Cryptography-Digest Digest #738
Cryptography-Digest Digest #738, Volume #13 Fri, 23 Feb 01 14:13:00 EST
Contents:
Re: New unbreakable code from Rabin? ("Tony T. Warnock")
Re: New unbreakable code from Rabin? (Bill Unruh)
á÷ôïûéîù éú ñðïîéé, îå äïòïçï!!! ("kononec")
Re: looking for 16-bit RNG... ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: New unbreakable code from Rabin? ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Comments on Rabin's proposal ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: The Key Vanishes: Scientist Outlines Unbreakable Code, Read it and ("Douglas A.
Gwyn")
Random numbers from your sound card ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: super-stong crypto, straw man phase 2 (John Myre)
fiat shamir (zipa)
Open-SSH(portable) and EGD ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: New unbreakable code from Rabin? ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Any alternatives to PGP? (Alberto)
Re: Super strong crypto (JPeschel)
Re: Any alternatives to PGP? ("Sam Simpson")
Re: Random numbers from your sound card (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Powers of Complex Associative Functions (Jim Steuert)
From: "Tony T. Warnock" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: New unbreakable code from Rabin?
Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2001 10:18:30 -0700
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Page 107778788373812 of "Gone With the Solar Wind"
--
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bill Unruh)
Subject: Re: New unbreakable code from Rabin?
Date: 23 Feb 2001 17:25:22 GMT
In <8Uol6.20332$[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wint <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
writes:
>In article <3a93968d$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] says...
>> John Savard <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>> > Obviously, any random bit stream two participants are capable of
>> > exchanging is capable of being stored by an adversary.
>>
>> The point is that this isn't such a bit stream.
>> No one generates, transmits or exchanges this bit stream.
>> They only exchange information on how to extract a bit
>> stream from a transient, public pool of random data.
Both people need access to it. Since it is public, so does a third
person, and can record it. "Noone can record that much data" is in the
same league as "no one can factor numbers". Ie, it may well be
unbreakable in practice, but in theory it is as breakable as any
other scheme. It sounds like an attempt at creating a one time pad from
a public source. While the pad is provably secure IF the pad is not
known, in this case the pad is a known subset of a large number of pads
(actually not that large, since the number of reliable public random
bitstreams is not that great-- remember both parties must be able to
reliably extract the same bitstream from the public source, and such
reliable bitstreams are not that common.)
--
From: "kononec" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To:
relcom.www.users,relcom.x,sci,soc,soc.culture,soc.culture.brazil,soc.culture.irish,soc.culture.israel,soc.culture.scottish
Subject: á÷ôïûéîù éú ñðïîéé, îå äïòïçï!!!
Date: Sat, 24 Feb 2001 02:32:20 +1000
þð "ëÏÎÏÎÅÃ" ÐÒÅÄÌÁÇÁÅÔ ËÏÎÔÒÁËÔÎÙÅ ÐÏÓÔÁ×ËÉ ËÒÕÐÎÙÍ É ÍÅÌËÉÍ ÏÐÔÏÍ Á×ÔÏÛÉÎ
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×ÉÄÏ×. ôÏ×ÁÒ ×Ù ÍÏÖÅÔÅ ÐÒÉÏÂÒÅÓÔÉ ÎÁ ÓËÌÁÄÅ ÐÏ ÁÄÒÅÓÕ: ç. ÷ÌÁÄÉ×ÏÓÔÏË, ÕÌ.
äÎÅÐÒÏÐÅÔÒÏ×ÓËÁÑ 19, ÓËÌÁÄ óÅ×ÅÒÏÔÏÒÇÁ, × Ò-ÎÅ. âÁÍÁ. ôÅÌÅÆÏÎ: 8(22)
46-72-89
mail-to:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.primrek.by.ru
--
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: looking for 16-bit RNG...
Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2001 16:55:26 GMT
Rik Blok wrote:
> Does anybody know of a simple and fast 16-bit pseudo-random number
> generator I could use? There are more constraints: I want to use it on
> a Lego Mindstorms robot which can only handle 16-bit integers (and only
> has enough storage for 32 of them...and no support for arrays). I was
> thinking something like a linear congruential generator but is there
> anything better? If I do use a LCG what are some good constants to use?
Your choices are basically LCG or shift-register. Here is a LCG
implementation; like any 16-bit PRNG it is not of crypto quality.
However, it may be enough for the LEGO MindStorms robot (which by
the way is a great toy for adults).
static unsigned Next16 = 1; /* current state (seed) */
unsigned Rand16( void ) { /* returns "random" value 0 .. 65535 */
return Next16 = (Next16 * 15245 + 12345) & 0x;
}
--
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: New unbreakable code from Rabin?
Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2001 16:56:21 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> I think we can agree that the "random" bit stream must come
> from a completely trusted sou
Cryptography-Digest Digest #738
Cryptography-Digest Digest #738, Volume #12 Fri, 22 Sep 00 07:13:01 EDT
Contents:
Re: Software patents are evil. (David Rush)
Re: Again a topic of disappearing e-mail? (Runu Knips)
Re: t ("Trevor L. Jackson, III")
Re: What am I missing? (Sagie)
Re: PGP 6.5.8 source code published ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: CDMA tracking (was Re: GSM tracking) (Sagie)
Re: Maximal security for a resources-limited microcontroller (Sagie)
Re: Maximal security for a resources-limited microcontroller (Sagie)
Re: Tying Up Loose Ends - Correction (Tim Tyler)
Re: Maximal security for a resources-limited microcontroller (Paul Rubin)
From: David Rush <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Software patents are evil.
Date: 22 Sep 2000 10:23:19 +0100
"Trevor L. Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Bill Unruh wrote:
> > In <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> "Trevor L. Jackson, III"
> > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> > Patents had has almost nothing to do with software until
> > recently. Yet, you could not say that software has suffered in the
> > US.
>
> Devil's advocate position. Resolved: that the low quality of US
> software is due to the lack of an effective protection for
> intellectual property.
Oooh. I feel the first rumblings of a paradigm shift.
> dominated by cost differences. So a company that prices its
> software higher than the competition to cover serious development
I've been there. My first startup, back in 1985 had this problem. That
was when I concluded that the American myth of the better mousetrap
was false, and that better salesman were the ones who truly get
rewarded. u$oft has only confirmed my suspicions.
> Effective IP would restore the balance between quality and cost and
> reduce the domination of the first-to-market mentality.
Actually, you could easily extend your argument to say that the
open source movement has come about due to that first-to-market
mentality. I know for myself, that If I'm looking for high-quality
software I'll take a mature open source project any day of the week.
And I work on open source because I *can* produce good work without
having to deal with the 'first is better than best' reality of the
software marketplace.
Of course this also implies that Richard Stallman has propagated more
evil than Bill Gates...
> Conclusion: I can say that software has suffered in the US if low
> quality counts as suffering.
I am definitely feeling some rumblings in my paradigm.
david rush
--
Next to the right of liberty, the right of property is the most
important individual right ... and ... has contributed more to the
growth of civilization than any other institution established by the
human race.
-- Popular Government (William Howard Taft)
--
Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2000 11:30:32 +0200
From: Runu Knips <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Again a topic of disappearing e-mail?
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> Email users will soon be able to erase the messages they send
> from the recipient's hard drive using software called SafeMessage
> that a company called AbsoluteFuture is releasing today.
> SafeMessage destroys messages within a certain amount of time
> after the recipient opens them, erasing all footprints on PC
> hard drives and computer servers, says AbsoluteFuture CEO Graham
> Andrews. Law enforcement officials worry that criminals and
> terrorists will use SafeMessage to conceal their communications,
> arguing that fighting crime effectively in the digital age
> requires email tracing. Meanwhile, privacy advocates applaud
> the new software. One oil executive says he uses a beta version
> of SafeMessage to prevent rivals from accessing his messages.
>http://www.usatoday.com/usatonline/2920/2662888s.htm
Pfft as if this is something noticeable. Using PGP and removing
the email by hand has the same effect, doesn't it ?
--
Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2000 05:43:19 -0400
From: "Trevor L. Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: t
John Savard wrote:
> On Thu, 21 Sep 2000 16:34:39 GMT, "John R."
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>
> >> But the plot is cliched. I can guess how the book begins. Something
> >> like:
>
> >> T
> >> NNT
> >> NF
> >> TOT
> >> TOF
> >> FOT
> >> TIT
> >> FIT
> >> FIF
> >> TET
> >> FEF
> >> TAT
> >> LTR
> >> LNNTR
> >> LNFR
> >> LTOTR
> >> LTOFR
> >> LFOTR
> >> LTITR
> >> LFITR
> >> LFIFR
> >> LTETR
> >> LFEFR
> >> LTATR
> >&
Cryptography-Digest Digest #738
Cryptography-Digest Digest #738, Volume #11 Tue, 9 May 00 07:13:01 EDT
Contents:
Re: Scary Possibility: Ticklish Chips (Paul Rubin)
high speed public key crypto ("Mehdi Sotoodeh")
Re: Why no civilian GPS anti-spoofing? / proposal (Paul Rubin)
Re: Scary Possibility: Ticklish Chips (Volker Hetzer)
Extended Euclidian Algorithm In C, C++ or Java ("Lewis-Oakes")
Prime Generation in C,C++ or Java ("Lewis-Oakes")
Re: Extended Euclidian Algorithm In C, C++ or Java (Eric Hambuch)
Re: Generator for ElGamal? (Eric Hambuch)
Re: Prime Generation in C,C++ or Java (Eric Hambuch)
Re: high speed public key crypto (Eric Hambuch)
Re: Q: Searching for authentication protocols (=?iso-8859-1?Q?Tom=B4s?= Perlines
Hormann)
Re: Newbie question about primes ("JoeC")
Re: An argument for multiple AES winners ("Simon Johnson")
Re: An argument for multiple AES winners ("Simon Johnson")
RSA ("Simon Johnson")
Re: RSA (Soeren Mors)
Re: Extended Euclidian Algorithm In C, C++ or Java ("Simon Johnson")
F function. ("Simon Johnson")
Re: Is this random? ("Simon Johnson")
Re: F function. (Tom St Denis)
Re: Is there a Commercially Available Tranposition Program ("Simon Johnson")
Re: Is there a Commercially Available Tranposition Program (Tom St Denis)
Re: Making Java & C Serpent code compatible? (Gisle Sælensminde)
Re: Hardware RNG (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Extended Euclidian Algorithm In C, C++ or Java (John Bailey)
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Paul Rubin)
Subject: Re: Scary Possibility: Ticklish Chips
Date: 9 May 2000 07:51:17 GMT
In article <8f802p$rdc$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, zapzing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Here's something to keep you awake at night: What if some of the
>chips for doing DES etc. have been made "ticklish" , that is what if
>some sort of irritant, such as a dose of radiation or an electrical
>input that is out of band would prompt the chip to divulge its key.
>This could be bad if bad guys manage to steal your (otherwise tamper
>proof) encryption device. Any ideas on how to prevent this, (other
>than by just trying to make your packaging impervious to all possible
>tickles, which seems to me to be pretty hopeless) ?
That's called differential fault analysis and it's a serious problem
for smart card manufacturers. Several papers have been written about it.
For modules with more complicated packaging than smart cards, it's easier
to protect against, though I don't think any type of hardware tamper
resistance can stop a really determined and rich attacker.
--
From: "Mehdi Sotoodeh" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: high speed public key crypto
Date: Tue, 09 May 2000 07:59:37 GMT
I have found a new public key crypto system that is fast, easy to implement
and requires low level of system resources.
I am looking for someone who is interested to work on this as a joint
project. I specifically need help on evaluation and publication of the
project.
Please let me know if you are interested.
Mehdi Sotoodeh.
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
--
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Paul Rubin)
Crossposted-To: sci.geo.satellite-nav
Subject: Re: Why no civilian GPS anti-spoofing? / proposal
Date: 9 May 2000 08:08:32 GMT
In article ,
Mxsmanic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>"Paul Rubin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
>news:8f35o6$o7i$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>
>> I'd like to propose that civilian signals on
>> the new carriers have public-key digital signatures,
>> signed by the satellites.
>
>Just what part would you sign, exactly? Public-key encryption is not
>appropriate for every application.
Dunno. I leave that to GPS experts. I do see some of the obvious
obstacles but maybe not all of them. I have some ideas for getting
around the obstacles but they're probably naive.
>Since mission-critical navigation applications would supplement the
>satellite signals with a ground-based signal, spoofing of both would be
>no more likely than spoofing of VOR or ILS signals today, even without
>encryption. In fact, I don't remember terrorists ever spoofing any kind
>of navigation signal at all--have I missed something?
I know one thing, which is that the US military considers spoofing a
serious enough threat to PPS that the P-code encryption system is
called "anti-spoofing" rather than "encryption". That by itself makes
me feel that the civilian signal should also be authenticated, unless
there's a really strong reason not to do so.
--
From: Volker Hetzer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Scary Possibility: Ticklish Chips
Date: Tue, 09
Cryptography-Digest Digest #738
Cryptography-Digest Digest #738, Volume #10 Tue, 14 Dec 99 13:13:01 EST Contents: Re: Better encryption? PGP or Blowfish? (Tom St Denis) Re: Better encryption? PGP or Blowfish? (Tom St Denis) Re: Better encryption? PGP or Blowfish? (Tom St Denis) Re: Simple newbie crypto algorithmn (Eric Hambuch) Re: The Cracking of SecurityPlus! 4.32 (JPeschel) Re: The Code Book (Paul Schlyter) Re: Synchronised random number generation for one-time pads (Richard Herring) "The Cracking of Security Plus" completed (JPeschel) Re: Deciphering without knowing the algorithm? (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY) Re: Why no 3des for AES candidacy (Eric Lee Green) Re: Deciphering without knowing the algorithm? (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY) how easy would this encryption be to crack? (Christoffer =?iso-8859-1?Q?Lern=F6?=) How to implement different modes using the twofish algorithm? (Martin Bädeker) Re: NSA should do a cryptoanalysis of AES (Derek Bell) Re: NSA should do a cryptoanalysis of AES (Derek Bell) Looking for a DES implementation in JavaScript or VBScript ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Re: Are thermal diodes as RNG's secure (Tim Tyler) Re: Data Encryption in Applet? (Tim Tyler) Re: how easy would this encryption be to crack? (Jerry Coffin) Re: Deciphering without knowing the algorithm? (Tim Tyler) Re: Deciphering without knowing the algorithm? (albert) From: Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: Better encryption? PGP or Blowfish? Date: Tue, 14 Dec 1999 12:58:55 GMT In article <8345je$4v8$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Phillip George Geiger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > : I was just being honest. People never think twice before launching a > : flame war when I am wrong. I know two wrongs don't make a right, but > : what other response could i give? > > You could have briefly explained why his question was a bad one, and > pointed him at a FAQ. > > : His ignorant comparaison was just plain silly. > > And in the time it took you to think up that "witty" response, giggle > like the child you are, and hit "enter" - you could have posted something > far more interesting and useful to a newbie. But that's the thing, no one in sci.crypt cares about any real scientific discussion, it's just a flame war waiting to happend. Tom Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/ Before you buy. -- From: Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: Better encryption? PGP or Blowfish? Date: Tue, 14 Dec 1999 13:04:07 GMT In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Not always. Depends on the message space. > > Consider the reponse to a proposed contract. It can be encoded in a bit. > Any boolean message has this property. Some messages have even less > information. > > Consider the case of a "Go!" command. The message itself contains zero > information. The recipient is waiting for exactly this message and no > other. So the message consists of zero bits of plaintext plus whatever > authentication is necessary. > > Now consider the data rate of a channel used to transmit the Go! message. > Normally it has no data flowing through it, but there's a tacit streams of > "Not Yet!" messages that match the sampling rate of the receiver. This data > stream has no bits in it at all. Perhaps it has a stream of noise to > reassure the receiver that a mesage hasn't been missed. But there's no > information in the noise. It's just noise. > > Tough to crack such virtual messages. Ok true, I would not attack a message with 'Go!' in it. I would attack the messages that described what they should go do. Tom Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/ Before you buy. -- From: Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: Better encryption? PGP or Blowfish? Date: Tue, 14 Dec 1999 13:02:23 GMT In article <8348is$2g18$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY) wrote: >This just shows how fucking stupid you are little boy pain > in the ass. Try reading what a ZERO Iinformation system is > sometimes instead of opening your mouth. In a ZERO information > protocall the seeds are in there to solve any encryption including > that of a random file. IF you think mine has enough information > for a random file break your not only full of shit but you know > nothing about encryption. Try to learn something Tom becasue > your posts are gettting dumber and dumber and it is getting > frustracting wasting my time to try to improve your pee brain. I will just go out invent this new attack called brute force. I will win a nobel.
Cryptography-Digest Digest #738
Cryptography-Digest Digest #738, Volume #9 Sat, 19 Jun 99 09:13:02 EDT Contents: [SSL-Talk List FAQ] Secure Sockets Layer Discussion List FAQ v1.1.1 (Shannon Appel) From: Shannon Appel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Crossposted-To: alt.security,comp.security.misc,comp.protocols,comp.infosystems.www.misc,alt.answers,comp.answers,news.answers,sci.answers Subject: [SSL-Talk List FAQ] Secure Sockets Layer Discussion List FAQ v1.1.1 Date: 19 Jun 1999 12:22:31 GMT Content-type: text/x-usenet-FAQ; version=1.1; title="[SSL-Talk List FAQ] Secure Sockets Layer Discussion List FAQ v1.1.1" Archive-name: computer-security/ssl-talk-faq Posting-Frequency: monthly Last-modified: Nov 16 12:00:00 PST 1998 Version: 1.1.1 (text) Mon Nov 16 12:00:00 PST 1998 URL: http://www.consensus.com/security/ssl-talk-faq.html Copyright-Notice: (c) Copyright 1996-1998 by Consensus Development Corporation -- All Rights Reserved SSL-Talk FAQ Secure Sockets Layer Discussion List FAQ v1.1.1 Mon Nov 16 12:00:00 PST 1998 FAQ Maintained by: Shannon Appel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Consensus Development Corporation <http://www.consensus.com/> The latest edition of this FAQ can always be found at: <http://www.consensus.com/security/ssl-talk-faq.html> <http://www.consensus.com/security/ssl-talk-faq.txt> Copyright (c) 1996-1998 Consensus Development Corporation - All Rights Reserved * Due to the November 15, 1998 dissolution of the SSL-Talk mailing list, this will be the last version of this FAQ in its current form. It will be replaced by a more general TLS & SSL FAQ in the near future that is not tied to any mailing list or newsgroup. * All information contained in this work is provided "as is." All warranties, expressed, implied or statutory, concerning the accuracy of the information of the suitability for any particular use are hereby specifically disclaimed. While every effort has been taken to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this work, the authors assume(s) no responsibility for errors or omissions or for damages resulting from the use of the information contained herein. This work may be copied in any printed or electronic form for non-commercial, personal, or educational purposes if the work is not modified in any way, provided that the copyright notice, the notices of any other author included in this work, and this copyright agreement appear on all copies. Consensus Development Corporation also grants permission to distribute this work in electronic form over computer networks for other purposes, provided that, in addition to the terms and restrictions set forth above, Consensus Development Corporation and/or other cited authors are notified and that no fees are charged for access to the information in excess of normal online charges that are required for such distribution. This work may also be mentioned, cited, referred to or described (but not copied or distributed, except as authorized above) in printed publications, on-line services, other electronic communications media, and otherwise, provided that Consensus Development Corporation and any other cited author receives appropriate attribution. Comments about, suggestions about, or corrections to this document are welcomed. If you would like to ask us to change this document in some way, the method we appreciate most is for you to actually make the desired modifications to a copy of the posting, and then to send us the modified document, or a context diff between the posted version and your modified version (if you do the latter, make sure to include in your mail the "Version:" line from the posted version). Submitting changes in this way makes dealing with them easier for us and helps to avoid misunderstandings about what you are suggesting. Many people have in the past provided feedback and corrections; we thank them for their input. In particular, many thanks to: Christopher Allen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Shannon Appel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Nelson Bolyard <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Tim Dierks <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Eric Greenberg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Charles Neerdaels <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Bruce Schneier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Tom Weinstein <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Jonathan Zamic
