Re: paid parking a market failure?

2005-10-14 Thread RFibe
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Or are shelves full of goods--inventories--inefficient too somehow?

Toyota's Just In Time was so successful for a reason...

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Re: paid parking a market failure?

2005-10-14 Thread Robert A. Book
I think the problem is, that idea that marginal cost pricing is
optimal is in some sense related to the assuming that marginal cost is
rising at the optimal point.  Recall that many authors define the
supply curve as the upward-sloping portion of the marginal cost
curve.

That model was conceived with factor and farm production in mind --
and those two accounted for most production in those days.  There was
nearly always a point at which marginal cost started to increase, and
after that once it intersected marginal benefit from the bottom, it
was time to stop.  (Call this the U-shaped average cost curve
assumption.)

The trouble is, this model starts to break down when marginal costs
are either zero or nearly zero, usually with lumpy capacity (e.g.,
movie theaters and airline seats).  In those cases, if you require
P=MC, you almost guarantee that the firm will go bankrupt, because
MC=0 for nearly all the possible levels of consumption -- and when the
last seat or parking space is taken, who pays?  The last consumer, or
everybody?  Because when the last spot is taken, the last consumer
imposes the cost, but ANY other consumer could send MC back to zero by
dropping out of the market.  You no longer have either symmetry among
consumers, or the same MC from above and below.

Nowadays, there are a huge number of industries that don't satisfy the
U-shaped average cost curve assumption -- not just parking and theater
seats, but long-distance or cellular phone calls (very low MC, until
you need a new line or switch), plane tickets (very low MC, until you
need another plane or a larger one), internet services, published
music, books, or software (low and everywhere-decreasing MC), and
cable TV (zero MC for each program once the consumer is hooked up).

In each of these cases, requiring P=MC would guarantee that no firm
could make a non-negative profit.  The industries simply could not
exist.  They would disappear, along with the substantial consumer and
producer surplus they produce at their non-optimal prices.

When I was in my second year of grad school, I thought of doing my
dissertation on this problem -- what is the optimal (i.e.,
surplus-maximizing) price when MC is decreasing everywhere?  I
mentioned this to my advisor, he advised against it -- he said it has
to be long-run average cost and that it's not really an interesting
problem.

I did my dissertation on something else, but I'm still not sure it's
not an interesting problem.  Now, I think there are some industries
with downward-sloping supply curves -- which means there are certain
cost structures that exist in real life that can produce them.
(Before you say I'm crazy about this, check the price of, say, Super 8
movie film and compare it to the (inflation-adjusted) price 20 years
ago when demand was much higher.  Also, compare the price of
short-wave radios to comparable-quality radios that receive only
commercial AM/FM bands.  In both cases, you have similar costs, but
higher prices corresponding to lower demand functions.)


--Robert Book
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]




 Fred Foldvary wrote:

 1. Is it the case that if the government offers street
 parking, given that the marginal cost of one more
 parked car is zero, the efficient charge is zero when
 uncongested and when congested, a charge just high
 enough to eliminate congestion?
 
 2.  If the answer to #1 is yes, then is it the case
 that if a private parking lot charges for parking at a
 time when the lot is never congested, this is socially
 inefficient, and a market failure?
 
 3.  Is cases #2 any different from a move theater
 charging admission when there are still seats
 available, the MC of one more viewer being zero?
 
 4. Is it a correct proposition that government-owned
 parking should use marginal-cost pricing, but private
 parking may charge the average cost, without this
 being labeled socially inefficient?  If so, why the
 difference?  If not, is it socially efficient for
 government to own all parking lots and charge MC?
 
 Fred Foldvary
 
 
 This would be true if it were possible to charge different people
 different prices for parking based on congestion. I guess,
 theoretically, you could implement some sort of dynamic pricing system
 [...]


Re: paid parking a market failure?

2005-10-14 Thread Fred Foldvary
--- Ricardo Gambirasio [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 I fail to see what's so special about parking.

Parking as such is indeed not a special case.
It only illustrates the general case.

 also in software,

I don't see how software, etc., are similar.
With software, shoes, etc., I pay for actual use and
also for their availability.

In the case of parking, if a city government provides
it, nobody is paying for empty spaces.
The availableness of street parking increases the
productivity of the area and increases the rentals
charged to tenants.  People pay for empty street
spaces as higher land rent or land prices.

If city-provided street parking is not congested, what
is the efficient price for parking, zero or greater
than zero?

 I guess a tougher question would be:
 where isn't there this kind of market failure?

Are you saying there is, or is not, market failure?

 I can't see how that is any more of a waste

I don't claim it is a waste of space.
The question is whether charging for parking space
when  there is no congestion, is efficient.

 problem is: where do
 we find such a government?

It seems to me that is a separate question.
Mine is about economic theory.

Fred


Re: paid parking a market failure?

2005-10-14 Thread Fred Foldvary
 I seem to recall learning that rather than
 demonstrating an inefficiency, the
 presence of inventories represents a form of
 insurance against uncertainty in
 demand.
 David Levenstam

Right, but suppose that the parking lot is an evenly
rotating economy, and the parking use is the same day
after day.  The parking lot is full at particular
times and not full other times.  There is no
uncertainty.  It is known how many cars will park at
particular times. Unlike produced goods, the number of
parking places is fixed.

Now, is it efficient to charge for a parking place
when the lot is not full?

Fred Foldvary


Re: paid parking a market failure?

2005-10-14 Thread Fred Foldvary
Robert A. Book [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 I think the problem is, that idea that marginal cost
 pricing is optimal is in some sense related to the
assuming that marginal cost is rising at the optimal
 point.

But suppose the marginal cost curve at that point is
horizontal.  Does marginal cost pricing cease to
exist?

  Recall that many authors define the
 supply curve as the upward-sloping portion of the
 marginal cost curve.

MC rises because MP falls.
MP falls because in the short run, one factor is
fixed.
But MC can be zero.
Textbooks also have an illustration of the Nash
equilibrium for a duopoly of water provision, where
the MC of water is zero.  In perfect competition, the
price of water is zero.  In monopoly, revenue is
profit, and is maximized where MR is zero, where
MR=MC=0.

 what is the optimal (i.e.,
 surplus-maximizing) price when MC is decreasing
 everywhere?
 -- he said it has
 to be long-run average cost and that it's not
 really an interesting problem.

He was wrong.  A hotel elevator has a zero MC for
another user.  The hotel prices the use at MC.
Shuttles are often user-priced at zero.  A restaurant
bathroom is usually priced at zero (but not always).
Drinking fountains have no charge.  Lots of services
are priced at zero.

Fred Foldvary


Re: paid parking a market failure?

2005-10-14 Thread Fred Foldvary
--- Xianhang Zhang [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 This would be true if it were possible to charge
 different people different prices for parking based
 on congestion.

It is possible, and is done in practice.
Many parking lots charge more during peak times than
in other times.  There is predictability, because the
typical usage does not vary much.

 cost of admitting an extra person is NOT zero
 because it requires you to drop prices which means
you lose the revenue from all the other
 parkers/theatre goers.

I don't follow this.  Why does charging zero at some
times require a drop in price when the lot is full?

Fred Foldvary


Re: paid parking a market failure?

2005-10-14 Thread Robert A. Book
  I seem to recall learning that rather than
  demonstrating an inefficiency, the
  presence of inventories represents a form of
  insurance against uncertainty in
  demand.
  David Levenstam

 Right, but suppose that the parking lot is an evenly
 rotating economy, and the parking use is the same day
 after day.  The parking lot is full at particular
 times and not full other times.  There is no
 uncertainty.  It is known how many cars will park at
 particular times. Unlike produced goods, the number of
 parking places is fixed.

 Now, is it efficient to charge for a parking place
 when the lot is not full?

 Fred Foldvary


Depends on your assumptions.  If the asphalt or concrete deteriorates
at a rate dependent on how often a car is parked there, the charge
should be related to rate of deterioration and the cost of replacement
(repaving).  And as long as there's no uncertainty, we can even set
different rates for different spaces, since they are different
distances of people's destinations, and therefore of different value.
High-value parking spaces will be more desirable and therefore
deteriorate faster (in calendar time, if the same amount per use), or
perhaps slower, if deterioration is related to sun exposure.  (In that
latter case, perhaps people should be paid to park there!)

:-)

OK, I'll be serious now:  One characteristic about parking is that
people park for particular time intervals.  Suppose you know that
there are 10 spaces, and 5 cars come at 1pm and another 5 at 2pm.  In
this case, the marginal cost-- even when the lot is full -- is zero,
since no one else wants to park there.  Now, suppose 5 cars come at
1pm and SIX cars at 2pm.  Now, someone doesn't get to park.  So what
do you do?  Start charging when there is only one space left?  If so,
the 10th car when you arrive has to pay, and the 11th doesn't get to
park (unless the 10th declines to pay and the 11th is willing to
pay).

This sounds efficient when the 10th and 11th drivers have different
valuation being able to park there, and the price in somewhere in
between.  But there's another possible outcome -- everyone races to be
the 9th to arrive and get the last free space.  This is costly in
time, since you have to come (say) at 1:55pm when really you don't
want to be there until 2:00pm.  If there's not uncertaintly in
anybody's schedules, whoever has the lowest time value wins -- that
is, the 4 drivers with the lowest value attached to the minutes before
2:00pm get the free spaces, and the next two bid for the 10th
space.

This is a deadweight loss, since the value of that time is dissipated
rather than collected by somebody.  You could get rid of this by
charging anybody who arrives earlier than they would otherwise need to
for the purpose of getting a parking space.  But this requires
assuming away far more uncertainty (not to mention assuming far more
omniscience!) than I think is reasonable.  And in any case, these
lower-value-of-time folks could line up outside the entrance to the
parking lot and come in at the last minute anyway.

I think there are three problems with your question: First,
uncertainty is an inherent part of the problem.  Assuming it away
makes the problem intractable.  Second, I think you are
(inadvertently) assuming that there is some non-price way of
allocating spaces taht is superior to an allocation with prices.  For
example, allocating by arrival order.  Third, the way you've set
things up, it's never clear what the marginal cost is, or who the
marginal consumer is.  Is the marginal consumer the last to get a
space, or the first to be turned away?  Or some person who parked in
the middle when there were plenty of empty spaces, but values the
space at less than the first person turned away?


--Robert Book
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Re: paid parking a market failure?

2005-10-14 Thread Robert A. Book
 --- Xianhang Zhang [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

  This would be true if it were possible to charge
  different people different prices for parking based
  on congestion.

 It is possible, and is done in practice.
 Many parking lots charge more during peak times than
 in other times.  There is predictability, because the
 typical usage does not vary much.

Yeah, but it's weird pricing.  In Chicago, there are early bird
rates where you get in by a certain time and get a cheap fixed price
for as long as you want that day -- if you come in later, you pay by
the hour, which could result in a higher or lower charge than the fix
price, not to mention a higher or lower rate per hour.  And after a
certain time, you get the evening rate, which is fixed as long as you
get in AFTER a certain time.

There is clearly more going on than simple congestion, or the people
who get in at 7am and stay the whole day would pay more than the
people who come in for two hours in the middle.  (It is quite possible
to have something like 7am-7pm for $12 and 11am-3pm for $25.)


  cost of admitting an extra person is NOT zero
  because it requires you to drop prices which means
 you lose the revenue from all the other
  parkers/theatre goers.

 I don't follow this.  Why does charging zero at some
 times require a drop in price when the lot is full?

 Fred Foldvary


I think he was assuming that the ticket price had to be the same for
everybody.  That may not be necessary, but you didn't assume the
opposite.


--Robert Book
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Re: paid parking a market failure?

2005-10-14 Thread Fred Foldvary
--- Robert A. Book [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 5 cars come at 1pm and SIX cars at 2pm.

During that time, charge just high enough so that all
who want to park, can.  The last car in does get a
space, if he is willing to pay.

 between.  But there's another possible outcome --
 everyone races to be
 the 9th to arrive and get the last free space.

Everybody knows the price will go up at a particular
time.  Every car there will pay the price.  The spaces
are no longer free.

 I think you are
 (inadvertently) assuming that there is some
 non-price way of allocating spaces taht is superior
 to an allocation with prices.

No, that is not a correct inference.

 Is the marginal consumer the last to get a
 space, or the first to be turned away?

It is the next one to get a space.  Nobody gets turned
away, because when the lot is full, there is a
positive price.

Fred Foldvary