Re: Clipper for luggage
[Moderator's note: With this, I'm ending all baggage messages for now. --Perry] It will also mean more peace of mind for passengers worried about reports of increased pilferage from unlocked bags. ... so, TSA people are stealing from unlocked bags. Not necessarily. I was under the impression that there are also non-TSA folks (airline-employed baggage handlers) in the baggage-handling pipeline. - Bill - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Monoculture
Who on this list just wrote a report on the dangers of Monoculture? An implementation monoculture is more dangerous than a protocol monoculture.. Most exploitable security problems arise from implementation errors, rather than from inherent flaws in the protocol being implemented. And broad diversity in protocols has a downside from another general systems security principle: minimization.. The more protocols you need to implement to talk to other systems, the less time you have to make sure the ones you implement are implemented well, and the more likely you are to pick up one which has a latent implementation flaw. - Bill - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Attacking networks using DHCP, DNS - probably doesn't kill DNSSEC
One key point though: even if DNSSEC was deployed from the root, and a trusted copy of the root key was the client, the search path/default domain must *also* come from a trusted source. Currently, default domain/search path often comes from DHCP, and for nomadic laptops where the relationship to the local network is often casual at best, this is likely to be a mistake. - Bill - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
