Re: [Cryptography] Der Spiegel: "NSA Can Spy on Smart Phone Data"
The article of "der Spiegel" in english can be found on: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/privacy-scandal-nsa-can-spy-on-sma rt-phone-data-a-920971.html and an update ( in English ) will be added today. -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: cryptography-bounces+nap.van.zuuren=pandora...@metzdowd.com [mailto:cryptography-bounces+nap.van.zuuren=pandora...@metzdowd.com] Namens Christian Huitema Verzonden: maandag 9 september 2013 6:22 Aan: 'Jerry Leichter'; 'Perry E. Metzger' CC: cryptography@metzdowd.com Onderwerp: Re: [Cryptography] Der Spiegel: "NSA Can Spy on Smart Phone Data" -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 > Apparently this was just a "teaser" article. The following is apparently the full story: http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones.pdf I can't tell > for sure - it's the German original, and my German is non-existent. The high level summary is that phones contain a great deal of interesting information, that they can target IPhone and Android phone, and that after some pretty long efforts they can hack the Blackberry too. Bottom line, get a Windows Phone... - -- Christian Huitema -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.20 (MingW32) Comment: Using gpg4o v3.1.107.3564 - http://www.gpg4o.de/ Charset: utf-8 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJSLUz0AAoJELba05IUOHVQTvUH/2XXo92DcMKpWUQ/8q4dg8BY 4B+/ytLy8tpBH33lT+u1yTpnLH/OV0h6mQdIusMun94JugGlJiePe0yC6zcsEE+s OgU1SNdvqRoc5whTiV6ZIMfoOakyzeLPonS+gZ6hOWBLjQf52JNVHE4ERWTOK5un iymLK36wTFqHceF6+iVrJEwaYEvLURpUB2U3dghC5OJyQzf5yqCvdYP18iStz2WT woSJikGps2dS7eV6vPtkqhar5EWXHpPPAYwZbDskuMx10Y8Z8ET+HTFAw5rV3d3L 925adBWQLjR73wpANRyH85LtsK6nJlJzW0D1IMBmFyOqKZsOxjZQ75dAyi4oE+o= =/S/b -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
TextTell - 1983 - Encrypted Text Transmission
In my collection I have : TextTell - 1983 - Encrypted Text Transmission via Acoustic Coupler to Telephone mouthpiece ( for Transmission ) and Telephone receiver ( for Reception ) Forbidden by the (then West) German BKA for showing at CeBIT 1983 fair at Hannover Photos on http://picasaweb.google.nl/nap210534/TextTell Hope that someone can inform me on which algorithm and which keylenght was used on these units. T.I.A. Nap van Zuuren - Gent - Belgium [EMAIL PROTECTED] - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
CORRECTION / RE: Qualified Certificate Request
CORRECTION: You are right about the (real life) notaries function, still being necessary. As far as I am informed, by my contributorship within CEN & ETSI -EESSI and CEN-NIS, there is still no solution for (very) long TERM Storage AND RETRIEVAL of documents, key pairs, certificates, relating algorithms, software used etc. Greetings, Nap -Original Message- From: Florian Weimer [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, July 22, 2005 7:42 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com Subject:Re: Qualified Certificate Request * Nap van Zuuren: > Might be a nice (intellectual) crypto-exercise, but I am afraid that the > concept of the Qualified Signature will not get a widespread > implementation, expect for very specific areas/disciplines. That's by design, all those notaries public don't like being replaced by smartcards. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. Version: 7.0.338 / Virus Database: 267.9.4/57 - Release Date: 22/07/2005 -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. Version: 7.0.338 / Virus Database: 267.9.7/60 - Release Date: 28/07/2005 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Qualified Certificate Request
Might be a nice (intellectual) crypto-exercise, but I am afraid that the concept of the Qualified Signature will not get a widespread implementation, expect for very specific areas/disciplines. The main problem with the Qualified Certificate (overhere in Europe) is the fact that the creating components have to obtain - as a minimum - Common Criteria EAL4 ( Evaluated -Security- Assurance Level ) qualification; and the lack of "card-readers" on User equipment. On the European "exercise", started by a Directive of the European Commission see: http://www.ictsb.org/EESSI_home.htm On Common (Security) Criteria, see: http://csrc.nist.gov/cc/ Greetings, Nap - Gent - Belgium -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. Version: 7.0.323 / Virus Database: 267.9.2/55 - Release Date: 21/07/2005 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]