Re: def-2001-16: Internet Acceleration Server Event DoS

2001-04-03 Thread Brian McClory

I don't see this as being a true security risk.  As you mention in
your advisory, this only occurs if the installer has notification set for
event logs and event logs are left to the default write method.

I honestly think that the only people at risk here are incompitent
administrators who do not porperly configure their network.  That being the
case,
this puts the risk into the ID10T catagory.  I put this on the par with
administrators who allow their smtp servers to relay for anyone and who set
their firewalls to allow netbios traffic through.

Just my 2 cents...

Brian P. McClory MCT, CCI, MCSE, MCP+I, CCA, ETC...

"I'm not an actor, I just play one on TV."



def-2001-16: Internet Acceleration Server Event DoS

2001-04-02 Thread Peter Gründl

==
  Defcom Labs Advisory def-2001-16

  Internet  Acceleration Server Event DoS

Authors: Peter Grndl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Andreas Sandor [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Release Date: 2001-04-02
==
=[Brief Description]=-
If an alert action has been chosen in the ISA server console, a
malicious attacker can cause a Denial of Service situation on the ISA
server.

=[Affected Systems]=--
- Internet  Acceleration Server for Windows 2000 Server

--=[Detailed Description]=
By default the log settings on the Windows 2000 server are not set to
overwrite the log files as needed, and since the installation of the
ISA server does not change these settings, this is also the case with
the ISA server. If you enable the "Event Log Failure" option in the
ISA console, an attacker can send in any kind of spoofed packets that
will trigger event logs and cause the ISA server to start spawning a
CMD.EXE for each event log failure. This will result in the server
running very slowly and consuming all available memory.

This will go on even after the ISA server is rebooted until the event
log is cleaned.

We used ISIC to create a flood of spoofed, random packets:
http://www.packetfactory.net/Projects/ISIC/

Whether you chalk this one up as a security vulnerability or not, it
is still a potential problem that should be given attention if you
set up an "Internet Security and Acceleration" Server.

---=[Workaround]=-
Make sure your log file is either overwritten as needed or that you
have the "event log failure" option disabled in the ISA firewall.

The issue is now described in Q284800 by MSRC:
http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q284/8/00.ASP

-=[Vendor Response]=--
This issue was brought to the vendor's attention on the 20th of
February, 2001. The vendor replied:

"There are two issues here: the particular alert action (i.e., opening
 the command prompt in response to the log becoming full), and the fact
 that the alert action recurs each time you boot.

 * Alert action.  By default, there is no alert action selected -- you
 have to have enabled alerts.  Once they're enabled, the default alert
 mechanism is to run a program.  This is usually used to run a program
 to, for instance, send a mail to the administrator.  If you want to,
 you can select a different alert mechanism.

 * Recurrence.  By default, ISA will continue to take the alert action
 each time the machine is booted, until the "log full" condition no
 longer applies.  Again, the idea here is that ISA will give the
 administrator a signal that he needs to tend to his logs.  You can
 reset the recurrence so that the alert action is only take at
 predefined intervals, or only after a manual reset of the event log."

Also:

"Thanks for letting me review the draft.  I don't see anything in it
 that's factually incorrect.  However, classifying this as a denial of
 service vulnerability seems excessive, don't you think?  There isn't
 a product flaw here -- the only issue is that if the user
 deliberately turns on a feature, but doesn't configure it correctly,
 he can hurt the performance of his machine.  That is, there isn't any
 way for a bad guy to force the admin to turn on the Event Log Failure
 option, nor is there any way for him to prevent the admin from
 properly configuring it.  It seems much more appropriate to discuss
 this as an issue of proper use of the product, rather than as a
 security vulnerability."

And finally:

"I agree that the right way to use the alert mechanism isn't intuitive,
 and that we need to get the word out so folks will use it
 appropriately."

==
This release was brought to you by Defcom Labs

  [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.defcom.com
==