-Caveat Lector- <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/"> </A> -Cui Bono?- from: http://www.aci.net/kalliste/ Click Here: <A HREF="http://www.aci.net/kalliste/">The Home Page of J. Orlin Grabbe</A> ----- Cocaine Market Muddle in the Colombian Jungle More drug war stupidity. IT IS not Vietnam, nor will it become so. But once again the United States is preparing to commit lots of cash, military hardware and advisers to a battle in a foreign jungle. This one is in southern Colombia, where an embattled president, Andres Pastrana, faces daunting problems. These include left-wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries. Political violence caused almost 300,000 Colombians to flee their homes last year; the better-off have been terrorised by kidnapping and extortion. The country is also home to the world’s biggest illegal drugs industry: it accounts for about 80% of the cocaine and some of the heroin imported by the United States, and has displaced Peru as the world’s main source of coca, the raw material for cocaine. This is the main front in the developed world’s war against the supply of drugs. And, to make matters worse, Colombia’s economy is reeling from its worst slump since the 1930s. On taking office in 1998, Mr Pastrana boldly launched peace talks with the FARC, the largest guerrilla group. But they have moved slowly. The war continues, amid widespread scepticism about the FARC’s intentions. At the same time, Mr Pastrana has turned to the United States for help. Bill Clinton is sympathetic, and now Congress is debating an administration request for more aid, which would take total American assistance to Colombia to $1.6 billion over the next two years. Mr Pastrana leads a democracy, albeit an imperfect one, and deserves international support. But the proposed aid is ambiguous in purpose, and its results may disappoint. The largest chunk is to set up and train three special anti-drugs battalions, equipped with 63 helicopters, including 30 fast, modern Blackhawks. Their mission is to “push into the coca-growing regions of southern Colombia”, in mountainous jungles now controlled by the FARC. Once secured, the police would go in to wipe out the coca plantations. The supply-siders’ plan Its backers present this as a plan to staunch the flow of drugs to the United States. But the motivation seems to be a fear that the FARC’s insurgency is now out of control, and is a threat to other countries in the region. In practice, the new battalions’ target will be the FARC. Since the FARC gets lots of money (perhaps as much as $500m a year) from taxing and protecting the drugs trade, this new southern push would not only help to prosecute the international war on drugs but also weaken the guerrillas, persuading them to seek peace. That, at least, is the theory. Yet if the main aim were to support the pursuit of peace, the aid proposal might look very different. To achieve peace, Colombia needs stronger democratic institutions, capable of guaranteeing security and justice for its citizens (including demobilised guerrillas). And it needs radical reform of its armed forces. Despite Mr Pastrana’s efforts, they continue to suffer from two serious failings. First, they remain a largely reactive force, lacking mobility and relying too heavily on poorly trained conscripts. Second, many military commanders retain close links with the paramilitaries. The belief runs deep that paramilitary violence will hasten peace. In fact, it does the opposite. It is as unacceptable as the violence of the guerrillas. Yet the American aid proposal looks as if it will merely bolt three shiny new anti-drugs battalions on to an abusive and unreformed military force. That imbalance is familiar. After more than a decade of American aid, Colombia’s national police are capable of staging sophisticated operations against drugs gangs, involving months of surveillance and intricately co-ordinated raids. Yet they are incapable of acting as an efficient constabulary, providing the average Colombian with security against crime, kidnapping or assassination. Meanwhile, back in the United States That is not by chance. Aiding the Colombian police has been adopted as a political cause by a group of congressional Republicans who believe that one of the cheaper and more effective ways to deal with the United States’ addiction to drugs is to stop their production at source. That approach is also reflected in the annual “certification” process, which this week again saw the United States stand in unilateral judgment over its neighbours’ anti-drugs efforts. Belief in supply-side remedies has come to be shared by some officials in the Clinton administration. They argue that the sharp fall in coca production in Peru and Bolivia in recent years is proof that a combination of stepped-up repression and programmes to help former coca farmers can achieve the complete elimination of coca in those countries—and in Colombia (see article). It is a heady vision, but a flawed one. In fact, these policies have fuelled Colombia’s conflict. The increase in Colombian coca (and thus in the FARC’s income) is a direct consequence of its reduction elsewhere. That is just the latest example of the “balloon” effect: squeeze the drugs industry at one point, and it reappears somewhere else. Already drugs-trafficking gangs, with all their corruption and violence, have spread across Latin America from Mexico to Brazil. The reason is elementary. Demand calls forth supply. Prohibition and repression merely increase the price; and, where cocaine is concerned, they have failed to increase it enough to have any significant effect in reducing consumption. After more than a decade of the United States’ war against cocaine at the source, the price of the drug in the United States remains stable, the supply abundant. The number of hard-core takers remains stable, too, although casual consumption has been declining since the mid-1980s. Latin Americans pay a high price for the drugs trade: it corrupts their societies from top to bottom. If this price is ever to be reduced, Americans will have to look not just at the supply but also at the demand for drugs. That means they will have to consider alternative policies at home, even decriminalisation. This is a war that will not be won with helicopters. The Economist, March 4-10, 2000 ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, All My Relations. Omnia Bona Bonis, Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soap-boxing! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'—with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright frauds—is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRL gives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. 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