Re: [coreboot] T450S + Coreboot
Wow, Mike, seriously, I am going to side 100% with Nico, you are spreading FUD, making your own personal opinions (which are themselves derived from other people's FUD) and stating them as the universal law. The ME is not known to be a backdoor. It doesn't mean that it's not a backdoor, it simply means that it's not known to be a backdoor. The fact that it's closed source and not user-controlled (Even if you had the sources, you can't modify them and update it to your custom ME version) is where the problem actually is. There *might* be a backdoor hidden somewhere in there, or maybe there isn't, nobody knows, but there has been a lot of research done on the ME and so far, none have been found as far as I know. Your worry about what the ME does, how it can give someone control over the PC, etc.. are NOT what qualifies it as a "backdoor", but like Nico said, it's a frontdoor, it's not a "hidden access", it's a "promoted access" to the PC, it's the main ME functionality which is well documented. You don't have to use some "only known to some secret person" trick to access the ME, you just need to point your web browser to the right port on localhost. Your comparison of saying the ME is a backdoor is like saying that a webcam is a spying device because it can capture images of you! Yeah, sure, that's technically true, it can capture images of you, but only after you plug it in and open an image capture software, and you still have control of those images. The fact that the webcam schematics isn't open means that it could still have a small wifi or GSM chip embedded inside which makes it send the images to the CIA, but it's not a guarantee that it does. So, yes, you can complain that the webcam isn't open hardware so you can't technically trust what it does, but you can't just come out and say with absolute certainty that any and all webcams in the world are spying devices for the CIA, that's just ridiculous. So, back to the ME, we know exactly what it does, it's all extremely well documented and explained, the fact that it allows remote control of the PC is actually the reason for its existence and it's a very very valid reason in the corporate context and the fact that those features also 'coincidentally' resemble the features of an actual 'trojan horse' virus, doesn't mean that the ME itself is a virus.. otherwise the 'rm' linux command would be considered a virus since it deletes files and there are some viruses that can delete your files as well Now the problem is that it's closed source, and not user controlled (remote control features *are* user controlled, I'm talking about being able to replace the firmware with your own), so yes, it can't be audited by the larger open source community, but that also doesn't guarantee any security necessarily (how many open source programs still have security bugs?). Either way, you yourself said earlier, when talking about the AtomBIOS that "it could be disassembled quite well with AtomDis - https://github.com/mikebdp2/AtomDis - reducing any security concerns regarding this blob to a minimum.", well, the ME can be disassembled with any x86 disassembler, so why can't you also say that "reduces any security concerns regarding the ME to a minimum". We're about to get full control back of the ME. I've been working for the past few weeks on reproducing the PTResearch buffer overflow exploit on the ME, and yesterday they released a PoC for Apollolake (in case you missed it : https://github.com/ptresearch/IntelTXE-PoC), so with the progress I made and with that, I should be able to soon port it to skylake (and write docs on how to port to other platforms as well) which will at least give us the ability to gain back the 'user-controlled' aspect of it as we'd have code execution on it. Which by the way, also means that BootGuard can be disabled (since the ME is the one checking for the boot guard signatures), which should enable the ability to port coreboot to a lot more machines (including the T450S that this thread is supposed to be about). Hopefully On Wed, Aug 29, 2018 at 5:50 AM Mike Banon wrote: > > > What suspicious activities? I know, for many people the Intel ME firmware > > contains unwanted features. But these features are documented. > > In your world, a device becomes backdoored because somebody > > didn't read the manual?!? > > Somewhere I've seen a report about Intel ME suspicious network > activities (if I remember correctly they were using Wireshark on a PC > placed between a computer with ME and the outside network) which has > affected my personal opinion. Although it could be argued that its > just some OEM has set up their ME in such a way, maybe even in a > documented way (although a way undesirable to the end user), still it > didn't look good to me. In addition, regarding all those Intel ME > vulnerabilities recently discovered: one could assume that at least > some of these "vulnerabilities" @ were actually the backdoors which > have
Re: [coreboot] T450S + Coreboot
> What suspicious activities? I know, for many people the Intel ME firmware > contains unwanted features. But these features are documented. > In your world, a device becomes backdoored because somebody > didn't read the manual?!? Somewhere I've seen a report about Intel ME suspicious network activities (if I remember correctly they were using Wireshark on a PC placed between a computer with ME and the outside network) which has affected my personal opinion. Although it could be argued that its just some OEM has set up their ME in such a way, maybe even in a documented way (although a way undesirable to the end user), still it didn't look good to me. In addition, regarding all those Intel ME vulnerabilities recently discovered: one could assume that at least some of these "vulnerabilities" @ were actually the backdoors which have been patched just because they have been discovered by someone else than the american intelligence agencies who always knew them @ . Now Intel has patched these "vulnerabilities", but we do not know if some other "vulnerabilities" have been left unnoticed by the outsiders or if some new "vulnerabilities" have been added. And we the open source enthusiasts can't even verify that personally, because the source code of Intel ME firmware is closed. I cannot understand, how such a high level professional open source developer as you, Nico, finds it okay to just trust Intel ME despite its' deeply proprietary nature. Management engine with a closed source proprietary firmware - it even sounds awful. I totally agree with Richard Stallman when he calls Intel ME a backdoor - https://stallman.org/intel.html > Please read [1] and [2] very carefully, I hope even you will spot > technical differences. [...] You cannot just take somebody's words > and give them a different meaning just because somebody else used > them in a different context. [...] You did it again, btw., stating something > (definition of frontdoor) and making it look like the generally accepted > definition. Before receiving your message I knew only one definition of a "frontdoor" computing term which I described in my previous message. Although I don't know which definition is more popular, sorry for misunderstanding you. Mike On Wed, Aug 29, 2018 at 12:24 AM Nico Huber wrote: > > *sigh*, > > On 28.08.2018 22:00, Mike Banon wrote: > > You are right, my choice of words has been far from ideal. I apologize > > for that. However, to be confident that Intel ME is a backdoor > > (personal opinion) - one does not have to be its' creator. > > sorry I meant the creator of us (God) not the ME. I doubt the creator > of the ME knows everybody's opinion either. Which is what I was talking > about. A good practice is to quote and answer below that quote, this way > you can easily check if what you write makes sense in the given context. > > > I think > > there are enough documents describing its' functionality and enough > > evidence gathered by the independent security researchers about the > > suspicious activities of this hardware module. If it looks like a > > duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a > > duck? > > WTF again? what suspicious activities? I know, for many people the ME > firmware contains unwanted features. But these features are documented. > In your world, a device becomes backdoored because somebody didn't read > the manual?!? > > > There are no technical differences between the 'backdoor', and > > 'frontdoor'. > > Please read [1] and [2] very carefully, I hope even you will spot tech- > nical differences. > > > Like a 'conspiracy theorist', 'frontdoor' is a term > > coming from the american 3-letter-agencies. 'Frontdoor' is their term > > for a 'backdoor' to which only they (currently) have an access. This > > article summarizes it well: > > https://www.justsecurity.org/16503/security-front-doors-vs-back-doors-distinction-difference/ > > . 'Backdoor' term has a negative reputation, so they would like to > > push this 'frontdoor' term forward. > > This is very infantile. You cannot just take somebody's words and give > them a different meaning just because somebody else used them in a dif- > ferent context. When I say frontdoor, I mean a door at a front where > everyone can see it. A backdoor implies something hidden, the ME fea- > tures were never hidden (AFAIK, a stupid OEM may prove me wrong, but I > don't know any instance). > > You did it again, btw., stating something (definition of frontdoor) and > making it look like the generally accepted definition. > > Nico > > [1] https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/back_door > [2] https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/front_door -- coreboot mailing list: coreboot@coreboot.org https://mail.coreboot.org/mailman/listinfo/coreboot
[coreboot] Fwd: USB to Serial Converters
Hello Friends , I compiled Coreboot 4.5 for Minnow board max and see this message in consol. "Memory Configure Data Hob is not present. Not updating MRC data in flash." what is Data Hob? Cold you help me how to solve it? Best wishes , Zhara -- Forwarded message - From: zahra rahimkhani Date: Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 4:52 PM Subject: Fwd: [coreboot] USB to Serial Converters To: cc: Coreboot -- Forwarded message - From: zahra rahimkhani Date: Sat, Aug 18, 2018 at 12:47 PM Subject: Re: [coreboot] USB to Serial Converters To: David Hendricks Hello David Thank you very much for your help . I used version 4.8 but it shows this message on consol and do not boot usb flash or sata. Running option rom at c000:0003 Turning on vga text mode console SeaBIOS (version rel-1.11.2-0-gf9626cc) EHCI init on dev 00:1d.0 (regs=0xd061e020) WARNING - Timeout at i8042_flush:71! AHCI controller at 00:13.0, iobase 0xd061d000, irq 10 Searching bootorder for: /pci@i0cf8/*@12 Found 0 lpt ports Found 1 serial ports Searching bootorder for: /pci@i0cf8/usb@1d/hub@1/storage@1/*@0/*@0,0 Searching bootorder for: /pci@i0cf8/usb@1d/hub@1/usb-*@1 USB MSC vendor='UFD 2.0' product='Silicon-Power8G' rev='1100' type=0 removable=1 USB MSC blksize=512 sectors=15730688 Initialized USB HUB (1 ports used) All threads complete. Scan for option roms Press ESC for boot menu. Searching bootorder for: HALT drive 0x000f62c0: PCHS=0/0/0 translation=lba LCHS=979/255/63 s=15730688 Space available for UMB: cd800-ed800, f5b60-f62c0 Returned 253952 bytes of ZoneHigh e820 map has 18 items: 0: - 0009fc00 = 1 RAM 1: 0009fc00 - 000a = 2 RESERVED 2: 000f - 0010 = 2 RESERVED 3: 0010 - 2000 = 1 RAM 4: 2000 - 2010 = 2 RESERVED 5: 2010 - 7ad9c000 = 1 RAM 6: 7ad9c000 - 8000 = 2 RESERVED 7: e000 - f000 = 2 RESERVED 8: feb0 - fec01000 = 2 RESERVED 9: fed01000 - fed02000 = 2 RESERVED 10: fed03000 - fed04000 = 2 RESERVED 11: fed05000 - fed06000 = 2 RESERVED 12: fed08000 - fed09000 = 2 RESERVED 13: fed0c000 - fed1 = 2 RESERVED 14: fed1c000 - fed1d000 = 2 RESERVED 15: fee0 - fee01000 = 2 RESERVED 16: fef0 - ff00 = 2 RESERVED 17: ff80 - 0001 = 2 RESERVED enter handle_19: NULL Booting from Hard Disk... Booting from :7c00 I would be grateful if you guide me . I should set a special config or no? Best , Zahra On Sun, Aug 5, 2018 at 4:35 PM David Hendricks wrote: > Hi Zahra, > Yes, I used the 6-pin serial port header. Also, make sure the microcode > header(s) you include correspond to the CPUID of your processor. The E3825 > and E3826 use different microcode headers, so M0130679901.h will not work > for you. > > Please keep the coreboot mailing list CC'd. I haven't done anything with > Minnowboard in several months and others may be able to help. > > On Thu, Aug 2, 2018 at 5:01 PM, zahra rahimkhani < > zrahimkhani2...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Hi David >> >> Thank you for your help. >> I extract your file and got M0130679901.h as Microcode but my board does >> not work it did not show anything. >> I use E3825. >> In previous notes, you told "My guess is that you don't have >> CONFIG_ENABLE_BUILTIN_COM1 selected >> (under "Chipset"), which is an option you have to set in addition to >> the stuff under "Console." >> but in your config, you had not enabled this option. >> Could you help me with this and Did you use 6 pins that are separated >> on board for console port? >> I do not know what is my problem .it did not show anything log. >> >> >> >> Thank you for your time. >> Zahra >> >> >> >> On Wed, Aug 1, 2018 at 2:04 AM David Hendricks >> wrote: >> >>> Hi Zahra, >>> That header may be out of date >>> (https://mail.coreboot.org/pipermail/coreboot/2017-August/084800.html). >>> >>> I had to manually download the microcode file corresponding to my >>> processor SKU from Intel. Use the link I sent you earlier to download >>> Baytrail_FSP_Gold4.tgz and see if the microcode headers included in >>> that tarball match your processor. The Atom on my Minnowboard Turbot >>> has a CPUID of 30679, so I needed to use M0130679901.h. >>> >>> (note that the Minnowboard Max uses an Atom E3825, while the Turbot >>> uses an E3826 dual-core SoC or E3845 quad-core SoC) >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 30, 2018 at 2:36 AM, zahra rahimkhani >>> wrote: >>> > >>> > Dear David >>> > >>> > for Microcode file I just it from coreboot source from this path >>> > coreboot/3rdparty/blobs/soc/intel/baytrail/microcode_blob.h >>> > >>> > Is that good ? >>> > >>> > Thanks , >>> > >>> > >>> > On Sun, Jul 29, 2018 at 1:18 PM zahra rahimkhani < >>> zrahimkhani2...@gmail.com>
[coreboot] OSFC Tickets
Friendly reminder. 2 days until the ticket sale is closed. Buy your tickets now https://osfc.io/tickets -- coreboot mailing list: coreboot@coreboot.org https://mail.coreboot.org/mailman/listinfo/coreboot
Re: [coreboot] Intel ME what is it? And when did this dangerous thing get installed?
I think there's a good explanation of it in the FAQ of the libreboot project here : https://libreboot.org/faq.html#intelme If there are more specific questions that you have, ask them and I might be able to answer them! On Wed, Aug 29, 2018 at 2:36 AM Gregg Levine wrote: > > Hello! > Would one of you, or even any of you please take some time out of your > busy schedule and ponder the subject? And of course try to respond > accordingly? > > Bootguard sadly I am familiar with, but the Intel ME product I confess > I understand a portion about it. And not enough to mention here. > - > Gregg C Levine gregg.drw...@gmail.com > "This signature fought the Time Wars, time and again." > > -- > coreboot mailing list: coreboot@coreboot.org > https://mail.coreboot.org/mailman/listinfo/coreboot -- coreboot mailing list: coreboot@coreboot.org https://mail.coreboot.org/mailman/listinfo/coreboot
[coreboot] Intel ME what is it? And when did this dangerous thing get installed?
Hello! Would one of you, or even any of you please take some time out of your busy schedule and ponder the subject? And of course try to respond accordingly? Bootguard sadly I am familiar with, but the Intel ME product I confess I understand a portion about it. And not enough to mention here. - Gregg C Levine gregg.drw...@gmail.com "This signature fought the Time Wars, time and again." -- coreboot mailing list: coreboot@coreboot.org https://mail.coreboot.org/mailman/listinfo/coreboot
