Re: Run a remailer, go to jail?
> So there are no FedEx drop boxes in D.C.?? no pickups at hotels etc?? It is not possible to use the drop boxes anonymously, because you must give an account number or credit card number as payment. -- Shields. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Run a remailer, go to jail?
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "dave" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Will FedEx now require an ID before sending packages? At least in Washington, DC, Fedex already requires an ID before sending packages. -- Shields. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: DeCSS, crypto, law, and economics
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Phil Karn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Exactly. Time segmentation already practiced by the movie studios and > book publishers, and it's pretty hard to arbitrage -- until somebody > invents time travel. For books and CDs -- and as the region coding system breaks down, increasingly for DVDs as well -- only shipping costs and market illiquidity protect the segmentation. And markets are becoming more liquid, even at the consumer level. For example, I routinely order the European editions of books from amazon.co.uk, for example, instead of waiting for them to be published in the US. This is exactly as easy as buying from amazon.com; they even accept the same login. -- Shields. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: limits of watermarking (Re: First Steganographic Image in the Wild)
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > b) Even if physical media goes away, individual watermarking blows away > multicast - and broadband will just never work without that. It is true that broadband isn't viable if it requires a high-bandwidth from one source to every end user; the stream has to be exploded at some replication points near the viewers. But that replication doesn't have to be done by the routers; it can also happen at a distributed network of servers, which can be intelligent enough to add watermarking at a cost on the same order of the cost to provide SSL. This sort of server-based multicasting is widely deployed today by Akamai and others, and has been far more successful than router-based multicasting. -- Shields. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Which internet services were used?
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Perry E. Metzger" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > These same people ignore the fact that the US economy, and indeed the > world economy, could no longer function without encryption. I am not sure that it is accurate to say that the world economy will grind to a halt without encryption. It would suffer massive truly fraud losses, just as credit cards currently experience massive fraud due to their use of a single fixed account number. But given the current mood in the US, the public might even be prepared to accept huge economic losses -- if it made them feel safer. An effective argument against crypto restrictions must be on the grounds that new laws would not help fight terrorism. It is very difficult to convince people with a cost-side argument, because the effects of a successful terrorist attack can be viewed as nearly infinite. The public will only be strongly opposed to new measures if they feel that they are ineffective. -- Shields. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]