Re: [cryptography] Can there be a cryptographic dead man switch?
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 mhey...@gmail.com mhey...@gmail.com writes: ... and the trustee (that I never really trusted) ... Actually, Trustee may prefer to have no access to the secret so as to be above suspicion if some of the gold should disappear. - -- -- StealthMonger stealthmon...@nym.mixmin.net Long, random latency is part of the price of Internet anonymity. anonget: Is this anonymous browsing, or what? http://groups.google.ws/group/alt.privacy.anon-server/msg/073f34abb668df33?dmode=sourceoutput=gplain stealthmail: Hide whether you're doing email, or when, or with whom. mailto:stealthsu...@nym.mixmin.net?subject=send%20index.html Key: mailto:stealthsu...@nym.mixmin.net?subject=send%20stealthmonger-key -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.5.9 http://mailcrypt.sourceforge.net/ iEUEARECAAYFAlBd6UEACgkQDkU5rhlDCl5GZgCeIScQG+YT+FnX4swb9VpoA3r6 rLUAl1Yw38Zt7A+5ULNfbjSfYfZWN8A= =08BZ -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [cryptography] Can there be a cryptographic dead man switch?
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com writes: On 2012-09-05 11:51 PM, StealthMonger wrote: Can there be a cryptographic dead man switch? A secret is to be revealed only if/when signed messages stop appearing. It is to be cryptographically strong and not rely on a trusted other party. Such a system cannot exist: Obviously the messages have to appear on the system that contains the secret. Pull the internet connection. Counter-measures to Donald's dilemma have so far involved servers too hidden or numerous to simply pull the internet connection. Another approach is for the server to be too big to fail, i.e. public and widely used, so that a whole business would be destroyed if the Internet connection were pulled. It wouldn't take much capability in such a server to allow Grantor to create a robot there which gives Trustee access to the secret, but only if it doesn't hear from the Grantor for some time. With suitable permissions, the Trustee can even be given read-only access the whole while to everything except to the secret itself, so that Trustee can assure herself that it's all actually there. Are there existing public servers that can provide this functionality? Google mail? Zooko's Tahoe? - -- -- StealthMonger stealthmon...@nym.mixmin.net Long, random latency is part of the price of Internet anonymity. anonget: Is this anonymous browsing, or what? http://groups.google.ws/group/alt.privacy.anon-server/msg/073f34abb668df33?dmode=sourceoutput=gplain stealthmail: Hide whether you're doing email, or when, or with whom. mailto:stealthsu...@nym.mixmin.net?subject=send%20index.html Key: mailto:stealthsu...@nym.mixmin.net?subject=send%20stealthmonger-key -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.5.9 http://mailcrypt.sourceforge.net/ iEYEARECAAYFAlBd+C8ACgkQDkU5rhlDCl4gmQCeNRJga4jKwFecbsYWi1LgUSv6 eYsAniTaSeZ8raCBfENb9H+hgdfZ+bxB =rty8 -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [cryptography] Can there be a cryptographic dead man switch?
I can not imagine anything inherently trustable. I do not want to trust that single server won't be hacked, tapped by NSA or raided by FBI. Den 22 sep 2012 22:49 skrev StealthMonger stealthmon...@nym.mixmin.net: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com writes: On 2012-09-05 11:51 PM, StealthMonger wrote: Can there be a cryptographic dead man switch? A secret is to be revealed only if/when signed messages stop appearing. It is to be cryptographically strong and not rely on a trusted other party. Such a system cannot exist: Obviously the messages have to appear on the system that contains the secret. Pull the internet connection. Counter-measures to Donald's dilemma have so far involved servers too hidden or numerous to simply pull the internet connection. Another approach is for the server to be too big to fail, i.e. public and widely used, so that a whole business would be destroyed if the Internet connection were pulled. It wouldn't take much capability in such a server to allow Grantor to create a robot there which gives Trustee access to the secret, but only if it doesn't hear from the Grantor for some time. With suitable permissions, the Trustee can even be given read-only access the whole while to everything except to the secret itself, so that Trustee can assure herself that it's all actually there. Are there existing public servers that can provide this functionality? Google mail? Zooko's Tahoe? - -- -- StealthMonger stealthmon...@nym.mixmin.net Long, random latency is part of the price of Internet anonymity. anonget: Is this anonymous browsing, or what? http://groups.google.ws/group/alt.privacy.anon-server/msg/073f34abb668df33?dmode=sourceoutput=gplain stealthmail: Hide whether you're doing email, or when, or with whom. mailto:stealthsu...@nym.mixmin.net?subject=send%20index.html Key: mailto:stealthsu...@nym.mixmin.net?subject=send%20stealthmonger-key -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.5.9 http://mailcrypt.sourceforge.net/ iEYEARECAAYFAlBd+C8ACgkQDkU5rhlDCl4gmQCeNRJga4jKwFecbsYWi1LgUSv6 eYsAniTaSeZ8raCBfENb9H+hgdfZ+bxB =rty8 -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [cryptography] Can there be a cryptographic dead man switch?
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Natanael natanae...@gmail.com writes: I do not want to trust that single server won't be hacked, tapped by NSA or raided by FBI. I absolutely agree. But the adversary here is nothing like NSA or FBI, and the stakes are nowhere near threats to any State, and nobody has reason to believe otherwise. Remember, this is basically a friendly agreement between Grantor and Trustee and in the category of good fences make good neighbors. Of course, the Trustee, to whose key the secret is encrypted the whole while, has to use a strong key to keep third parties out. - -- -- StealthMonger stealthmon...@nym.mixmin.net Long, random latency is part of the price of Internet anonymity. anonget: Is this anonymous browsing, or what? http://groups.google.ws/group/alt.privacy.anon-server/msg/073f34abb668df33?dmode=sourceoutput=gplain stealthmail: Hide whether you're doing email, or when, or with whom. mailto:stealthsu...@nym.mixmin.net?subject=send%20index.html Key: mailto:stealthsu...@nym.mixmin.net?subject=send%20stealthmonger-key -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.5.9 http://mailcrypt.sourceforge.net/ iEYEARECAAYFAlBeLwgACgkQDkU5rhlDCl6z4wCdFwSXhSi1FarU53U/mlJelwKX MN4AnA93gcQ5AnepfiFMq4S5l2K6KGq1 =L1pU -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [cryptography] Can there be a cryptographic dead man switch?
In that case Anonymous and other hacker groups is your problem. Den 23 sep 2012 01:37 skrev StealthMonger stealthmon...@nym.mixmin.net: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Natanael natanae...@gmail.com writes: I do not want to trust that single server won't be hacked, tapped by NSA or raided by FBI. I absolutely agree. But the adversary here is nothing like NSA or FBI, and the stakes are nowhere near threats to any State, and nobody has reason to believe otherwise. Remember, this is basically a friendly agreement between Grantor and Trustee and in the category of good fences make good neighbors. Of course, the Trustee, to whose key the secret is encrypted the whole while, has to use a strong key to keep third parties out. - -- -- StealthMonger stealthmon...@nym.mixmin.net Long, random latency is part of the price of Internet anonymity. anonget: Is this anonymous browsing, or what? http://groups.google.ws/group/alt.privacy.anon-server/msg/073f34abb668df33?dmode=sourceoutput=gplain stealthmail: Hide whether you're doing email, or when, or with whom. mailto:stealthsu...@nym.mixmin.net?subject=send%20index.html Key: mailto:stealthsu...@nym.mixmin.net?subject=send%20stealthmonger-key -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.5.9 http://mailcrypt.sourceforge.net/ iEYEARECAAYFAlBeLwgACgkQDkU5rhlDCl6z4wCdFwSXhSi1FarU53U/mlJelwKX MN4AnA93gcQ5AnepfiFMq4S5l2K6KGq1 =L1pU -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography