-Caveat Lector-
Senior Officer Points to Cultural Ignorance In an Essay Published by the
U.S. Military
By Thomas E. RicksWashington Post Staff
WriterWednesday, January 11, 2006; A17
FORT LEAVENWORTH, Kan. -- A senior British officer has written a scathing
critique of the U.S. Army and its performance in Iraq, accusing it of cultural
ignorance, moralistic self-righteousness, unproductive micromanagement and
unwarranted optimism there.
His publisher: the U.S. Army.
In an article published this week in the Army magazine Military Review,
British Brig. Nigel Aylwin-Foster, who was deputy commander of a program to
train the Iraqi military, said American officers in Iraq displayed such
"cultural insensitivity" that it "arguably amounted to institutional racism" and
may have spurred the growth of the insurgency. The Army has been slow to adapt
its tactics, he argues, and its approach during the early stages of the
occupation "exacerbated the task it now faces by alienating significant sections
of the population."
The decision by the Army magazine to publish the essay -- which already has
provoked an intense reaction among American officers -- is part of a broader
self-examination occurring in many parts of the Army as it approaches the end of
its third year of fighting in Iraq.
Military Review, which is based here along with many of the Army's
educational institutions, has been part of that examination, becoming
increasingly influential and pointed under the editorship of Col. William M.
Darley. In the past two years, his magazine has run articles that have sharply
criticized U.S. military operations in Iraq. A piece last summer by then-Iraq --
especially since Chiarelli was recently selected to become the No. 2 American
officer there.
But none of the earlier articles has been as bluntly critical of the Army as
the essay by Aylwin-Foster, whose assessment is also unusual because it Maj.
Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli about how to better counter the insurgency has become
required reading for officers deploying to comes from a senior military
commander with the closest ally the U.S. government has in Iraq.
The Army is full of soldiers showing qualities such as patriotism, duty,
passion and talent, writes Aylwin-Foster, whose rank is equivalent to a U.S.
one-star general. "Yet," he continues, "it seemed weighed down by bureaucracy, a
stiflingly hierarchical outlook, a predisposition to offensive operations, and a
sense that duty required all issues to be confronted head-on."
Those traits reflect the Army's traditional focus on conventional
state-on-state wars and are seen by some experts as less appropriate for
counterinsurgency, which they say requires patience, cultural understanding and
a willingness to use innovative and counterintuitive approaches, such as
employing only the minimal amount of force necessary. In counterinsurgency
campaigns, Aylwin-Foster argues, "the quick solution is often the wrong
one."
He said he found that an intense pressure to conform and overcentralized
decision making slowed the Army's operations in Iraq, giving the enemy time to
understand and respond to U.S. moves. And the Army's can-do spirit, he wrote,
encouraged a "damaging optimism" that interfered with realistic assessments of
the situation in Iraq.
"Such an ethos is unhelpful if it discourages junior commanders from
reporting unwelcome news up the chain of command," Aylwin-Foster says. A
pervasive sense of righteousness or moral outrage, he adds, further distorted
military judgments, especially in the handling of fighting in Fallujah.
Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, who runs much of the Army's educational
establishment, and also oversees Military Review, said he does not agree with
many of Aylwin-Foster's assertions. But Petraeus, who commanded Aylwin-Foster in
Iraq, said "he is a very good officer, and therefore his viewpoint has some
importance, as we do not think it is his alone."
Reflecting that ambivalence, the article was published with two disclaimers
-- one in the form of an introduction, the other as a footnote -- which make
clear that the views expressed do not reflect those of the British government,
the British military, the U.S. Army, its Combined Arms Center or Military
Review.
"I think he's an insufferable British snob," said Col. Kevin Benson,
commander of the Army's elite School of Advanced Military Studies, referring to
Aylwin-Foster. Benson said he plans a rebuttal.
"I think he's overstating the case," said another military intellectual here,
retired Col. Gregory Fontenot, who led U.S. forces into Bosnia in 1995. But he
added, "whether he's right or wrong, what's important is that the Army
understands it has a problem, which it does."
Aylwin-Foster, now on assignment in Bosnia, said he has heard favorable early
reaction to the article. "The Brits approve, those that have read it," he said
by e-mail yesterday.
Darley, the review's editor, is holding his grou
