Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal to replace BIP0039
On Sat, Nov 02, 2013 at 10:44:58AM +0100, Thomas Voegtlin wrote: > > >To be specific, we (in cooperation with / inspired by Timo Hanke) > >developed method how to prove that the seed generated by Trezor > >has been created using combination of computer-provided entropy > >and device-provided entropy, without leaking full private > >information to other computer, just because we want Trezor to be > >blackbox-testable and fully deterministic (seed generation is > >currently the only operation which uses any source of RNG). > > > > Thanks for the explanation. Here is how I understand how it works, > please correct me if I'm wrong: > > The user's computer picks a random number a, the Trezor picks a > random number b. > Trezor adds a and b in the secp256k1 group, and this creates a > master private key k. > Trezor sends the corresponding master public key K to the computer. > Thus, the computer can check that K was derived from a, without knowing b. No. You mean the computer would use B for this check? (k,K) could be rigged by Trezor, who computes b as k-a. Timo > This also allows the computer to check that any bitcoin address > derived from K is derived from a, without leaking b. (and > reciprocally) > > However, it seems to me that this property will work only with bip32 > public derivations; if a private derivation is used, don't you need > to know k? > > > -- Timo Hanke PGP 1EFF 69BC 6FB7 8744 14DB 631D 1BB5 D6E3 AB96 7DA8 -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Message Signing based authentication
On Sat, Nov 02, 2013 at 02:14:22PM -0700, Johnathan Corgan wrote: > On 11/01/2013 10:01 PM, bitcoingr...@gmx.com wrote: > > > Server provides a token for the client to sign. > > Anyone else concerned about signing an arbitrary string? Could be a > hash of $EVIL_DOCUMENT, no? I'd want to XOR the string with my own > randomly generated nonce, sign that, then pass the nonce and the > signature back to the server for verification. There were several replies like this, suggesting the client should modify or add something to the token, or should give the token some structure. But signing a token is not what the client should do in the first place. At least not if the client's key is (EC)DSA. The standard way is a challenge-response protocol in the form of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, which avoids producing any unintentional signatures. Say the clients wants to prove he owns private key p, belonging to public key P. P=p*G and G is the "base" of the (EC)DSA signature system. The server generates a new keypair (a,A), a is private, A is public, and sends A to the client as a challenge. The client computes and sends p*A back. The server verifies whether p*A = a*P. Only "public keys" are exchanged here, there's nothing that can be mistaken for a (EC)DSA signature. Timo > -- > Johnathan Corgan, Corgan Labs > SDR Training and Development Services > http://corganlabs.com > begin:vcard > fn:Johnathan Corgan > n:Corgan;Johnathan > org:Corgan Enterprises LLC dba Corgan Labs > adr:;;6081 Meridian Ave. Suite 70-111;San Jose;CA;95120;United States > email;internet:johnat...@corganlabs.com > title:Managing Partner > tel;work:+1 408 463 6614 > x-mozilla-html:FALSE > url:http://corganlabs.com > version:2.1 > end:vcard > -- Timo Hanke PGP 1EFF 69BC 6FB7 8744 14DB 631D 1BB5 D6E3 AB96 7DA8 -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Message Signing based authentication
Required vs. strongly recommended is an important distinction. Satoshi Dice reuses EC Keys for every single transaction. Exchanges will have the same address you deposit in over and over, which gets reused. This is a best practice argument rather than a protocol requirement. On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 8:27 PM, Luke-Jr wrote: > On Sunday, November 03, 2013 1:19:51 AM Allen Piscitello wrote: > > I actually had a use case in my case where it was possible, and that was > > the check I used to get around it, just configured it so that I always > > generated a new key when I needed to set up a 2 of 2 Multisig Refund Tx. > > It was either that or making sure I had no unspent outputs. The use > case > > of doing it was laziness in just creating a single key. > > Use cases mean an actual use, not mere laziness. Bitcoin as a system has > always required a unique EC key (and address) for each transaction. > > Luke > -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Message Signing based authentication
On Sunday, November 03, 2013 1:19:51 AM Allen Piscitello wrote: > I actually had a use case in my case where it was possible, and that was > the check I used to get around it, just configured it so that I always > generated a new key when I needed to set up a 2 of 2 Multisig Refund Tx. > It was either that or making sure I had no unspent outputs. The use case > of doing it was laziness in just creating a single key. Use cases mean an actual use, not mere laziness. Bitcoin as a system has always required a unique EC key (and address) for each transaction. Luke -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Message Signing based authentication
I actually had a use case in my case where it was possible, and that was the check I used to get around it, just configured it so that I always generated a new key when I needed to set up a 2 of 2 Multisig Refund Tx. It was either that or making sure I had no unspent outputs. The use case of doing it was laziness in just creating a single key. On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 7:33 PM, Luke-Jr wrote: > On Sunday, November 03, 2013 12:29:28 AM Allen Piscitello wrote: > > This was one of my concerns when implementing a scheme where you sign a > > refund transaction before the original transaction is broadcast. I > > originally tried to pass a hash and have the server sign it. However, I > > had no way to know that what I was signing wasn't a transaction that was > > spending my coins! So I changed the code to require sending the full > > transaction, not just the hash. The other way to mitigate this is > through > > not having any unspent outputs from this key. > > Well, there's no use case to sign with an address that has already been > sent > coins. The main problem with enforcing this is that you can't exactly stop > someone from sending to an "identity" address. > > Luke > -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Message Signing based authentication
On Sunday, November 03, 2013 12:29:28 AM Allen Piscitello wrote: > This was one of my concerns when implementing a scheme where you sign a > refund transaction before the original transaction is broadcast. I > originally tried to pass a hash and have the server sign it. However, I > had no way to know that what I was signing wasn't a transaction that was > spending my coins! So I changed the code to require sending the full > transaction, not just the hash. The other way to mitigate this is through > not having any unspent outputs from this key. Well, there's no use case to sign with an address that has already been sent coins. The main problem with enforcing this is that you can't exactly stop someone from sending to an "identity" address. Luke -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Message Signing based authentication
This was one of my concerns when implementing a scheme where you sign a refund transaction before the original transaction is broadcast. I originally tried to pass a hash and have the server sign it. However, I had no way to know that what I was signing wasn't a transaction that was spending my coins! So I changed the code to require sending the full transaction, not just the hash. The other way to mitigate this is through not having any unspent outputs from this key. For authentication, you could have both a user-generated and server-generated portion, so that you signed something that clearly had data from you, so even if the server-data was a hash of $EVIL_DOCUMENT, you have clear plausible deniability in that your data that is also signed is "ATTEMPTING LOGIN TO XYZ.COM Hash($EVIL_DOCUMENT)". On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 4:51 PM, Mark Friedenbach wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA1 > > Or SIGHASH of a transaction spending those coins or updating the SIN... > > On 11/2/13 2:14 PM, Johnathan Corgan wrote:> On 11/01/2013 10:01 PM, > bitcoingr...@gmx.com wrote: > > > >> Server provides a token for the client to sign. > > > > Anyone else concerned about signing an arbitrary string? Could be > > a hash of $EVIL_DOCUMENT, no? I'd want to XOR the string with my > > own randomly generated nonce, sign that, then pass the nonce and > > the signature back to the server for verification. > > > -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- > Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.19 (Darwin) > Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org > Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ > > iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJSdXPaAAoJEAdzVfsmodw4+m8P/1Ce/PwZOYfiFuFJ8pmT2tb2 > ro7tw7zSr12RSTvs+qRl7lDzJzQ6BDXOdXZCkcU0Vj3TDm8fdrrXN/iw3iQYU/5Y > 3K7hj2mGqQUMovCLw0CbrMWrMvor7FhO6MZsRwe0+VxDV/dDrX5f5vSEhnkR26be > NrzOFU4hqGM3R4eLq8Bmw5rVD/VCrRzKoXXAvJb1EwM1+fQPjKi+bNMJu3reyfXU > 5eMbbiM6tUMmPXy9M6vZrN+6ad53x3KUVP6+/hXxsrnfPp57WQzRZlvwTo/qdJ1C > Oxl71m6o2zkXbLTFmg1xmK/A4V1BPTLD6nLDIsw+wTBBfdn22pfDv6Q8d3VRctrd > 6x+PMkwysoMjhemmkXCY/7G9GD6AGsrYSqIShSULd9QO5WxAFzRO01ewiRUCUFHi > Dn0LEjy8/R/CWK3jvj9uL3vQh9DLdOtqf/X7cEtjF3LThVP+stFTsmXObhTh/8Ai > YYjpnwOFG5ZtDzRZfP3OCwyhqlsaMlNgN4xnyR4GPaoJRP3a0zllblIbTWzg6nhY > jbON5Ec9N9txGhagYOoAvcQYqGyJdffkBzW82CRUsFYuYYmW2oLUQXPhAGDBIzzj > g/7RjMlM1OEp3qctxMZQlrTj7VJmhD768PRLh2XvEDmEC5Qb8Tcq28Nq5t85/O/6 > i3+pzT5rMuiIZWLx7Msv > =tAUY > -END PGP SIGNATURE- > > > -- > Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that > developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white > paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep > Android apps secure. > http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk > ___ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Message Signing based authentication
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Or SIGHASH of a transaction spending those coins or updating the SIN... On 11/2/13 2:14 PM, Johnathan Corgan wrote:> On 11/01/2013 10:01 PM, bitcoingr...@gmx.com wrote: > >> Server provides a token for the client to sign. > > Anyone else concerned about signing an arbitrary string? Could be > a hash of $EVIL_DOCUMENT, no? I'd want to XOR the string with my > own randomly generated nonce, sign that, then pass the nonce and > the signature back to the server for verification. > -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.19 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJSdXPaAAoJEAdzVfsmodw4+m8P/1Ce/PwZOYfiFuFJ8pmT2tb2 ro7tw7zSr12RSTvs+qRl7lDzJzQ6BDXOdXZCkcU0Vj3TDm8fdrrXN/iw3iQYU/5Y 3K7hj2mGqQUMovCLw0CbrMWrMvor7FhO6MZsRwe0+VxDV/dDrX5f5vSEhnkR26be NrzOFU4hqGM3R4eLq8Bmw5rVD/VCrRzKoXXAvJb1EwM1+fQPjKi+bNMJu3reyfXU 5eMbbiM6tUMmPXy9M6vZrN+6ad53x3KUVP6+/hXxsrnfPp57WQzRZlvwTo/qdJ1C Oxl71m6o2zkXbLTFmg1xmK/A4V1BPTLD6nLDIsw+wTBBfdn22pfDv6Q8d3VRctrd 6x+PMkwysoMjhemmkXCY/7G9GD6AGsrYSqIShSULd9QO5WxAFzRO01ewiRUCUFHi Dn0LEjy8/R/CWK3jvj9uL3vQh9DLdOtqf/X7cEtjF3LThVP+stFTsmXObhTh/8Ai YYjpnwOFG5ZtDzRZfP3OCwyhqlsaMlNgN4xnyR4GPaoJRP3a0zllblIbTWzg6nhY jbON5Ec9N9txGhagYOoAvcQYqGyJdffkBzW82CRUsFYuYYmW2oLUQXPhAGDBIzzj g/7RjMlM1OEp3qctxMZQlrTj7VJmhD768PRLh2XvEDmEC5Qb8Tcq28Nq5t85/O/6 i3+pzT5rMuiIZWLx7Msv =tAUY -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Message Signing based authentication
Glad to see that there are more and more people wanting to replace passwords with digital signatures. Although such method has been already used on other websites like Eligius or bitcoin-otc, I dont think theres any standard way to doing so yet. Two comments to your proposal: A) message-to-be-signed need to be carefully composed to be both structured and human readable. It should contain at least: Desired username/identity handler Server identifier (url) Timestamp to prevent replay attack Server challenge Then the user can see what he's signing, instead of signing some binary blob which can contain some evil data. B) Same structured data should be a part of html page in some header tag, ideally signed by server certificate to confirm that the request is valid. Then the login request can be processed by machine automatically, without a need of copy&paste by a user. Slush On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 6:01 AM, wrote: > Passwords are inefficient by design: frequently we hear news from Sony, > Square Enix, Adobe, and various others about passwords being compromised, > databases being copied and stolen. This story remains true in the Bitcoin > space. In light of the recent Bitcointalk forum breach echoes an increasing > need for passwords to become a thing of the past. > > > > In celebration of the 5 year anniversary of the Bitcoin whitepaper, we are > delighted to introduce the Message Signing based authentication method. > > > > In brief, the authentication work as follows: > > > > Server provides a token for the client to sign. > > client passes the signed message and the bitcoin address back to the > server. > > server validates the message and honors the alias (optional) and bitcoin > address as identification. > > > > http://forums.bitcoingrant.org/ > > > > Above is a proof of concept forum that utilize this authentication method. > Following Kerckhoffs's principle, this forum only stores the signed message > and bitcoin address the users provide the first time they use the site, > both are public information. In addition, there is no database, everything > is simply an RSS feed. For the sake of usability we have included a redis > for the sessions, at the cost of additional exposure to potential risks: > users no longer need to sign a token every time they wish to post. > > > > All source code will be available on github in the next few days. > > > > We welcome any feedback or suggestions. > > > > > > -- > Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that > developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white > paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep > Android apps secure. > http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk > ___ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Message Signing based authentication
On 11/01/2013 10:01 PM, bitcoingr...@gmx.com wrote: > Server provides a token for the client to sign. Anyone else concerned about signing an arbitrary string? Could be a hash of $EVIL_DOCUMENT, no? I'd want to XOR the string with my own randomly generated nonce, sign that, then pass the nonce and the signature back to the server for verification. -- Johnathan Corgan, Corgan Labs SDR Training and Development Services http://corganlabs.com <> signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Message Signing based authentication
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 02.11.2013 19:08, Jeff Garzik wrote: > On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 12:52 PM, Melvin Carvalho > wrote: >> Identity need not be a hard problem. In my view it is a solved >> problem. > > > Yes: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Identity_protocol_v1 > Well in the view of an average internet browser, it is not a solved problem neither does this identity protocol solve it. But Mike is correct, this is a wrong place to discuss about it. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iEYEARECAAYFAlJ1M30ACgkQvafo1Ths1SxypQCgor9LQTyKnlr0gByMPPJRQF6U LpIAnRMj/udBSDJOK+2JP0hhiG1Bk81d =tcpx -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Message Signing based authentication
On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 12:52 PM, Melvin Carvalho wrote: > Identity need not be a hard problem. In my view it is a solved problem. Yes: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Identity_protocol_v1 -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Message Signing based authentication
On 2 November 2013 17:26, Mike Hearn wrote: > Guys, identity systems for the web are off-topic for this list. Other than > the anonymous passports/SINs/fidelity bond ideas, Bitcoin doesn't have any > relevance to it. > > On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 2:19 PM, Hannu Kotipalo wrote: > >> Maybe this is a bit off-topic, but the *real* answer to the question >> "why-is-nobody-using-ssl-client-certificates" is that it would force >> www pages to be encrypted and would make it a lot more difficult for >> NSA to log www-trafic. >> > > No, it wouldn't. You can log a user in using SSL and then redirect the > user back to an encrypted page, using cookies for the rest of the session. > Please don't clutter up this list with conspiracy theories. The brutal > reality is that identity is a hard problem. > Identity need not be a hard problem. In my view it is a solved problem. You have a real world entity translated to a digital format. Yes that can be slightly ambiguous at time, naming is hard, and people do get this wrong frequently. The most common problem is to name something in a way that does not scale. The solution to this problem is rather easy, and that is to use a URI to name something, which makes it global and scalable. In the case of bitcoin you could have use the bitcion URI scheme bitcion:1fhdjkfhjksf... > > > -- > Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that > developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white > paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep > Android apps secure. > http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk > ___ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Message Signing based authentication
Guys, identity systems for the web are off-topic for this list. Other than the anonymous passports/SINs/fidelity bond ideas, Bitcoin doesn't have any relevance to it. On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 2:19 PM, Hannu Kotipalo wrote: > Maybe this is a bit off-topic, but the *real* answer to the question > "why-is-nobody-using-ssl-client-certificates" is that it would force > www pages to be encrypted and would make it a lot more difficult for > NSA to log www-trafic. > No, it wouldn't. You can log a user in using SSL and then redirect the user back to an encrypted page, using cookies for the rest of the session. Please don't clutter up this list with conspiracy theories. The brutal reality is that identity is a hard problem. -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Message Signing based authentication
> No, it wouldn't. You can log a user in using SSL and then redirect the user back to an encrypted page sorry, I meant unencrypted page of course -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Message Signing based authentication
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 02.11.2013 15:02, Mike Hearn wrote: > > http://pilif.github.io/2008/05/why-is-nobody-using-ssl-client-certificates/ > > Maybe this is a bit off-topic, but the *real* answer to the question "why-is-nobody-using-ssl-client-certificates" is that it would force www pages to be encrypted and would make it a lot more difficult for NSA to log www-trafic. So they have been made not-user-friendly by default. But what you think about this: "White paper on passwordless secure login (based on bitcoin/bitmessage technology)" https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=323360.0 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iEYEARECAAYFAlJ0+/cACgkQvafo1Ths1Sw5FwCgxdJB/lazDzxRos1ogSfJQo0V El4AnjyHxWjOXG6qjcTcWvccty+03xRa =BikE -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Message Signing based authentication
On 2 November 2013 14:02, Mike Hearn wrote: > On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 6:01 AM, wrote: > >> In brief, the authentication work as follows: >> >> >> >> Server provides a token for the client to sign. >> >> client passes the signed message and the bitcoin address back to the >> server. >> >> server validates the message and honors the alias (optional) and bitcoin >> address as identification. >> > > http://pilif.github.io/2008/05/why-is-nobody-using-ssl-client-certificates/ > I actually use client certificates for almost all of my authentication. It's true that the browser manufacturers have created an UX which is not ideal, and very little effort is made to improve it. But it is possible. See this project from Mozilla labs. http://www.azarask.in/blog/post/identity-in-the-browser-firefox/ Unfortunately this got killed :( More popular is the trusted third party model like OAuth or Persona. There's a conflict of interest as well, because browser manufacturers are often identity providers too, so there is an incentive to push TTP technology. There's two elements here. One is paswordless login (which I love). The other is who controls your identity. I like to control my own identity (in my browser) using PKI. But facebook and the big webmail providers have a lions share of the market. The way to shift the balance is to offer the right incentives. > > > -- > Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that > developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white > paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep > Android apps secure. > http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk > ___ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Message Signing based authentication
On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 6:01 AM, wrote: > In brief, the authentication work as follows: > > > > Server provides a token for the client to sign. > > client passes the signed message and the bitcoin address back to the > server. > > server validates the message and honors the alias (optional) and bitcoin > address as identification. > http://pilif.github.io/2008/05/why-is-nobody-using-ssl-client-certificates/ -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal to replace BIP0039
Le 31/10/2013 12:18, slush a écrit : > Oh, I forgot to one practical aspect; the way how the mnemonic is > "mined" in Thomas proposal prevents usage in embedded devices, because > difficulty of generating proper mnemonic is simply too high for > embedded microcontrollers. Maybe this can be solved somehow by > modifying the proposal, but right now it is a showstopper for us. > > even if metadata is only 8 bits ? (that's about 256 hashes) -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal to replace BIP0039
> To be specific, we (in cooperation with / inspired by Timo Hanke) > developed method how to prove that the seed generated by Trezor has > been created using combination of computer-provided entropy and > device-provided entropy, without leaking full private information to > other computer, just because we want Trezor to be blackbox-testable > and fully deterministic (seed generation is currently the only > operation which uses any source of RNG). > Thanks for the explanation. Here is how I understand how it works, please correct me if I'm wrong: The user's computer picks a random number a, the Trezor picks a random number b. Trezor adds a and b in the secp256k1 group, and this creates a master private key k. Trezor sends the corresponding master public key K to the computer. Thus, the computer can check that K was derived from a, without knowing b. This also allows the computer to check that any bitcoin address derived from K is derived from a, without leaking b. (and reciprocally) However, it seems to me that this property will work only with bip32 public derivations; if a private derivation is used, don't you need to know k? -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
