Re: Teaching the Articles of Confederation [Was 'Re: Just for laughs']

2003-08-14 Thread Sanford Levinson
Ilya writes:

At 01:58 PM 8/8/2003, you wrote:
Well, as I tell my Con Law I students on the first day of class, the only
possible conclusion is that [1] the Constitution is illegal, [2] the
Articles of
Confederation are still in force, and [3] I don't really need to teach the
rest of the course:).
Of course, 2 and 3 really don't follow from 1, anymore than the initial
illegality of a given use of property necessarily stands for the
proposition that it can never become legalized through adverse
possession.  So the con law students should reflect on how it is that the
illegality of the Constitution was cured, perhaps, as Madison suggested
in Federalist 40, by popular approbation.
sandy


Re: Teaching the Articles of Confederation [Was 'Re: Just for laughs']

2003-08-14 Thread Eastman, John
Not Marshall (or Joseph Story, for that matter), but Wilson.  And the
difference is significant.  Marshall would view the new regime as ONLY a
national government.  Wilson recognized, rightly, in my view, that the
people acted in different capacities, as a national people for some
purposes, and as separate state people for other purposes.

As for whether I reject the views of Justice Thomas in Term Limits, I
think Sandy mischaracterizes the opinion.  I do not see it as based on a
state compact theory.  In fact, I think it takes great pains to reject
that theory.  See, e.g., 514 U.S. at 851 ( But it was not the state
governments that were doing the reserving. The Constitution derives its
authority instead from the consent of the people of the States.); see
also id. at 847 (When they adopted the Federal Constitution, of course,
the people of each State surrendered some of their authority to the
United States (and hence to entities accountable to the people of other
States as well as to themselves).).

As for Alden et al., I do agree that they are wrongly decided, and have
stated those views in print (as well as previously on this list, if I
recall correctly).  See John C. Eastman, A Seminole Dissent,
Georgetown Journal of Law  Public Policy, Vol. 1.  See also John C.
Eastman, Altered States: A Review of John T. Noonan, Jr., Narrowing the
Nation's Power: The Supreme Court Sides with the States, The Claremont
Review of Books, Spring 2003.

I think the Calhounian states-compact view can arguably be drawn from
Jefferson's Kentucky resolution, but not from Madison's Virginia
resolution.  And Madison himself distanced himself from that
interpretation later on (and I think Jefferson did somewhat, as well,
but my memory is hazy on this at the moment).

Finally, Kennedy in Thornton vs. Kennedy in Alden incoherent?  I would
never make such a claim.  :-)

John C. Eastman
Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law
Director, The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional
Jurisprudence


-Original Message-
From: Sanford Levinson [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, August 08, 2003 12:26 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Teaching the Articles of Confederation [Was 'Re: Just for
laughs']


John Eastman write;

The Constitution, on the
other hand, was adopted by a national people, as a charter for how they

were going to govern themselves.  The ratifications were made by the
people in their states (where else would they have been made, as one
founder noted), but the very act of ratification made them part of a
national people, engaged in constitution-making rather than
treaty-making.


Two questions:  Does John view Marshall as a founder, since I assume
it is he whom John is citing?  Does this mean that John rejects the
views of Thomas et al. in dissent in the term limits case as to the
basis of the Constitution in state compact?  And a third, bonus,
question:  If he does indeed accept the Marshallian understanding of
constitutional ontology, then does this have implications for the
legitimacy of the state sovereignty decisions, such as Alden etc.,
which also seem to rest on the Kentucky-Virginia resolution view of
ratification?  (A double bonus question is whether Kennedy simply
changes his mind between his Thornton conurrence and his discovery of
state dignitary interests in Alden or, rather, is simply incoherent in
terms of constitutional metaphysics.)

sandy


Re: Teaching the Articles of Confederation [Was 'Re: Just for laughs']

2003-08-14 Thread Eastman, John
I don't dispute #1 or #2 on Earl's list, but I do take issue with #3.
The ratification conventions were expressly NOT held under the authority
of the state governments, but by separate ratifying conventions unknown
to any of the existing state governmental structures.  The reason for
this was explicitly to make an appeal directly to the people rather than
to the existing state governments.

#4 -- the ratification process was not established by the existing state
governments, but by the people of the state (acting, to be sure, through
representatives chosen for the purpose, representatives who in many
cases were the same individuals currently sitting in the state
legislatures).

#5 -- true, but he actually refers to the new system as a hybrid.
Again, I'll turn to Wilson, who stated in the PA ratifying concention,
correctly and most cogently, I think:

I consider the people of the United States as forming one great
community, and I consider the people of the different States as forming
communities again on a lesser scale. From this great division of the
people into distinct communities it will be found necessary that
different proportions of legislative powers should be given to the
governments, according to the nature, number and magnitude of their
objects.
Unless the people are considered in these two views, we shall never be
able to understand the principle on which this system was constructed. I
view the States as made for the people as well as by them, and not the
people as made for the States. The people, therefore, have a right,
whilst enjoying the undeniable powers of society, to form either a
general government, or state governments, in what manner they please; or
to accommodate them to one another, and by this means preserve them all.
This, I say, is the inherent and unalienable right of the people, and as
an illustration of it, I beg to read a few words from the Declaration of
Independence . . . . 

John C. Eastman
Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law
Director, The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional
Jurisprudence


-Original Message-
From: Earl Maltz [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, August 08, 2003 12:44 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Teaching the Articles of Confederation [Was 'Re: Just for
laughs']


How does this argument square with the following facts (rather than some
post-hoc theoretical rationalization)

1.  The delegates came to the Constitutional Convention as
representatives not of the nation, but of their states.

2.  At the Convention, each state delegation had one vote, and a
majority was required to adopt any provision.

3.  The ratification conventions were held under the authority of the
state governments.

4.  The selection process was established by the each state, rather than
by any national body.

5.  Madison referred to ratification as a federal rather than a national
act.

At 12:13 PM 8/8/2003 -0700, John Eastman wrote:

As per my earlier reference to James Wilson's speeches on the subject,
the difference bewteen the source of authority for the Articles, and
the source of authority for the Constitution of 1787, is profound.  The

Articles were adopted by the legislatures of the states, acting as the
delegated agents of the people of the states.  (Francisco Martin's
treaty claims are much more apropos here).  The Constitution, on the
other hand, was adopted by a national people, as a charter for how they

were going to govern themselves.  The ratifications were made by the
people in their states (where else would they have been made, as one
founder noted), but the very act of ratification made them part of a
national people, engaged in constitution-making rather than
treaty-making.  That Rhode Island and North Carolina did not
immediately become part of this national people does not make the new
Constitution a treaty.  And here is the key point:  by resorting to a
higher authority (the national people, rather than merely the agents of

the state people), the 1787 convention was able to offer a constitution

that had a constitutional footing, despite the breach of the unanimity
requirement in the Articles.

John C. Eastman
Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law
Director, The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional
Jurisprudence


-Original Message-
From: Ilya Somin [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, August 08, 2003 11:58 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Teaching the Articles of Confederation [Was 'Re: Just for
laughs']


Well, as I tell my Con Law I students on the first day of class, the
only possible conclusion is that the Constitution is illegal, the
Articles of Confederation are still in force, and I don't really need
to teach the rest of the course:).

Ilya Somin



On Fri, 8 Aug 2003, Sanford Levinson wrote:

  Michael Froomkin wries:
 
  When I taught con law I, I always started with the Articles.  Being

  a

  new teacher, I had some trouble persuading the students in the
  first days 

Re: Teaching the Articles of Confederation [Was 'Re: Just for laughs']

2003-08-14 Thread Sanford Levinson
Michael Froomkin wries:

When I taught con law I, I always started with the Articles.  Being a new
teacher, I had some trouble persuading the students in the first days of
their second semester of first year that this was a valuable use of their
time, even though it seems evident to me that many features of the
federalists' Constitution are best understood as a reaction against what
they saw as the flaws of the Articles.
I begin with a discussion of the propriety of the Framers' blithe
willingness to ignore Article XIII of the Articles and its requirement of
unanimous consent for amendment (the Rhode Island veto).  What do we/they
think of this demonstrated infidelity to constitutional command?  Do
we/they applaud the framers for doing what was necessary?  Does that
establish a precedent for later exigencies, including, say, the Louisiana
Purchase, Lincoln's acts during the War, and current policies of the
Administration re the war on terrorism?  What do we mean by
constitutionalism and how important is it, anyway.  All of this comes
from even a brief look at the Articles and the response to them in 1787.
sandy


Re: Teaching the Articles of Confederation [Was 'Re: Just for laughs']

2003-08-14 Thread Ilya Somin
Well, as I tell my Con Law I students on the first day of class, the only
possible conclusion is that the Constitution is illegal, the Articles of
Confederation are still in force, and I don't really need to teach the
rest of the course:).

Ilya Somin



On Fri, 8 Aug 2003, Sanford Levinson wrote:

 Michael Froomkin wries:

 When I taught con law I, I always started with the Articles.  Being a new
 teacher, I had some trouble persuading the students in the first days of
 their second semester of first year that this was a valuable use of their
 time, even though it seems evident to me that many features of the
 federalists' Constitution are best understood as a reaction against what
 they saw as the flaws of the Articles.

 I begin with a discussion of the propriety of the Framers' blithe
 willingness to ignore Article XIII of the Articles and its requirement of
 unanimous consent for amendment (the Rhode Island veto).  What do we/they
 think of this demonstrated infidelity to constitutional command?  Do
 we/they applaud the framers for doing what was necessary?  Does that
 establish a precedent for later exigencies, including, say, the Louisiana
 Purchase, Lincoln's acts during the War, and current policies of the
 Administration re the war on terrorism?  What do we mean by
 constitutionalism and how important is it, anyway.  All of this comes
 from even a brief look at the Articles and the response to them in 1787.

 sandy



Re: Teaching the Articles of Confederation [Was 'Re: Just for laughs']

2003-08-14 Thread Earl Maltz
At 01:38 PM 8/8/2003 -0700, you wrote:
I don't dispute #1 or #2 on Earl's list, but I do take issue with #3.
The ratification conventions were expressly NOT held under the authority
of the state governments, but by separate ratifying conventions unknown
to any of the existing state governmental structures.  The reason for
this was explicitly to make an appeal directly to the people rather than
to the existing state governments.

#4 -- the ratification process was not established by the existing state
governments, but by the people of the state (acting, to be sure, through
representatives chosen for the purpose, representatives who in many
cases were the same individuals currently sitting in the state
legislatures).
With respect to both  3 and 4, my understanding is that the state
legislatures passed laws that both called the conventions and established
eligibility requirements for both membership in the conventions and who
could vote for members.  Further, nothing happened in any state until the
state legislature acted.  To me, that makes the legislature the authority
that establishes the ratification process in the state.

#5 -- true, but he actually refers to the new system as a hybrid.


True, but we're not talking about the nature of the system that was
created, but rather the source of authority for its creation.  My
impression of Wilson is that he was a radical Democrat/nationalist, and
that his views are not entitled to any particular priority
Again, I'll turn to Wilson, who stated in the PA ratifying concention,
correctly and most cogently, I think:
I consider the people of the United States as forming one great
community, and I consider the people of the different States as forming
communities again on a lesser scale. From this great division of the
people into distinct communities it will be found necessary that
different proportions of legislative powers should be given to the
governments, according to the nature, number and magnitude of their
objects.
Unless the people are considered in these two views, we shall never be
able to understand the principle on which this system was constructed. I
view the States as made for the people as well as by them, and not the
people as made for the States. The people, therefore, have a right,
whilst enjoying the undeniable powers of society, to form either a
general government, or state governments, in what manner they please; or
to accommodate them to one another, and by this means preserve them all.
This, I say, is the inherent and unalienable right of the people, and as
an illustration of it, I beg to read a few words from the Declaration of
Independence . . . . 
John C. Eastman
Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law
Director, The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional
Jurisprudence
-Original Message-
From: Earl Maltz [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, August 08, 2003 12:44 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Teaching the Articles of Confederation [Was 'Re: Just for
laughs']
How does this argument square with the following facts (rather than some
post-hoc theoretical rationalization)
1.  The delegates came to the Constitutional Convention as
representatives not of the nation, but of their states.
2.  At the Convention, each state delegation had one vote, and a
majority was required to adopt any provision.
3.  The ratification conventions were held under the authority of the
state governments.
4.  The selection process was established by the each state, rather than
by any national body.
5.  Madison referred to ratification as a federal rather than a national
act.
At 12:13 PM 8/8/2003 -0700, John Eastman wrote:

As per my earlier reference to James Wilson's speeches on the subject,
the difference bewteen the source of authority for the Articles, and
the source of authority for the Constitution of 1787, is profound.  The
Articles were adopted by the legislatures of the states, acting as the
delegated agents of the people of the states.  (Francisco Martin's
treaty claims are much more apropos here).  The Constitution, on the
other hand, was adopted by a national people, as a charter for how they
were going to govern themselves.  The ratifications were made by the
people in their states (where else would they have been made, as one
founder noted), but the very act of ratification made them part of a
national people, engaged in constitution-making rather than
treaty-making.  That Rhode Island and North Carolina did not
immediately become part of this national people does not make the new
Constitution a treaty.  And here is the key point:  by resorting to a
higher authority (the national people, rather than merely the agents of
the state people), the 1787 convention was able to offer a constitution

that had a constitutional footing, despite the breach of the unanimity
requirement in the Articles.

John C. Eastman
Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law
Director, The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional

Re: Teaching the Articles of Confederation [Was 'Re: Just for laughs']

2003-08-12 Thread Sanford Levinson
John Eastman write;

The Constitution, on the
other hand, was adopted by a national people, as a charter for how they
were going to govern themselves.  The ratifications were made by the
people in their states (where else would they have been made, as one
founder noted), but the very act of ratification made them part of a
national people, engaged in constitution-making rather than
treaty-making.


Two questions:  Does John view Marshall as a founder, since I assume it
is he whom John is citing?  Does this mean that John rejects the views of
Thomas et al. in dissent in the term limits case as to the basis of the
Constitution in state compact?  And a third, bonus, question:  If he does
indeed accept the Marshallian understanding of constitutional ontology,
then does this have implications for the legitimacy of the state
sovereignty decisions, such as Alden etc., which also seem to rest on the
Kentucky-Virginia resolution view of ratification?  (A double bonus
question is whether Kennedy simply changes his mind between his Thornton
conurrence and his discovery of state dignitary interests in Alden or,
rather, is simply incoherent in terms of constitutional metaphysics.)
sandy