Op 13 sep. 2013, om 21:23 heeft Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com het
volgende geschreven:
On Fri, 13 Sep 2013 08:08:38 +0200 Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org
wrote:
Why e.g. SWIFT is not running on one time pads is beyond me.
I strongly suspect that delivering them securely to the vast number
of endpoints involved and then securing the endpoints as well would
..
The problem these days is not that something like AES is not good
enough for our purposes. The problem is that we too often build a
While most documents on Swift its move from something very akin to OTP (called
BKE) seem no longer to be on the internet; the documents:
http://web.archive.org/web/20070218160712/http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?item_id=57203
and
http://web.archive.org/web/20070928013437/http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?item_id=61595
should give you a good introduction; and outline quite clearly what
organisational issues they where (and to this day stil are) in essence trying
to solve.
I found them quite good readings - with a lot of (often) implicit governance
requirements which have wider applicability. And in all fairness - quite a
good example of an 'open' PKi in that specific setting if you postulate you
trust SWIFT only so-so as a fair/honest broker of information - yet want to
keep it out of the actual money path. A separation of roles/duties which some
of the internet PKI's severly lack.
Dw.
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