Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For Ordering Transactions In Blocks

[Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev]

You can feel free to write this version and try to get miners to use it.
 That's the nice thing about Bitcoin.

On Thu, Dec 7, 2017 at 3:49 PM, Damian Williamson via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Good morning ZmnSCPxj,
>
>
> Actually, there is no incentive to cheat target block size by providing a
> next block size that is higher or lower than the proposal would give. Under
> the proposal the transaction pool can grow quite large. A low next block
> size just defers collecting transaction fees, while a high next block size
> shrinks the transaction pool and thereby lowers fees. It seems like a
> standoff. This is especially true if the curve for time waiting in the
> transaction pool is extended beyond n days, since it is a curve, after
> waiting longer than 60 days (if n = 60 days) a transaction would have a
> priority greater than one-hundred and would therfore be the first
> transaction included with no possibility of failing the likelihood, so,
> even low fee paying transactions would be included first if the pool size
> is growing through incorrectly providing the next block size.
>
>
> As it is now, I presume, a miner could include exactly one transaction in
> a block and pad?
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Damian Williamson
> --
> *From:* Damian Williamson <willt...@live.com.au>
> *Sent:* Thursday, 7 December 2017 7:13:14 PM
> *To:* ZmnSCPxj
>
> *Cc:* bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> *Subject:* Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction
> Weight For Ordering Transactions In Blocks
>
>
> Good morning ZmnSCPxj, it must be where you are,
>
>
> I suppose that we are each missing each other's point some.
>
>
> I understand that nodes would not be expected to agree on the transaction
> pool and do not propose validating that the correct transactions are
> included in a block. I speak of probability and likelihood of a transaction
> being included in a block, implying a random element. I do not propose
> rejecting blocks on the basis that the next block size is stated too large
> or too small for the transaction pool, only that the block received
> conforms to the next block size given on the previous block. Yes, it could
> be cheated. Also, various nodes may have at times wildly different amounts
> of transactions waiting in the transaction pool compared to each other and
> there could be a great disparity between them. It would not be possible in
> any case I can think of to validate the next block size is correct for the
> current transaction pool. Even as it is now, nodes may include transactions
> in a block that no other nodes have even heard of, nodes have no way to
> validate that either. If the block is built on sufficiently, it is the
> blockchain.
>
>
> I will post back the revised proposal to the list. I have fleshed parts of
> it out more, given more explanation and, tried this time not to recycle
> terminology.
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Damian Williamson
> ------------------
> *From:* ZmnSCPxj <zmnsc...@protonmail.com>
> *Sent:* Thursday, 7 December 2017 5:46:08 PM
> *To:* Damian Williamson
> *Cc:* bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> *Subject:* Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction
> Weight For Ordering Transactions In Blocks
>
> Good morning Damian,
>
> >As I understand it, each node would be aware independently of x
> transactions waiting for confirmation, the transaction pool.
>
> Each long-running node would have a view that is roughly the same as the
> view of every other long-running node.
>
> However, suppose a node, Sleeping Beauty, was temporarily stopped for a
> day (for various reasons) then is started again.  That node cannot verify
> what the "consensus" transaction pool was during the time it was stopped --
> it has no view of that.  It can only trust that the longest chain is valid
> -- but that means it is SPV for this particular rule.
>
> >If next blocksize is broadcast with the completed block it would be a
> simple matter to back confirm that.
>
> It would not. Suppose Sleeping Beauty slept at block height 500,000.  On
> awakening, some node provides some purported block at height 500,001.  This
> block indicates some "next blocksize" for the block at height 500,002.  How
> does Sleeping Beauty know that the transaction pool at block 500,001 was of
> the correct size to provide the given "next blocksize"?  The only way,
> would be to look if there is some other chain with greater height that
> includes or does not include that block: that is, SPV confirmation.
>
> How does Sleeping Beauty know it has caught up, and that its

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For Ordering Transactions In Blocks

[Damian Williamson via bitcoin-dev]

Good morning ZmnSCPxj,


Actually, there is no incentive to cheat target block size by providing a next 
block size that is higher or lower than the proposal would give. Under the 
proposal the transaction pool can grow quite large. A low next block size just 
defers collecting transaction fees, while a high next block size shrinks the 
transaction pool and thereby lowers fees. It seems like a standoff. This is 
especially true if the curve for time waiting in the transaction pool is 
extended beyond n days, since it is a curve, after waiting longer than 60 days 
(if n = 60 days) a transaction would have a priority greater than one-hundred 
and would therfore be the first transaction included with no possibility of 
failing the likelihood, so, even low fee paying transactions would be included 
first if the pool size is growing through incorrectly providing the next block 
size.


As it is now, I presume, a miner could include exactly one transaction in a 
block and pad?


Regards,

Damian Williamson


From: Damian Williamson <willt...@live.com.au>
Sent: Thursday, 7 December 2017 7:13:14 PM
To: ZmnSCPxj
Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For 
Ordering Transactions In Blocks


Good morning ZmnSCPxj, it must be where you are,


I suppose that we are each missing each other's point some.


I understand that nodes would not be expected to agree on the transaction pool 
and do not propose validating that the correct transactions are included in a 
block. I speak of probability and likelihood of a transaction being included in 
a block, implying a random element. I do not propose rejecting blocks on the 
basis that the next block size is stated too large or too small for the 
transaction pool, only that the block received conforms to the next block size 
given on the previous block. Yes, it could be cheated. Also, various nodes may 
have at times wildly different amounts of transactions waiting in the 
transaction pool compared to each other and there could be a great disparity 
between them. It would not be possible in any case I can think of to validate 
the next block size is correct for the current transaction pool. Even as it is 
now, nodes may include transactions in a block that no other nodes have even 
heard of, nodes have no way to validate that either. If the block is built on 
sufficiently, it is the blockchain.


I will post back the revised proposal to the list. I have fleshed parts of it 
out more, given more explanation and, tried this time not to recycle 
terminology.


Regards,

Damian Williamson


From: ZmnSCPxj <zmnsc...@protonmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, 7 December 2017 5:46:08 PM
To: Damian Williamson
Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For 
Ordering Transactions In Blocks

Good morning Damian,

>As I understand it, each node would be aware independently of x transactions 
>waiting for confirmation, the transaction pool.

Each long-running node would have a view that is roughly the same as the view 
of every other long-running node.

However, suppose a node, Sleeping Beauty, was temporarily stopped for a day 
(for various reasons) then is started again.  That node cannot verify what the 
"consensus" transaction pool was during the time it was stopped -- it has no 
view of that.  It can only trust that the longest chain is valid -- but that 
means it is SPV for this particular rule.

>If next blocksize is broadcast with the completed block it would be a simple 
>matter to back confirm that.

It would not. Suppose Sleeping Beauty slept at block height 500,000.  On 
awakening, some node provides some purported block at height 500,001.  This 
block indicates some "next blocksize" for the block at height 500,002.  How 
does Sleeping Beauty know that the transaction pool at block 500,001 was of the 
correct size to provide the given "next blocksize"?  The only way, would be to 
look if there is some other chain with greater height that includes or does not 
include that block: that is, SPV confirmation.

How does Sleeping Beauty know it has caught up, and that its transaction pool 
is similar to that of its neighbors (who might be lying to it, for that 
matter), and that it should therefore stop using SPV confirmation and switch to 
strict fullnode rejection of blocks that indicate a "next blocksize" that is 
too large or too small according to your equation?  OR will it simply follow 
the longest chain always, in which case, it trusts miners to be honest about 
how loaded (or unloaded) the transaction pool is?

---

As a general rule, consensus rules should restrict themselves to:

1.  The characteristics of the block.
2.  The characteristics of the transactions within the block.

The transaction pool is spe

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For Ordering Transactions In Blocks

[Damian Williamson via bitcoin-dev]

Good morning ZmnSCPxj, it must be where you are,


I suppose that we are each missing each other's point some.


I understand that nodes would not be expected to agree on the transaction pool 
and do not propose validating that the correct transactions are included in a 
block. I speak of probability and likelihood of a transaction being included in 
a block, implying a random element. I do not propose rejecting blocks on the 
basis that the next block size is stated too large or too small for the 
transaction pool, only that the block received conforms to the next block size 
given on the previous block. Yes, it could be cheated. Also, various nodes may 
have at times wildly different amounts of transactions waiting in the 
transaction pool compared to each other and there could be a great disparity 
between them. It would not be possible in any case I can think of to validate 
the next block size is correct for the current transaction pool. Even as it is 
now, nodes may include transactions in a block that no other nodes have even 
heard of, nodes have no way to validate that either. If the block is built on 
sufficiently, it is the blockchain.


I will post back the revised proposal to the list. I have fleshed parts of it 
out more, given more explanation and, tried this time not to recycle 
terminology.


Regards,

Damian Williamson


From: ZmnSCPxj <zmnsc...@protonmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, 7 December 2017 5:46:08 PM
To: Damian Williamson
Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For 
Ordering Transactions In Blocks

Good morning Damian,

>As I understand it, each node would be aware independently of x transactions 
>waiting for confirmation, the transaction pool.

Each long-running node would have a view that is roughly the same as the view 
of every other long-running node.

However, suppose a node, Sleeping Beauty, was temporarily stopped for a day 
(for various reasons) then is started again.  That node cannot verify what the 
"consensus" transaction pool was during the time it was stopped -- it has no 
view of that.  It can only trust that the longest chain is valid -- but that 
means it is SPV for this particular rule.

>If next blocksize is broadcast with the completed block it would be a simple 
>matter to back confirm that.

It would not. Suppose Sleeping Beauty slept at block height 500,000.  On 
awakening, some node provides some purported block at height 500,001.  This 
block indicates some "next blocksize" for the block at height 500,002.  How 
does Sleeping Beauty know that the transaction pool at block 500,001 was of the 
correct size to provide the given "next blocksize"?  The only way, would be to 
look if there is some other chain with greater height that includes or does not 
include that block: that is, SPV confirmation.

How does Sleeping Beauty know it has caught up, and that its transaction pool 
is similar to that of its neighbors (who might be lying to it, for that 
matter), and that it should therefore stop using SPV confirmation and switch to 
strict fullnode rejection of blocks that indicate a "next blocksize" that is 
too large or too small according to your equation?  OR will it simply follow 
the longest chain always, in which case, it trusts miners to be honest about 
how loaded (or unloaded) the transaction pool is?

---

As a general rule, consensus rules should restrict themselves to:

1.  The characteristics of the block.
2.  The characteristics of the transactions within the block.

The transaction pool is specifically those transaction that are NOT in any 
block, and thus, are not safe to depend on for any consensus rules.

Regards,
ZmnSCPxj

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Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For Ordering Transactions In Blocks

[Damian Williamson via bitcoin-dev]

Hello Jim,


The variable block sizes would not, as I understand it, be easily implemented 
by a solo miner.


You are right, there is presently nothing stopping a miner from ordering the 
transactions included by a priority that is not entirely based on the fee.


It may be possible to verify blocks conform to the proposal by showing that the 
probability for all transactions included in the block statistically conform to 
a probability distribution curve, if that is necessary and,  *if* the 
individual transaction priority can be recreated. I am not that deep into the 
mathematics, however, it may also be possible to use a similar method to do 
this just based on the fee, that statistically, the blocks conform to a fee 
distribution. Needs a clever mathematician.


It is certainly possible to verify that blocks conform to the expected size.


Honour is why people follow policy without enforcement. I may be in the wrong 
group. (sic)


Regards,

Damian Williamson


From: bitcoin-dev-boun...@lists.linuxfoundation.org 
<bitcoin-dev-boun...@lists.linuxfoundation.org> on behalf of Jim Renkel via 
bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Sent: Wednesday, 6 December 2017 4:18:11 PM
To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For 
Ordering Transactions In Blocks


As i understand it, the transactions to be included in a block are entirely up 
to the miner of that block.


What prevents a miner from implementing the proposal on their own?


If this is adopted as some kind of "policy", what forces a miner to follow it?

Jim Renkel


On 12/2/2017 10:07 PM, Damian Williamson via bitcoin-dev wrote:

# BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For Ordering Transactions In 
Blocks

I admit, with my limited experience in the operation of the protocol, the 
section entitled 'Solution operation' may not be entirely correct but you will 
get the idea. If I have it wrong, please correct it back to the list.


## The problem:


Everybody wants value. Miners want to maximize revenue from fees. Consumers 
want transaction reliability and, (we presume) low fees.

Current transaction bandwidth limit is a limiting factor for both.


## Solution summary:


Provide each transaction with a transaction weight, being a function of the fee 
paid (on a curve), and the time waiting in the transaction pool (also on a 
curve) out to n days (n=30 ?); the transaction weight serving as the likelihood 
of a transaction being included in the current block, and then use a target 
block size.

Protocol enforcement to prevent high or low blocksize cheating to be handled by 
having the protocol determine the target size for the current block using; 
current transaction pool size x ( 1 / (144 x n days ) ) = transactions to be 
included in the current block.

The curves used for the weight of transactions would have to be appropriate.


## Pros:

* Maximizes transaction reliability.
* Maximizes possibility for consumer and business uptake.
* Maximizes total fees paid per block without reducing reliability; because of 
reliability, confidence and uptake are greater; therefore, more transactions 
and more transactions total at priority fees.
* Market determines fee paid for transaction priority.

* Fee recommendations work all the way out to 30 days or greater.

* Provides additional block entropy and greater security since there is less 
probability of predicting the next block.


## Cons:

* ?
* Must be first be programmed.
* Anything else?


## Solution operation:


As I have said, my simplistic view of the operation. If I have this wrong, 
please correct it back to the list.

1. The protocol determines the target block size.

2. Assign each transaction in the pool a transaction weight based on fee and 
time waiting in the transaction pool.

3. Begin selecting transactions to include in the current block using 
transaction weight as the likelihood of inclusion until target block size is 
met.

4. Solve block.


Regards,

Damian Williamson



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Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For Ordering Transactions In Blocks

[ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev]

Good morning Damian,

>As I understand it, each node would be aware independently of x transactions 
>waiting for confirmation, the transaction pool.

Each long-running node would have a view that is roughly the same as the view 
of every other long-running node.

However, suppose a node, Sleeping Beauty, was temporarily stopped for a day 
(for various reasons) then is started again.  That node cannot verify what the 
"consensus" transaction pool was during the time it was stopped -- it has no 
view of that.  It can only trust that the longest chain is valid -- but that 
means it is SPV for this particular rule.

>If next blocksize is broadcast with the completed block it would be a simple 
>matter to back confirm that.

It would not. Suppose Sleeping Beauty slept at block height 500,000.  On 
awakening, some node provides some purported block at height 500,001.  This 
block indicates some "next blocksize" for the block at height 500,002.  How 
does Sleeping Beauty know that the transaction pool at block 500,001 was of the 
correct size to provide the given "next blocksize"?  The only way, would be to 
look if there is some other chain with greater height that includes or does not 
include that block: that is, SPV confirmation.

How does Sleeping Beauty know it has caught up, and that its transaction pool 
is similar to that of its neighbors (who might be lying to it, for that 
matter), and that it should therefore stop using SPV confirmation and switch to 
strict fullnode rejection of blocks that indicate a "next blocksize" that is 
too large or too small according to your equation?  OR will it simply follow 
the longest chain always, in which case, it trusts miners to be honest about 
how loaded (or unloaded) the transaction pool is?

---

As a general rule, consensus rules should restrict themselves to:

1.  The characteristics of the block.
2.  The characteristics of the transactions within the block.

The transaction pool is specifically those transaction that are NOT in any 
block, and thus, are not safe to depend on for any consensus rules.

Regards,
ZmnSCPxj___
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For Ordering Transactions In Blocks

[Jim Renkel via bitcoin-dev]

As i understand it, the transactions to be included in a block are 
entirely up to the miner of that block.



What prevents a miner from implementing the proposal on their own?


If this is adopted as some kind of "policy", what forces a miner to 
follow it?


Jim Renkel

On 12/2/2017 10:07 PM, Damian Williamson via bitcoin-dev wrote:


# BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For Ordering 
Transactions In Blocks



I admit, with my limited experience in the operation of the protocol, 
the section entitled 'Solution operation' may not be entirely correct 
but you will get the idea. If I have it wrong, please correct it back 
to the list.


## The problem:


Everybody wants value. Miners want to maximize revenue from fees. 
Consumers want transaction reliability and, (we presume) low fees.



Current transaction bandwidth limit is a limiting factor for both.

## Solution summary:


Provide each transaction with a transaction weight, being a function 
of the fee paid (on a curve), and the time waiting in the transaction 
pool (also on a curve) out to n days (n=30 ?); the transaction weight 
serving as the likelihood of a transaction being included in the 
current block, and then use a target block size.



Protocol enforcement to prevent high or low blocksize cheating to be 
handled by having the protocol determine the target size for the 
current block using; current transaction pool size x ( 1 / (144 x n 
days ) ) = transactions to be included in the current block.


The curves used for the weight of transactions would have to be 
appropriate.


## Pros:


* Maximizes transaction reliability.
* Maximizes possibility for consumer and business uptake.
* Maximizes total fees paid per block without reducing reliability; 
because of reliability, confidence and uptake are greater; therefore, 
more transactions and more transactions total at priority fees.

* Market determines fee paid for transaction priority.

* Fee recommendations work all the way out to 30 days or greater.

* Provides additional block entropy and greater security since there 
is less probability of predicting the next block.


## Cons:


* ?
* Must be first be programmed.
* Anything else?

## Solution operation:


As I have said, my simplistic view of the operation. If I have this 
wrong, please correct it back to the list.



1. The protocol determines the target block size.

2. Assign each transaction in the pool a transaction weight based on 
fee and time waiting in the transaction pool.


3. Begin selecting transactions to include in the current block using 
transaction weight as the likelihood of inclusion until target block 
size is met.


4. Solve block.

Regards,

Damian Williamson



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Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For Ordering Transactions In Blocks

[Damian Williamson via bitcoin-dev]

Good afternoon ZmnSCPxj,


I have posted some discussion on the need for this proposal and, some 
refinements to the proposal explanation (not changes to the intended operation) 
to the bitcoin-discuss list. I didn't exactly mean to double post but thought 
it could use the discussion and, not to post it again, I will link to it when 
(if) it turns up, or will post it back here as an update on request. Currently, 
that post is awaiting moderator approval. I have also rewritten the solution 
operation section a bit in that post, not the idea that is being conveyed. I 
have added an additional step, reject blocks that do not meet the target block 
size for the current block.

I suggest it still should be added to the solution operation, to broadcast the 
next target block size with the current block when it is solved. Using that 
method may answer a part of your concern.

As I understand it, each node would be aware independently of x transactions 
waiting for confirmation, the transaction pool. Each node would no doubt have 
its own idea about how many waiting transactions there are and which particular 
transactions exist. I do not see why each node could not just work with the 
information at hand, it is my understanding that is what happens now, even with 
solved blocks vs the longest chain. I have not followed why you foresee from my 
proposal the need for fullnodes to back confirm the previous blocks in that 
manner.

If next blocksize is broadcast with the completed block it would be a simple 
matter to back confirm that. With transaction weight (transaction priority) I 
am suggesting that value gives the likelihood of a transaction being included, 
presuming an element of randomness as to whether any particular transaction is 
then included or not. Back confirmations on a transaction basis would be 
impossible anyway, all that could be confirmed is that a particular block has 
transactions that conform to a probability curve, if the variables are known, 
fee amount and time waiting in the pool, then the transaction priority can be 
recreated to establish that the probability of a particular block conforms. I 
certainly do not foresee including the full transaction pool in each block.

I am also presuming blocksize as a number of transactions rather than KB.

My suggestion, if adopted, is to directly make the operation of transaction 
priority a part of the operational standard - even without verification that it 
is being followed. The result of full transactional reliability is actually in 
the interests of miners as much as anyone.

The benefit of the proposal, not directly stated, is variable sized blocks 
(uncapped block size).

Yes, I have learned not to recycle terminology. My apologies, I had not been 
made aware that terminology already had use. Perhaps it would be simpler to 
call the proposal that I am putting forward here Transaction Priority.

Regards,
Damian Williamson



From: ZmnSCPxj <zmnsc...@protonmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, 6 December 2017 4:46:45 PM
To: Damian Williamson
Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For 
Ordering Transactions In Blocks

Good morning Damian,

The primary problem in your proposal, as I understand it, is that the 
"transaction pool" is never committed to and is not part of consensus 
currently.  It is unlikely that the transaction pool will ever be part of 
consensus, as putting the transaction pool into consensus is effectively 
lifting the block size to include the entire transaction pool into each block.  
The issue is that the transaction pool is transient and future fullnodes cannot 
find the contents of the transaction pool at the time blocks were made and 
cannot verify the correctness of historical blocks.  Also, fullnodes using 
-blocksonly mode have no transaction pool and cannot verify incoming blocks for 
these new rules.

Applying a patch that follows this policy into Bitcoin Core without enforcing 
it in all fullnodes will simply lead to miners removing the patch in software 
they run, making it an exercise in futility to write, review, and test this 
code in the first place.

In addition, you reuse the term "weight" for something different than its 
current use.  Current use, is that the "weight" of a transaction, is the 
computed weight from the SegWit weight equation, measured in virtual units 
called "sipa", using the equation (4sipa / non-witness byte + 1sipa/witness 
byte).

Regards,
ZmnSCPxj




Sent with ProtonMail<https://protonmail.com> Secure Email.

 Original Message 
Subject: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For 
Ordering Transactions In Blocks
Local Time: December 6, 2017 3:38 AM
UTC Time: December 5, 2017 7:38 PM
From: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org 
<bitcoin-dev@lists

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For Ordering Transactions In Blocks

[ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev]

Good morning Damian,

The primary problem in your proposal, as I understand it, is that the 
"transaction pool" is never committed to and is not part of consensus 
currently.  It is unlikely that the transaction pool will ever be part of 
consensus, as putting the transaction pool into consensus is effectively 
lifting the block size to include the entire transaction pool into each block.  
The issue is that the transaction pool is transient and future fullnodes cannot 
find the contents of the transaction pool at the time blocks were made and 
cannot verify the correctness of historical blocks.  Also, fullnodes using 
-blocksonly mode have no transaction pool and cannot verify incoming blocks for 
these new rules.

Applying a patch that follows this policy into Bitcoin Core without enforcing 
it in all fullnodes will simply lead to miners removing the patch in software 
they run, making it an exercise in futility to write, review, and test this 
code in the first place.

In addition, you reuse the term "weight" for something different than its 
current use.  Current use, is that the "weight" of a transaction, is the 
computed weight from the SegWit weight equation, measured in virtual units 
called "sipa", using the equation (4sipa / non-witness byte + 1sipa/witness 
byte).

Regards,
ZmnSCPxj

Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email.

>  Original Message 
> Subject: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For 
> Ordering Transactions In Blocks
> Local Time: December 6, 2017 3:38 AM
> UTC Time: December 5, 2017 7:38 PM
> From: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org 
> 
>
> # BIP Proposal: UTWFOTIB - Use Transaction Weight For Ordering Transactions 
> In Blocks
>
> I admit, with my limited experience in the operation of the protocol, the 
> section entitled 'Solution operation' may not be entirely correct but you 
> will get the idea. If I have it wrong, please correct it back to the list.
>
> ## The problem:
>
> Everybody wants value. Miners want to maximize revenue from fees. Consumers 
> want transaction reliability and, (we presume) low fees.
>
> Current transaction bandwidth limit is a limiting factor for both.
>
> ## Solution summary:
>
> Provide each transaction with a transaction weight, being a function of the 
> fee paid (on a curve), and the time waiting in the transaction pool (also on 
> a curve) out to n days (n=30 ?); the transaction weight serving as the 
> likelihood of a transaction being included in the current block, and then use 
> a target block size.
>
> Protocol enforcement to prevent high or low blocksize cheating to be handled 
> by having the protocol determine the target size for the current block using; 
> current transaction pool size x ( 1 / (144 x n days ) ) = transactions to be 
> included in the current block.
>
> The curves used for the weight of transactions would have to be appropriate.
>
> ## Pros:
>
> * Maximizes transaction reliability.
> * Maximizes possibility for consumer and business uptake.
> * Maximizes total fees paid per block without reducing reliability; because 
> of reliability, confidence and uptake are greater; therefore, more 
> transactions and more transactions total at priority fees.
> * Market determines fee paid for transaction priority.
>
> * Fee recommendations work all the way out to 30 days or greater.
>
> * Provides additional block entropy and greater security since there is less 
> probability of predicting the next block.
>
> ## Cons:
>
> * ?
> * Must be first be programmed.
> * Anything else?
>
> ## Solution operation:
>
> As I have said, my simplistic view of the operation. If I have this wrong, 
> please correct it back to the list.
>
> 1. The protocol determines the target block size.
>
> 2. Assign each transaction in the pool a transaction weight based on fee and 
> time waiting in the transaction pool.
>
> 3. Begin selecting transactions to include in the current block using 
> transaction weight as the likelihood of inclusion until target block size is 
> met.
>
> 4. Solve block.
>
> Regards,
>
> Damian Williamson___
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