Re: charlatanism

2002-08-18 Thread Alypius Skinner


- Original Message -
From: fabio guillermo rojas [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Example from my professional life: As is probably obvious, I'm not
 an economist - I'm a sociologist who takes economics very seriously
 and I sometimes use economic tools in my research. So I'm always
 in a position of explaining economic ideas to non-economists and I
 frequently find that people tend to avoid economic issues.


Rodney Stark and some other sociologists have very fruitfully used supply
and demand for public goods to explain the rise and fall of religious
bodies.  They also discuss religious entrepreneurship and the attempt to
impose religious monopolies or religious cartels to fend off competition.
This school has also explained the secularization of western Europe as a
supply side failure.  Within this genre,  I regard Stark and Bainbridge's
_The Future of Religion_ as a latter day classic.  Since many sociologists
seem to have an aversion to both religion and economics, I wonder whether
their studies have adversely affected their professional reputations.
(Also, I regard Stark's textbook _Sociology_ as the only introductory
sociology textbook so interesting it can be read for pleasure, but I don't
think it is in print anymore.)

~Alypius Skinner






Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-18 Thread Alypius Skinner


- Original Message -
From: Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 One factor that keeps large corporations honest is the threats of hostile
 takeovers and bankruptcy. Unfortunately neither of these seem likely to
 apply to a large nation-as-corporation. Imagine creditors trying to force
 everyone else to leave the U.S. after a bankruptcy because they now own
 all of the shares.


What if a foreign power began buying up large numbers of shares and
assigning them to its foreign agents? How many shares would Al Qua'ida buy?

Other questions/observations I have:  will shareholders receive dividends?
Would immigration's effect on dividend size affect shareholders' demand for
one immigration policy or another?

If the government refused to issue more shares, but simply bought one back
on the open market to issue to each new child and charge the parents's for
the cost, this would be an interesting way to stabilize population.

Would it make more sense to organize a nation like a not-for-profit
corporation?

Since the modern state is often regarded as already being organized like a
corporation, I assume this thread is about organizing the literal nation
itself as a corporation.  Does this not mean an internal labor market in
which the managers would be responsible for training, job assignments,  and
promotions (and wages and salaries), so that involuntary unemployment and
welfare schemes would be non-existent?

Would social security and medicare be run like a pension system? But what
would they be invested in? With the nation (not just the state) as
corporation, there presumably would not be any use for a stock market, so
pensions would have to be funded entirely out of corporate (national)
profits.  If the whole apparatus of state were so funded, there really would
be no need for taxes per se.  (Perhaps this thread should be nation as
conglomerate.)

Would corporate divisions or subsidiairies compete against each other or
receive protected territories?

Could the corporation hire employees who were not shareholders?

Could one become a shareholder without moving here?  What if most of our
shareholders eventually lived overseas, while our residents were mostly
employees?

If only shareholders may be employees, and foreigners may not own shares,
does that mean no overseas employees permitted unless they are shareholders
stationed abroad? The nation could not be a multinational corporation?

Would a social stigma  to selling one's share evolve? In one survey, 25% of
US respondents said they would change their religion for 2 million dollars,
but only 16% would give up their US citizenship for the same sum.  Go
figure.

How would we preserve an independent judiciary (essentially an arbitration
system)--although that is a challenge under any system?  The US judiciary
already seems to be increasingly politicized.

Would the only restraint on our CEO be contractual agreements and decisions
by the Board of Directors? If so, we would not need a legislature anymore.
New laws-regulations could be drafted by legal experts as the CEO directed.


John Hull wrote:
 1. The program will prevent poor from coming to the
 States.  I think that's wrong, but I respect your view
 if you feel otherwise.

So you think its wrong to demand that poor people respect private property
rights (since the corporate-nation would be the private property of the
shareholders).  But if you want to forcibly confiscate a share or two from
Berkshire-Hathaway and donate it to me (since I can't afford to buy them),
I won't complain very loudly :)

Seriously though, if no limitations are placed on immigration, the effects
would likely be unpleasant for many of the people who already live here and
do, in fact, think of themselves sort of as shareholders (citizens) of the
nation.  (In olden times, the kingdom was viewed as a sole proprietorship
owned by the king and national identity was weak or non-existent.  Soldiers
were mercenairies beholden only to their employer, not to the people.
Multicultural states were much more stable under sole
proprietorship-monarchies than under conditions of republican nationalism.)
Do you mean that you want to benefit a select few of the foreign poor at the
cost of depressing wages and opportuny for the native poor of your own
country and raising the net cost of public services (according to labor
economists), or do you mean that you want mutually open borders as a matter
of principle?  In either case, what effect will this have on the native
lower classes' sense of belongingness, national loyalty, willingness to make
sacrifices and avoid free-riding, etc.? Does the logic here not ultimately
lead to an every-man-for-himself mentality that ultimately shifts loyalty
from the nation-state to the family with whatever repercussions that may
have for political stability?  Now, I will readily agree that the concept of
transferable national shares may well have the effect of eroding social
capital, but so does your view that foreign 

China Will Soon Be Second Only To The US

2002-08-18 Thread Alypius Skinner
Title: China Will Soon Be Second Only To The US





  
  
  

  
  
  http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2002/08/02/200208020048.asp 

   
  
  China Will Soon Be Second Only To The 
  USThe Korea Herald8-4-2
  


  

  Over the coming decades, China will become a 
  thoroughly new form of political and economic entity. Brutally 
  competitive in both politics and world markets, innovative and 
  resilient, China will be more dominant than any nation save 
  America. 
   
  Such a shift in the global balance of power occurs 
  only about once every century and is comparable to the emergence of 
  the U.S. power a century ago. The magnitude of this change is due, in 
  part, to a radical and rapid shift in China's governance. Because of 
  its suddenness, it is tempting to write this shift off as a fluke. But 
  China's restructuring is permanent and will affect every aspect of its 
  national life, as well as its global standing. 
   
  The People's Republic now embodies two systems: the 
  centralized, autocratic Communist administration, dominated by an 
  outdated ideology and military interests, and the decentralized 
  free-market economic regime. Whether deliberately or not, China is 
  reorganizing itself to balance central authority and common purpose 
  with decentralized freedom, in the same way that nimble companies 
  balance home-office and divisional control. The result is an entirely 
  new geopolitical model - the country as corporation. 
   
  Call the new China "Chung-hua, Inc." (Chunghua 
  translates as "China" and actually means "the prosperous center of the 
  universe.") Like many corporations, China is moving most 
  decision-making to the "business unit" level - semi-autonomous, 
  self-governing economic region-states that compete fiercely against 
  each other for capital, technology, and human resources (just as 
  America's states do). 
   
  This new, decentralized free-market regime currently 
  encompasses only a small part of China's vast territory, and many 
  Chinese officials still refuse to acknowledge its existence. Indeed, 
  only seven years ago, the word "federation" was banned from the 
  Chinese language; companies like Federal Transport or Federation 
  Merchants were required to change their names. Today, China has the 
  most federal governance structure of any large nation except the 
  United States. 
   
  Two broad categories of region-states exist. The 
  first are relatively small, composed of cities and their surrounding 
  areas, generally with a population of 5-7 million people. Some of 
  these - Shenzhen, Shanghai, Dalian, Tianjin, Shenyang, Xiamen, 
  Qingdao, and Suzhou - are now growing economically at a rate of 15-20 
  percent per year - faster than such Asian "tigers" as Malaysia, 
  Taiwan, Thailand and Korea ever did. These smaller region-states, in 
  turn, are propelling the growth of larger mega-regions, with 
  populations approaching 100 million each. 
   
  The mega-regions, which tend to share common 
  dialects, ethnic identities, and histories, are becoming economic 
  powerhouses in their own right. If they were separate nations, five of 
  them - the Yangtze Delta, the Northeastern Tristates area (formerly 
  known as Manchuria), the Pearl River Delta, the Beijing-Tianjin 
  corridor, and Shandong - would rank among Asia's 10 largest 
  economies. 
   
  Regional governments have also been toughened up by 
  the Chung-hua, Inc. ethic. Most officials are appointed, not elected. 
  Not only are they held to targets of 7-percent annual economic growth 
  or better (like many corporate executives), they must also improve 
  environmental quality, build better infrastructure, and reduce local 
  crime levels. In October 2001, a half-dozen bureaucrats were expelled 
  from one of China's major cities for not meeting their economic growth 
  and security targets. 
   
  Local officials are often considered heroes, not 
  oppressors. In January 2001, Bo Xhi Lai, then mayor of Dalian, was 
  promoted to governor of Liaoning province. Thousands of women, many in 
  tears, spontaneously came to a park to bid him farewell. During his 
  nine-year tenure, Dalian evolved from a ramshackle port into one of 
  the cleanest and most prosperous cities in Asia. It now has a street 
  life more vibrant than Singapore, a layout 

Re: Nations as Corporations

2002-08-18 Thread john hull

--- Alypius Skinner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
'John Hull wrote:
1. The program will prevent poor from coming to the
States.  I think that's wrong'
So you think its wrong to demand that poor people
respect private property rights

That's a bit of a non sequitur. :)
Nope.  All I was saying is that poor shouldn't be
prevented from immigrating simply for being poor (and
that the proposed citizenship structure would do that,
a view that has been well challenged).  Furthermore,
that people should be allowed to move from country to
country fairly unhindered--taking the fleas with the
dog.  No insightful economic arguments here, it's just
a value that I have (and interjected).

Alypius Skinner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Ken Lay, Bill Clinton (Hillary in 2008), what's the
difference? Lay might even be an improvement.

Hillary in 2008?  Ooof.  Humor aside, I'm not sure I
agree that Lay-esque leadership would be an
improvement.  You remark how stupid and apathetic
voters are, it seems to me that in that environment
someone more clever than I could come up with a scheme
to build stock prices in the short-run, get paid, and
bail out of office.  The world has certainly seen its
share of bad leaders, but that doesn't mean that they
couldn't be worse.  I think that the proposed scheme
would shorten political time horizons by linking
reward to a very short-term phenomenon, and thereby
produce even greater incentives for bone-head moves. 
I feel that if leaders' primary compensation comes in
the form of going down in the history books in a good
light, then they'll be more inclined to think in the
longer term.  

Obviously, I don't have a general argument to back
this up.  It is also obvious that one could easily
pick out plenty of counter examples, which I could not
counter with counter examples because we're dealing
with a hypothetical.  I would like to hear an argument
as to why linking reward to an extremely short-term
phenomenon would produce better leaders on average. 
I'm not throwing down the gauntlet...it's just
something I'd like to hear.

--- Alypius Skinner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But all the incentives for that scenario (embracing
mercantile excesses) already exist.

That must be true to some degree since people keep
putting Pat Buchanan on TV.  But I submit that those
incentives arise from your aforementioned voter
ignorance  stupidity: some people support schemes
that are ultimately harmful for the nation  the world
and will vote for the slobs who enact such policies. 
The proposed scheme, IMO, creates an *institutional*
incentive for such mercantilist policies because they
can, at least in the short-run, hurt the rest of the
world alot more than they will hurt us.

Thanks for reading my stuff,
jsh

=
...for no one admits that he incurs an obligation to another merely because that 
other has done him no wrong.
-Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, Discourse 16.

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