yet read Kauffman's 
Reinventing the Sacred (publ this year)? The entire book is devoted to this 
theme and treats it globally, ranging  from this kind of emergence in 
physics, to emergence/evolution of natural species, to emergence/deliberate 
creativity in the economy and human thinking. Kauffman systematically - and 
correctly - argues that the entire, current mechanistic worldview of science 
is quite inadequate to dealing with and explaining creativity in every form 
throughout the world and at every level of evolution.  Kauffman also 
explicitly deals with the kind of problems AGI must solve if it is to be 
AGI.


In fact, everything is interrelated here. Ben argues:

we are not trying to understand some natural system, we are trying to 
**engineer** systems 


Well, yes, but how you get emergent physical properties of matter, and how 
you get species evolving from each other with creative, scientifically 
unpredictable new organs and features , can be *treated*  as 
design/engineering problems (even though, of course, nature was the 
designer).


In fact, AGI *should* be doing this - should be understanding how its 
particular problem of getting a machine to be creative, fits in with the 
science-wide problem of understanding creativity in all its forms. The two 
are mutually enriching, (indeed mandatory when it comes to a) the human and 
animal brain's creativity and an AGI's and b)  the evolution of the brain 
and the evolutionary path of AGI's).



Richard:
Perhaps now that there are other physicists (besides myself) making these 
claims, people in the AGI community will start to take more seriously the 
implications for their own field 


http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20026764.100

For those who do not have a New Scientist subscription, the full article 
refers to a paper at http://www.arxiv.org/abs/0809.0151.


Mile Gu et al looked at the possibility of explaining emergent properties 
of Ising glasses and managed to prove that those properties are not 
reducible.


Myself, I do not need the full force of Gu's proof, since I only claim 
that emergent properties can be *practically* impossible to work with.


It is worth noting that his chosen target systems (Ising glasses) are very 
closely linked to some approaches to AGI, since these have been proposed 
by some neural net people as the fundamental core of their approach.


I am sure that I can quote a short extract from the full NS article 
without treading on the New Scientist copyright.  It is illuminating 
because what Gu et al refer to is the problem of calculating the lowest 
energy state of the system, which approximately corresponds to the state 
of maximum understanding in the class of systems that I am most 
interested in:


BEGIN QUOTE:

Using the model, the team focused on whether the pattern that the atoms 
adopt under various scenarios, such as a state of lowest energy, could be 
calculated from knowledge of those forces. They found that in some 
scenarios, the pattern of atoms could not be calculated from knowledge of 
the forces - even given unlimited computing power. In mathematical terms, 
the system is considered formally undecidable.


We were able to find a number of properties that were simply decoupled 
from the fundamental interactions, says Gu. Even some really simple 
properties of the model, such as the fraction of atoms oriented in one 
direction, cannot be computed.


This result, says Gu, shows that some of the models scientists use to 
simulate physical systems may actually have properties that cannot be 
linked to the behaviour of their parts (www.arxiv.org/abs/0809.0151). 
This, in turn, may help explain why our description of nature operates at 
many levels, rather than working from just one. A 'theory of everything' 
might not explain all natural phenomena, says Gu. Real understanding may 
require further experiments and intuition at every level.


Some physicists think the work offers a promising scientific boost for the 
delicate issue of emergence, which tends to get swamped with philosophical 
arguments. John Barrow at the University of Cambridge calls the results 
really interesting, but thinks one element of the proof needs further 
study. He points out that Gu and colleagues derived their result by 
studying an infinite system, rather than one of large but finite size, 
like most natural systems. So it's not entirely clear what their results 
mean for actual finite systems, says Barrow.


Gu agrees, but points out that this was not the team's goal. He also 
argues that the idealised mathematical laws that scientists routinely use 
to describe the world often refer to infinite systems. Our results 
suggest that some of these laws probably cannot be derived from first 
principles, he says.


END QUOTE.


I particularly liked his choice of words when he said: We were able to 
find a number of properties that were simply decoupled from the 

Re: [agi] New Scientist: Why nature can't be reduced to mathematical laws

2008-10-06 Thread Ben Goertzel
I didn't read that book but I've read dozens of his papers ... it's cool
stuff but does not convince me that engineering AGI is impossible ...
however when I debated this with Stu F2F I'd say neither of us convinced
each other ;-) ...

On Mon, Oct 6, 2008 at 2:07 PM, Mike Tintner [EMAIL PROTECTED]wrote:

 This is fine and interesting, but hasn't anybody yet read Kauffman's
 Reinventing the Sacred (publ this year)? The entire book is devoted to this
 theme and treats it globally, ranging  from this kind of emergence in
 physics, to emergence/evolution of natural species, to emergence/deliberate
 creativity in the economy and human thinking. Kauffman systematically - and
 correctly - argues that the entire, current mechanistic worldview of science
 is quite inadequate to dealing with and explaining creativity in every form
 throughout the world and at every level of evolution.  Kauffman also
 explicitly deals with the kind of problems AGI must solve if it is to be
 AGI.

 In fact, everything is interrelated here. Ben argues:

 we are not trying to understand some natural system, we are trying to
 **engineer** systems 

 Well, yes, but how you get emergent physical properties of matter, and how
 you get species evolving from each other with creative, scientifically
 unpredictable new organs and features , can be *treated*  as
 design/engineering problems (even though, of course, nature was the
 designer).

 In fact, AGI *should* be doing this - should be understanding how its
 particular problem of getting a machine to be creative, fits in with the
 science-wide problem of understanding creativity in all its forms. The two
 are mutually enriching, (indeed mandatory when it comes to a) the human and
 animal brain's creativity and an AGI's and b)  the evolution of the brain
 and the evolutionary path of AGI's).


 Richard:

 Perhaps now that there are other physicists (besides myself) making these
 claims, people in the AGI community will start to take more seriously the
 implications for their own field 

 http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20026764.100

 For those who do not have a New Scientist subscription, the full article
 refers to a paper at http://www.arxiv.org/abs/0809.0151.

 Mile Gu et al looked at the possibility of explaining emergent properties
 of Ising glasses and managed to prove that those properties are not
 reducible.

 Myself, I do not need the full force of Gu's proof, since I only claim
 that emergent properties can be *practically* impossible to work with.

 It is worth noting that his chosen target systems (Ising glasses) are very
 closely linked to some approaches to AGI, since these have been proposed by
 some neural net people as the fundamental core of their approach.

 I am sure that I can quote a short extract from the full NS article
 without treading on the New Scientist copyright.  It is illuminating because
 what Gu et al refer to is the problem of calculating the lowest energy state
 of the system, which approximately corresponds to the state of maximum
 understanding in the class of systems that I am most interested in:

 BEGIN QUOTE:

 Using the model, the team focused on whether the pattern that the atoms
 adopt under various scenarios, such as a state of lowest energy, could be
 calculated from knowledge of those forces. They found that in some
 scenarios, the pattern of atoms could not be calculated from knowledge of
 the forces - even given unlimited computing power. In mathematical terms,
 the system is considered formally undecidable.

 We were able to find a number of properties that were simply decoupled
 from the fundamental interactions, says Gu. Even some really simple
 properties of the model, such as the fraction of atoms oriented in one
 direction, cannot be computed.

 This result, says Gu, shows that some of the models scientists use to
 simulate physical systems may actually have properties that cannot be linked
 to the behaviour of their parts (www.arxiv.org/abs/0809.0151). This, in
 turn, may help explain why our description of nature operates at many
 levels, rather than working from just one. A 'theory of everything' might
 not explain all natural phenomena, says Gu. Real understanding may require
 further experiments and intuition at every level.

 Some physicists think the work offers a promising scientific boost for the
 delicate issue of emergence, which tends to get swamped with philosophical
 arguments. John Barrow at the University of Cambridge calls the results
 really interesting, but thinks one element of the proof needs further
 study. He points out that Gu and colleagues derived their result by studying
 an infinite system, rather than one of large but finite size, like most
 natural systems. So it's not entirely clear what their results mean for
 actual finite systems, says Barrow.

 Gu agrees, but points out that this was not the team's goal. He also
 argues that the idealised mathematical laws that scientists routinely use to
 

Re: [agi] New Scientist: Why nature can't be reduced to mathematical laws

2008-10-06 Thread Mike Tintner
Ben:I didn't read that book but I've read dozens of his papers ... it's cool 
stuff but does not convince me that engineering AGI is impossible ... however 
when I debated this with Stu F2F I'd say neither of us convinced each other ;-) 
...

Ben,

His argument (like mine), is that AGI is *algorithmically* impossible, 
(Similarly he is arguing only that our *present* mechanistic worldview is 
inadequate). I can't vouch for it, since he doesn't explicitly address AGI as 
distinct from the powers of algorithms, but I would be v. surprised if he was 
arguing that AGI is impossible, period (no?).  

I would've thought that he would argue something like that just as we need a 
revolutionary new mechanistic worldview, so we need a revolutionary approach to 
AGI, (and not just a few tweaks  :)  ).


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Re: [agi] New Scientist: Why nature can't be reduced to mathematical laws

2008-10-06 Thread Abram Demski
Nice!

As someone who knows a thing or two, though, I'd like to point out
that the undecidability of one thing from another thing depends on the
choice of logic. For example, everything else being equal, if we state
the basic rules of the system in both first-order logic and in ZF set
theory, far more will be undecidable from the first-order
characterization. So while it is convenient to make blanked statements
of the form global property X is undecidable from the local
interactions, it isn't quite accurate.

This means that in principle all we need is a stronger logic-- we
don't necessarily need to determine the results experimentally just
because they appear undecidable. But, doing an experiment may be
(immensely) more convenient. This has at least some relevance to
symbolic-style AGI, because one of the primary examples of undecidable
facts is the consistency of a particular logic-- it is only decidable
in a stronger logic. I don't know if I can transfer this result to say
the eventual optimality of an optimization process is only decidable
by a stronger optimization process... which would be more directly
relevant...

--Abram

On Mon, Oct 6, 2008 at 12:16 PM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:



 Perhaps now that there are other physicists (besides myself) making these
 claims, people in the AGI community will start to take more seriously the
 implications for their own field 

 http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20026764.100

 For those who do not have a New Scientist subscription, the full article
 refers to a paper at http://www.arxiv.org/abs/0809.0151.

 Mile Gu et al looked at the possibility of explaining emergent properties of
 Ising glasses and managed to prove that those properties are not reducible.

 Myself, I do not need the full force of Gu's proof, since I only claim that
 emergent properties can be *practically* impossible to work with.

 It is worth noting that his chosen target systems (Ising glasses) are very
 closely linked to some approaches to AGI, since these have been proposed by
 some neural net people as the fundamental core of their approach.

 I am sure that I can quote a short extract from the full NS article without
 treading on the New Scientist copyright.  It is illuminating because what Gu
 et al refer to is the problem of calculating the lowest energy state of the
 system, which approximately corresponds to the state of maximum
 understanding in the class of systems that I am most interested in:

 BEGIN QUOTE:

 Using the model, the team focused on whether the pattern that the atoms
 adopt under various scenarios, such as a state of lowest energy, could be
 calculated from knowledge of those forces. They found that in some
 scenarios, the pattern of atoms could not be calculated from knowledge of
 the forces - even given unlimited computing power. In mathematical terms,
 the system is considered formally undecidable.

 We were able to find a number of properties that were simply decoupled from
 the fundamental interactions, says Gu. Even some really simple properties
 of the model, such as the fraction of atoms oriented in one direction,
 cannot be computed.

 This result, says Gu, shows that some of the models scientists use to
 simulate physical systems may actually have properties that cannot be linked
 to the behaviour of their parts (www.arxiv.org/abs/0809.0151). This, in
 turn, may help explain why our description of nature operates at many
 levels, rather than working from just one. A 'theory of everything' might
 not explain all natural phenomena, says Gu. Real understanding may require
 further experiments and intuition at every level.

 Some physicists think the work offers a promising scientific boost for the
 delicate issue of emergence, which tends to get swamped with philosophical
 arguments. John Barrow at the University of Cambridge calls the results
 really interesting, but thinks one element of the proof needs further
 study. He points out that Gu and colleagues derived their result by studying
 an infinite system, rather than one of large but finite size, like most
 natural systems. So it's not entirely clear what their results mean for
 actual finite systems, says Barrow.

 Gu agrees, but points out that this was not the team's goal. He also argues
 that the idealised mathematical laws that scientists routinely use to
 describe the world often refer to infinite systems. Our results suggest
 that some of these laws probably cannot be derived from first principles,
 he says.

 END QUOTE.


 I particularly liked his choice of words when he said: We were able to find
 a number of properties that were simply decoupled from the fundamental
 interactions...

 Now where have I heard that before, I wonder?



 Richard Loosemore







 ---
 agi
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 RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/
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AW: [agi] New Scientist: Why nature can't be reduced to mathematical laws

2008-10-06 Thread Dr. Matthias Heger
The problem of the emergent behavior already arises within a chess program
which 
visits millions of chess positions within a second.
I think the problem of the emergent behavior equals the fine tuning problem
which I have already mentioned:
We will know, that the main architecture of our AGI works. But in our first
experiments 
we will observe a behavior of the AGI which we don't want to have. We will
have several parameters which we can change.
The big question will be: Which values of the parameters will let the AGI do
the right things.
This could be an important problem for the development of AGI because in my
opinion the difference between a human and a monkey is only fine tuning. And
nature needed millions of years for this fine tuning.

I think there is no way to avoid this problem but this problem is no show
stopper.

- Matthias


Mike Tintner wrote:

This is fine and interesting, but hasn't anybody yet read Kauffman's 
Reinventing the Sacred (publ this year)? The entire book is devoted to this 
theme and treats it globally, ranging  from this kind of emergence in 
physics, to emergence/evolution of natural species, to emergence/deliberate 
creativity in the economy and human thinking. Kauffman systematically - and 
correctly - argues that the entire, current mechanistic worldview of science

is quite inadequate to dealing with and explaining creativity in every form 
throughout the world and at every level of evolution.  Kauffman also 
explicitly deals with the kind of problems AGI must solve if it is to be 
AGI.

In fact, everything is interrelated here. Ben argues:

we are not trying to understand some natural system, we are trying to 
**engineer** systems 

Well, yes, but how you get emergent physical properties of matter, and how 
you get species evolving from each other with creative, scientifically 
unpredictable new organs and features , can be *treated*  as 
design/engineering problems (even though, of course, nature was the 
designer).

In fact, AGI *should* be doing this - should be understanding how its 
particular problem of getting a machine to be creative, fits in with the 
science-wide problem of understanding creativity in all its forms. The two 
are mutually enriching, (indeed mandatory when it comes to a) the human and 
animal brain's creativity and an AGI's and b)  the evolution of the brain 
and the evolutionary path of AGI's).





---
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Re: [agi] New Scientist: Why nature can't be reduced to mathematical laws

2008-10-06 Thread Mike Tintner

Matthias,

You don't seem to understand creative/emergent problems (and I find this 
certainly not universal, but v. common here).


If your chess-playing AGI is to tackle a creative/emergent  problem (at a 
fairly minor level) re chess - it would have to be something like: find a 
new way for chess pieces to move - and therefore develop a new form of 
chess   (without any preparation other than some knowledge about different 
rules and how different pieces in different games move).  Or something like 
get your opponent to take back his move before he removes his hand from the 
piece  - where some use of psychology, say, might be appropriate rather 
than anything to do directly with chess itself.


IOW by definition a creative/emergent problem is one where you have to bring 
about a given effect by finding radically new kinds of objects that move or 
relate in radically new kinds of ways -  to produce that effect. By 
definition, you *do not know which domain is appropriate to solving the 
problem,* (what kinds of objects or moves are relevant),  let alone have a 
set of instructions to hold your hand every step of the way -   and the 
eventual solution will involve crossing hitherto unrelated domains.


That, as Kauffman also insists, is an absolute show stopper. Which is why 
the show that is AGI cannot not only not go on, but hasn't even started.


No form of logic or maths or programming -  no preexisting frame - is 
sufficient to deal with such problems - and cross domains in surprising 
ways. If those are the only relevant disciplines you know, then you will 
indeed have major difficulties understanding creative problems. They do not 
prepare you.


PS Ditto all evolutionary steps present creative problems of discovery. For 
example - give me a *biological* piece of the puzzle that explains how 
humans/apes with relatively curved spines acquired erect spines   (an 
explanation that reveals something about the *internal* processes by which 
permanent changes in the body's blueprints come about - as opposed to 
something about external, natural selection).




Matthias:  The problem of the emergent behavior already arises within a 
chess program

which
visits millions of chess positions within a second.
I think the problem of the emergent behavior equals the fine tuning 
problem

which I have already mentioned:
We will know, that the main architecture of our AGI works. But in our 
first

experiments
we will observe a behavior of the AGI which we don't want to have. We will
have several parameters which we can change.
The big question will be: Which values of the parameters will let the AGI 
do

the right things.
This could be an important problem for the development of AGI because in 
my
opinion the difference between a human and a monkey is only fine tuning. 
And

nature needed millions of years for this fine tuning.

I think there is no way to avoid this problem but this problem is no show
stopper.

- Matthias


Mike Tintner wrote:

This is fine and interesting, but hasn't anybody yet read Kauffman's
Reinventing the Sacred (publ this year)? The entire book is devoted to 
this

theme and treats it globally, ranging  from this kind of emergence in
physics, to emergence/evolution of natural species, to 
emergence/deliberate
creativity in the economy and human thinking. Kauffman systematically - 
and
correctly - argues that the entire, current mechanistic worldview of 
science


is quite inadequate to dealing with and explaining creativity in every 
form

throughout the world and at every level of evolution.  Kauffman also
explicitly deals with the kind of problems AGI must solve if it is to be
AGI.

In fact, everything is interrelated here. Ben argues:

we are not trying to understand some natural system, we are trying to
**engineer** systems 

Well, yes, but how you get emergent physical properties of matter, and how
you get species evolving from each other with creative, scientifically
unpredictable new organs and features , can be *treated*  as
design/engineering problems (even though, of course, nature was the
designer).

In fact, AGI *should* be doing this - should be understanding how its
particular problem of getting a machine to be creative, fits in with the
science-wide problem of understanding creativity in all its forms. The two
are mutually enriching, (indeed mandatory when it comes to a) the human 
and

animal brain's creativity and an AGI's and b)  the evolution of the brain
and the evolutionary path of AGI's).





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Re: [agi] New Scientist: Why nature can't be reduced to mathematical laws

2008-10-06 Thread Mike Tintner

Matthias (cont),

Alternatively, if you'd like *the* creative ( somewhat mathematical) 
problem de nos jours - how about designing a bail-out fund/ mechanism for 
either the US or the world, that will actually work?  No show-stopper for 
your AGI?  [How would you apply logic here, Abram?] 





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Re: [agi] New Scientist: Why nature can't be reduced to mathematical laws

2008-10-06 Thread Ben Goertzel
On Mon, Oct 6, 2008 at 7:36 PM, Mike Tintner [EMAIL PROTECTED]wrote:

 Matthias (cont),

 Alternatively, if you'd like *the* creative ( somewhat mathematical)
 problem de nos jours - how about designing a bail-out fund/ mechanism for
 either the US or the world, that will actually work?  No show-stopper for
 your AGI?  [How would you apply logic here, Abram?]


Mike, I am quite sure that an AGI with human-level general intelligence ...
and access to Mathematica and scripting languages ... would be able to sort
through the problems of the global financial system far better than any
human ...

The fact that we have not yet written an AGI that can do it, doesn't tell us
anything about the potential of AGI

Ben G



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Re: [agi] New Scientist: Why nature can't be reduced to mathematical laws

2008-10-06 Thread Ben Goertzel
Mike,


 by definition a creative/emergent problem is one where you have to bring
 about a given effect by finding radically new kinds of objects that move or
 relate in radically new kinds of ways -  to produce that effect. By
 definition, you *do not know which domain is appropriate to solving the
 problem,* (what kinds of objects or moves are relevant),  let alone have a
 set of instructions to hold your hand every step of the way -   and the
 eventual solution will involve crossing hitherto unrelated domains.

 That, as Kauffman also insists, is an absolute show stopper. Which is why
 the show that is AGI cannot not only not go on, but hasn't even started.



This is just an argument by reference to authority ... Stu Kauffman wrote a
book saying X, therefore we're supposed to believe X is true???

He certainly did not convincingly demonstrate in any of his books or papers
that AGI cannot deal with creativity in the same sense that humans can...

These discussions get **so** tiresome... I am soon going to stop
participating in threads of this nature...

ben g



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Re: [agi] New Scientist: Why nature can't be reduced to mathematical laws

2008-10-06 Thread Charles Hixson

Mike Tintner wrote:
Ben:I didn't read that book but I've read dozens of his papers ... 
it's cool stuff but does not convince me that engineering AGI is 
impossible ... however when I debated this with Stu F2F I'd say 
neither of us convinced each other ;-) ...
 
Ben,
 
His argument (like mine), is that AGI is *algorithmically* 
impossible, (Similarly he is arguing only that our *present* 
mechanistic worldview is inadequate). I can't vouch for it, since he 
doesn't explicitly address AGI as distinct from the powers of 
algorithms, but I would be v. surprised if he was arguing that AGI is 
impossible, period (no?). 
 
I would've thought that he would argue something like that just as we 
need a revolutionary new mechanistic worldview, so we need a 
revolutionary approach to AGI, (and not just a few tweaks  :)  ).

I would go both further and not as far.

Math clearly states that to derive all the possible truths from a 
numeric system as strong as number theory requires an infinite number of 
axioms.  I.e., choices.  This is clearly impossible.  To me this implies 
(but not proves) that there are an infinite number of possible futures 
descending from any precisely defined state.  As such, no AGI will be 
able to solve this problem.  It can't even make probability based choices.


OTOH, given a few local biases to start with, and reasoning with a 
relatively short headway from current time, Bayesian predictions work 
pretty well, and don't require infinite resources.


It's my further suspicion that we are equipped with sets of domain 
biases, and that at any one time one particular set is dominant.  This 
I see as primarily a simplifying approach, but one which reduces the 
amount of computation needed in any situation, allowing faster 
near-future predictions.


So what we have is something less that totally general.  Call it an 
A(g)I.  It has a general mode that it can use when it's got plenty of 
time, but that's not what it uses in real-time, and it's never run as a 
dominant mode, only as a moderately high priority task.  And the general 
mode tends to get stuck on insoluble (or just too complex) problems 
until it times out.  Sometimes it saves the state and returns to it 
later, but sometimes a meta-heuristic says Forget about it.  That 
game's not worth the candle.


The problem comes when you take the G in AGI too seriously.  There is no 
existence proof that such a thing can exist in finite space/time/energy 
situations.  But you should be able to get closer to it than people have 
evolved to demonstrate.




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Re: [agi] New Scientist: Why nature can't be reduced to mathematical laws

2008-10-06 Thread Mike Tintner
Ben,

I am frankly flabberghasted by your response. I have given concrete example 
after example of creative, domain-crossing problems, where obviously there is 
no domain or frame that can be applied to solving the problem (as does 
Kauffman) - and at no point do you engage with any of them - or have  the least 
suggestion as to how a logical/mathematical AGI could go about solving them, or 
identify a suitable domain..

On the contrary,it is  *you* who repeatedly resort to essentially *reference to 
authority* arguments  - saying read my book, my paper etc etc - and what 
basically amounts to the tired line I have the proof, I just don't have the 
time to write it in the margin  (Or it's too complicated for your pretty 
little head.)  Be honest - when and where have you ever addressed creative 
problems? [Just count how many problems I have raised).. 

Just as it is obvious that I know next to nothing about programming, it is also 
obvious that you have v. little experience of discussing creative 
problemsolving - at, I stress, a *metacognitive* level. (And nor, AFAIK, do any 
AGI-ers -  only partly excepting Minsky).

All this stands in total, stark contrast to any discussion of logical or 
mathematical, problems, where you are always delighted to engage in detail, and 
v. helpful and constructive - and do not make excuses to cover up your 
inexperience.



Mike,



by definition a creative/emergent problem is one where you have to bring 
about a given effect by finding radically new kinds of objects that move or 
relate in radically new kinds of ways -  to produce that effect. By definition, 
you *do not know which domain is appropriate to solving the problem,* (what 
kinds of objects or moves are relevant),  let alone have a set of instructions 
to hold your hand every step of the way -   and the eventual solution will 
involve crossing hitherto unrelated domains.

That, as Kauffman also insists, is an absolute show stopper. Which is why 
the show that is AGI cannot not only not go on, but hasn't even started.


  This is just an argument by reference to authority ... Stu Kauffman wrote a 
book saying X, therefore we're supposed to believe X is true???

  He certainly did not convincingly demonstrate in any of his books or papers 
that AGI cannot deal with creativity in the same sense that humans can...

  These discussions get **so** tiresome... I am soon going to stop 
participating in threads of this nature...

  ben g 




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Re: [agi] New Scientist: Why nature can't be reduced to mathematical laws

2008-10-06 Thread Ben Goertzel

 On the contrary,it is  *you* who repeatedly resort to essentially
 *reference to authority* arguments  - saying read my book, my paper etc
 etc - and what basically amounts to the tired line I have the proof, I
 just don't have the time to write it in the margin


 No.  I do not claim to have any proof.  I claim to have a rational
 argument.  And, **I have already taken the time to write it down**.



By the way, what Fermat wrote was that he did not have **room** to fit his
proof in the margin.  Not time.

There is not room enough to write my arguments for my AGI approach in
emails, but there is room to write them in books, which is what I have
done.  If you don't want to take time to read them, or don't have the
technical background, that's fine ... but please don't criticize me for not
being willing to take the time to write my ideas down or present them to
the world.  It is simply not true.

-- Ben G



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Re: [agi] New Scientist: Why nature can't be reduced to mathematical laws

2008-10-06 Thread Abram Demski
Charles,

Again as someone who knows a thing or two about this particular realm...

 Math clearly states that to derive all the possible truths from a numeric
 system as strong as number theory requires an infinite number of axioms.

Yep.

  I.e., choices.  This is clearly impossible.  To me this implies (but not
 proves) that there are an infinite number of possible futures descending
 from any precisely defined state.

Not quite.

An infinite number of axioms may be needed, but there is a right and
wrong here! We cannot choose any axioms we like. Well, we can, but if
we choose the wrong ones we will eventually derive a contradiction.
When we choose the right ones, we can't know that we have... we just
hold our breath and hope that no contradiction arises. :)

--Abram


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Re: [agi] New Scientist: Why nature can't be reduced to mathematical laws

2008-10-06 Thread Charles Hixson

Abram Demski wrote:

Charles,

Again as someone who knows a thing or two about this particular realm...

  

Math clearly states that to derive all the possible truths from a numeric
system as strong as number theory requires an infinite number of axioms.



Yep.

  

 I.e., choices.  This is clearly impossible.  To me this implies (but not
proves) that there are an infinite number of possible futures descending
from any precisely defined state.



Not quite.

An infinite number of axioms may be needed, but there is a right and
wrong here! We cannot choose any axioms we like. Well, we can, but if
we choose the wrong ones we will eventually derive a contradiction.
When we choose the right ones, we can't know that we have... we just
hold our breath and hope that no contradiction arises. :)

--Abram
  
Sorry.  Thinking on it you are correct.  Merely because the math ends up 
consistent doesn't mean that it matches reality.  But we can't know 
until after, quite possibly long after, we choose the axiom.  Which 
furthers the need for built in biases.  (I wish I'd realized your point, 
it would have made my argument stronger.)


OTOH, this is an argument by analogy, so it's not certain anyway.  It 
might be possible to derive a proof, but I sure couldn't do it.




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