bug#66072: Duplicate/conflicting definitions for ocl-icd
As the duplicate has been removed, I'm closing the issue. If one day we find a conflict between open-icd-loader and ocl-icd, we'll open a new bug report. signature.asc Description: PGP signature
bug#66140: ghc-memory not maintained anymore
Hi, The ghc-memory package uses the https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-memory git repository. Days ago[1] that repository was "archived" / made read-only, so is is not maintained anymore. The bad news is that ghc-memory package is used directly or indirectly by about 1400 packages. It only happened days ago and that other GNU/Linux distributions and many upstream projects are affected as well but I'm unsure if they know about this issue yet, so there is still a lot of unknown. As a side note it might be interesting to try to see if it's easy or not to detect cases like that with guix lint, as github might have some API that enable to detect if a project is archived or not. Though I've no idea how much work or maintenance something like that would require. If something like that is ever made, it would also probably only work for packages that don't have bundled dependencies. References: --- [1]Probably around the 20th september[2]. [2]https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-memory/pull/98#event-10418690170 Denis. pgpP40iIy7vt9.pgp Description: OpenPGP digital signature
bug#30434: magit won’t work over TRAMP
Hi, This bug#30434 [1] had been closed on 14 Feb 2018 and then reopened on 18 May 2022. 1: https://issues.guix.gnu.org/issue/30434 On Thu, 21 Jul 2022 at 00:04, Maxim Cournoyer wrote: >> More concretely, try "guix shell emacs emacs-magit --pure -- emacs" >> followed by "M-x magit-status" in a Git checkout, it will fail due to >> not finding the 'git' executable. >> >> So my idea is to use the new magit changes to both make the remote >> TRAMP work and _also_ make local things work in a pure environment, >> undoing the regression that was caused by reverting the >> git->/gnu/store/.../bin/git substitution without creating new >> regressions. > > Sounds good to me! I'll be happy to review any patch implementing it. Now, we are 1 year, 17 weeks, 6 later after this message. So I propose to close this issue and then open another one for this potential patch. WDYT? Cheers, simon
bug#65056: https://issues.guix.gnu.org available through Tor again
Altadil via Bug reports for GNU Guix writes: > Hi, > > it seems https://issues.guix.gnu.org can again be accessed when using > Tor Browser. Thank you! I'm closing this bug, feel free to reopen it if needed. Best regards, Gio' -- Giovanni Biscuolo Xelera IT Infrastructures signature.asc Description: PGP signature
bug#65056: https://issues.guix.gnu.org/ cannot be accessed through Tor
Hello, Ricardo Wurmus writes: [...] > IT had installed some DoS attack protection thing for the DMZ with > different thresholds based on past access patterns. Probably some of us is using access patterns the "thing" considers DoS :-) > Upon my request they have now disabled this completely for our IPs > corresponding to ci.guix.gnu.org and its sibling node. Thanks a lot! We should probably consider this (disable any firewall protection) as a requirement when one or more of our public facing hosts firewalling is not under our direct control. Now we only have berlin and bayfront as public facing hosts... but for example milan.guix-1 is connected by our build farm via its public IP (ehrm, time to set up wireguard for that, too). Anyway, AFAIU this "thing" in berlin network is no more an issue, we do not need a new bug report IMO. Thank you! [...] -- Giovanni Biscuolo Xelera IT Infrastructures signature.asc Description: PGP signature
