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Peace at any cost is a Prelude to War!

'Bush Doctrine' reshaping U.S. strategy
All foreign-policy interests take backseat to defense of homeland

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Posted: February 26, 2002
5:00 p.m. Eastern


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Although the Bush administration has seemed to be without a clear strategy
for fighting groups like al-Qaida, a doctrine is slowly emerging that will
reshape the global U.S. strategy. The defense of the United States is
Washington's top priority, with all other foreign policy interests taking a
back seat. Any nation that does not act against terror groups within its
borders will be in a virtual state of war with Washington.

Since the fall of the Taliban last year, the United States appears to have
become rudderless in its war against terrorism. Washington's strategy has
consisted of chasing down rumors about the location of al-Qaida and making
vague threats about Iraq and insinuations about Iran and North Korea. It
looks like the United States doesn't really know what to do next. But looks
can be deceiving. If you examine carefully, you can see both a doctrine and a
strategy emerging.

This is all framed by the Bush administration's view of the situation. From
where it sits, there is every reason to believe that the United States will
be attacked by al-Qaida again. Even more important, the possibility that
al-Qaida or some other anti-U.S. organization has obtained weapons of mass
destruction cannot be excluded. If that turns out to be true, then millions
of Americans may possibly be killed in the coming months or years.

The most important goal for Washington must be to make absolutely certain
that no further attacks, especially nuclear, chemical or biological, can be
launched on the United States. There is no other comparable interest. The
Bush Doctrine is based on the notion that the defense of the homeland from
attacks represents an interest so fundamental that all other foreign policy
interests must be completely subordinated.

We might summarize the Bush Doctrine this way: The United States faces an
extraordinary danger. Washington is therefore prepared to take any action
anywhere in the world to defend itself from this threat.

The defense of the homeland cannot be reduced to only defeating al-Qaida. The
Bush administration has studied the lessons of the Israeli wars on Black
September and other Palestinian groups and has drawn this conclusion: the
defeat of any single group can disrupt and delay future attacks, but it
cannot by itself eliminate them. Even if the United States were to utterly
destroy al-Qaida, a new group would likely emerge. Therefore, the United
States has three strategic goals:


Disrupt and defeat al-Qaida in order to buy time for a more thorough
solution.

Prevent the emergence of follow-on groups by denying them sanctuaries in
states where they can organize, train and plan.

Limit the threat posed by al-Qaida and follow-on groups by systematically
eliminating weapons of mass destruction being held or developed by regimes
that are favorably inclined toward them or in states where there is
substantial sympathy for them.
Beginning with the last goal, there are a finite number of nations that have
intensive programs underway to develop weapons of mass destruction and
delivery systems and that also might be prepared to aid al-Qaida. Three were
named by U.S. President George W. Bush during the State of the Union: Iraq,
Iran and North Korea. Another unnamed nation is Pakistan.

It must be assumed by the United States that the first three of these
countries are developing WMD and/or delivery systems. It cannot be ruled out
that either their governments or powerful factions within their borders might
be inclined to provide al-Qaida or other groups with these weapons for use
against the United States.

Washington requires that these and other nations that are identified
demonstrably and verifiably abandon all attempts to build weapons of mass
destruction and delivery systems. They should also convince the United States
that they will under no circumstances transfer any technology to al-Qaida or
any other group that intends covert action against the United States.

In the case of Iraq, for example, no assurances that might be made by Baghdad
could possibly carry any weight. It would therefore follow that it is the
intention of the United States to identify and directly attack any Iraqi
facilities that might be developing WMD. The recent announcement that the
United States reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if needed fits
clearly into this strategy. If it is determined that there are facilities
that cannot be destroyed by conventional means, Washington is prepared to use
nuclear weapons on them.

Intelligence is always imperfect. It is possible that sites will be hit that
do not produce WMD. This is something the United States is prepared to
accept. More serious is the possibility that all WMD sites are not
identified. So in order to minimize the risk the United States intends to
destroy the Iraqi regime by overthrowing its leadership through a variety of
military means, obviously including air strikes and special operations.

If Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is in a hardened facility, even the use of
nuclear weapons is not out of the question. A secondary and highly desirable
outcome will be replacing the Hussein regime with one that is prepared to
both abandon the development of WMD and deny sanctuary to groups planning to
attack the United States. All other considerations, both humanitarian and
geopolitical, are completely secondary to the primary goal.

Iran, North Korea and Pakistan are all in a different class from Iraq, but
still represent fundamental threats to the United States either because their
governments' actions are unpredictable or because the governments' control
over WMD facilities are uncertain. Assurances from these various regimes
cannot be taken at face value.

Therefore Iran and North Korea have been publicly warned, and we assume that
Pakistan has been privately warned, that the threat presented to the United
States by the diffusion of weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems or
partial technologies is intolerable. Each country is being given
opportunities to convince Washington that it is either not developing such
weapons or that it is prepared to put into place inspection protocols that
will guarantee non-diffusion. Barring a satisfactory solution, the United
States is prepared to take extreme military measures in each of these
countries to guarantee the elimination of threats.

Simultaneously, the United States is putting forces into place for a direct,
global attack on al-Qaida. U.S. intelligence is in the process of identifying
locales in which al-Qaida is operating, and to the extent possible
identifying precise facilities and individuals. Under the Bush Doctrine and
according to clear statements by the administration, the United States will
at a suitable time attack each of these facilities regardless of where they
are located.

If they have the support of the host government, that will be welcomed. If
the host government cannot provide support but does not hinder operations,
the United States will enter that country unilaterally. If the host country
is actively hostile to the entry of the United States, that country will be
regarded as an enemy aiding al-Qaida and its military forces will also be
subject to attack.

Washington has been allied with many countries since World War II. Historical
relationships are of significance only to the extent that the ally is
prepared to materially aid the United States in defending its physical
security. If, for example, European allies cannot countenance an attack on an
Iraq, then what will they support?

If even the destruction of Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction appear
to be too extreme a measure, then clearly the Europeans don't understand or
are indifferent to the threat to the United States. The Bush administration
will question the use of an ally who opposes steps essential to the physical
safety of the United States.

Thus, embedded in the emerging Bush Doctrine is a fundamental redefinition of
the U.S. alliance. During the Cold War, U.S. allies were judged on their
willingness to stand with the United States against the Soviets. Now they are
judged by their willingness stand with Washington not only against al-Qaida,
but the range of threats that now physically threaten the United States.

The strategy that results from this appears to be a massive onslaught on
multiple levels against al-Qaida, against countries that are intentionally or
unintentionally enablers of al-Qaida and, above all, against countries that
might be in the process of giving al-Qaida access to weapons of mass
destruction. The key to understanding this U.S. strategy is its
limitlessness. Embedded in the Bush Doctrine is the operational principle
that there is no measure too extreme given the threat that exists to the
United States.

The Bush administration thinks that extreme and limitless responses are what
is needed to prevent the emergence of follow-on organizations. Building an
organization like al-Qaida has taken years, a great deal of resources and
above all physical sanctuary. For al-Qaida, there were several bases of
operation, but Afghanistan was the most recent and best known.

A certain weakness has been identified in Washington's stance on previous
anti-U.S. groups. In the past, the United States and others treated support
for and hosting of such groups as one strand in a bilateral relationship. It
was certainly a black mark, but it was also not a reason for decisive action.

So in spite of the fact that the Syrians supported and hosted extremists
groups, the United States did not regard this by itself as a reason to launch
military action. Quite the contrary, Washington maintained a complex and
varied relationship with Syria in which it would fight to undermine these
groups while simultaneously working with the government on other matters. In
short, support for militant groups was not a threshold, but simply another
strand in the relationship.

Clearly, Bush intends to change that. Under the emerging Bush Doctrine, if a
nation supports or hosts a group that intends to attack the United States, or
if it deliberately fails to act against such a group, then that nation is in
a de facto state of war with the United States. The act of supporting or
hosting such groups is a threshold that renders all other aspects of a
bilateral relationship of no consequence. At a time and place of its
choosing, the United States will act against both the group and the state.

In order to prevent the emergence of follow-on al-Qaidas, the central feature
must be to deny them sanctuary. Ideally, as some have suggested, the United
States could work to abolish the poverty and misunderstanding that have given
rise to al-Qaida. Unfortunately, even if this were possible, there is no
time.

The threat, in the eyes of the Bush administration, is a matter of months and
the abolition of poverty is a matter of generations. Therefore, if the carrot
is impossible, then the stick will be used.

It is not clear that the Bush Doctrine will ever be formalized. But it is
increasingly apparent that the United States is moving to adopt this
strategy. It is a complete reshaping of U.S. global strategy based on the
assumption that the interests of the United States have been fundamentally
redefined by al-Qaida. An extraordinary threat has been posed. An
extraordinary solution will be implemented.

In one sense, this seems to play into al-Qaida's hands. The group's strategy
was to force the United States into a war with the Islamic world, so that its
vision of Washington as the "crusader" enemy of Islam would be validated.

The Bush strategy accepts such a risk for two reasons. First, there is no
choice. If the United States refuses to attack al-Qaida everywhere out of
fear of perceptions, then al-Qaida will be a perpetual menace. Second,
al-Qaida envisioned a series of broad attacks that were neither devastating
nor decisive. The United States is indeed launching a broad attack, but
intends to make it so stunningly decisive that it will impose a reality that
will render perception immaterial.

The Bush strategy also plays to the core strengths of the United States. The
United States is a global power and this is a global strategy. It is heavily
dependent on military power and not particularly dependent on complex
diplomatic solutions.

The last aspect is critical because, in this mode of thinking, time is of the
essence. Al-Qaida is already deployed and other attacks will happen. If it
does not yet have WMD, it is certainly trying to get them. Therefore, every
day's delay increases the possibility of catastrophe. It follows then, that
there is not an infinite amount of time available for action.




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