RE: Lester's extreme compatibility thesis

2003-01-19 Thread Fred Foldvary
--- Gil Guillory [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 ... I think there's something to
 Hoppe's and von Kuehnelt-Leddihn's arguments that monarchy is superior
 to democracy with regard to this general problem of what we might
 euphemistically call the externalities of war.

Does World War I and its initiation by the monarchies of Germany, Austria,
Turkey, the UK and Russia, fit this?
Fred Foldvary

=
[EMAIL PROTECTED]




RE: Lester's extreme compatibility thesis

2003-01-14 Thread Gil Guillory
Sorry, just catching up to this post...

 First, if war were so expensive relative to peace why
 does it exist? Maybe peace is more expensive, in
 terms of risk for example, than open warfare.

The costs of war are born by those who pay for and die in the wars, and
these people are not the same people that write articles and books in
support of wars, and they are not the same people that benefit from
wars, such as military industrialists, generals, and politicians, the
latter two of which fulfill their legacies by agitating for war.

It's more nuanced than that, of course; but I think there's something to
Hoppe's and von Kuehnelt-Leddihn's arguments that monarchy is superior
to democracy with regard to this general problem of what we might
euphemistically call the externalities of war.

 Second,
 I might say that going to war isn't expensive, going
 to war against ME is expensive, because I'm going to
 recruit the demons who walk the earth.  I won't put
 Charles Manson in jail, I'll put him on the payroll.

I don't understand this question. Shifting the dialog to another
adversarial arena, it is precisely the costs of employing agents on
one's behalf for extended battles that provides the incentive for people
to settle their conflicts before they get to court. Approximately 95% of
civil cases that try mediation (including those who are instructed to
try it by the judge) settle.

The analogy is apt, and I will defend it if necessary.



smime.p7s
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Re: Lester's extreme compatibility thesis

2003-01-11 Thread Ben Powell
John, there has been plenty written in the academic
journals over the past decade debating your questions.
  For theoretical arguements look up Tyler Cowen The
Economics of Anarchy in Economics and philosophy and
David Friedman's response.  Dan Sutter's paper
Asymetric Power relations in Anarchy in the Southern
Economic Journal (1995).  Caplan and Stringham have
responses to the above in a forthcoming Article in the
Review of Austrian Economics (Bryan is this available
on your website?).  All of these articles address the
problems you mention much more seriously than the
naive Hobbesian vision.
  Perhaps more interesting than just the theoretical
literature are the historical accounts of interaction
without the state.  Fred Foldvary has mentioned David
Friedman's research on Iceland, also there is the
classic by Terry Anderson and PJ Hill America's
Experiment with Anarcho Capitalism: The NOT so Wild
Wild West in the Journal of Libertarian studies,
availible online at www.mises.org .  Also not to be
missed is much of Bruce Benson's work including his
book The Enterprise of Law, Justice without the
State.  
  Hope you find these references helpful in answering
your questions.

Ben Powell


--- john hull [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 What prevents a particular private law enforcement
 agency from engaging in mob-style protection?  For
 example, in Friedman's Anarchy and Efficient Law,
 he
 states that, The most obvious and least likely is
 direct violence-a mini-war between my agency,
 attempting to arrest the burglar, and his agency
 attempting to defend him from arrest. A somewhat
 more
 plausible scenario is negotiation. Since warfare is
 expensive, agencies might include in the contracts
 they offer their customers a provision under which
 they are not obliged to defend customers against
 legitimate punishment for their actual crimes. 

(http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Anarchy_and_Eff_Law/Anarchy_and_Eff_Law.html)
  First, if war were so expensive relative to peace
 why
 does it exist?  Maybe peace is more expensive, in
 terms of risk for example, than open warfare. 
 Second,
 I might say that going to war isn't expensive, going
 to war against ME is expensive, because I'm going to
 recruit the demons who walk the earth.  I won't put
 Charles Manson in jail, I'll put him on the payroll.
 
 This is an honest question, one that has been vexing
 me.
 
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Lester's extreme compatibility thesis

2003-01-10 Thread Gil Guillory
 From: Pinczewski-Lee, Joe (LRC)
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] 

 Nothing in the state, 
 everything against the state, 
 everything outside the state. 

 Which is why neither Mises, Rothbard, OR Mussolini ought never have
been
 allowed near the levers of power.  A world with the all inclusive
Corporatist
 State or NO state would all be equally horrific.  So, we debate at the
 margins of the middle ground for the best mix of us and me that
works
 best.

This is surely odd. Firstly, Mises was not an anarchist. Secondly, the
whole point of anarchism is for no one to be near or at the levers of
power; so, Rothbard never pined for such a position.

It is a bold conjecture, though popular, to claim that anarchy would be
as horrific as thoroughgoing fascism. I deny it. Also, I would like your
account of how far we are from thoroughgoing fascism today (to get you
started, what in the modern US is outside or against the state?). If
we are sufficiently close to ideal fascism, do you mean to say that a
switch to anarchy would not greatly affect our aggregate collective
welfare? If not, what would?

Of particular interest to me lately is Jan Lester's book _Escape from
Leviathan_ which argues at (book) length for what Lester calls the
extreme compatibility thesis: in practice...and in the long term,
there are no systematic clashes among interpersonal liberty, general
welfare, and market-anarchy... This is the exact opposite of your
conjecture, but put in a more analytical framework. If you'd like to
advance criticisms of Lester's thesis, I think that would be both
interesting and on-topic for the list.

What puzzles me about your post also is what you mean by the best mix
of 'us' and 'me' that works the best. What does that mean?



smime.p7s
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Re: Lester's extreme compatibility thesis

2003-01-10 Thread john hull
What prevents a particular private law enforcement
agency from engaging in mob-style protection?  For
example, in Friedman's Anarchy and Efficient Law, he
states that, The most obvious and least likely is
direct violence-a mini-war between my agency,
attempting to arrest the burglar, and his agency
attempting to defend him from arrest. A somewhat more
plausible scenario is negotiation. Since warfare is
expensive, agencies might include in the contracts
they offer their customers a provision under which
they are not obliged to defend customers against
legitimate punishment for their actual crimes. 
(http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Anarchy_and_Eff_Law/Anarchy_and_Eff_Law.html)
 First, if war were so expensive relative to peace why
does it exist?  Maybe peace is more expensive, in
terms of risk for example, than open warfare.  Second,
I might say that going to war isn't expensive, going
to war against ME is expensive, because I'm going to
recruit the demons who walk the earth.  I won't put
Charles Manson in jail, I'll put him on the payroll.

This is an honest question, one that has been vexing me.

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