Re: [asterisk-users] Is there a public blacklist of hackers' IPaddresses?

2009-03-26 Thread randulo
This brings up a side issue. Banks on the Internet have had to provide
a sort of insurance that allows the customer to be protected if
someone hacks in to his or her account. ITSP will need to think
carefully about having a similar policy that protects people from an
attack to the provider, no?

What do those of you who sell these services thing about liability?
Has anyone come up with a statement on this?

/r

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Re: [asterisk-users] Is there a public blacklist of hackers' IPaddresses?

2009-03-26 Thread Gordon Henderson
On Wed, 25 Mar 2009, Zeeshan Zakaria wrote:

 Thanks Gordon for your suggestions and advices. I changed the passwords same
 day, and was monitoring my system very closely. I also use a non standard
 port for SSH, and also plan to move my SIP port to a non standard one too in
 future. At this time things are ok, but I know that this problem is growing
 very fast, and hackers are after VoIP servers because they can do so much
 with them. I had to present a seminar few weeks ago on VoIP Security
 Threats, and while doing my own research, I was shocked to know how hackers
 are misusing VoIP technology. We definitely need to come up with some really
 good and effective solutions against these threats.

There are other more advanced things you can do with iptables which I've 
been looking at - but the esence is to count/time new connections to a 
particular service from each IP address and if more connections per unit 
of time happen, then apply a temporary block for a bigger period of time.

This works for ssh when you know there are only a small number of people 
who might connect in, but for SIP, you need to check the timings 
carefully, although one thing I've had issues with is Snom phones which 
seem to be overly enthusiastic when the end-user has the wrong password in 
them - they keep trying to register 2 or 3 times a second )-:

Gordon



  
 -- 
 Zeeshan A Zakaria

 On Tue, Mar 24, 2009 at 2:01 PM, Roderick A. Anderson 
 raand...@cyber-office.net wrote:



 Wilton Helm wrote:
 If life were only that simple.  A lot of hacking passes through
 unsuspecting intermediary computers, precisely to hide their tracks, not
 to mention IP spoofing.  People have offered for sale access to 10,000
 computers to use for propagating mischief.  That's a lot of IPs to block!

 I got hacked about six months ago.  They came in through SSH and figured
 out roots password, which was a concatenation of two English words.  I
 presume they did a dictionary search.

 I used to get hit very hard with these type of attacks (hundreds to
 thousands per day) on 25-30 servers until I added some iptables rules to
 REJECT the offending IP for 5 minutes after three unsuccessful attempts
 in 60 seconds.  The attacks typically have dropped to less than five per
 day.

 This means those that need access don't need to make _odd_ changes to
 standard programs' setting and the rules do allow a whitelisting of
 specific IPs.


 \\||/
 Rod
 --
 Then they changed the password,
 replaced some key files and launched a denial of service attack against
 somebody (including compiling the program on my machine)!

 I traced the IP address to a Comcast customer in Indiana or something
 and notified Comcast, but haven't heard anything.  Probably their
 customer never even knew it happened--it was probably a hijacked
 situation.

 Prior to that I had been logging hundreds of robotic attacks a day that
 were unsuccessful!

 I re-installed everything and changed my SSH to a non-standard port and
 used a more robust password.  I haven't had a single hack attempt the
 four months since.  For my purposes, I don't really need SSH on a
 standard port.  That made all the difference in the world.

 Two areas that have had large hacker presences in the past:  Russia and
 China.  A lot of E-Mail spam originates in those two areas, also.  I've
 considered blocking the entire host domain for any provider generating
 spam from those regions, as I have no legitimate business need to
 correspond with people in those regions in general.  However, I suspect
 it might block messages from a few users on this list, and I know it
 would block at least one user from another list I am on.

 Wilton



 

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Re: [asterisk-users] Is there a public blacklist of hackers' IPaddresses?

2009-03-26 Thread SIP
randulo wrote:
 This brings up a side issue. Banks on the Internet have had to provide
 a sort of insurance that allows the customer to be protected if
 someone hacks in to his or her account. ITSP will need to think
 carefully about having a similar policy that protects people from an
 attack to the provider, no?

 What do those of you who sell these services thing about liability?
 Has anyone come up with a statement on this?

 /r

   

The customer IS protected because it's excellent marketing for the bank
or credit card provider. If someone steals my card number and racks up a
bunch of charges, I'm often not liable for those charges (dependent, of
course, on bank policy).  However, the seller who was duped into selling
those items because the bank approved the charges on the card? They're
simply out of luck. They're charged any relevant charge-back fees AND
are out any fees for services or product losses they may have incurred.
The bank still gets its money.

In the end, SOMEone has to pay.

As an end-point ITSP, I can assure you, it would be us who's assessed
the requisite charges. If someone uses a fraudulent card, we're required
to pay. If someone uses a three letter password on his account, and it's
hacked into and uses to rack up charges, we have to pay.

In the purely virtual sense, as we're often selling to people we've
never met via the Internet, it becomes difficult to say with any
certainty if the person who logged into the account and used up the
account's money is a hacker or just the account holder who doesn't want
to own up to the charges. It puts us in a difficult position. 
Obviously, in some cases, this becomes more obvious. If the account
holder is in the UK and the calls come in from China or Nigeria or
Turkey or some such, it would be more likely to be suspect and if the
account holder challenged the charges, we might be more liable to work
with him or her.

However, for the most part, we require a certain 'strength' of password
to be used, and we rely on safeguards and monitors on the site itself to
try and avoid brute force hacks. With no evidence for a brute force
attempt or some other security failure on our side, we're somewhat at
the mercy of logic to assume that calls from a customer's premises using
a customer's account actually came from the customer, and I think we
might be hard pressed to simply ignore said charges.

If the security failure is clearly ours, though, I don't think it would
be at all reasonable to expect the customer to accept responsibility.
I'd be especially wary of a company that blamed the customer for its own
security failings.

-- 
Neil Fusillo
CEO
Infinideas, inc.
http://www.ideasip.com



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Re: [asterisk-users] Is there a public blacklist of hackers' IPaddresses?

2009-03-26 Thread randulo
On Thu, Mar 26, 2009 at 1:32 PM, SIP s...@arcdiv.com wrote:
 As an end-point ITSP, I can assure you, it would be us who's assessed
 the requisite charges. If someone uses a fraudulent card, we're required
 to pay. If someone uses a three letter password on his account, and it's
 hacked into and uses to rack up charges, we have to pay.

Neil,

It hadn't occurred to me when writing it, but obviously there are
situations that don't match the banking paradigm. For example, suppose
I run my own asterisk, I have a contract with a company like yours and
you have my banking info with an authorization to top up. If the fraud
is someone on the banking end (hacked my card details for example)
that's covered by the bank. But if they brute force hacked my asterisk
install because the extension, the username and the secret are all
'2005' and then make $100k worth of calls, people like lawyers and
judges won't easily see that it's the asterisk install that's
responsible, not your company or even the bank. I wonder what steps
can be taken legally right now to make responsibilities clearer to the
legal world?

I once had a guy break in to my house and call his girlfriend in
Mexico about 50 times in  two weeks. When I called Pacific Bell, the
operator placed a call to the number, the woman (stupidly!) admitted,
yes I know Luis, he calls me all the time and even though the
operator heard this, PB still refused to exempt those charges and go
after the guy.

I closed my PB account and opened a new one under a variation of my name.

/r

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Re: [asterisk-users] Is there a public blacklist of hackers' IPaddresses?

2009-03-26 Thread SIP
randulo wrote:
 On Thu, Mar 26, 2009 at 1:32 PM, SIP s...@arcdiv.com wrote:
   
 As an end-point ITSP, I can assure you, it would be us who's assessed
 the requisite charges. If someone uses a fraudulent card, we're required
 to pay. If someone uses a three letter password on his account, and it's
 hacked into and uses to rack up charges, we have to pay.
 

 Neil,

 It hadn't occurred to me when writing it, but obviously there are
 situations that don't match the banking paradigm. For example, suppose
 I run my own asterisk, I have a contract with a company like yours and
 you have my banking info with an authorization to top up. If the fraud
 is someone on the banking end (hacked my card details for example)
 that's covered by the bank. But if they brute force hacked my asterisk
 install because the extension, the username and the secret are all
 '2005' and then make $100k worth of calls, people like lawyers and
 judges won't easily see that it's the asterisk install that's
 responsible, not your company or even the bank. I wonder what steps
 can be taken legally right now to make responsibilities clearer to the
 legal world?

 I once had a guy break in to my house and call his girlfriend in
 Mexico about 50 times in  two weeks. When I called Pacific Bell, the
 operator placed a call to the number, the woman (stupidly!) admitted,
 yes I know Luis, he calls me all the time and even though the
 operator heard this, PB still refused to exempt those charges and go
 after the guy.

 I closed my PB account and opened a new one under a variation of my name.

 /r

   

Indeed, the old method of this sort of fraud involved a lineman's
handset or a phone modified with alligator clips to attach to the NID
outside the home of someone not in town, thereby being able to call long
distance on someone else's bill.  I've heard of NO cases in which the
phone company accepted liability for those charges, even if they forgot
to lock the NID itself. For all intents and purposes, it's a
telco-installed back door into your system with poor overall security.

The problem with getting the legal system to understand whose
responsibility this is is a difficult one. Politics and an overall lack
of good, unbiased information has always affected legislation and, as
such, jurisprudence. Politicians neither know nor tend to care about the
finer points of technology and how it may be used. They rely on advisors
to tell them the bullet-point version of any issue before they make a
snap decision on whether it's expedient to back it legislatively. These
advisors are either lobbyists, PACs, or advised by such, and all of them
have an agenda. I can assure you that the agenda of the home or home
business with Asterisk is not heard. Ever.

This leaves a judge to make a decision should it come to court, and it
could go either way, but it would be a messy and expensive battle, and
the decision of the judge would be tempered by what's written into the
law, which right now is hardly kept up to date for modern technologies.

In a situation like ours, we'd be dealing with legal systems in a
variety of countries, which would make things even more complex.

I think step one in this sort of fight is, and has always been, having a
true political voice that can be heard above the din of established
special-interest groups. The VON Coalition was an idea like this, but
it's an incredibly exclusive membership -- designed for companies making
hundreds of millions if not billions a year in revenue. With minimum
annual dues of $10,000 or more, it's quite reasonable as a
semi-democratic organisation for business making $500,000,000 a year.
For smaller companies, it's laughable. And so, the voices heard are the
ones which were heard before -- the ATTs, the British Telecoms, the
Comcasts, and the Verizons of the world. It becomes just another avenue
to get the same political point across.  A second opinion that's
guaranteed to be the same as the first, as it were.

And so, in answer to your question, I don't think there ARE necessarily
steps that can be taken right now to ensure that there's a rational
approach to the resolution of such an issue of fraud. Barring some sort
of major legal precedent, it's going to be anyone's guess how the
verdict comes out in the end.


-- 
Neil Fusillo
CEO
Infinideas, inc.
http://www.ideasip.com



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Re: [asterisk-users] Is there a public blacklist of hackers' IPaddresses?

2009-03-26 Thread randulo
On Thu, Mar 26, 2009 at 2:38 PM, SIP s...@arcdiv.com wrote:
 And so, in answer to your question, I don't think there ARE necessarily
 steps that can be taken right now to ensure that there's a rational
 approach to the resolution of such an issue of fraud. Barring some sort
 of major legal precedent, it's going to be anyone's guess how the
 verdict comes out in the end.

Hence the need for all of us, everywhere to step up measures to
prevent as much as possible, the unlawful use of a system. Maybe some
kind of  (optional modular) monitor or engine could be built for the
asterisk platform to at least send alerts when it deduces suspicious
activity?

r

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Re: [asterisk-users] Is there a public blacklist of hackers' IPaddresses?

2009-03-26 Thread ContactTel Business
Yes, i agree with this !..

People are stupid and or stressed like hell , jumping head first in crap and
then forgetting about what they just said or done.

They Google some crap question  copy/paste the first result
dialplan/sip.conf stanza etc.. and assume it will work..

lolIt's open source aint'it ? it should be easy as building cities with
legos.../lol

So then comes in the problems, instead of understanding the core of the
problem at hand, they jump to quick answers and solutions, which of course
are usually 90% wrong... Google is not an encyclopaedia.. it's an archive of
everyone's thoughts, and notes.

So now you got extension 123 pass 123 context default, where context default
- include demo... include ld, include International...

Every hacker out there has the tools to check for those, and of course when
the server answers with invalid password instead of something else, it gives
them a hint that 123 is in fact an extension.. they won't BRUTE force
anything, there's so many open SIP boxes out there, it's scary...

It's a vicious circle, people don't learn , so apps like trixbox etc make it
easier for them , which in turns opens up the problems..

Then again are we asking MR smith to learn networking security fundamentals
? programming habbits , etc ?

This is a tool that was made for developers by developers, went mainstream ,
making cash , and now it's a commercial swiss army knife with no crowd
control.

I really like the default #REMOVE ME in some apps to make something work..
as i am too really used to start the damn app without even looking at most
of it.

But once you get hit.. you will get hit hard, and then comes the learning...

Seems that's the society these days.

Contacttel Support 








-Original Message-
From: asterisk-users-boun...@lists.digium.com
[mailto:asterisk-users-boun...@lists.digium.com] On Behalf Of randulo
Sent: March-26-09 9:03 AM
To: Asterisk Users Mailing List - Non-Commercial Discussion
Subject: Re: [asterisk-users] Is there a public blacklist of hackers'
IPaddresses?

On Thu, Mar 26, 2009 at 1:32 PM, SIP s...@arcdiv.com wrote:
 As an end-point ITSP, I can assure you, it would be us who's assessed
 the requisite charges. If someone uses a fraudulent card, we're required
 to pay. If someone uses a three letter password on his account, and it's
 hacked into and uses to rack up charges, we have to pay.

Neil,

It hadn't occurred to me when writing it, but obviously there are
situations that don't match the banking paradigm. For example, suppose
I run my own asterisk, I have a contract with a company like yours and
you have my banking info with an authorization to top up. If the fraud
is someone on the banking end (hacked my card details for example)
that's covered by the bank. But if they brute force hacked my asterisk
install because the extension, the username and the secret are all
'2005' and then make $100k worth of calls, people like lawyers and
judges won't easily see that it's the asterisk install that's
responsible, not your company or even the bank. I wonder what steps
can be taken legally right now to make responsibilities clearer to the
legal world?

I once had a guy break in to my house and call his girlfriend in
Mexico about 50 times in  two weeks. When I called Pacific Bell, the
operator placed a call to the number, the woman (stupidly!) admitted,
yes I know Luis, he calls me all the time and even though the
operator heard this, PB still refused to exempt those charges and go
after the guy.

I closed my PB account and opened a new one under a variation of my name.

/r

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Re: [asterisk-users] Is there a public blacklist of hackers' IPaddresses?

2009-03-26 Thread SIP
randulo wrote:
 On Thu, Mar 26, 2009 at 2:38 PM, SIP s...@arcdiv.com wrote:
   
 And so, in answer to your question, I don't think there ARE necessarily
 steps that can be taken right now to ensure that there's a rational
 approach to the resolution of such an issue of fraud. Barring some sort
 of major legal precedent, it's going to be anyone's guess how the
 verdict comes out in the end.
 

 Hence the need for all of us, everywhere to step up measures to
 prevent as much as possible, the unlawful use of a system. Maybe some
 kind of  (optional modular) monitor or engine could be built for the
 asterisk platform to at least send alerts when it deduces suspicious
 activity?

 r

   

There are generally two approaches to this. Neither is necessarily
'correct,' but one is considerably less unwise.

The first approach is the current approach:   build software with little
thought to how it will be secured, opting for all the work of securing
the product once it's been implemented to come down to a requirement for
the deployer to both know and, more importantly, understand good
security practices. This has a value for enthusiasts because many of
them will be running the service just in a home network or test
environment, and it lets them get things up and running without worrying
about all the little issues that might get in the way of a
quickly-deployed system. It's essentially like choosing 'install
everything' on a linux install and opting to have no firewall. It's
wonderfully easy to deploy and there are no weird rules getting in the
way of using the system immediately.

It's also a really REALLY (I can't stress how strongly enough) bad idea
if you're building a product that is deployed by more than just
enthusiasts and will ever be in any remote way tied to someone's
finances (including, but not limited to, telephone access charges,
bandwidth fees, etc).

The second approach is to build the product to be as secure as it can
possibly be right out of the box, and require those deploying it to
essentially remove levels of security in order to get things working in
a particular environment. This also requires a certain knowledge of
security practices, and it relies on those deploying the product to
understand that the errors they may be seeing on deployment are likely
to do with security feature X or Y. This takes time and a lot of work,
because every component of the system has to be hardened and tested to
ensure a seamless security model throughout without worries about
incompatibilities in the basic security model between modules of a
complex system. It also makes the system harder to deploy out of the box
because it requires tailoring for the specific environment not just to
handle a different user base, but also simply to work.

I think there's a lot of push back on this sort of model for something
like Asterisk because people feel that security should be this nebulous
thing that exists 'somewhere else.'   But in reality, security starts
with the software itself and works outward. Just as you can't build a
stable house on an unstable foundation, any weak link in the security
chain is an invitation to disrupt the entire system with an exploit. And
the weak link in MANY systems when it comes to security is the knowledge
of the person deploying it.

I believe a certain level of high grade security should certainly be
built into Asterisk, and that it should have an overall security model,
as well as documentation discussing the security of the system and the
parameters that accompany it. Not only would this alleviate the concerns
of many people deploying, but it would be excellent marketing. Have you
seen the number of cars that advertise their side-impact air bags,
safety rating, and other such features? Nothing will keep a person from
killing himself in a car if he chooses not to wear a seatbelt and drive
unsafely in heavy traffic. But if he's in a car without seatbelts? Or
with a horrible crash test rating? Chances are he may end up getting
hurt anyway. Even if he makes sure he drives carefully.


-- 
Neil Fusillo
CEO
Infinideas, inc.
http://www.ideasip.com




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Re: [asterisk-users] Is there a public blacklist of hackers' IPaddresses?

2009-03-26 Thread randulo
On Thu, Mar 26, 2009 at 4:19 PM, SIP s...@arcdiv.com wrote:
 The first approach is the current approach:   build software with little
 thought to how it will be secured, opting for all the work of securing

What about SIP itself? Does it provide enough crypto to be solid? Or
is that handled only by the layer above it?

/r

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Re: [asterisk-users] Is there a public blacklist of hackers' IPaddresses?

2009-03-26 Thread Dan Austin
Gordon wrote:
 There are other more advanced things you can do with iptables which I've
 been looking at - but the esence is to count/time new connections to a
 particular service from each IP address and if more connections per unit
 of time happen, then apply a temporary block for a bigger period of time.

 This works for ssh when you know there are only a small number of people
 who might connect in, but for SIP, you need to check the timings
 carefully, although one thing I've had issues with is Snom phones which
 seem to be overly enthusiastic when the end-user has the wrong password in
 them - they keep trying to register 2 or 3 times a second )-:

I few years ago I noticed and quickly became annoyed by the volume
of dictionary attacks on my home server.  No one broke in, but the logs
were becoming useless.  Since installing it my logs are once again
readable, and I have a nice long list of naughty addresses in my
iptables DROP table.

I found a package called sshdfilter that can add and remove iptables rules
based on a number of conditions-
1.  Invalid username - block immediately
2.  Valid username w/invalid password - block after x attempts
It supports white-listing so that a slip of the finger does not lock
you out from a trusted host.

The setup is fairly simple and system load is minimal.  The package
works by parsing syslog messages, and it appears that it could be extended
to cover VoIP attacks, as long as the system is logging failed authentication
attempts.

Dan

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Re: [asterisk-users] Is there a public blacklist of hackers' IPaddresses?

2009-03-26 Thread SIP
randulo wrote:
 On Thu, Mar 26, 2009 at 4:19 PM, SIP s...@arcdiv.com wrote:
   
 The first approach is the current approach:   build software with little
 thought to how it will be secured, opting for all the work of securing
 

 What about SIP itself? Does it provide enough crypto to be solid? Or
 is that handled only by the layer above it?

 /r

 ___
   

SIP CAN be reasonably secure, but it suffers from some inherent issues
in the protocol for which things like TLS and the like were developed. 

It's still comparatively new, and it's a draft that I think needs some
work.  But it also suffers from an increasing amount of competition from
upstarts that are trying to muddy the field somewhat (IAX, Jingle, etc.)
and position themselves as the 'new' and 'better' way to address
communication. This detracts from a unified methodology -- even if only
somewhat.

SIP is, for all intents and purposes, as secure as vanilla SMTP email.
In fact, SIP was designed to closely resemble a combination of SMTP and
HTTP to make it easy to implement and process. However, like both SMTP
and HTTP, I think what SIP needs is a solid roll out of a secure layer
over and above the MD5 hashes commonly used to pass passwords -- but
that isn't really necessary to secure the protocol from
password-sniffing ne'er-do-wells who are out to steal your accounts.

SIP was written in such a way that the hashes it sends for passwords
could, with only a trivial rewrite of the server code, be SHA1 instead
of MD5 -- which would increase security to the level that, currently, it
would be far more trouble than it's worth to even bother to attempt to
crack.

For keeping people out of your paid accounts, this would make SIP quite
secure.  The only issue most people have with SIP at the moment is that,
if you're sniffing the network, you can read the SIP messages
themselves, even if you can't crack the passwords, so even with SRTP or
some other form of RTP encryption to protect the voice, your basic
privacy is still at risk.

But to protect money? I think SIP is perfectly fine even without TLS. It
just needs a change in commonly-used password hashing to alleviate the
concerns people have with the breakability of MD5.



-- 
Neil Fusillo
CEO
Infinideas, inc.
http://www.ideasip.com



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Re: [asterisk-users] Is there a public blacklist of hackers' IPaddresses?

2009-03-26 Thread J. Oquendo

http://www.google.com/search?q=asterisk+brute+force+prevention
http://etel.wiki.oreilly.com/wiki/index.php/Asterisk_Brute_Force_Prevention

=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
J. Oquendo
SGFA, SGFE, C|EH, CNDA, CHFI, OSCP

Enough research will tend to support your
conclusions. - Arthur Bloch

A conclusion is the place where you got
tired of thinking - Arthur Bloch

227C 5D35 7DCB 0893 95AA  4771 1DCE 1FD1 5CCD 6B5E
http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=getsearch=0x5CCD6B5E


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Re: [asterisk-users] Is there a public blacklist of hackers' IPaddresses?

2009-03-26 Thread Matt Riddell
On 27/03/2009 3:32 a.m., randulo wrote:
 On Thu, Mar 26, 2009 at 2:38 PM, SIPs...@arcdiv.com  wrote:
 And so, in answer to your question, I don't think there ARE necessarily
 steps that can be taken right now to ensure that there's a rational
 approach to the resolution of such an issue of fraud. Barring some sort
 of major legal precedent, it's going to be anyone's guess how the
 verdict comes out in the end.

 Hence the need for all of us, everywhere to step up measures to
 prevent as much as possible, the unlawful use of a system. Maybe some
 kind of  (optional modular) monitor or engine could be built for the
 asterisk platform to at least send alerts when it deduces suspicious
 activity?

There are a few options we use here.

1. Snort with SIP rules - detects brute forces, floods etc - just a 
notification

2. fail2ban - blocks hosts who attack at the iptables level

3. exception reporting - our billing sends SMS messages if a customer 
uses a lot more than their average spend - i.e. if they normally spend 
$10 a month and they have just spent $20 in ten minutes then an SMS is 
sent - while this isn't conclusive, it does warn you that something 
might be going on.

-- 
Kind Regards,

Matt Riddell
Director
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Re: [asterisk-users] Is there a public blacklist of hackers' IPaddresses?

2009-03-26 Thread Dave Platt
 SIP was written in such a way that the hashes it sends for passwords
 could, with only a trivial rewrite of the server code, be SHA1 instead
 of MD5 -- which would increase security to the level that, currently, it
 would be far more trouble than it's worth to even bother to attempt to
 crack.

I strongly doubt that the known weaknesses in the MD5 hash are
the weak point in SIP account security.

Weak passwords are almost certainly much more of a problem.  Performing
a dictionary attack is going to be a lot faster than attempting
a brute-force mathematical attack against MD5... and switching from
MD5 to SHA-1 provides no significant defense against dictionary
attacks.

The only good way to keep passwords secure against dictionary attacks,
is to make sure that the passwords aren't guessable by that means...
no common words, no names, no simple permutations or birthdates or
anything like that.  Use a decent random-number generator and
number-to-character conversion algorithm to generate SIP passwords
that are sufficiently long and very dtr8fbwf_==...@\.-+!n$ and you'll
be well defended.



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Re: [asterisk-users] Is there a public blacklist of hackers' IPaddresses?

2009-03-26 Thread SIP
Dave Platt wrote:
 SIP was written in such a way that the hashes it sends for passwords
 could, with only a trivial rewrite of the server code, be SHA1 instead
 of MD5 -- which would increase security to the level that, currently, it
 would be far more trouble than it's worth to even bother to attempt to
 crack.
 

 I strongly doubt that the known weaknesses in the MD5 hash are
 the weak point in SIP account security.

 Weak passwords are almost certainly much more of a problem.  Performing
 a dictionary attack is going to be a lot faster than attempting
 a brute-force mathematical attack against MD5... and switching from
 MD5 to SHA-1 provides no significant defense against dictionary
 attacks.

 The only good way to keep passwords secure against dictionary attacks,
 is to make sure that the passwords aren't guessable by that means...
 no common words, no names, no simple permutations or birthdates or
 anything like that.  Use a decent random-number generator and
 number-to-character conversion algorithm to generate SIP passwords
 that are sufficiently long and very dtr8fbwf_==...@\.-+!n$ and you'll
 be well defended.


   

I'm referring to the weak link in the SIP protocol. Not in Asterisk's 
SIP accounts.  The question was whether or not SIP itself was secure.

-- 
Neil Fusillo
CEO
Infinideas, inc.
http://www.ideasip.com



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Re: [asterisk-users] Is there a public blacklist of hackers' IPaddresses?

2009-03-25 Thread Zeeshan Zakaria
Thanks Gordon for your suggestions and advices. I changed the passwords same
day, and was monitoring my system very closely. I also use a non standard
port for SSH, and also plan to move my SIP port to a non standard one too in
future. At this time things are ok, but I know that this problem is growing
very fast, and hackers are after VoIP servers because they can do so much
with them. I had to present a seminar few weeks ago on VoIP Security
Threats, and while doing my own research, I was shocked to know how hackers
are misusing VoIP technology. We definitely need to come up with some really
good and effective solutions against these threats.

-- 
Zeeshan A Zakaria

On Tue, Mar 24, 2009 at 2:01 PM, Roderick A. Anderson 
raand...@cyber-office.net wrote:



 Wilton Helm wrote:
  If life were only that simple.  A lot of hacking passes through
  unsuspecting intermediary computers, precisely to hide their tracks, not
  to mention IP spoofing.  People have offered for sale access to 10,000
  computers to use for propagating mischief.  That's a lot of IPs to block!
 
  I got hacked about six months ago.  They came in through SSH and figured
  out roots password, which was a concatenation of two English words.  I
  presume they did a dictionary search.

 I used to get hit very hard with these type of attacks (hundreds to
 thousands per day) on 25-30 servers until I added some iptables rules to
 REJECT the offending IP for 5 minutes after three unsuccessful attempts
 in 60 seconds.  The attacks typically have dropped to less than five per
 day.

 This means those that need access don't need to make _odd_ changes to
 standard programs' setting and the rules do allow a whitelisting of
 specific IPs.


 \\||/
 Rod
 --
  Then they changed the password,
  replaced some key files and launched a denial of service attack against
  somebody (including compiling the program on my machine)!
 
  I traced the IP address to a Comcast customer in Indiana or something
  and notified Comcast, but haven't heard anything.  Probably their
  customer never even knew it happened--it was probably a hijacked
 situation.
 
  Prior to that I had been logging hundreds of robotic attacks a day that
  were unsuccessful!
 
  I re-installed everything and changed my SSH to a non-standard port and
  used a more robust password.  I haven't had a single hack attempt the
  four months since.  For my purposes, I don't really need SSH on a
  standard port.  That made all the difference in the world.
 
  Two areas that have had large hacker presences in the past:  Russia and
  China.  A lot of E-Mail spam originates in those two areas, also.  I've
  considered blocking the entire host domain for any provider generating
  spam from those regions, as I have no legitimate business need to
  correspond with people in those regions in general.  However, I suspect
  it might block messages from a few users on this list, and I know it
  would block at least one user from another list I am on.
 
  Wilton
 
 
 
  
 
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Re: [asterisk-users] Is there a public blacklist of hackers' IPaddresses?

2009-03-24 Thread Wilton Helm
If life were only that simple.  A lot of hacking passes through unsuspecting 
intermediary computers, precisely to hide their tracks, not to mention IP 
spoofing.  People have offered for sale access to 10,000 computers to use for 
propagating mischief.  That's a lot of IPs to block!

I got hacked about six months ago.  They came in through SSH and figured out 
roots password, which was a concatenation of two English words.  I presume they 
did a dictionary search.  Then they changed the password, replaced some key 
files and launched a denial of service attack against somebody (including 
compiling the program on my machine)!

I traced the IP address to a Comcast customer in Indiana or something and 
notified Comcast, but haven't heard anything.  Probably their customer never 
even knew it happened--it was probably a hijacked situation.

Prior to that I had been logging hundreds of robotic attacks a day that were 
unsuccessful!

I re-installed everything and changed my SSH to a non-standard port and used a 
more robust password.  I haven't had a single hack attempt the four months 
since.  For my purposes, I don't really need SSH on a standard port.  That made 
all the difference in the world.

Two areas that have had large hacker presences in the past:  Russia and China.  
A lot of E-Mail spam originates in those two areas, also.  I've considered 
blocking the entire host domain for any provider generating spam from those 
regions, as I have no legitimate business need to correspond with people in 
those regions in general.  However, I suspect it might block messages from a 
few users on this list, and I know it would block at least one user from 
another list I am on.

Wilton
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Re: [asterisk-users] Is there a public blacklist of hackers' IPaddresses?

2009-03-24 Thread Roderick A. Anderson


Wilton Helm wrote:
 If life were only that simple.  A lot of hacking passes through 
 unsuspecting intermediary computers, precisely to hide their tracks, not 
 to mention IP spoofing.  People have offered for sale access to 10,000 
 computers to use for propagating mischief.  That's a lot of IPs to block!
  
 I got hacked about six months ago.  They came in through SSH and figured 
 out roots password, which was a concatenation of two English words.  I 
 presume they did a dictionary search. 

I used to get hit very hard with these type of attacks (hundreds to 
thousands per day) on 25-30 servers until I added some iptables rules to 
REJECT the offending IP for 5 minutes after three unsuccessful attempts 
in 60 seconds.  The attacks typically have dropped to less than five per 
day.

This means those that need access don't need to make _odd_ changes to 
standard programs' setting and the rules do allow a whitelisting of 
specific IPs.


\\||/
Rod
-- 
 Then they changed the password, 
 replaced some key files and launched a denial of service attack against 
 somebody (including compiling the program on my machine)!
  
 I traced the IP address to a Comcast customer in Indiana or something 
 and notified Comcast, but haven't heard anything.  Probably their 
 customer never even knew it happened--it was probably a hijacked situation.
  
 Prior to that I had been logging hundreds of robotic attacks a day that 
 were unsuccessful!
  
 I re-installed everything and changed my SSH to a non-standard port and 
 used a more robust password.  I haven't had a single hack attempt the 
 four months since.  For my purposes, I don't really need SSH on a 
 standard port.  That made all the difference in the world.
  
 Two areas that have had large hacker presences in the past:  Russia and 
 China.  A lot of E-Mail spam originates in those two areas, also.  I've 
 considered blocking the entire host domain for any provider generating 
 spam from those regions, as I have no legitimate business need to 
 correspond with people in those regions in general.  However, I suspect 
 it might block messages from a few users on this list, and I know it 
 would block at least one user from another list I am on.
  
 Wilton
  
 
 
 
 
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