Re: How filter with RPZ only A and AAAA type records ?

2022-08-10 Thread Fred Morris

On Tue, 9 Aug 2022, sub zero wrote:

Short question, is it possible to filter with BIND RPZ only A and  type
records? If yes, how?


A similar question was asked recently on the DNS Firewalls list at Redbarn
(http://lists.redbarn.org/pipermail/dnsfirewalls/)

Short answer is no, or at least not that I know of. But maybe sort of. You 
can certainly return some RPZ generated answer (A record), but things like 
e.g. NXDOMAIN and passthru are done with CNAME and apply to the FQDN.


I note that returning NXDOMAIN for an rtype and an answer for a different 
rtype for the FQDN is not conformant with how the DNS is supposed to 
behave (the conformant answer is success+ANSWER:0 not NXDOMAIN).


Short questions don't always result in short answers. ;-) You might try 
the DNS Firewalls list, you might also see if you can come up with a 
scenario and functional tests; that might help people give a better 
answer.


--

Fred Morris, internet plumber

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Re: dnssec-policy: Old DNSKEYs still in zone despite status showing hidden

2022-08-10 Thread Matthijs Mekking

Hi Magnus,

On 10-08-2022 11:13, Magnus Holmgren wrote:

Hi,

I migrated a couple of zones from BIND 9.16.6 on SuSE to 9.16.27 on Debian and
at the same time switched from auto-dnssec maintain to a dnssec-policy with
RSASHA256 instead of RSASHA1 (actually, I first applied a policy matching the
old keys and with unlimited lifetime to avoid confusing BIND).

Though it seems to take longer than expected to finish a key rollover, even
taking into account propagation delay, TTLs, and retire-safety, the old keys
were eventually removed from the first zone. One zone I'm still waiting for,
and that rollover started Friday. One question: Is it necessary to use rndc
dnssec -checkds or is that only meant as a backup, and named is supposed to
query the parent for DS records automatically?


That depends if you have set up parental-agents. If not, then you need 
to run 'rndc dnssec -checkds'.




The last zone, milltime.se, has become stuck. sudo rndc dnssec -status reports
that the old keys are removed from the zone and the new keys are omnipresent,
but the log says "zone milltime.se/IN (signed): Key milltime.se/RSASHA1/22971
missing or inactive and has no replacement: retaining signatures."

Never mind. I was too quick switching to NSEC3, which is incompatible with the
old key. Switching back to NSEC allowed the rollover to complete. Still,
shouldn't BIND have been able to figure this out on its own? It kept using
NSEC because of the incompatible key, and it kept the incompatible key needed
to verify the NSEC records. Catch-22? (Yes, I've read about the questionable
merits of NSEC3.)


I think we could improve named-checkconf to error out on a policy that 
uses NSEC3 with an incompatible algorithm yes. Thanks for the suggestion.



The subject of the mail seems to indicate a different problem than the 
body, or am I missing something?



Best regards,

Matthijs
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dnssec-policy: Old DNSKEYs still in zone despite status showing hidden

2022-08-10 Thread Magnus Holmgren
Hi,

I migrated a couple of zones from BIND 9.16.6 on SuSE to 9.16.27 on Debian and 
at the same time switched from auto-dnssec maintain to a dnssec-policy with 
RSASHA256 instead of RSASHA1 (actually, I first applied a policy matching the 
old keys and with unlimited lifetime to avoid confusing BIND).

Though it seems to take longer than expected to finish a key rollover, even 
taking into account propagation delay, TTLs, and retire-safety, the old keys 
were eventually removed from the first zone. One zone I'm still waiting for, 
and that rollover started Friday. One question: Is it necessary to use rndc 
dnssec -checkds or is that only meant as a backup, and named is supposed to 
query the parent for DS records automatically?

The last zone, milltime.se, has become stuck. sudo rndc dnssec -status reports 
that the old keys are removed from the zone and the new keys are omnipresent, 
but the log says "zone milltime.se/IN (signed): Key milltime.se/RSASHA1/22971 
missing or inactive and has no replacement: retaining signatures."

Never mind. I was too quick switching to NSEC3, which is incompatible with the 
old key. Switching back to NSEC allowed the rollover to complete. Still, 
shouldn't BIND have been able to figure this out on its own? It kept using 
NSEC because of the incompatible key, and it kept the incompatible key needed 
to verify the NSEC records. Catch-22? (Yes, I've read about the questionable 
merits of NSEC3.)

-- 
Magnus Holmgren, utvecklare
MILLNET AB, Datalinjen 1, 583 30 Linköping

Direkt:  013-470 40 09 Växel: 013-470 40 00
Support: 013-470 40 19



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