Re: [bitcoin-dev] Yet another Taproot activation logic

2021-03-08 Thread Carlo Spiller via bitcoin-dev

Hi Ariel

Thanks for your reply with the link to the SMA proposal, which I had 
missed previoulsy. It is indeed very similar.


I see that Speedy trial is currently gaining broad support, which is 
good. I think my proposal with the threshold set to 51% instead of 80% 
to change LOT=false to LOT=true is also pretty similar to ST, with the 
key difference being that the next step after a fail of MASF is already 
baked in.


Excited to see how it all plays out.

Best

Carlo

Carlo Spiller
+41 79 368 85 06
www.carlospiller.com

Am 07.03.21 um 22:13 schrieb Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces:

Hi Carlo

This your proposal is similar to the Simple Majority Activation 
proposal (SMA). The difference is that your proposal has the final 
activation threshold set to 80% and SMA has it set to 51% 
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-March/018587.html 



The problem with what you're proposing is what do users do if 
signaling is somewhere between 51% to 79%? Users that want to promote 
a UASF know that their miner majority can activate Taproot and 
activate without the 21% to 49% of miners needing to signal (or 
purposefully stalling). A UASF knows they have majority mining power 
so there is little risk to them and a big reward (activating Taproot) 
so they are incentivized to do a UASF.


A UASF with a miner majority can scare everyone else about them being 
at risk of big reorgs to gain traction and followers.


With the same proposal but the final threshold set to 51% instead of 
80% there can't be risk of a UASF because if 51% is not reached they 
know they don't have enough miner support to keep the chain together.


If support is less than 50% a UASF movement needs to hard fork anyway 
to change the PoW (for protection) and change addresses to prevent 
double spends.


I really like the SMA proposal with 51% because it removes the 
incentive to do a UASF.


Cheers
Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces
On Mar 7, 2021, at 6:37 AM, Carlo Spiller via bitcoin-dev 
> wrote:


Hi everybody

I'm new to this list, but not new to Bitcoin, having skin in the game
since 2014. I was there for the scaling war and the drama around SegWit,
as a simple user. This time, I run my own full node and follow
development. I hope to bring something new to the table.

Having witnessed the miner's unwillingness to activate SegWit truly
makes me concerened for a simple LOT=false. After reading the discussion
now for some time and thinking about it myself, I have come to the
following proposal.

Initially deploy with LOT=false and an activation threshold of 95% of
miner signaling.

*IFF* after 6 months Taproot is not activated by MASF, BUT at least 80%
of hashpower signaled for the upgrade, LOT gets a lock-in date another 6
months later and the threshold for MASF is lowered to 90%.

If after the initial 6 months of signaling with LOT=false, 80% is not
reached, the proposal expires.

This way, a small percent of hashpower does not get to stall activation,
rather, 80% of hashpower can activate LOT=true, and later, 90% can
activate Taproot. If a flaw is found in Taproot in the first six months
(unlikely anyway), miners simply don't signal and the proposal expires.
If miners don't signal at all, only six months are lost, before a new
activation logic can be deployed.

Don't mind this if something similar was already proposed somewhere else.

Best

Carlo



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Re: [bitcoin-dev] Yet another Taproot activation logic

2021-03-07 Thread Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces via bitcoin-dev
Hi Carlo

This your proposal is similar to the Simple Majority Activation proposal (SMA). 
The difference is that your proposal has the final activation threshold set to 
80% and SMA has it set to 51% 
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-March/018587.html

The problem with what you're proposing is what do users do if signaling is 
somewhere between 51% to 79%? Users that want to promote a UASF know that their 
miner majority can activate Taproot and activate without the 21% to 49% of 
miners needing to signal (or purposefully stalling). A UASF knows they have 
majority mining power so there is little risk to them and a big reward 
(activating Taproot) so they are incentivized to do a UASF.

A UASF with a miner majority can scare everyone else about them being at risk 
of big reorgs to gain traction and followers.

With the same proposal but the final threshold set to 51% instead of 80% there 
can't be risk of a UASF because if 51% is not reached they know they don't have 
enough miner support to keep the chain together.

If support is less than 50% a UASF movement needs to hard fork anyway to change 
the PoW (for protection) and change addresses to prevent double spends.

I really like the SMA proposal with 51% because it removes the incentive to do 
a UASF.

Cheers
Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces


On Mar 7, 2021, 6:37 AM, at 6:37 AM, Carlo Spiller via bitcoin-dev 
 wrote:
>Hi everybody
>
>I'm new to this list, but not new to Bitcoin, having skin in the game
>since 2014. I was there for the scaling war and the drama around
>SegWit,
>as a simple user. This time, I run my own full node and follow
>development. I hope to bring something new to the table.
>
>Having witnessed the miner's unwillingness to activate SegWit truly
>makes me concerened for a simple LOT=false. After reading the
>discussion
>now for some time and thinking about it myself, I have come to the
>following proposal.
>
>Initially deploy with LOT=false and an activation threshold of 95% of
>miner signaling.
>
>*IFF* after 6 months Taproot is not activated by MASF, BUT at least 80%
>
>of hashpower signaled for the upgrade, LOT gets a lock-in date another
>6
>months later and the threshold for MASF is lowered to 90%.
>
>If after the initial 6 months of signaling with LOT=false, 80% is not
>reached, the proposal expires.
>
>This way, a small percent of hashpower does not get to stall
>activation,
>rather, 80% of hashpower can activate LOT=true, and later, 90% can
>activate Taproot. If a flaw is found in Taproot in the first six months
>
>(unlikely anyway), miners simply don't signal and the proposal expires.
>
>If miners don't signal at all, only six months are lost, before a new
>activation logic can be deployed.
>
>Don't mind this if something similar was already proposed somewhere
>else.
>
>Best
>
>Carlo
>
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[bitcoin-dev] Yet another Taproot activation logic

2021-03-07 Thread Carlo Spiller via bitcoin-dev

Hi everybody

I'm new to this list, but not new to Bitcoin, having skin in the game 
since 2014. I was there for the scaling war and the drama around SegWit, 
as a simple user. This time, I run my own full node and follow 
development. I hope to bring something new to the table.


Having witnessed the miner's unwillingness to activate SegWit truly 
makes me concerened for a simple LOT=false. After reading the discussion 
now for some time and thinking about it myself, I have come to the 
following proposal.


Initially deploy with LOT=false and an activation threshold of 95% of 
miner signaling.


*IFF* after 6 months Taproot is not activated by MASF, BUT at least 80% 
of hashpower signaled for the upgrade, LOT gets a lock-in date another 6 
months later and the threshold for MASF is lowered to 90%.


If after the initial 6 months of signaling with LOT=false, 80% is not 
reached, the proposal expires.


This way, a small percent of hashpower does not get to stall activation, 
rather, 80% of hashpower can activate LOT=true, and later, 90% can 
activate Taproot. If a flaw is found in Taproot in the first six months 
(unlikely anyway), miners simply don't signal and the proposal expires. 
If miners don't signal at all, only six months are lost, before a new 
activation logic can be deployed.


Don't mind this if something similar was already proposed somewhere else.

Best

Carlo

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