[cryptography] OT: Feds probe alleged hacking theft of Romney's tax returns
I know this is off topic - my apologies "Feds probe alleged hacking theft of Romney's tax returns," http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57506843-83/feds-probe-alleged-hacking-theft-of-romneys-tax-returns/ A follow up message posted yesterday [on PasteBin] said the files [Romney's 1040 tax returns] were accessed from the PWC [Price Waterhouse Cooper] network file servers and would be released in encrypted form to major news media outlets. The encrypted key to open the files would be released publicly unless Romney paid the hackers $1 million by transferring that amount -- in the virtual currency called Bitcoins -- to a specific account. However, if someone else wants the information to be released publicly sooner than that, they would need to transfer the same amount to a different Bitcoin account, the message said. ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [cryptography] Can there be a cryptographic "dead man switch"?
And make sure there are multiple internet connections to the hidden servers. Adam On Thu, Sep 06, 2012 at 03:40:23AM +0100, StealthMonger wrote: Good argument. Thanks. It makes Natanael's solution, or some variant of it, all the more appealing. Keep Natanael's servers secret, such as on scattered Virtual Private Servers. They read the Grantor's signed messages from a message pool such as alt.anonymous.messages and use that channel also to communicate among themselves, outputting via anonymizing remailers. The adversary wouldn't know which of the world's internet connections to pull. When the servers agree that the Grantor is dead, they release the secret, encrypted all the while with the Trustee's key. ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
