Source discrimination.
My search is not directly related to cryptography, except perhaps, as part of the stegonograph y threads: Does anyone know of a source package that can discriminate vocal/ambient noise sources from musical/instrumental sources? Ie, instruments vs voice? I'm aware of various canned bandpass approaches, which work (sorta) for karoke use, but don't quite work for what I'm trying to do. (I want to preserve both channels for separate analysis.) -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Stegdetect 0.4 released and results from USENET search available
I download all of alt.anonymous.messages from the same news server that large numbers of people post and download child porn on. It might be that child porn posted to these lists is the most attractive vehicle as it is illegal everywhere, it will not be downloaded at random, those who do download it will be damned careful in where they keep it and how they use it, those who do not want it won't touch it, and the endlessly repetitious nature of the imagery makes it unlikely that those not looking for the special version with the embedded hidden message would bother taking down yet another copy. --dan - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Source discrimination.
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Sat, 29 Dec 2001 23:44:08 -0500 My search is not directly related to cryptography, except perhaps, as part of the stegonograph y threads: Does anyone know of a source package that can discriminate vocal/ambient noise sources from musical/instrumental sources? Ie, instruments vs voice? I'm aware of various canned bandpass approaches, which work (sorta) for karoke use, but don't quite work for what I'm trying to do. (I want to preserve both channels for separate analysis.) Not exactly what you're looking for, but it might give you somewhere to look... In the early '70s there was work done at the University of Utah by a doctoral candidate (first name 'Tony' - I forget the last name) separating voice from music. He used a recording by Caruso from the early part of the 1900's as his data source. Tony succeeded. Had the voice on one channel with the music on the other. Used a digital FFT to make the discrimination. The FFT was compiled in Fortran and ran under DEC Tenex in a standalone mode on a PDP-10. (To give you the time frame) About this same time, also at the University of Utah, Barry Wessler made a 'Hidden line' algorithm that also ran on the same setup. Barry made a 30 second animation of a biplane doing a barrel roll to show that the hidden line algorithm worked. Regards, Gregory Hicks -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED] - Gregory Hicks | Principal Systems Engineer Cadence Design Systems | Direct: 408.576.3609 555 River Oaks Pkwy M/S 6B1 | Fax: 408.894.3479 San Jose, CA 95134 | Internet: [EMAIL PROTECTED] There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit. - Robert Woodruff The trouble with doing anything right the first time is that nobody appreciates how difficult it was. When a team of dedicated individuals makes a commitment to act as one... the sky's the limit. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Source discrimination.
You might have some luck with ProSoniq's sonicWORX Studio, which I'm pretty certain can do this. -- Ben -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:owner- [EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Saturday, December 29, 2001 11:44 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Source discrimination. My search is not directly related to cryptography, except perhaps, as part of the stegonograph y threads: Does anyone know of a source package that can discriminate vocal/ambient noise sources from musical/instrumental sources? Ie, instruments vs voice? I'm aware of various canned bandpass approaches, which work (sorta) for karoke use, but don't quite work for what I'm trying to do. (I want to preserve both channels for separate analysis.) -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED] - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Source discrimination.
Oops -- sorry, I forgot to send the link; they are at www.prosoniq.de. -- Ben -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:owner- [EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of Ben Cox Sent: Sunday, December 30, 2001 2:07 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: Source discrimination. You might have some luck with ProSoniq's sonicWORX Studio, which I'm pretty certain can do this. -- Ben -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:owner- [EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Saturday, December 29, 2001 11:44 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Source discrimination. My search is not directly related to cryptography, except perhaps, as part of the stegonograph y threads: Does anyone know of a source package that can discriminate vocal/ambient noise sources from musical/instrumental sources? Ie, instruments vs voice? I'm aware of various canned bandpass approaches, which work (sorta) for karoke use, but don't quite work for what I'm trying to do. (I want to preserve both channels for separate analysis.) -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED] - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED] - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Steganography covert communications - Between Silk and Cyanide
generally, imagine you are a consultant to some nefarious organization and think about what it would take to convince them that the method you propose is safe, capable of being taught to their covert agents, and tolerant of the inevitable slip ups in the field (and remember their attitude toward warrantee disclaimers). Along these lines I can't help but recommend reading one of the best crypto books of the last few years: Between Silk and Cyanide Leo Marks, 1999 This wonderful, funny, serious, and readable book was written by the chief cryptographer for the 'nefarious organization' in England which ran covert agents all over Europe during WW2 -- the Special Operations Executive. He found upon arriving (as a teenager) that agents were constantly dying in the field because of poor codes and poor encryption and radio transmission practices. Their bad systems had been penetrated for years, and in some countries such as the Netherlands, all of their agents had been killed or captured by the Germans. He shored up their poor systems until he could work around the bureacracy to get them replaced. He taught the receiving code clerks in England how to decode even garbled messages, rather than asking agents to re-send them. (Re-sends of the same text gave the enemy even more trivial ways to crack the codes.) He trained each outgoing agent in good coding practices, then watched heartbroken as many were captured. He independently reinvented one-time pads, and had them printed on silk. They could be sewn into the linings of clothing for non-detection even during searches by the enemy, and so that as each part was used, it could be cut off and burned to keep previous messages secret (providing forward secrecy). Leo Marks died almost a year ago, but fortunately he wrote down much of the practical knowledge that came from making and breaking codes for a covert organization working in a very hostile environment. Here is his AP obituary: http://surf.bookwire.com/news/authors/2001/01/22/wstm-/2440-1571-Britain-Obit-Marks..html John Gilmore - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: CFP: PKI research workshop
another aspect that overlaps PKIs and quality is the difference between application code and service code turning an application into a service can be hard possibly writing 4-10 times as much code as in the base application infrastructure and very high-quality code dealing with potentially very complex failure modes. Related thread (buffer overflow) has been running in the sci.crypt newsgroups. partial reference: http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#93 Buffer overflow http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#91 Buffer overflow http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#90 Buffer overflow also an older thread regarding assurance in application and digital signature authentication http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn1 Assurance, e-commerce, and some x9.59 http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn2 Assurance, e-commerce, and some x9.59 http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn3 Assurance, e-commerce, and some x9.59 http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn4 assurance, x9.59, etc [EMAIL PROTECTED] at 12?29/2001 3:22 pm wrote: Now, an interesting thing might be regarding rapid uptake of general security. One could contend that majority of the market believes that good, strong security should be an attribute of the basic infrastructure ... somewhat like the issue of automobile quality in the '70s, not going to pay any more for it ... but would migrate to a manufactor that had significantly better quality. You then have the 1) vendors that don't see quality as worth while since they won't be able to charge more 2) new vendors that would like to sell quality as a stand-alone attribute ... not actually having to manufactor automobiles but somehow convince customers that they can sell quality independent of any product, and 3) vendors that feel that they can eventually gain market share by providing better quality. Substitute security and/or PKI in place of quality. Part of the issue is that security (and strong authentication) should be an attribute of the basic infrastructure ... not something that exists by itself in a vacuum. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: CFP: PKI research workshop
somewhat as an aside the gift cards (and other flavors) that you see at large percentage of retail check-out counters in the US are effectively digital cash ... although the current incarnation results in a different card at every retailer. however, they are online, magstripe-based digital cash utilizing the same ubquituous point-of-sale infrastructure as debit credit (it is just that the transaction routing goes to different online transaction processing than credit debit). The issue of whether or not it would be possible to use any card at any merchant is more of a business rule issue than a technology issue. note from a higher assurance standpoint ... the x9.59 work is applicable to all electronic transactions whether they are credit, debit, e-check, OR (online) digital cash ... AND x9.59 transactions could flow over both existing ubiquituous point-of-sale network and/or a ubiquituous internet network (or any other kind of network). random refs: http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/index.html#x959 http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/index.html#aads [EMAIL PROTECTED] on 12/28/2001 4:50 pm wrote: A local financial branch implementation and a digital cash implementation might have a number of similar useability attributes aka from the standpoint of how local funds do you have immediately available aka funds are transferred into you local PDA as digital cash for immediate use or funds are transferred into the local financial institution for immediate use. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: CFP: PKI research workshop
Arnold G. Reinhold [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: The EWR monorail had been shut down for the better part of a year to correct a pesky track corrosion problem (it's hard to get all the bugs out of a system that is not widely used). Thus making it a perfect analogy for PKI [0]. Peter. [0] Before people flame me for this, what's currently widely-used is what's in X.509v1 modulo CRL support. Anything else, you're on your own. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Steganography covert communications - Between Silk and Cyanide
At 02:59 PM 12/30/01 -0800, John Gilmore wrote: Along these lines I can't help but recommend reading one of the best crypto books of the last few years: Between Silk and Cyanide Leo Marks, 1999 This wonderful, funny, serious, and readable book was written by the chief cryptographer for the 'nefarious organization' in England which ran covert agents all over Europe during WW2 -- the Special Operations Executive. One of the more interesting conclusions of Marks is that different cognitive types require different kinds of instruction in crypto techniques ---some learned rote behavior, some needed reasons. One of the more poignant parts of his memoirs is that he knew that half his pupils would be dead soon after dropping. Another is his worries when trying to figure if someone behind the lines had been compromised (and their directions should not be followed) or they are merely forgetful or stressed. He would refer to their records during study, to see the kinds of errors they made, to help him decide. A very very good book. Unbeknown to the latter, Marks had already cracked General de Gaulle's private cypher in a spare moment on the lavatory. -from the obit of Leo Marks, cryptographer - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
